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This thesis is a study of the paradigmatic and epistemological elements 
within one feminist christian theological framework. Specifically, its focus is 
on North American feminist christian theology as written by white, highly 
educated and economically privileged women in the latter third of the 
twentieth century. That such a theological paradigm does exist seems to be 
accepted as a given within the academic discipline of christian theology. 
However, as yet a detailed examination of the metaphysical assumptions, 
accompanying value judgements, metaphors and models that comprise this 
paradigm has not been undertaken. Nor has an analysis of the 
epistemological presuppositions inherent · within this theoretical framework 
been made. Accordingly, in this thesis I take the work of Rosemary Radford 
Ruether, Carter Heyward, and Sallie McFague as representative of this 
feminist christian theological paradigm, and make explicit their 
metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. 
As the title of this thesis implies, their metaphysical and epistemological 
assumptions are strikingly different from those usually associated with 
Western christian theology. Rather than posit a transcendent God Above 
from whom all knowledge comes, most often in the form of the revelation by 
God to a single individual of an eternal, unchanging truth, these feminist 
christian theologians assert that neither god nor truth can ever be entirely 
transcendent or unchanging. This theological and epistemological shift is 
integrally related to their metaphysical presuppositions concerning the 
underlying nature of reality. Ruether, Heyward, and McFague all affirm that 
change best characterises both the internal nature of all entities and the nature 
of the interdependent relations in which all entities are involved. On the 
basis of their assumptions of the thoroughly relational ( albeit in a deeply 
ambiguous sense) and changing nature of all that is, neither Ruether nor 
Heyward nor McFague can affirm an immutable god or an immutable truth. 
What they do assume and affirm is a rather more complicated, communal 
and ongoing process in which knowledges are made and made again 
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In the beginning, when I first encountered christian theology as an 
academic subject, I had no idea that feminist christian theology existed. It 
was 1983, and I was a fresh-faced student at Birmingham-Southern 
College (a United Methodist institution) in Birmingham, Alabama. I had 
lived in Mobile, Alabama, since 1977, and, as I had been born in 
Montgomery in 1965, I regarded the years my family had not lived in the 
state as something of an aberration. Alabama, while not the whole world, 
was definitely the centre of the universe. It was a slow, orderly universe, 
with a distant and distractedly aloof (in that reserved, Episcopalian way) 
God Above; it was made for and meant to be used by "us"; and it was a 
universe sometimes threatened (but never seriously) by "those sorts of 
people", those who, for some unfathomable and obviously sinful reason, 
were too uppity, or vocally discontent with their God-given place in the 
scheme of things. I was never taught these things explicitly, nonetheless, 
these facts were in the very air I breathed, so learn them I did. For the 
next year or two nothing I would be taught at Birmingham-Southern 
College would threaten this understanding of the universe. And then 
my world turned upside-down and inside-out, simultaneously. The 
following thesis is, in part at least, my attempt to explain to myself, fifte_en 
years and two continents later, what happened.1 
1 I was to move from Durham, North Carolina, to Canberra, Australia, in November of 1992, and to 
Budapest, Hungary, in January of 1999. The body of this thesis was written in Canberra, revised in 
Budapest, and introduced and concluded, during a rather focused two weeks, in Ann Arbor and Novi, 
Michigan. 
What happened was a love affair - a tumultuous, charged and painful 
love affair with feminist christian theology, of the sort written by white, 
highly educated and economically privileged women in North America. 2 
In a matter of days, it seems in retrospect, I went from being a dutiful (if a 
tad brash) daughter of traditional christian theology to a mad woman 
given to making incomprehensible utterances in theology classes. The 
problem was that I had been a very good daughter, with a surprisingly 
clear if mostly intuitive understanding of the sons' systematic theologies 
and, especially, their most fundamental assumptions, those without 
which their theologies made no sense. When at last I was introduced to 
feminist christian theology (in Dr. Earl Gossett's seminar on 
contemporary christian thought, in the fall of 1985), I simply .ugot" the fact 
that here was a whole new set of assumptions about the world, humanity, 
and god - assumptions I had never before dreamt of. And they all made 
more sense to me than any I had learned before. So I purchased all the 
feminist theology texts I could find at that time and read them again and 
again and again, until I learned how to speak this new language. That's 
when I began to make incomprehensible utterances in class. 
Incomprehensible? Yes. For while I understood what I was trying to say, 
and Dr. Gossett (to his great credit) understood that I was saying 
something that might, in the right circumstances, be intelligible, no one 
else in the classroom did; suddenly I was speaking, it seemed to my peers, 
in a foreign language about a foreign world. It was, to put it mildly, a 
difficult time, but oh I had lovers. I had texts by Ruether, Daly, Collins, 
Morton, Heyward, Harrison, McFague, Plaskow, Christ, Russell, 
Schussler-Fiorenza, Trible; I was never alone, and I was busy. 
To put it in the language that will appear in this thesis, I was wrestling a 
blessing from a new worldview, one conveyed and revealed to me 1n a 
new language, a language composed of transformed metaphors and 
2 Importantly, I believe strongly that it is only after I have a thorough understanding of my own 
specific theological heritage that I can begin to compare this body of thought with, for example, 
womanist theology or mujerista theology or feminist christian theology being written in England or 
Germany or Australia. 
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models, a language spoken by a small (but rapidly growing) epistemic 
community. I was diving into a new feminist christian theological 
paradigm, and, in my excitement, I took it all for granted. I took it for 
granted that this was a body of knowledge that counted as knowledge, and 
it was knowledge I hungered for. I, probably arrogantly and certainly 
unthinkingly, took for granted my right to enter the epistemic 
community engaged in the making of this knowledge. 
To be fair, that arrogance was born not only out of my whiteness and my 
class privilege, but also the fact that I was living as a young "out" lesbian 
in Birmingham, Alabama. In the mid-eighties baby dykes there needed a 
bit of arrogance just to get by. As for the thoughtlessness, it too was no 
doubt a product of whiteness and privilege, partly. But in part I was 
simply responding to my calling. It felt, and continues to feel, as though I 
have no choice in the matter. Feminist christian theology is my life's 
passion, my vocation and my joy; it is the sort of knowledge I still hunger 
for, still desire to co-create with others. Accordingly, when the time came 
to decide what to write a thesis about, the decision was easy - feminist 
christian theology and feminist epistemology: the knowledge, both sacred 
and secular (and always both at once), that has so changed my life. 
Chapter one consists of an explanation of what I take to be the 
fundamental components of a theological paradigm. Given that within 
the academic discipline of christian theology the notion of theological 
paradigms in general and of the existence of several feminist christian 
theological paradigms in particular is commonplace, I was struck by the 
fact that no one had attempted to detail the ways in which this particular 
feminist christian theological paradigm differed from the classical 
christian theological paradigm. What I discovered was that it is actually 
much more difficult to describe a paradigm than I had thought. As 
Thomas Kuhn noted, entering a new paradigm is akin to going through a 
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conversion experience; 3 words tend to fail one, although the experience 
itself is real indeed. This being the case, or at least having been my 
experience, I set out to understand why, when one is looking into ( or 
speaking out of) a new paradigm, words fail in the ways they do. I 
conclude that it is because the metaphors and models of a new paradigm 
are so tied to the basic metaphysical assumptions (or worldview) and 
value judgements of the new paradigm that without a grasp of the whole 
the individual terms are, by themselves, practically meaningless - in that 
their possible meanings are too many. 
In chapter one I introduce as well the notions of "epistemic 
communities" and "rhetorical spaces", drawing on the work of feminist 
philosopher Lorraine Code in particular. The point I try to make is that a 
theoretical paradigm is created and sustained not by isolated individuals 
but by an epistemic community: a group of people who, while they never 
agree on everything, at least understand each other well enough to 
engage in what I term meaningful disagreement with one another. 
Further, their words only make sense when they are spoken and heard 
within the rhetorical space specific to their epistemic community. One of 
the epistemological issues that follows from this is that access to such 
epistemic communities and rhetorical spaces is limited, limited in power-
riddled, non-innocent ways. 
In chapter two I back up, all the way to the Enlightenment, seeking to 
trace what I consider to be some of the most important philosophical and 
theological influences on the formation of one feminist christian 
theological paradigm. The point I try to make in this chapter is two-fold. 
On the one hand, feminist christian theology written by white, 
educationally and economically privileged North American women 1n 
the latter third of the twentieth century is an outgrowth (one among 
others) of post-Enlightenment christian theology, thoroughly rooted in 
3 Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, second ed. , The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1970, p. 151. "The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion 
experience that cannot be forced." 
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what has gone before. On the other hand, it is also a unique combination 
of ideas and neither the epistemic community to utter them nor the 
rhetorical space in which they could be uttered existed before the mid-
1960s (in the US). Making no claim to being a historian, I need to stress 
that the themes I chose to focus on in this chapter are those that I hear 
echoed in early and current feminist christian theological texts. Other 
ears would have listened for and no doubt heard themes I did not. In 
addition, I deliberately chose not to discuss Marxism as a philosophical 
influence on feminist christian theology because of all such philosophical 
influences it is arguably the most self-evident and most often explicitly 
named as such by feminist christian theologians.4 I was more interested 
in tracing those influences that are seldom named, often simply taken for 
granted. 
Having thus set the stage, in chapter three I engage with feminist 
christian theology proper, giving a close reading of three early and 
influential feminist christian theological essays. Specifically, I seek to 
identify the underlying metaphysical assumptions (or worldview) 
presupposed within these texts, their accompanying value judgements, 
and the metaphors and models used to convey these assumptions. It is 
my hypothesis that these essays by Valerie Saiving, Rosemary Radford 
Ruether, and Mary Daly do not serve as a mere corrective to some of the 
dominant tradition's more blatant excesses or lacks as regards its 
understanding of "women", but are instead written from an 
understanding of "a different heaven and earth", to borrow a phrase from 
Sheila Collins.5 I seek to make this new worldview explicit in order to 
compare these early fundamental assumptions and value judgements 
concerning the nature of things with (in chapters six, seven, and eight) 
the fundamental assumptions running throughout the work of 
Rosemary Ruether, Carter Heyward, and Sallie McFague. Again, my 
4 This will be evident especially in chapters six and seven. 
5 A Different Heaven and Earth is the title of Sheila Collins ' 1974 assessment of the shape and 
contours of feminist theology in the United States to that date. Collins , Sheila D., A Different 
Heaven-and Earth, Judson Press, Valley Forge, PA, 1974. 
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hypothesis is that, if feminist christian theology as written in North 
America by certain white, educationally and economically privileged 
women is indeed a theological paradigm, then the fundamental 
assumptions of this paradigm must be fairly stable and substantially 
unchanging, although open to different emphases. They should be as 
readily identifiable in the first instances of this feminist christian theology 
as they are in the most recent. 
In chapter four I exchange the language of paradigms for that of feminist 
epistemology. I do so because paradigmatic assumptions concerning 
humanity and the world (or creation) are always interwoven with 
epistemological assumptions about humans as knowers (or epistemic 
agents) and the world as a place it is important to know. Needing a 
language with which to discuss the epistemological assumptions inherent 
within the feminist christian theological paradigm I am examining, I turn 
to feminist epistemology as written primarily by white, educationally and 
economically privileged women in North America for assistance. 
Specifically, in this chapter I provide a reading of feminist standpoint 
theory as presented by Nancy Hartsock, Donna Haraway, and Sandra 
Harding. 
In chapter five I delve further into several epistemological themes which 
I read as being present but not fully elaborated in feminist standpoint 
theory /ies. These include the notion of an epistemic ( or epistemological) 
community as the creator of knowledge, rather than an understanding of 
individuals as knowledge makers; the notion of different epistemic 
communities as being granted more or less "cognitive authority" 
(Kathryn Pyne Addelson's phrase) by the wider society of which they are a 
part; and the notion of knowledge as being continually made and remade 
within specific times and contexts, or, knowledge as inescapably relative 
to different communities of knowledge makers. I include as well within 
this chapter a reading of Lorraine Code's discussion of the relationship 
between knowledge and power. 
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Importantly, I want to acknowledge that my journey into the land of 
feminist epistemology was, is, and cannot help but be coloured by the 
theological lenses set so firmly upon my nose. In other words, my 
readings of feminist epistemological texts are readings from the "outside", 
and I need to own the fact that my interpretations lack the subtlety of 
touch and the extensive familiarity with the background to this material 
that a feminist philosopher would bring to the same texts. For this I 
apologise to those philosophers whose work I am indebted to; I learned 
much from them, and could not have written this thesis without the 
tools they provided. Nonetheless I cannot shake the feeling that in places 
I might have, unwittingly, used a wrench as a hammer - hence the 
apology. 
With this groundwork in place, in chapters six, seven, and eight I finally 
put all the pieces together as I engage in close readings of the feminist 
christian theology of Rosemary Radford Ruether, Carter Heyward, and 
Sallie McFague, respectively. I seek to identify their paradigmatic 
assumptions concerning humanity, creation, and god; the influences of 
post-Enlightenment theology and philosophy on their thought; and their 
accompanying epistemological presuppositions. In so doing I argue that, 
collectively, their work is representative of one particular feminist 
christian theological paradigm; it is a body of knowledge in its own right, 
one that is (as all bodies of knowledge are) open to serious 
misinterpretation if the underlying assumptions that support the 
knowledge claims made by these feminist christian theologians are not 
acknowledged and taken seriously. (Let me state from the outset, 
however, that while I believe serious misinterpretation is always a 
possibility, I do not affirm the possibility of there ever being one single 
correct interpretation of any theologian's work or any theological 
paradigm.) 
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Because Ruether, Heyward, and McFague are not the only three white, 
highly educated and economically privileged North American feminist 
christian theologians whose work I could have examined, I need to 
explain why I chose their work in particular. In part my reasons were 
purely pragmatic. Rosemary Ruether, a historical theologian, is the most 
widely published (and prolific) feminist christian theologian in the world. 
Her influence on the development of feminist christian theology is 
immense, and I know of no feminist christian theologian who does not 
draw upon, at a minimum, her early work. Carter Heyward's writings are 
also highly influential, perhaps especially so to those who, like myself, 
have a background in systematic theology. I chose to examine her work 
in the context of this thesis precisely because it is, as I read it, the most 
"creatively theological" of all the feminist christian theology with which I 
am acquainted. While she is perhaps better known for being the first 
feminist christian theologian to discuss openly her lesbian life-choice as 
an integral part of her theology, I am more concerned (within the context 
of this thesis) with the fact that, as a constructive, systematic feminist 
christian theologian, Heyward is changing the way theology can be done. 
Lastly, I chose to examine Sallie McFague's work on metaphorical 
theology because she has devoted more attention to the world-shaping 
power of language than any other feminist christian theologian. As 
chapter eight will make clear, her attention to the metaphysical and 
epistemological implications of theological words is, in my opinion, 
unparalleled amongst feminist christian theologians. 
Additionally, the fact that Ruether writes as a Roman Catholic, Heyward 
as an Episcopalian, and McFague as a (never specifically identified) 
Protestant theologian means that, collectively, their work is broadly 
representative of North American, white feminist christian thought per 
se - of the non-Evangelical sort. Finally, I must admit that I chose to 
examine their work in part because each one of these theologians has had 
a formative (more accurately, formidable) influence on my own 
theological education. In studying their work in such detail, I am 
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researching my own theological heritage in order to have a better 
understanding of the theological ground I stand upon, always with 
others. This notion of a theological ground brings me to chapter nine, the 
conclusion of this thesis. 
In chapter nine I reflect upon the possibilities that such a theological 
ground (or framework or paradigm) provide to those of us who have the 
privilege of doing this sort of feminist christian theology. In essence, I 
suggest that rather than assuming that everything that can be said about 
this sort of theology has been said (and therefore it is time to move on), it 
is only now that we can begin to do the meticulous, detailed work of re-
writing, re-imagining every single theological concept we can think of. 
We can do this work now because, finally, we need not concern ourselves 
with defining, explicitly, every general theological assumption we make. 
In addition, I reflect upon a troubling (to me) tendency I have perceived 
recently amongst some white, highly educated and economically 
privileged feminist christian theologians - a tendency to interpret others' 
works without regard to the theoretical assumptions inherent within the 
paradigmatic context in which those works were written. Such a 
tendency, I suggest, points to the usefulness if not the necessity of the sort 
of research project I undertake in this thesis. 
It points as well to the need to be mindful of the language-worlds in 
which we speak and write. Perhaps because it has been years since I was 
able to take for granted or even to name the centre of my universe, I have 
grown increasingly attuned to the many, varied universes our words 
convey. I have come to the realisation that there will always be just a 
trace of a southern drawl in my words, a drawl accompanied by that 
curious, unshakeable southern certainty that stories which seem to be 
going nowhere are the ones which will surprise you most in the end. 
There will be traces as well of blunt Australian directness, and instances 
of extreme Australian understatement. And I am learning even now the 
language-world of English as a second ( or third or fourth) language, the 
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English of Central and Eastern Europe. It is both bewilderingly dense and 
practical; modifiers appear in the most unlikely places; and it is all too 
often bereft of just the right word, just the right expression. For whatever 
reasons, I seem to enjoy the challenge of translating (when possible, and 
it's not, always) the feminist christian theology I know into the languages 
of the different worlds in which I somehow find myself. It may be 
helpful to read this thesis, then, as a translation, as my attempt to 
translate feminist christian theology as written by certain white, highly 
educated and economically privileged women in North America into a 
language intelligible to those who are and those who are not members of 
the epistemic community that makes this knowledge. A translation into 
a language a student at Birmingham-Southern College might be able to 
use to make herself better understood by others, wherever and with 
whomever she unexpectedly finds herself. It is not exactly trendy or 
cutting-edge stuff, but it is my hope that it is solid. It is also my hope that, 
from now on, I will be able to write feminist christian theology, instead of 




What is a Disciplinary Paradigm? 
Does the feminist christian theology written in the United States of 
America in the last third of the twentieth century by white, economically 
and educationally privileged women comprise a unique and identifiable 
body of knowledge? If it does, if, that is, such a specifically located and 
limited use of the term "feminist christian theology" is at all meaningful, 
then how is it possible to identify this body of knowledge? What are its 
distinguishing characteristics? What are the theoretical components of 
this body of knowledge? These are the questions I seek to answer in this 
thesis. They are epistemological questions broadly conceived which will 
lead eventually to a point by point examination of the epistemological 
framework around which one feminist christian theological paradigm is 
constructed. 
But I have just exchanged the phrase ''body of knowledge" for the term 
"paradigm", and must now explain my reasons for this shift in language. 
In part my reasons are pragmatic; I have chosen to use the term and 
explore the concept of a paradigm simply because this term is a 
theological commonplace. With regard to feminist christian theology 
written by white, educationally and economically privileged women in 
the United States, since the early 1970s most of these women have either 
implicitly or explicitly accepted that they are working both within and 
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from a new theological paradigm.1 However, puzzlingly (given the 
number of times the fact of this paradigm is mentioned or assumed), the 
precise nature of this paradigm has remained tacit, understood but 
unspoken. It has been taken for granted that both the nature of a 
disciplinary paradigm in general and of this new paradigm in particular 
are somehow self-evident. While Thomas Kuhn's work on scientific 
paradigms has been cited and quoted in brief, a more comprehensive 
examination of the nature of disciplinary paradigms in connection with a 
feminist christian theological paradigm has not yet occurred.2 It is my 
contention that until the structure and components of this feminist 
christian theological paradigm are explicitly identified, it will be 
impossible to perceive, let alone to examine, the epistemological 
framework of this new theological paradigm. Additionally, it will be 
most difficult for anyone not working from within this paradigm to 
perceive it as a paradigm in its own right, or as a body of knowledge 
unique within the overarching academic discipline of christian theology. 
It is also my contention, although I will not attempt to make the case 
here, that within the discipline of christian theology there are a number 
of emerging christian theological paradigms (in the sense of conceptual 
frameworks), each of which is consistent within itself and each of which 
forms a whole-though-not-static worldview. To complicate matters 
further, I suggest that no one understands christian theology (or any other 
discipline) from outside an existing paradigm of some sort or another .3 
Unfortunately, to borrow a phrase from Wittgenstein, a disciplinary 
paradigm is "like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see 
1 The earliest use of the term "paradigm" ( with reference to feminist theology) that I have found is by 
Rita Gross, in her introduction to the 1977 book, Beyond Androcentrism. She wrote there, "This 
volume, which grows out of the 1975 meeting of the Women and Religion section of the American 
Academy of Religion, reflects the continuing paradigm shift that is occurring in the discipline of the 
Academic Study of Religion... . This paradigm shift is the scholarly and philosophic dimension of the 
feminist transformation of culture." Gross, Rita M., ed, Beyond Androcentrism: New Essays on 
Women and Religion, Scholars Press, Missoula, Montana, 1977, p. 1. 
2 See McFague, Sallie, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language, Fortress 
Press, Philadelphia, 1982, pp. 79-83, and Schussler Fiorenza, Elisabeth, In Memory of Her: A 
Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins, Crossroad, New York, 1986, pp. xxi-xxii. 
Both authors discuss Kuhn's understanding of a paradigm, McFague quite extensively, but neither 
elaborate on the specifically paradigmatic elements of feminist christian theology. 
3 See Midgley, Mary, Wisdom, Information and Wonder: What is Knowledge For?, Routledge, 
London and New York, 1989, p. 233. "[S]ome set of propositions ... must occupy this base position." 
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whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off."4 Therefore, 
before I investigate the nature of one particular feminist christian 
theological paradigm I need to make a case for my understanding of 
disciplinary paradigms in general. 
My understanding of the concept of a disciplinary paradigm has been 
informed by a reading of Thomas Kuhn's (1970) The Structure of a 
Scientific Revolution as well as by various feminist philosophers and 
epistemologists' thoughts on and critiques of the concept of a paradigm, 
in particular those of Lorraine Code, Mary Midgley, and Lynn Hankinson 
Nelson.5 While Kuhn's work has shaped my understanding of the 
concept of a paradigm, I am consciously picking and choosing from his 
work those aspects of his thought that I find most convincing and/ or 
useful to my own argument. I do not engage in a direct critique of his 
conception of a paradigm; instead I plunder his text for the treasures I find 
most valuable with regard to the nature of a theological, rather than 
scientific, paradigm. Regarding my own reformulation of the concept, I 
am most indebted to Lorraine Code: in part for her insistence on 
Wittgenstein's dictum, "knowledge is in the end based on 
acknowledgement", and in part for providing the theoretical notion she 
terms "rhetorical space" - a notion I will adapt ( and adjust slightly) in 
order to provide a ground for my conception of a disciplinary paradigm.6 
Accordingly, in this chapter I will firstly present a broad discussion of the 
concepts "disciplinary paradigm" and "rhetorical space". I will follow 
each broad overview with a more detailed analysis of each of the 
significant terms I introduce in the initial discussion. By the end of this 
chapter I will have established that inherent in any given disciplinary 
4 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, second ed., trans, G. E. M. Anscombe, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, p. 45e, #103. 
5 See Midgley, Wisdom, Information and Wonder, Nelson, Lynn Hankinson, Who Knows: From 
Quine to a Feminist Empiricism, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1990; and Code, Lorraine, 
What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, New York, 1991; and Code, Lorraine, Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations, 
Routledge, New York and London, 1995. 
6 Code, What Can She Know?, p. 215. See also Code, Rhetorical Spaces. 
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paradigm are epistemological presuppositions concerning, broadly, 
humans as knowers (or epistemic agents), the world to be known, and 
processes for acquiring knowledge. As, again, I am ultimately concerned 
with making explicit the epistemological elements inherent in one 
feminist christian theological paradigm, in the next chapters I will explore 
more fully certain influences upon the formation of this paradigm and 
then take up the notion of feminist epistemology, reviewing some of the 
recent developments in the area of feminist epistemology. At this point, 
though, the most pressing question is, what is a disciplinary paradigm? 
As I conceive it, the very concept of a disciplinary paradigm is itself a 
gestalt, a theoretical "whole" greater than the sum of its parts. Focusing 
on any one element of a disciplinary paradigm leads to a distorted view of 
the whole. To begin with the whole, therefore, I define a discipline as a 
body of shared knowledge structured by a conceptual framework of some 
sort or another.7 In simplest terms, a disciplinary paradigm is that shared 
conceptual framework. More specifically, it is a framework shaped by a 
set of metaphysical assumptions so taken for granted they are almost 
never questioned by the member-participants within a given disciplinary 
paradigm.8 It is on the basis of these shared metaphysical assumptions 
that member-participants in a specific discipline are able to discuss 
meaningfully their understandings of certain aspects of the world. 
Whether or not they reach complete agreement about any given aspect is 
irrelevant; what matters is that they share a particular focus on the world 
- about which they speak in "a common language". This "common 
language" is composed of a set of metaphors that are combined in various 
ways to form models that are in turn elaborations upon and refinements 
of specific aspects of that epistemic community's core metaphysical 
assumptions. Running throughout all the shared metaphors, models, 
7 I am assuming that all knowledge is mediated by a language of some sort; and I accept Elizabeth 
Potter's use of Wittgenstein's analysis of the impossibility of private language as the basis for my 
incessant use of the word "shared". See Elizabeth Potter, 'Gender and Epistemic Negotiation', in 
Feminist Epistemologies, eds, Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, Routledge, New York and London, 
1993, pp. 161-186. 
8 See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 7, 46, 184. 
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and core metaphysical assumptions is yet another shared variable: shared 
value judgements.9 
Thus far I have identified four components of a disciplinary paradigm: 1) 
a set of shared metaphysical assumptions, 2) shared metaphors, 3) shared 
models, and 4) shared value judgements. Additionally, I have introduced 
the notion of an epistemic community - by which I mean all those who 
work within a disciplinary paradigm and whose work sustains that 
discipline.1° Although I need to discuss these separately, each one of the 
first four components is integrally related to the other three, and none of 
them makes sense in the absence of a community of disciplinary 
practitioners: people working within the same discipline and 
communicating with each other through common metaphors and 
models. Let me stress that a disciplinary paradigm is not a recipe for 
complete agreement among all the members of a particular epistemic 
community, rather a disciplinary paradigm provides a blueprint for a 
depth of comprehension not possible when the metaphysical 
assumptions, common metaphors, models and basic value judgements 
are not shared. A disciplinary paradigm provides the basis for both 
meaningful agreement and meaningful disagreement within an 
epistemic community. 
As an example, imagine two ordained Roman Catholic theologians at the 
Vatican disagreeing al?out the importance of mass in a parish. Now 
imagine two particle physicists disagreeing about the importance of mass 
in an equation. In this example it is obvious that these conversations, 
while both about "mass", are about two completely different topics, topics 
comprehensible only when a .host of related assumptions about the 
nature of the world are tacitly acknowledged and accepted as framing the 
context of each discussion. As I define it, a disciplinary paradigm is a 
9 Ibid., pp. 182-185. In seeking to answer the question "what do its [a scientific community's] 
members share that accounts for the relative fullness of their professional communication and the 
relative unanimity of their professional judgments?" Kuhn names "metaphysical parts of paradigms", 
as well as "models", "metaphors", and "values". · 
IO See Midgley, Wisdom, Information and Wonder, p. 71. 
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conceptual framework inclusive of all those accepted .assumptions as well 
as the discipline-specific metaphors and models that enable meaningful 
discussion to happen at all. But, and this may be the most important but I 
will write in this thesis, meaningful discussion can only take place in 
those locations where the "cognitive authority" of each participant zs 
acknowledged by the other participants in the discussion.I l 
To put it another way, communication between member-participants of 
an epistemic community within a disciplinary paradigm is possible 
because each is speaking within the same rhetorical space. As Lorraine 
Code introduces the term, a rhetorical space is a "fictive but not fanciful 
or fixed location, whose (tacit, rarely spoken) territorial imperatives 
structure and limit the kinds of utterances that can be voiced within [it] 
with a reasonable expectation of uptake and 'choral support': an 
expectation of being heard, understood, taken seriously" .12 As I interpret 
this quote, the /✓rarely spoken territorial imperatives" comprising the 
boundaries of each rhetorical space are inclusive not only of all the 
components of an epistemic community's disciplinary paradigm, but also 
of the communal, power-riddled process of granting and withholding 
epistemic credibility to individual speakers. In her work, Code's 
emphasis is on "explorations of rhetorical spaces where 
acknowledgement is readily achieved, or where it is thwarted; where 
cognitive authority is readily granted, or denied and silenced" .13 Her 
primary concern is not with making explicit the different components of 
specific conceptual frameworks; rather, in Rhetorical Spaces she 
demonstrates why it is the case that in a given context a particular 
person's epistemic agency depends at least as much on the state of that 
person's communally-determined cognitive authority as it does on that 
person's grasp of any given conceptual framework. In positing the 
11 The expression "cognitive authority" is Kathryn Pyne Addelson's; see Kathryn Pyne Addelson, 
'Knower/Doers and Their Moral Problems', in Feminist Epistemologies, eds, Linda Alcoff and 
Elizabeth Potter, Routledge, New York and London, 1993, pp. 265-294. 
12 Code, Rhetorical Spaces, pp. ix-x. She borrows the phrase "choral support" from Patricinio 
Schweikart. 
13 lb"d . I ., pp. X-Xl. 
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concept of a rhetorical space as necessarily co-existent with a disciplinary 
paradigm, I am trying to move away from a reading of a disciplinary 
paradigm as a benign or innocent set of abstractions, able to be embraced 
by any individual at will. Instead, I deliberately want to ground my 
explication of the components of a disciplinary paradigm on a usually 
unacknowledged, yet critically important, foundation: the social, political 
and moral disposition of the epistemic community sustaining the 
disciplinary paradigm. 
On the one hand, deeply ingrained stereotypes and prejudices, when 
shared (consciously or not) by a majority or a powerful minority of an 
epistemic community, directly influence who is allowed to speak and 
who can expect to be heard within a disciplinary paradigm.14 Consider 
the following: if I, as a feminist lesbian theologian, tried to join in the 
conversation about mass with a group of physicists, my words would not 
be acknowledged, n_ot because feminist lesbians per se cannot be 
physicists, but because I personally do not know the language, the 
metaphors and models of particle physics. If, however, I tried to join in a 
conversation at the Vatican about mass, my words would go unheard not 
because I do not know the metaphors, models and metaphysical 
assumptions associated with parish mass, but because I am a feminist 
lesbian. Among the "territorial imperatives" guarding the Vatican are 
quite a few that explicitly exclude feminists and lesbians from that 
rhetorical space. As Kathryn Addelson succinctly puts it, "who makes 
knowledge makes a difference. Making knowledge is a political act."15 
Only those who are privileged to be communally acknowledged epistemic 
agents get to play in the paradigm, or, to have their voices heard in that 
14 See Code, What Can She Know, especially pp. 188-203. Code compares the effect of stereotypes 
on peoples' lives with the "entrenched institutional and disciplinary power of a paradigm" - asserting 
that the power of a paradigm "can confer legitimacy on [an] aspiring scientific endeavor or relegate it 
to the limbo of unacceptability" (p. 194). Likewise, stereotypes grant and deny legitimacy to whole 
categories of individuals. My contention is that the stereotypes unquestioningly held by a number of 
participants in any epistemic community are able to remain unquestioned in part precisely because the 
other components of their disciplinary paradigm support the stereotypic assumptions. In other words, 
it is a mutually reinforcing circle. Embedded in disciplinary paradigms are the assumptions that confer 
legitimacy to stereotypes. When stereotypes are challenged and dismantled, so too are disciplinary 
paradigms transformed. 
15 Addelson, 'Knower/Doers and their Moral Problems', p. 267, (italics original). 
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paradigm's rhetorical space.16 On the other hand, the structures that 
enable knowledge to be made, disciplinary paradigms, are not the 
individual creations of solitary eccentrics, nor do they exist in a cultural 
vacuum. A change in the cultural zeitgeist affects the attitudes and 
beliefs of the member-participants of the epistemic communities within 
that culture. Broad social movements like, in the United States, the 
movements for abolition and women's suffrage, the civil rights 
movement, the women's liberation movement, and the movement for 
gay and lesbian rights, can, over time, influence and transform the 
assumptions of a society about entire categories of humanity. That is, 
views formerly held by a minority can come to be held by a majority, 
although of course dissenting voices will remain. When such a broad 
shift in thought or value happens, however, no epistemic community 
within that society can 
. . 
remain 1mm une from the effects of this 
transformation. Either a particular discipline can resist such a shift, 
reinstating within its rhetorical space its own attitudes and beliefs in 
various ways (witness the Vatican vis-a-vis women) 17 or the components 
of a disciplinary paradigm operative within that society can shift (witness 
the Vatican vis-a-vis slavery). 
A rhetorical 
community's 
space 1s thus integrally connected to 
disciplinary paradigm. The relevance 
an epistemic 
accorded an 
epistemic community by the wider society seems to depend to a large 
extent on whether or not that community is able, over time, to express 
within its rhetorical space the insights, attitude changes, and mood 
swings felt by the wider society of which it is a part. And when 
expressions in a given rhetorical space are changed, so too are 
16 Thus in paying attention to the rhetorical space enveloping a disciplinary paradigm one finds 
answers to the following questions: who, in that space, is acknowledged to have cognitive authority, 
and who has the power and authority to do such acknowledging? 
17 See Rosemary Radford Ruether, 'Women's Difference and Equal Rights in the Church', in The 
Power of Naming: A Concilium Reader in Feminist Liberation Theology, ed, Elisabeth Schussler 
Fiorenza, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, 1996, pp. 210-211, for a discussion of the Roman 
Catholic Church's modern reversal of classical Christian anthropology. In the classical tradition 
"woman" was unequal to "man" as a creaturely being, but equal to "man" in the "sacramental order of 
salvation" (p. 211). From 1976, however, the Church has declared that, while "woman" is equal to 
"man" as a creaturely being, "she" is unable to represent the image of Christ at the sacramental level. 
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adjustments made to the components of the associated disciplinary 
paradigm. In short, a · disciplinary paradigm is not an inviolable 
theoretical abstraction; rather, the usually implicit assumptions and value 
judgements which saturate each disciplinary paradigm are steadily being 
negotiated and either affirmed or, occasionally, transformed by the 
member-participants sustaining that disciplinary paradigm.18 
Nonetheless, it does seem to require a rather loud19 social movement to 
provoke, within an epistemic community, the explicit examination of the 
core assumptions shaping that community's disciplinary paradigm. It is 
time now to look more closely at the notion of core metaphysical 
assumptions. 
Metaphysical Assumptions 
"[N]othing at all can be strongly affirmed unless a whole 
mass of truisms is taken for granted as a background for it. ''20 
Metaphysical assumptions are assumptions about the nature of reality; 
broadly, they are assumptions about the world, about being itself, 
including human beings. In Mary Midgley's words, quoted above, they 
are the "mass of truisms taken for granted" by a given community. This 
mass of truisms is akin to what Thomas Kuhn describes as the "symbolic 
generalisations" and "shared commitments" according to which a 
scientific community structures its research.21 For instance, no 
astronomer today would engage in a research project to determine how 
quickly the rest of the universe revolves around the earth. It would be 
unthinkable, for a core assumption concerning the nature of reality, one 
18 See Potter, 'Gender and Epistemic Negotiation ', pp. 161-186, for a discussion of epistemic 
negotiation. 
19 I use the word "loud" rather than "large" deliberately, for the power (to influence change) of the 
views expressed in a rhetorical space depends more on decibel level than on the numbers of individuals 
speaking within that space. 
20 Midgley, Wisdom, Information and Wonder, p. 235. 
21 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 182-183. 
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shared by all astronomers acknowledged by their peers to be astronomers, 
is that the earth is not the centre of the universe. This is a critical 
characteristic of metaphysical assumptions; they determine the extent of 
what is, to a given epistemic community, thinkable. One of the reasons 
Kuhn characterises co-existent disciplinary paradigms as 
"incommensurable", or unable to be compared with each other, is that 
each disciplinary paradigm is founded on a slightly or very different set of 
core metaphysical assumptions. What is thinkable in one paradigm is 
often not conceivable or even imaginable in another.22 This is easily 
understood when one asks a question appropriate in one discipline to a 
member-participant of another discipline. For example, if I asked the 
particle physicists to show me where in their equation concerning mass 
they had factored in the on-going salvation of creation, they would 
quickly agree that I was out of my mind. In fact, I would be utterly outside 
the disciplinary paradigm I call "home" .23 Within their metaphysical 
frame of reference as physicists, physical reality cannot be subjected to 
salvation; it is a nonsensical thought. If, however, I asked a feminist 
ecological theologian to show me where in her theology she discusses the 
on-going salvation of creation, she could pick up a book and say, "chapter 
six". It is likely (not certain, but likely) that she would assume, moreover, 
that my question did not refer to a transcendent, other-worldly, god-
induced state of eternal unchanging perfection, but to the on-going, 
uphill effort on the part of humans in different times and places to enable 
the interdependent, co-existent flourishing of as many diverse aspects of 
creation as possible; it is highly unlikely that two conservative Southern 
Baptist theologians would make a similar assumption. Within their 
22 Ibid., p. 94. "Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing 
paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life." See also Midgley, 
Wisdom, Information and Wonder, p. 138. "For good or ill, metaphysics flows out of and acts 
directly upon the imagination, which shapes our lives. It is for instance often clear that conversion to 
or from a particular philosophical standpoint makes people view life itself quite differently.... This 
change is not just some chance psychological side-effect, or the result of naYve errors in the 
philosopher or the convert. It is conceptually necessary." 
23 I use the term "home" deliberately, not as poetic embellishment but as the most apt metaphor I 
could find to express an individual's relationship to a disciplinary paradigm. In a similar manner, 
using the term "circles" to refer to the "contexts, usable traditions, and sets of conceptual tools" needed 
by humans to communicate and live with each other, Mary Midgley suggests "we should regard the 
circles as our own homes, with gratitude and respect, not with the simple resentment which romantic 
individualism inculcates towards 'society'." Midgley, Wisdom, Information and Wonder, p. 237. 
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disciplinary paradigm is a set of metaphysical assumptions concerning the 
relative agency of humans and the ultimate agency of a transcendent god. 
The salvation of creation, in their frame of reference, is simply not 
conceived of in relative terms, whether relative to a particular time and 
place or relative to a particular group of human actors. Instead, only the 
ultimate metaphysical reality within their disciplinary paradigm, god, can 
effect the once and for all salvation of physical reality. 
This last example highlights the difficulty of writing about metaphysical 
assumptions in general; they are not free-floating abstractions, able to be 
plucked from thin air and examined at will. Instead, they are implicitly 
incorporated within the metaphors and models of a disciplinary 
paradigm. The dissonance between a disciplinary paradigm that includes 
a specific metaphysical assumption (and a model through which that 
assumption is expressed) and a disciplinary paradigm that does not 
include the same assumption is readily evident. No less real, though far 
more difficult to grasp, is the difference between two disciplinary 
paradigms both of which incorporate a metaphysical assumption about 
"the same" topic, and both of which use a specific model to convey that 
assumption. When the models appear to be the same, as in the phrase 
"the salvation of creation", the temptation is great to accept that the 
underlying metaphysical assumption is the same.24 This issue, while 
complicating my discussion of metaphysical assumptions and thus 
necessary to identify at this point, will have to wait until my discussion of 
metaphors and models for further elaboration. 
I wish now to draw a distinction in emphasis between two sorts of 
metaphysical assumptions: ontological and anthropological assumptions. 
Ontological assumptions I define as having to do primarily with the 
nature of physical reality. That is, I am using the phrase ontological 
assumptions to refer primarily (though not exclusively) to assumptions 
about non-human creation. In epistemological terms, ontological 
assumptions are assumptions about "the world to be known". Certainly 
24 Ibid., p. 72. 
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assumptions about the nature of human beings (or human essence) are 
assumptions about the nature of being as well, but for clarity's sake I am 
calling these sorts of assumptions, particularly when they incorporate 
social, ethical, political and cultural aspects, anthropological assumptions. 
I want to emphasise that anthropological assumptions are at least as 
much assumptions about the nature of human social/political existence 
as they are assumptions about a state of being or essence. Again 1n 
epistemological terms, anthropological assumptions correspond to 
assumptions about "knowers" or epistemic agents. In effect, both sorts of 
assumptions are sub-categories of metaphysical assumptions, sub-
categories with overlapping boundaries. Anthropological assumptions 
are a particularly important sub-category, however, for an examination of 
the anthropological assumptions of a given disciplinary paradigm reveals 
the usually tacit guidelines used by that epistemic community to measure 
the potential "cognitive worthiness" of any given individual. That is to 
say, the anthropological assumptions inherent in a given disciplinary 
paradigm comprise at least some of the "territorial imperatives" 
governing entrance into the epistemic community practising within that 
paradigm. How is this the case? 
Are men (in the non-generic sense of the term) inherently incapable of 
rational thought? Are white-skinned individuals fully human? Are 
heterosexuals genetically flawed? The answers to these sorts of questions 
constitute the anthropological assumptions of a disciplinary paradigm. If 
the answer to the first question is "yes", men's high testosterone levels do 
result in mental impairment, then it is highly unlikely that one will find 
many men participating in an epistemic community sustaining a 
disciplinary paradigm imbued . with rational thought, for the simple 
reason that "men" have been deemed incapable of academic pursuits. 
Likewise, if white-skinned individuals are, perhaps by virtue of their 
shocking melanin deficiency, not fully human, then it is hardly necessary 
to take their opinions of themselves into account when one is studying 
their habits. Their opinions and feelings do not count, for they are not 
fully human opinions or feelings . Are heterosexuals genetically flawed? 
22 
Why bother even to ask this question? It is quite silly.if not unthinkable-
after all, everyone knows that heterosexuality is perfectly normal. Indeed, 
no less a figure than James D. Watson, Nobel laureate and former head of 
the US based portion of the Human Genome Project, accepts this 
assumption without question. What he also accepts without question is 
the assumption that homosexual individuals are genetically flawed.25 
Absent from Watson's set of anthropological assumptions is the idea that 
sexuality is as social as it is personal, that it has a history, or better, 
histories contingent . to time and place, histories that change and whose 
changes can be traced by examining different societies' attitudes and 
responses to the issue (broadly conceived) of sexuality. Instead, he accepts 
the notion of sexuality as an inviolable, genetically-determined fact 
specific to each individual regardless of society, culture, era. Further, he 
assumes that homosexual lives have less inherent value than 
heterosexual lives. On the basis of these assumptions he has said publicly 
that if "the gene which determines sexuality" is identified, he would 
support a woman's right to abort a homosexual foetus.26 
My point, starkly made for emphasis, is that anthropological assumptions 
matter, that they are as moral/political as they are metaphysical. Not only 
do they separate the thinkable from the unthinkable, they also define and 
separate the "normal" from the "not normal" .27 Anthropological 
assumptions define and sanction the limits of scientific, social, political 
and moral acceptability in their time and place. Furthermore, at the same 
time they define who does and who does not have the potential to be an 
acknowledged epistemic agent in a community sustaining a disciplinary 
paradigm. Helen Longino, using the phrase "background assumptions" 
where I would write metaphysical assumptions, expresses the issue in 
this manner: 
25 See story in Canberra Times, Monday, February 17, 1997, 'Let mums abort gay babies: Nobel 
laureate'. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Evelyn Fox Keller, 'Nature, Nurture, and the Human Genome Project', in The Code of Codes: 
Scientific and Social Issues in the Human Genome Project, eds, Daniel J. Kevles and Leroy E. Hood, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992, p. 298. 
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Because background assumptions can be and most 
frequently are invisible to the members of the scientific 
community for which they are background and because un-
reflective acceptance of such assumptions can come to 
define what it is to be a member of such a community (thus 
making criticism impossible), effective criticism of 
background assumptions requires the presence and 
expression of alternative points of view.28 
I interpret her point to be that anthropological assumptions have 
profound (and profoundly power-riddled) epistemological ramifications -
but then, so too do ontological assumptions. 
Is physical reality composed entirely of discreet bits of matter, and is it able 
to be most fully known by the examination of each discreet bit in its most 
divisible form? Or is physical reality an interdependent, integrally related 
whole, with no single aspect able to be fully known in isolation from its 
relation to the whole? These are ontological questions baldly stated; yet 
any answer to them, even a simple yes or no response, requires at a 
m1n1mum an implicit affirmation of a corresponding set of 
anthropological assumptions and value-judgements. This is a critical 
point; every ontological assumption is also, simultaneously, a value-
judgement. There are no value-neutral metaphysical assumptions. The 
following questions highlight the interdependence of value-judgements 
with ontological and anthropological assumptions. 
If physical reality can be most fully known by an examination of each 
discreet bit of matter in its most divisible form, then does the whole of 
physical reality in itself have any inherent value? If the "whole" does 
have value, then do divided bits of matter have any inherent value? Is 
there more value to be gained by dividing a bit of physical reality into its 
smallest constituent parts than there is value in leaving it alone? Is the 
value of physical reality less than the value of human knowledge gained 
by dissecting and manipulating that reality? What is the relationship 
between human and non-human reality (or matter)? Is all non-human 
matter of value only insofar as it proves useful to humans? Which 
28 Helen E. Longino, 'Subjects, Power, and Knowledge', in Feminist Epistemologies, eds, Linda 
Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, Routledge, New York and London, 1993, pp. 111-112. 
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humans get to decide which non-human matter is useful/valuable and 
which is not? Are some humans of more value than other humans and 
therefore worthy of greater access to useful/valuable bits of non-human 
matter? If so, then which humans get to decide who is of more value and 
who is of less value? Are humans, as part of physical reality, simply the 
sum of their smallest, most divisible parts? Does knowing an 
individual's smallest parts (considered at this time by molecular 
geneticists to be the base pairs of proteins which make up their genetic 
sequence) constitute knowing fully that individual? Which is of more 
value, knowing a particular human's genetic sequence, or knowing that 
embodied human? 
These are some of the questions encompassed by a disciplinary 
paradigm's supporting metaphysical assumptions. And these 
metaphysical assumptions combine to create an epistemological 
framework roughly sketched; they provide the answers to the questions 
"who is able to know?", "what conceivably can be known about the 
world?", and "how are those acknowledged to be knowers able to know 
the world?" In short, every disciplinary paradigm is necessarily imbued 
throughout with a set of ontological and anthropological assumptions, or 
"a mass of background truisms", which combine to form the basis of a 
shared, value-laden worldview. Importantly, metaphysical assumptions 
and value judgements (unlike a discipline's metaphors and models) are 
never specific to a single disciplinary paradigm.29 This is because no 
disciplinary paradigm is entirely isolated from what Lynn Nelson, 
following Quine, calls 'a network of other going theories'. Instead, 
Nelson argues that each disciplinary paradigm occupies a position in 
relation to a network of other disciplines, and the metaphysical 
assumptions of an era permeate them all.30 Think, for instance, of 
theology and astronomy, two disciplines with only the most tenuous 
relation to each other: nonetheless, just as today no astronomer 
acknowledged to be an astronomer can examine the heavens from the 
29 See Midgley, Wisdom, Information, and Wonder, p. 69. 
30 See Nelson, Who Knows, pp. 82-83, 88-90. 
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perspective of a flat earth, neither can a theologian acknowledged to be a 
theologian posit heaven and hell to be located respectively above and 
below a flat earth. The "going theory" inherent in the ontological 
assumptions of both disciplines is that the earth is not flat and, by 
implication, that the universe is not a hierarchically tiered structure - a 
theory with profound astronomical and theological consequences. Not 
all metaphysical assumptions of each discipline are shared by all the other 
disciplines of an era, but no discipline will be acknowledged in the wider 
society/ culture to be a legitimate discipline if it does not share some of the 
assumptions of an era. 
Metaphors and Models 
"[O]ur words are surely [both] the open channels 
through which we communicate with others, 
[and] a wall that divides us from them."31 
As mentioned above, within a disciplinary paradigm the member-
participants communicate with each other by drawing from and 
contributing to a common pool of metaphors. More specifically, they 
share a set of metaphors, the meanings and uses of which are discipline-
specific; as mentioned earlier, the metaphor "mass" means one thing to a 
particle physicist and quite another to a Roman Catholic theologian,32 
while the metaphor "salvation" means one thing to a feminist christian 
theologian and something else entirely to a Southern Baptist theologian. 
Knowing how a metaphor is used and understood within a given 
disciplinary paradigm is not, however, a matter of memorising a simple 
definition. Instead, the metaphor can be understood only in the broader 
context of the metaphysical assumptions and accompanying value-
31 Midgley, Wisdom, Information and Wonder, p. 223. 
32 Soskice, Janet Martin, Metaphor and Religious Language, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985, p. 83. 
I am aware that, strictly speaking, the priests' "mass" and the physicists' "mass" is an example of 
homonymy, or an instance where two words are spelled exactly alike but have drastically different 
meanings. My point is simply that their meanings are entirely dependent upon the contexts in which 
they are used. 
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judgements inherent in that disciplinary paradigm, and in the narrower 
context of its relationship to the other discipline-specific metaphors with 
which it is layered to give shape to given disciplinary models. 
Language: A Brief Segue 
Thus far I have been using the terms "metaphor" and "model" as though 
their meanings are self-evident. Before I attempt to unpack or untangle 
my uses and intended meanings of these terms, however, I need to 
provide a ground for such uses/meanings by way of a brief explanation of 
the understanding of language that underpins this entire thesis. Debates 
concerning language rage on; the following is not a thorough survey of 
those debates, but a slender collection of scavenged insights chosen 
because they "fit" within the concept of a disciplinary paradigm I am 
proposing. Methodologically, this brief section is not a justification for 
my understanding of metaphors and models, but, following Nelson 
Goodman, an invitation.33 That is, I invite the reader to be persuaded by 
the following depiction of language on the basis of its suitability or 
fittingness in relation to the rest of my thesis. If it helps to make sense of 
my discussion of metaphors and models then that is justification enough. 
I begin by paraphrasing Paul Tillich: "all language points beyond itself 
while participating in that to which it points" .34 After inserting human 
language-users into Tillich's words, I understand his point to be as 
follows: Language is the swaddling cloth in which all of us are wrapped 
at birth. We are never nakedly, innocently "in" the world, for we 
33 See Gill, Jerry H., Wittgenstein and Metaphor, University Press of America, Washington, DC, 
1981, p. 53. Gill, discussing Nelson Goodman's epistemological criteria as presented in his book 
Languages and Art, writes the following: "The truths of philosophical accounts of 'how things are' in 
various worlds and in world-making, as well as the truth of metaphilosophical versions of the nature 
of such philosophical accounts, is dependent on a flexible and relative application of such non-
absolute criteria as coherence, consistency, and fittingness. When pressed to offer a justification of 
these criteria themselves, and of his own advocacy of them, Goodman replies that at such a bedrock 
level justification consists more of invitation and persuasion than of traditional argumentation" 
(underlining in original). 
34 Tillich, Paul, Dynamics of Faith, Harper and Colophon, New York, 1958, p. 45 (italics added). 
This quote was written in the context of a discussion of symbols as being distinct from signs, and 
religious language as being symbolic language. 
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experience the world through the warp of the cloth so given.35 Likewise 
never are we sent naked into the wilderness, nor are we able to choose so 
to go, for "beyond" is always already known as the weft of the cloth 
enfolding. Though we tear at our garments our lives are ever clothed. 
Humans are born into language at the same time as we are born into the 
world (the physical world inclusive of non-linguistic relations with other 
humans). Though distinct, the two are, in our experience, inseparable, 
each "mutually constitutive" of the other(s).36 That is, our words 
structure our world(s) just as much as our world(s) give shape to our 
words. For example, though physically I have never been in a desert, 
though deserts are beyond my physical, embodied experience, nonetheless 
if I were to go to a desert one day I could never experience a desert as it is, 
but only through the categories and concepts I know already through 
language - hot, dry, dust, thirst, sand, camels, sunsets, wind, etcetera. The 
linguistic world I was born into includes the structure and character of 
"desert", and my experiences of a desert would be mediated through -
both made possible and constrained by - the linguistic categories and 
concepts I would carry with me into any place that fit, more or less, my 
pre-conceived understanding of a desert. To refer again to Tillich, the 
"desert" words I know point beyond themselves, alluding to that which 
they are not. Simultaneously, they wrap themselves around that which 
they are not: smoothing, stacking, separating, joining, giving shape and 
texture and form. Humans live, move, and have our being in world(s) 
ceaselessly embraced by words. These words both enable or make possible 
and constrain human relations with the world. To quote Jerry Gill, 
At the primordial level words do not function as arbitrary 
and/ or optional tags for various, ready-made, and isolated 
aspects of reality. Rather, they serve, along with our bodies, 
35 I realise that new born babies and wolf-children experience the world without language, but new 
born babies and wolf-children are not acknowledged to have cognitive authority in any epistemic 
community whatsoever by virtue of the fact that they are unable to communicate what they have 
experienced. 
36 See Gill, Wittgenstein and Metaphor, p. 60. Gill is discussing Ricoeur's understanding of the 
relationship between speech and reality as being "mutually constitutive". 
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as our primary means of indwelling and participating in the 
world.37 
The context from which I lifted this quote is crucial. Gill is not saying that 
the world does not exist apart from language about the world. Instead, he 
is alluding to the fact that as soon as any aspect of reality is named it is 
also placed in a network of relationships with other aspects of reality -
and with the people doing the naming. It ceases to exist, if it ever did, as a 
purely independent entity. Instead, it becomes woven into the warp and 
weft of some epistemic community's linguistically-expressed 
understanding of the world. It is through that shared understanding of 
the whole world (including metaphysical assumptions and value-
judgements concerning the world) that members of that community are 
able to engage or participate with any particular aspect of reality. Yet 
naming the world is not simply a unidirectional process, tightly 
controlled by a linguistic community. There is a difference between a 
word and an object named by that word, a gap between the two, and 
different aspects of the world do not yield readily to the embrace of just 
any words upon them. For an utterance _(or communication) to be 
understandable, there has to be some sort of "fit" between the thing or 
thought as named and its relations with other aspects of the world 
entangled/posited in the naming process. It may be a "fit" made possible 
or plausible on the basis of empirical sense data (rocks are hard), or on the 
basis of a tightly held value-judgement ( everyone ought to want to get 
married to someone of the opposite sex), or on the basis of a set of 
spurious assumptions about the world ("women's uteruses wander 
around in their bodies when they take math courses'.'38), but there must 
be some sort of "fit" in order for a meaningful relationship between word 
and referent to be proposed and acknowledged by an epistemic 
community. 
37 Ibid., p. 69. 
38 Example from Sandra Harding, 'Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is "Strong 
Objectivity'", in Feminist Epistemologies, eds, Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, Routledge, New 
York and London, 1993, pp. 49-82. 
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Nonetheless, while there is a "fit", there is also a gap between word and 
referent. And here, in the gap between the word and thing, in amongst 
all the possible relations between the word, the referent, and the rest of 
the world, lies metaphor. In short, "all speech is metaphoric in that it 
affirms an identity between two material entities (word and thing) which 
are not metaphysically identical".39 At the most basic level, then, my use 
of the term "metaphor" is broadly inclusive of every word used by 
member-participants of an epistemic community, for "all speech 1s 
metaphoric". This is not, however, an adequate account of metaphor 1n 
the context of a disciplinary paradigm, for most speech is composed of 
what Paul Ricoeur terms "dead metaphors", or terms that have become 
absolutised and literalised. When this happens the gap between the word 
and its referent (the thing or idea it points toward) closes up, making only 
one relationship between word and thing possible. As I understand 
them, "living" metaphors are those words evocative of more than one 
possible relationship between word and referent. When conversation or 
discourse occurs with living metaphors the speaker/writer and 
hearer/ reader in that rhetorical space are necessarily participants in the 
relational matrix formed by those metaphors. Meaning is co-created as 
much by the hearer's interpretation of the relations between the words 
and that to which they refer as by the speaker's intended relations 
between the words, as by the influence of the world upon those words. In 
other words, living metaphors are profoundly relational terms. To 
understand them one must participate in the relational networks of 
which they are a part. 
But there are potential problems with an account of metaphor in which 
individual terms are defined as metaphors, for some argue that single 
words are, by themselves, not metaphoric. Or, more precisely, that 
"metaphor is only meaningful in the context of a complete sentence" .40 
This is the case because one word apart from any context, like the word 
39 Gill, Wittgenstein and Metaphor, p. 44. 
4o Donaldson, Mara E., Holy Places Are Dark Places: C. S. Lewis and Paul Ricoeur on Narrative 
Transformation, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1988, p. 38. 
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salvation, can only hint at a host of possible, and possibly incompatible, 
relations with other words. A metaphorical expression narrows the range 
of those possible relations by relating one word directly to another. In the 
process, both words combine to create a new network of meaning. That 
is, together, the terms in a metaphorical expression both refer to 
something, some specific thing that is knowable, and simultaneously 
create that thing. A metaphorical expression evokes into being a set of 
relations that had not previously existed. Janet Martin Soskice speaks 
toward what I call the "channelling" of potential meanings into one 
metaphoric utterance: "plurality at the level of significance (a plurality of 
associative networks) is compatible with a unity of referential intent" .41 
While I am less certain than Soskice that a metaphorical expression is 
used to refer to one thing only, I believe she has named a critical factor 
concerning metaphors: single metaphors are inherently plural, so plural 
that they can be meaningful only insofar as they are related to other 
metaphors. 
Within a given disciplinary paradigm, then, are certain metaphorical 
terms which collectively bear the weight of conveying meaning about the 
subject matter with which the discipline is concerned. Strictly speaking, 
these key metaphors are, by themselves, practically meaningless. Rather, 
alone, their possible meanings are too many; they hint at too many 
possible relationships in the gap between word and referent. For 
example, by itself the metaphor "salvation" points beyond itself in a host 
of directions simultaneously. Because it is a vibrant metaphor it does 
evoke a range of possible models: perhaps a sense of salvation coming 
down to earth from a god above, or a momentary sense of healing and 
wholeness, or a struggle to put right that which is wrong, warped and 
twisted beyond recognition. By itself the metaphor "salvation" is too rich 
in potential meaning to be an open channel through which 
communication can happen. Instead, in isolation it serves as a wall 
blocking communication between speaker and hearer. But metaphors are 
never used in isolation. They are combined with other metaphors to 
41 Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, p. 88. 
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form models. And models, to quote Sallie McFague, "give intelligibility 
to the unintelligible. Models, unlike discrete or passing metaphors, yield 
this intelligibility in a structural or comprehensive manner. "42 Where a 
metaphor "suggests a community of relations",43 a model posits a specific 
set of relations between different aspects of the world; this relational 
network can be loosely or tightly presented, as with, loosely, "justification 
by grace through faith alone" or, tightly, "E=MC2". Thus it is the relations 
between the metaphors that are paradigm-specific: the way the metaphors 
are layered into models to provide a framework of images (loosely or 
tightly) expressive of meaning. But again, these models must not 
contradict the metaphysical assumptions imbued throughout the 
disciplinary paradigm of which they are a part. Instead, they are the 
means through which those assumptions are made explicit. 
At this point, in order to clarify my understanding of metaphors and 
models it will be helpful to examine in more detail concrete examples of 
what I am trying to describe. Already I have used the metaphor 
"salvation" several times, and earlier used the expression "the salvation 
of creation" as an example of a model whose meaning is paradigm-
dependent. It should be evident by now that "salvation" is a metaphor 
replete with a host of possible meanings; in other words, because different 
hearers or readers attribute to this metaphor vastly different meanings 
the metaphor salvation is necessarily entangled in a diverse range of 
associations with other metaphors. Which associations it is allowed 
depends on which paradigm it is uttered and heard in. Individual 
metaphors such as "mass" or "wave" or "salvation" or "sin" are all 
examples of vibrant, living metaphors. The possibilities they call to mind 
are numerous, and it is their very plurality that makes them so vibrant. 
Models, while evocative of fewer possible meanings, provide a depth of 
complexity and focus unattainable through single metaphors. 
42 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 73. 
43 Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, p. 95. 
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The model "the salvation of creation" is, according to the schema I have 
sketched, more accurately defined as approaching the status of a model. I 
write "approaching" deliberately, for whether it is appropriately 
understood as a model or not depends, again, on the context in which it is 
uttered or written. Context is everything for, waiting in the wings, just 
off to the side of the (potential) model "the salvation of creation", are at 
least three other metaphors: "god", "creation" and "humanity". At a 
m1n1mum, humanity waits there as a part of creation, subject to being 
affected somehow by salvation. Possibly, depending on the paradigm-
context in which the phrase is uttered and heard, humanity is there to 
effect salvation, both the salvation of creation and of god. Likewise, god's 
role in this potential model is unclear. God could be hanging around to 
do the work of salvation, or god could be in as much need of salvation as 
the rest of creation. How much need creation has for salvation is yet 
another related issue. The answer to that question depends on the 
metaphysical assumptions supplied by specific disciplinary paradigms. 
Different paradigms supply different assumptions, different value 
judgements and, ultimately, provide the possibility of two "identical" 
models positing drastically different relations between their "shared" 
metaphors. Sallie McFague puts the point succinctly: 
Models are paradigm-dependent - there is no innocent eye; 
hence, the principal criterion for judging a model, even in 
science, is not whether it corresponds with "facts", but 
whether it fits in the schema of "facts" as understood by a 
given paradigm. 44 
To her words I would add that the principal criterion for interpreting a 
model is understanding how it fits in the paradigm of which it is a part. It 
is not possible to understand the relationship between the metaphors 
"salvation" and "creation" in the absence of an accompanying 
framework; the best one can do when faced with this expression out of 
context is to identify that there is some sort of relationship between the 
metaphors. Of course, a good model, in context, will not limit the 
44 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 138. 
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possible relations between its metaphors to just one, but will evoke and 
hold in tension several possible relations simultaneously. 
Unfortunately, just as metaphors can lose their metaphoricity over time, 
becoming literalised (or being understood to have only one fixed 
meaning), so too can models lose their flexibility, becoming rigid 
prescriptions of "the way things are". When this occurs the model is 
mistaken for the modelled and the distance or the gap between the model 
and that to which it points is denied.45 And this is a critical issue: like all 
language, a model both points toward and participates in that to which it 
points. When the member-participants of any epistemic community 
confuse the model for the sum total of the reality it points toward they 
paradoxically participate in constricting the world about which they seek 
to know more. The model can become a tyrant, denying the existence of 
other equally valid models of the same subject matter. In theology the 
model God the Father_ has functioned in just such a tyrannical manner, 
denying the illuminative capacity of other models such as God the sister 
or God the wind. The hegemonic status of the model God the Father is _ 
brought home when one looks to a different disciplinary paradigm, such 
as physics, where two distinct models of light peacefully co-exist: light as 
wave and light as particle. In this case each model is revelatory of 
different aspects of the same reality, light. Neither model is understood 
to reveal completely the nature of light, and because both are necessary to 
illumine some but not all aspects of light, they each seem to be able to 
maintain more easily their own internal distance, the distance between 
the model and the modelled. This is a critic;al epistemological issue; 
whenever one model dominates the imagination of an epistemic 
community it limits that community's knowledge to those "facts" that 
are a reflection of the model's own image. The introduction of another 
model or models is necessary to re-establish the creative space in which 
disciplinary practitioners can ask a different set of "what if" questions. 
And sometimes a new model will introduce/ convey a new set of 
45 Ibid., p. 74. "The principal danger in the use of models is ... the loss of tension between model and 
modeled. When that distance is collapsed, we become imprisoned by dogmatic, absolutistic, 
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metaphysical assumptions and value judgements. If this new model is 
acknowledged to be of epistemic value by the member-participants of an 
epistemic community within a disciplinary paradigm, it can initiate a 
paradigm shift within that discipline. (Whether or not a new model is 
accepted, however, depends in part on the acknowledged epistemic 
agency or cognitive authority of those who propose and embrace the new 
model.) 
To conclude, then, models, which are themselves layered metaphors, are 
the means by which the metaphysical assumptions and underlying value 
judgements of a discipline are expressed. Epistemologically, knowledge of 
different aspects of reality is conveyed through models, but this 
knowledge is always paradigm-dependent. Returning to the quote from 
Wittgenstein with which I began this discussion of disciplinary 
paradigms, humans cannot help but view the world through "a pair of 
glasses on our nose". Another name for those glasses which, carefully 
ground and shaped and polished, do enable us to see some things clearly 
while blinding us to other aspects of the world, is "disciplinary 
paradigm". It is time now to look more closely at the theological and 
philosophical influences upon the formation of one disciplinary 
paradigm - that of feminist christian theology written by white, 
economically and educationally privileged women in North America. 
literalistic patterns of thought." 
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Chapter Two 
Influences on the Formation of One 
Feminist Christian Theological Paradigm 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify certain formative theological 
and philosophical influences on the structure and components of one 
feminist christian theological paradigm - that formed in the United 
States by white, educationally and economically privileged women 
throughout the late 1960s, '70s, and '80s. In theological terms I intend to 
establish that this feminist christian theology is neither a creation ex 
nihilo nor the development of a single insight peculiar to a few isolated 
middle class whit~ women. Instead, it is one outgrowth of approximately 
two centuries of theological and philosophical, not to mention scientific, 
political, and social upheaval in the United States and Europe - a time 
which saw the classical christian paradigm rejected, replaced, resurrected, 
again refuted and ultimately refused by a diverse assortment of christian 
theologians.1 Here I will not be identifying every new christian 
theological development since the Enlightenment, nor will I be exploring 
in detail every social and political influence upon the development of the 
feminist christian theological paradigm I will be examining.2 What I 
1 Robert H. King, 'Introduction: The Task of Theology ', in Christian Theology: An Introduction to 
its Traditions and Tasks, second ed. , eds, Hodgson, Peter C. and Robert H. King, Fortress Press, 
Philadelphia, 1985, p. 2. 
2 In particular I will not be tracing the development of Marxist thought, although feminist christian 
theology is highly influenced by it. My reason for this is that the influence of Marxist thought on 
feminist christian theology is, arguably, explicitly named more often than any other philosphical or 
ideological influence. In this chapter I want to focus on those influences which I perceive to be just 
as critical as Marxist thought but less often named as such. See, for example, Collins, A Different 
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intend to do instead is to paint a picture in broad strokes, to trace the 
outlines of those theological and philosophical themes and historical 
occurrences I consider to have been particularly important and 
particularly influential in the development of this feminist christian 
theological paradigm - as will be evident especially in the work of 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Carter Heyward, and Sallie McFague. 
Methodologically, while following a chronological outline I will be 
naming and lifting out ( of context) a wide smattering of theological and 
philosophical developments. The issues I will discuss are, I am well 
aware, far more complicated (in their contexts) than my analyses of them 
will convey. However, what I am trying to accomplish by the end of this 
chapter is to give the reader a rich sense of the theological, philosophical 
and social chaos out of which feminist christian theology was born. One 
of the implicit assumptions permeating this chapter is that, theologically, 
two hundred years is not a long time; the dust raised by the 
Enlightenment has not yet settled. Nonetheless, to put it metaphorically, 
a number of other earthquakes have already rocked the Western christian 
theological establishment. One of those earthquakes is feminist christian 
theology, and its epicentre is located at the convergence of several pre-
existing faultlines. In this chapter I identify these intellectual "faultlines", 
thereby contextualising feminist christian theology within the academic 
discipline of theology. Importantly, my concern in this chapter is 
primarily with identifying those theological and philosophical 
developments that feminist christian theologians have appropriated and 
transformed in the context of one feminist christian theological 
paradigm. I am not attempting to trace either the development of the 
rhetorical space that accompanies this feminist christian theological 
paradigm or the historical development of second-wave feminism. That 
is a task for a historian, which I am not. However, I do want to 
Heaven and Earth, p.116; Harrison, Beverly Wildung, 'The Role of Social Theory in Religious Social 
Ethics: Reconsidering the Case for Marxian Political Economy', in Harrison, Beverly Wildung, 
Making the Connections: Essays in Feminist Social Ethics, ed, Carol S. Robb, Beacon Press, 
Boston, 1985, pp. 54-80; Ruether, Rosemary Radford, 'Communitarian Socialism and the Radical 
Church Tradition: Building the Community of Liberation', in Liberation Theology: Human Hope 
Confronts Christian History and American Power, Paulist Press, New York, 1972, pp. 145-155. 
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acknowledge that the development of the rhetorical space in which 
feminist christian theologians could speak to each other with a 
"reasonable expectation of being heard, understood, taken seriously" (to 
quote Lorraine Code) was, epistemologically, the most vital element in 
the formation of the feminist christian theological paradigm. Within this 
"space" a number of feminist christian theologians acknowledged the 
epistemic agency of each other, and insisted that the abstract category 
"woman" had been the object of theological pronouncements for long 
enough. Within the rhetorical space enveloping the feminist christian 
theological paradigm, real live women became theological subjects. They 
did not, however, begin to do theology from scratch. 
As with the majority of contemporary North American and Western 
European christian theological developments, feminist christian theology 
is an outgrowth of the Enlightenment, one of the heirs, albeit a 
pessimistic heir, to the liberal Protestant theology that arose in response 
to the philosophical demise of an objective, transcendent, sovereign deity. 
Briefly, the eighteenth century saw the philosophy of David Hume (1711-
76) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) combine to call into question, indeed, 
to reject the possibility of any purely objective knowledge of god. While 
this statement seems a commonplace here and now, at the time it shook 
the epistemological foundations of the classical christian theological 
paradigm.3 If, as according to Hume, all knowledge of facts must be 
drawn from the sense-data of concrete experiences, then one cannot 
reasonably connect knowledge of the existence of the world with or to 
knowledge of a god beyond the world. The assumption of a god beyond 
the world can be an assumption or belief, but it cannot properly be called 
knowledge.4 Kant's arguments against objective knowledge of god went 
even further. Kant proposed that 
knowledge of God could only be established if either God 
himself were immediately accessible to our awareness, or 
3 Seep. 42 below for a description of the beliefs integral to the classical christian paradigm. 
4 Heron, Alasdair, A Century of Protestant Theology, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1980, 
pp. 14-16. 
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✓/God" were a category demonstrably necessary, like those of 
space and time, to the ordering and shaping of our 
understanding. 5 
Because god is neither "immediately accessible" to our physical senses nor 
"demonstrably necessary" to human conceptions of the existence of the 
world, no objective knowledge of god is possible, according to Kant. 
Simply put, in rejecting the objectivity of "god" Hume and Kant also 
undermined the rational basis or foundation of any theological assertion 
having to do with god (and most of them do). But the implications of 
their work went even further; not only were the gates of Reason 
temporarily closed to theologians, but also the realm of practical action. 
An objective god had been "proven" rationally to be no longer a pure 
necessity in day-to-day existence; and although Kant in particular was 
exceedingly clear that faith in god and, he asserted, belief in immortality 
were practically necessary to direct human affairs,6 one long-term 
consequence of his epistemological bomb-shell was to collapse the 
distinction between theology and ethics, "in effect reducing theology to 
ethics"? Consequently morality and ethics were able to stand alone, no 
longer intimately associated with theology. The question became, where 
is there room for religion? About what can theologians speak and on 
what grounds can they make their claims? Is there a difference between 
theology and ethics? Enter the German theologian Friederich 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834), according to Deane Ferm, the "most 
important forerunner of religious liberalism" .8 
In 1799 Schleiermacher published a slender (by German theological 
standards) volume entitled, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured 
Despisers.9 In it he identified and claimed for "religion" a space neither 
5 Ibid., p. 17. 
6 Ibid., p. 18. 
7 King, 'Introduction: The Task of Theology', p. 11. 
8 Ferm, Deane William, Contemporary American Theologies: A Critical Survey, Harper & Row 
Publishers, San Francisco, 1981, p. 3. 
9 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultures Despisers (1799), ed and trans, 
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rational nor experiential (in the sense of direct physical experience). 
According to Schleiermacher, "religion's essence is neither thinking nor 
acting, but intuition and feeling"_lO "To have religion means to intuit the 
universe .... "11 In a brilliant move, Schleiermacher accepted (on one 
level) Kant's separation of metaphysics and ethics from "god"; he tacitly 
accepted that "metaphysics and morals" were not divine creations. In the 
next breath, however, he located finite humans within the infinite 
totality of all that is; 
Metaphysics and morals see in the whole universe only 
humanity as the center of all relatedness, as the condition of 
all being and the cause of all becoming; religion wishes to see 
the infinite, its imprint and its manifestations, in humanity 
no less than in all other individual and finite forms. 12 
Schleiermacher side-stepped the question of a rational epistemological 
foundation for knowledge of an objective god by insisting that "the idea 
of God adapts itself to each intuition of the universe", and that "whether 
we have a God as part of our intuition depends on the direction of our 
imagination" .13 Because intuition or feeling simply cannot be 
empirically tested, the effect of Schleiermacher's proposal was to remove 
theology entirely from the scientific realm. In other words, in his attempt 
to save theology as a viable intellectual pursuit, Schleiermacher had to 
admit that theology was no longer "queen of the sciences". Put 
epistemologically, Schleiermacher made it possible for theologians to 
continue writing about the affect of god, but he made it much more 
difficult for theologians to be considered the final arbiters of truth claims 
about god or anything else. 
Richard Crouter, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 1988. I am focusing on Schleiermacher's 
early work rather than on his later theology because in it the disjunction between Schleiermacher's 
thought and the thought of the reformers is more immediately evident. However, Schleiermacher 
believed that his later theology was in continuity with what he proposed in On Religion. 
l O Ibid., p. 22. 
l l Ibid., p. 52. 
12 Ibid., p. 23. 
13 Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
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To return to his theological proposals: finite human participation in the 
universe was, for Schleiermacher, participation in the infinite, in the 
totality of all that is. Equally important, neither the universe nor 
humanity was dependent on an objective, transcendent deity. Humans 
were, however, intimately bound up in the universe as "finite 
manifestations of the infinite"; further, human existence was utterly 
dependent on the universe, over which humans had no absolute control. 
This is not to say that humans did not have the freedom to act or control 
parts of the earth, but this lived freedom was a consequence of finite 
existence and did not alter the fact of humans' absolute dependence on 
the totality of all that is, or the infinite. 
In his later work (The Christian Faith) 14 Schleiermacher characterised 
human awareness of this absolute dependence as "God-consciousness". 
In contrast to God-consciousness, he characterised "world-consciousness" 
as an awareness of lived interdependence, or "the feeling of relative 
freedom and dependence that one has over against the world".15 
Schleiermacher was wary that world-consciousness without God-
consciousness could lead to decidedly immoral human actions; but, he 
believed, the ethical consequences of acknowledging the ultimate unity of 
all that is (interpreting, as he did, the totality of all that is as a single 
whole) would lead to ever more just and equitable societies, for people 
would realise that their actions mattered in the far grander scheme of 
things. In other words, for Schleiermacher it was the awareness that 
individuals were always in relation to the whole, and that their always 
relational participation mattered or affected the course of finite instances 
in the infinite, that made ethics an integral aspect of theology.1 6 
Accordingly, he rejected Kant's second "postulate of practical reason", the 
14 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, The Christian Faith, second ed. (1830), eds, Mackintosh, H. R. and J. 
S. Stewart, T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1956. 
15 King, 'Introduction: The Task of Theology', p. 13. 
l6 See Schleiermacher, On Religion, p. 77. "Insofar as everyone stands only in contact with the 
closest person, but also has a closest person on all sides and in all directions, each is, in fact, 
inseparably bound up with the whole." 
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need for belief in individual immortality.1 7 Neither the threat of 
punishment nor the lure of heavenly reward was, for Schleiermacher, an 
adequate fulcrum upon which to place an ethical lever. Furthermore, in 
one astonishing sentence he dispensed with the traditional 
understanding of immortality altogether. "To be one with the infinite in 
the midst of the finite and to be eternal in a moment, that is the 
immortality of religion. "18 In short, Schleiermacher suggested that to 
"intuit the universe" leads one to live in it rightly or ethically, with the 
awareness that finite moments are a gift of the infinite, and that 
immortality as participation in the infinite occurs in every here and now. 
Theologically there are (at least) two extraordinary developments in 
Schleiermacher's thought. To begin with, he stepped outside the bounds 
of the classical christian paradigm initially formulated by Augustine and 
upheld, with varying emphases, by Aquinas, Luther and Calvin. Briefly, 
within the classical paradigm god is a wholly other, transcendent, 
omniscient, omnipotent, absolutely sovereign deity. In relation to this 
god humans are a "damned mass", non posse non pecarre, or not able not 
to sin. There is a gulf between god and humanity - caused by sinful 
human actions - that humans cannot overcome; nonetheless god can 
and does bridge this gulf, revealing godself to humanity through Jesus 
Christ and acting in history to effect salvation - through the saving death 
and resurrection of Jesus Christ, by establishing the christian church, by 
bestowing undeserved eternal life on a select few, and ultimately by 
bringing to an end the world as it is and restoring it to a state of 
perfection. 
On the one hand Schleiermacher relinquished the notion of an absolutely 
sovereign deity, opting instead for a god whose existence could be intuited 
but was not demanded; and on the other hand he rejected the notion that 
humanity was inevitably nothing more than a damned mass. Deeply 
l 7 Heron, A Century of Protestant Theology, p. 18. 
18 Schleiermacher, On Religion, p. 54. 
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influenced by the German Romanticism of his day,19 Schleiermacher had 
an optimistic opinion of human nature. Human beings could, through 
the judicious use of scientific and technological developments, change 
the course of history, alleviating misery and moving towards ever more 
just social relations.20 In incorporating these beliefs throughout his 
theology he initiated a major christian theological paradigm shift. His 
theology was infused throughout with a different set of metaphysical 
assumptions than those first put forward by Augustine over a 
millennium earlier. Two points are critical. He accepted implicitly the 
scientific view of the universe voiced by Galileo and established by 
Copernicus, Kepler and Newton. Rather than positing creation (the 
earth) as being in the centre of the universe and humanity as being the 
culmination of creation, he accepted simply that the earth was one small 
part of an infinitely vast whole, and that humans were but a tiny aspect of 
the universe.21 Similarly, rather than locate god directly above or over 
creation, he defined god as that which humanity is dependent upon. His 
emphasis was not on humanity standing in judgement under god, but on 
humanity enjoying finite existence because of "god". Drawing no sharp 
distinction between humanity, the universe, and god, Schleiermacher 
was able to see, in the natural world and in human creations, e.g. science 
and the arts, glimpses of the infinite.22 Furthermore, he acknowledged 
that these glimpses were visible to the non-christian as well as the 
19 See Crouter, Richard, 'Introduction', in Schleiermacher, Friedrich, On Religion: Speeches to its 
Cultures Despisers ( 1799), ed and trans, Richard Crouter, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 
1988, p. xi. 
20 See ibid., p. xxxviii, and Schleiermacher, On Religion, p. 93. Schleiermacher writes, "There is 
no greater hindrance to religion than that we must be our own slaves, for everyone is a slave who 
performs something that should be accomplished by dead forces. One thing we hope for from the 
perfection of the sciences and arts is that they will make these dead forces subject to us, that they 
might tum the corporeal world and everything of the spiritual world that can be regulated into a fairy 
palace where the god of the earth needs only to utter a magic word or to press a button to have his 
commands done. Then, for the first time, everyone will be freeborn .... " 
21 Schleiermacher, On Religion, p. 51. "But now I have told you clearly enough that humanity is 
not everything to me, that my religion strives for a universe of which humanity, with all that belongs 
to it, is only an infinitely small part, only one particular transient form." It is worth noting that it 
was not until November 2nd, 1992, that the Roman Catholic Church officially admitted that Galileo 
had been correct. Personal correspondence with Dorothea McEwan, Oct. 14, 1997. 
22 Ibid., p. 58, "For religious works of art are always exhibited everywhere; the whole world is a 
gallery of religious views .... " Also p. 63, "Being born and dying are such points, when they are 
perceived, at which it cannot escape us how are own self is universally surrounded by the infinite and 
which always arouse a quiet longing and a holy awe." 
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christian, although he did assert that christianity was the highest form of 
ethical monotheism.23 
In the nineteenth century these tendencies in Schleiermacher's thought 
were taken up and emphasised to varying degrees by Albrecht Ritschl 
(1822-89), Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930), and Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923), 
-
among others. Collectively, their theology came to be known as Liberal 
Protestantism.24 Receptivity to current scientific truths and an openness 
to future scientific revelations, rejection of creeds, dogmas and miracle 
stories that contradict rational ( empirical) knowledge of the world, respect 
for the truths of other religions, acceptance of historical-critical methods, 
and an insistence on the practical ethical implications of 
theology/ christianity: these are the characteristics of Liberal 
Protestantism. When applied to the "doing" of theology, these 
presuppositions resulted in the radical revisioning of a number of 
theological concepts. Sin and salvation in particular were transformed. 
Rather than understanding sin, both personal and systemic, as the 
bondage into which all humans are born and from which salvation 1s 
provided by god alone, there was a tendency in liberal theology to 
emphasise sin as the result of a lack of understanding or knowledge. 
Provided an opportunity, individuals could improve themselves and, 
collectively, society.25 Furthermore, the ethical imperative inherent in 
Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of God made it one's christian duty 
to strive to bring about the "salvation" of society. Instead of having an 
individualistic, otherwordly focus, liberal theologians turned their 
attention to influencing the historical developments of this world.26 The 
23 Ibid., p. 113-117. 
24 See J aines Richmond, 'Liberal Protestantism', in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian 
Theology, eds, Allan Richardson and John Bowden, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1983, pp. 
325-328. 
25 See Ferm, Contemporary American Theologies, pp. 4-9. See also Richmond, 'Liberal 
Protestantism', pp. 327-328. 
26 See Schleiermacher, On Religion, p. 16. Schleiermacher in particular seems to have been deeply 
offended by the idea of a heavenly hereafter and the classical emphasis on individual, eternal salvation. 
He wrote, "[T]hose who make a distinction between this world and the world beyond delude 
themselves; at least all who have religion believe in only one world." 
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kingdom of God was to be realised through human actions on earth.27 In 
other words, the kingdom of God was understood to be "the realm of 
ideal human relations" .28 But with no objective foundation (god) for 
these faith/knowledge claims, on what grounds could theologians speak 
of the kingdom of God? 
In answering this question Albrecht Ritschl contributed greatly not only 
to the development of what would become one of the central models of 
the feminist christian theological paradigm, but also to the re-
establishment of an epistemological foundation for theological assertions. 
Following Kant's distinction between "judgements of fact" and 
"judgements of value", Ritschl located all theological endeavours in the 
realm of "value". He "believed that religious and theological statements 
are essentially judgements of value-for-us" .29 While understandings of 
the world ( or creation) were quite properly informed by scientific 
research,30 and understandings of humankind were quite properly 
informed by critical-historical research, Ritschl believed it was the task of 
the theologian to posit the value of human existence. For the christian 
theologian, this meant turning to the work, deeds, teachings, and parables 
of Jesus - for in the gospels was the historical record of the faith claims of 
the christian church, more precisely, a record of the response of a faithful 
community to the values revealed to that community through the work 
and words of Jesus. Those values were found in the ethical demands of 
the kingdom of God as preached and lived by Jesus, which Ritschl 
interpreted to be "the organisation of humanity through action inspired 
27 Within Liberal Protestantism it was Albrecht Ritschl who took up Kant's identification of the 
kingdom of God with "the ethical organisation of human society". Heron, A Century of Protestant 
Theology, p. 35. See also King, 'Introduction: The Task of Theology ', p. 19, and Donald Miller, 
'Liberalism', in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology, eds, Allan Richardson and John 
Bowden, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1983, p. 324. 
28 Eric J. Sharpe, 'The Kingdom of God', in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian The;logy , eds, 
Allan Richardson and John Bowden, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1983, p. 317. 
29 Heron, A Century of Protestant Theology, p. 35. See also Richmond, 'Liberal Protestantism', p. 
326. 
30 In fact Ritschl had a negative view of the physical world; he accepted a mechanical view of nature 
and proposed that "each individual has more value than the whole of nature" (personal communication 
with Dr. Earl Gossett, 27 /2/85). 
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by love".31 Instead of relying on individual God-consciousness, or 
awareness of absolute dependence, as a ground for theological claims, 
Ritschl turned to the ethical imperative of love as the theological (and 
simultaneously epistemological) norm.32 Practically, his emphasis on 
love of god and neighbour meant paying attention to the actual welfare of 
one's neighbour, which meant that love had to have at least something 
to do with social justice.33 
The Social Gospel movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries took up this notion of the kingdom of God as a historical goal to 
be corporately realised on earth. In Social Gospel theology the emphasis 
was on the systemic nature of sin and evil. Injustices, or occasions when 
the possibility of human becoming was thwarted, were perceived to be a 
part of the social fabric of life. Consequently, institutional 
transformations were seen as the solution. Only by changing the social, 
economic, and political structures ("the greedy ethics of capitalism and 
militarism"34) in which whole communities live, move, and have ~heir 
being, could the kingdom of God be realised. Walter Rauschenbusch, a 
leading figure in the Social Gospel movement, stated the tenets of Social 
Gospel theology in this way: 
31 Ibid. 
Since Christ revealed the divine worth. of life and 
personality, and since his salvation seeks the restoration and 
fulfillment of even the least, it follows that the kingdom of 
God, at every stage of human development, tends toward 
the social order which will best guarantee to all personalities 
their freest and highest development. · This involves the 
redemption of social life from the cramping influence of 
religious bigotry, from the repression of self-assertion in the 
relation of upper and lower classes, and from all forms of 
slavery in which human beings are treated as merely means 
to serve the ends of others .... Since love is the supreme law of 
32 Ritschl rejected what he considered to be Schleiermacher's de-personalised characterisation of god; 
instead, he asserted that god must be a personality perfectly embodying the personal characteristic of 
love. 
33 This understanding of the integral relationship between love and justice will be strongly echoed in 
feminist christian theology. See in particular Heyward, Isabel Carter, The Redemption of God: A 
Theology of Mutual Relation, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1982. 
34 Eric J. Sharpe, 'Social Gospel', in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology, eds, Allan 
Richardson and John Bowden, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1983. 
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Christ, the kingdom of God implies a progressive reign of 
love in human affairs. 35 
Importantly, the ideal of the kingdom of God was both a future goal and a 
prophetic judgement upon existing injustices. If the kingdom was to be 
brought about, repentance and conversion would have to be collective 
processes, resulting in communal social and political changes. However, 
although the kingdom of God was understood to stand in judgement of 
the status quo, the Social Gospel movement was underpinned with a 
sense of optimism. Historical progress, while requiring great effort, was 
believed to be achievable. The kingdom of God could be "man-made". 
Two factors, one scholarly and one political, combined to call into 
question the progressive optimism of the Liberal theologians and their 
reliance on the ethical ideal of the kingdom of God. In 1906 Albert 
Schweitzer published The Quest for the Historical Jesus, a survey work in 
which he analysed the attempts (to that date) by New Testament scholars 
to discover what could be known about Jesus of Nazareth. He concluded 
that very little could be said about the historical figure of Jesus with any 
degree of certainty at all, and furthermore, what New Testament scholars 
were most certain of was that Jesus' message concerning the kingdom of 
God had a decidedly eschatalogical, indeed, apocalyptic focus. In simplest 
terms, critical readings of the gospels, in particular the synoptic gospels 
(Matthew, Mark and Luke), revealed, according to Schweitzer, that Jesus 
was not primarily concerned with establishing on-going just social 
relations on earth, but with preparing peoples' hearts and minds for the 
imminent arrival of the kingdom of God, that is, for life in the world to 
come as heralded by the end of all existing earthly relations.36 
35 Quoted from an excerpt of A Theology for the Social Gospel, by Walter Rauschenbusch. 
Originally published in 1917. Walter Rauschenbusch, 'A Theology for the Social Gospel' , in 
Readings in Christian Theology, eds, Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King, Fortress Press, 
Philadelphia, 1985, p. 319. 
36 See Heron, A Century of Protestant Theology , pp. 51-54. Regarding the eschatalogical 
(concerning "the end time" or "last times") focus of Jesus' preaching, it was Albrecht Ritschl's son-in-
law, Johannes Weiss, with his 1892 The Preaching of Jesus Concerning the Kingdom of God, who 
significantly challenged the notion of the kingdom as a human ideal. 
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Although the basis for the ethical interpretation of the gospel message as 
put forward by Liberal theologians was thus seriously challenged by 
historical and biblical scholars, it is possible that they could have 
countered this challenge successfully by reminding those scholars that 
Jesus' vision of the imminent coming of the kingdom of God did not in 
fact eventuate. Just as Paul had had to adjust his teachings to 
accommodate the fact that the end of the world was not at hand, so too 
was it still appropriate to do theology responsive to the on-going existence 
of humanity, taking into account historical developments (scientific and 
cultural) undreamed of in Jesus' time. However, in 1914 the optimistic 
sense of humanity's progress toward eradicating social sins and evils was 
almost utterly destroyed by the advent of the First World War. Suddenly 
it was evident that humans were just as capable of being inhumane as 
they ever had been. 
In response to the shortcomings of Liberal theology as he perceived them, 
Karl Barth, a Swiss pastor and professor, returned to the class~cal christian 
paradigm.37 He reasserted the notion of an unbridgeable gulf between 
god and humanity, insisting on god's "wholly otherness"; he insisted that 
the Word of God was unknowable to "man" except through god's 
revelation of that Word, and lastly, he insisted that the Word of God was 
Jesus Christ. Human beings were sinners, judged by god and completely 
dependent on god's mercy. Nothing in creation could lead one to god;38 
only god could reveal godself, which god did in Jesus Christ. For Barth 
the only subject of theology was the Word of God, Jesus Christ. The 
theologian ought to speak of nothing apart from its relationship to Jesus 
Christ. Barth thus reversed the liberal trend to speak of christianity as one 
religion among others (his faith allowing him to posit no saviour other 
than Jesus Christ); he believed christian theologians had no business 
doing theology in conversation with scientists or artists; and he insisted 
37 His first work, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, was published in 1918, while he was 
still a "virtually unknown pastor" in Safenwil, Switzerland. Ibid., p. 73 . 
38 Barth was vehemently opposed to any form of natural theology, or the attempt to discern god in 
any manifestation of creation, for example, through the universal laws of nature or through 
contemplation of particular, awe-inspiring aspects of creation. Barth insisted that god was wholly-
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that the only foundation (epistemological, ethical or otherwise) of 
christian theology was the faithful reception of god's revelation of the 
Word of God, which always and only came from god above.39 
In order to understand why Barth asserted the views he did as sharply as 
he did it is important to note what he was trying to achieve or, perhaps 
more accurately, to combat. The nineteenth century Liberal 
accommodation of contemporary scientific "truths" and support of state-
sanctioned social improvements had led to a feeling, among theologians 
and within christian churches, that a more perfect human realm could 
and would be brought about through cultural advancements. For Barth, 
who witnessed before and during WWI the churches' complicity in the 
German government's political and military actions, such an alliance 
between church and state or faith and culture became untenable, indeed, 
idolatrous. His response was a vehement "No" to every attempt by 
"man" to reach toward "god". Further, he wished for there never to be 
any confusion between human actions and divine actions.40 He insisted 
that all social, political, economic, and scientific achievements or 
programs were human programs, and as such they were inevitably 
flawed. To his credit, Barth took with utmost seriousness human capacity 
for sin. He believed, furthermore, that reinstating an unbridgeable gulf 
between humanity and god actually "freed man to be man"; it could lead 
to an acceptance and appreciation of imperfect, finite existence, and to 
humility and thanksgiving in the face of an almighty god. 
Barth's was the last great attempt to resurrect the classical christian 
paradigm. Widely acknowledged to be the most important christian 
theologian of the first half of the twentieth century, his words 
reverberated throughout the rhetorical space surrounding christian 
other-than god's creation. 
39 See John Bowden, Word of God',-in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology, eds, 
Allan Richardson and John Bowden, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1983, pp. 603-604. 
4o In 1934 he helped to draft the Barmen Declaration, a sharp criticism of those German Christians 
supportive of Hitler. At the time he was a university professor in Bonn, but when he refused to take 
the oath to Hitler he was dismissed and moved back to Switzerland. Heron, A Century of Protestant 
Theology, p. 86 and p. 74. 
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theology in Europe and North America, muffling less certain, less 
triumphal voices. Ironically, just as WWI had slowed the progress of 
Liberal theology, WWII and the Nazi Holocaust contributed greatly to the 
ensuing diminishment of Barth's "neo-orthodox" position.41 In allowing 
such incomprehensible suffering, Barth's all-powerful god had, it seemed 
to many, proven godself to be too far removed, too far above human 
affairs. Such a god simply was not worthy of worship. However, Barth's 
answer to Liberal theology was not the only influential theological 
development in the first half of the twentieth century, although it was for 
some time the benchmark against which other perspectives were 
measured. 
To conclude this review of the (pre-1960) influences on the feminist 
christian theological paradigm I will examine briefly two other 
theological approaches, theological existentialism and process theology -
both of which echo themes found in Schleiermacher's thought.42 Again, 
I will do no more than sketch the outlines of these complex areas, 
emphasising themes rather than particulars. · I am trying to convey not 
the fine details of particular theological approaches, but a sense of how it 
was that christian theology came apart at the seams in the latter half of 
the twentieth century, with more and more theologians expressing 
growing dissatisfaction with traditional understandings of theological 
concepts. This was a time when the old wine skins simply could not hold 
the new wine.43 
Concerning existentialist theology, I wish to highlight · three points. First, 
whereas Barth had insisted that the proper subject for theology was the 
4l See Ferm, Contemporary American Theologies, p. 20. 
42 See Schleiermacher, On Religion, p. 108 and p. 116, where Schleiermacher insists that humans 
are inescapably dwellers in the world and describes humanity as straining against the universe, "ever 
vacillating, ever halting at the particular and accidental ... ". This description resonates with the 
existentialists' understanding of humans' location in the world of objects, and with the risk of defining 
one's existence solely on the basis of those objects. Similarly, on p. 77 he describes his view of the 
universe as a whole, with each individual aspect of the universe integrated into the whole and only 
"separated forcibly and arbitrarily". Within this overarching schema, however, he also insists on 
individuation in order for participation in the universe (p. 67) - a belief integral to process thought. 
43 It was not until the 1960s, however, that the question of who was allowed to be a wine maker was 
raised. 
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Word of god as known to "man" by faith through revelation, one of his 
contemporaries, Rudolph Bultmann, asserted instead that the proper 
subject of theology was "the clarification of the content of faith" _44 
Adopting the existential philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Bultmann 
insisted on making explicit the "pre-theological" underpinnings of his 
assertion, namely, the ontological understanding of the existence of 
I/man", whose faith can only be known insofar as it is a part of I/his" 
human existence.45 In other words, before one can speak of the content of 
faith one must make clear the context of faith, and that context is human 
existence, human being-in-the-world.46 Furthermore, all understandings 
of human existence are a part of human existence. The argument was, 
therefore, that existentialism was "not a speculative philosophy, but an 
analysis of that understanding of human existence which is given with 
existence" .47 Thus while Barth argued that any extraneous philosophical 
system could only cloud or weaken the christian message, Bultmann (and 
Paul Tillich, among others) argued that one must understand the 
character of lived human existence in order to understand the christian 
faith as a part of that existence.48 
Second, both existentialist philosophers and theologians were deeply 
concerned with halting the modern trend according to which only 
scientific knowledge of "man" and the world was worthy of the name 
"knowledge". Scientific knowledge, they argued, was only one special 
sub-species of the knowledge/understanding humans need to live in the 
44 MacQuarrie, John, An Existentialist Theology, SCM Press, Ltd, London, 1955, p. 6. See also 
pp. 234-325 in the same volume, in which MacQuarrie discusses Bultmann's theology gaining 
prominence after WWII, when Barth's theological program came to be seen by many as "curiously 
irrelevant to the modem mind". 
45 Ibid., pp. 6-7 and p. 237. 
46 Ibid., p. 39. The expression "being-in-the-world" is the English translation of Heidegger's term, 
"in-der-Welt-sein", which he used to stress the point that human existence is only possible 
somewhere, in a context surrounded by other things, and that human existence is shaped by what "we" 
do or do not do with those other things. 
47 Ibid., p. 8. 
48 This is one aspect of existentialism that has been taken up in a lively fashion by feminist 
christian theologians, no doubt causing Bultmann, Tillich, and many others to roll over in their 
graves. It is safe to say that they did not foresee the consequences of their perfectly reasonable 
assertion. 
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world.49 They insisted that questions like "of what is sea water 
composed?" simply cannot replace questions like "what is the nature of 
my being?" According to the existentialists, practical, concrete existence is 
positively rife with situations in which discerning how I can participate 
meaningfully in the world (as opposed to losing myself in it) requires a 
radically different sort of knowledge than the knowledge of the chemical 
composition of sea water. Importantly, in making this argument the 
existentialist theologians re-inserted into the theological enterprise an 
epistemological component based on lived-experiences rather than on 
revelation breaking in from god above. With their emphasis on what 
knowledge is primarily for, theological existentialists called attention to 
the fact of embodied, incarnate, concrete, relational existence in-the-
world,50 and they insisted that interpreting understandings of existence is 
as theological a task as it is philosophical, for faith apart from existence is 
sim p 1 y nonsensical. 
Thirdly, instead of speaking of god almost exclusively in terms of the 
Word of God, as Barth did, the existentialists tended to speak of god as the 
"ground of Being". In order to grasp the implications of this shift in 
symbolic language ( and for Paul Tillich in particular language about god 
was symbolic, participatory language) it is necessary to explore what they 
meant by the term "being". According to Alasdair Heron, "when 
Existentialists spoke of "Being" they were not treating it as an entity, but 
using it in order to draw attention to the mysterious reality of existence 
itself, to the wonder of the fact that anything "is" at all. .. " .51 The phrase 
"ground of Being" is thus an allusion to the source or "author" of all 
49 See MacQuarrie, An Existentialist Theology, pp. 54-56. See also James Richmond, 
'Existentialism', in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology, eds, Allan Richardson and 
John Bowden, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1983, pp. 201-204. 
50 The Jewish existentialist (sometimes considered personalist) philosopher Martin Buber in 
particular posited the relational character of existence, declaring, in / and Thou, "In the beginning is 
relation" (p. 18). In this poetic work he contrasted I - Thou relationships, in which I and Thou 
(whether person, place or thing) are mutually enriched through our relationship, with I - It 
relationships, in which I seek to make It (whether person, place or thing) into an object for my own 
ends, and in so doing also objectify and thus diminish myself. See Buber, Martin, / and Thou, 
second ed., trans, Ronald G. Smith, T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1958 (originally appeared in German 
as /ch und Du in 1923). 
5l Heron, A Century of Protestant Theology, p. 144, paraphrasing a statement made by Heidegger in 
which he was trying to clarify his own use of the term. 
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being, human and non-human being alike.52 In terms reminiscent of 
Schleiermacher's characterisation of a feeling of absolute dependence (as 
God-consciousness), the existentialists asserted that all being (human and 
non-human alike) is dependent upon a ground of being - which does not 
necessarily have to be a personal deity. Again let me stress that here I am 
trying to describe briefly only some of those themes which are taken up 
and developed in feminist christian theology. Consequently I am not 
concerned with setting out, in the body of this chapter, the existentialists' 
conception of the fundamental condition of human existence -
alienation or estrangement. However, it is important to note that a core 
metaphysical presupposition upheld by the existentialists, namely that 
human being is utterly distinct from and alien to non-human being (or, 
theologically, that humans are in the world but not of it) is not a 
component in the feminist christian theological paradigm. 
Earlier I mentioned that the feminist christian theological paradigm is 
one of the inheritors of the scientific developments of the nineteenth. and 
twentieth centuries. Specifically, the metaphysical presuppositions 
inherent in the feminist christian theological paradigm are, as will 
become clear in future chapters, in accordance with the basic tenets of the 
theory of relativity and quantum rather than classical (or Newtonian) 
physics - briefly, interdependent relationality is posited as being 
fundamentally characteristic of all that is, rather than independence, 
isolation, and self-sufficiency. However, the first thorough-going 
incorporation of the assumptions of the "new" physics into a systematic 
philosophical/ theological approach was carried out by Alfred North 
Whitehead in his monumental (1929) work, Process and Reality.53 
Strictly speaking, (what came to be known as) process theology is a distinct 
theological paradigm unto itself by virtue of its numerous unique 
52 See MacQuarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p. 74. "[H]e can seek a ground of being, which 
means simply a Creator who is author both of man's being and of the being of nature." 
53 Whitehead, Alfred North, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, The MacMillan 
Company, New York, 1929. I am not here concerned with whether or not it was his deliberate 
intention to start with recent developments in physics and move to philosophy and theology, although 
I do not believe it was, or that he in fact did so. However, intentional or not, his thought was very 
much in line with the then newly developing scientific paradigm shift. 
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metaphors and models. In order to convey his thoughts Whitehead 
created, to quote Thomas Kuhn, "a new universe of discourse", and it is 
impossible to convey the depth and intricacy of his ideas without recourse 
to his metaphors. Broadly, what he tried to do was propose a general 
metaphysical description applicable to every "entity" in the universe as 
the universe is experienced in this "cosmic epoch".54 There are two 
points I need to clarify immediately: first, Whitehead insisted that 
metaphysical presuppositions lurked behind all statements of fact. 
"[E]very proposition proposing a fact must, in its complete analysis, 
propose the general character of the universe required for that fact. There 
are no self-sustained facts, floating in nonentity."55 Secondly, he did not 
believe that any cosmic epoch was eternal in a temporal sense, and he 
assumed that two or more cosmic epochs could exist simultaneously.56 
(To understand this statement imagine a universe composed of anti-
matter existing at the same time as our universe composed of matter -
the "general character" of that universe would be utterly distinct from 
ours.) The point is that he deliberately constructed his metaphysical 
scheme relative to "this" epoch in "this" universe, and he consistently 
carried the notion of "relativity" throughout his work. He thus rejected 
the notion of any "once and for all" description of reality. 
According to Whitehead "entities" are not to be conceived of as 
substances, but as processes. That is, an "actual entity" is to be conceived 
as an event becoming rather than as a state of being. When an entity 
ceases becoming, or in his terms, achieves satisfaction, it "perishes". 
However, no entity can "become" in isolation and no entity perishes 
without a trace. In Whitehead's words, "the primary stage in the 
concrescence [becoming] of an actual entity is the way in which the 
antecedent universe enters into the constitution of the entity in question, 
54 Ibid., pp. 148-150. 
55 Alfred North Whitehead, 'In Defence of Speculative Philosophy', in A Key to Whitehead's Process 
and Reality, ed, Donald W. Sherburne, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1966, p. 199. 
56 See Sherburne, A Key to Whitehead's Process and Reality, pp. 80-81. 
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so as to constitute the basis of its nascent individuality" .57 In other words, 
every present actual occasion ( another term for "actual entity") is 
indelibly shaped by the processes/ events that lead up to its "becoming". 
The weight of the past presses inexorably into the present, imposing a 
limited range of possibilities on the potential range of "becoming" 
experienced or felt by each actual entity. Because of this, some order is 
maintained in the universe. The past is never lost, but as it is re-
membered in each present it shapes and limits the form the present can 
take. 
Whitehead describes each perished actual entity as achieving "objective 
immortality" - immortal in the sense that it continues to be felt, 
remembered and incorporated into present actual entities, and objective 
in the sense that past actual occasions are objectified by present actual 
occasions. Which is to say the subjective fullness or entirety of the 
perished actual occasion is lost to the temporal world because only some 
aspects of it are "positively prehended" by concrescing (beco_ming) actual 
occasions. Those aspects of the perished actual occasion which are · 
"negatively prehended" are not incorporated into the physical/ temporal 
present. However, in Whitehead's description of god he posits the view 
that each perished actual occasion is remembered in its subjective fullness 
in the consequent nature of god. Briefly, Whitehead's "god" has three 
natures: the primordial, the consequent, and the superjective. These can 
be understood as corresponding respectively to divine imagination, 
eternal memory, and future vision. God "works" in the universe in 
three ways. Initially god perfectly imagined the most harmonious and 
most perfect relationships possible in a universe of pure potentiality. Our 
universe, however, is an actual, not a potential universe. Hence god's 
consequent nature: continually apprehending and remembering perfectly 
every single actual entity and every society of entities (enduring objects 
like rocks and humans). In god's superjective nature a possible future is 
envisioned in which each actual entity achieves as valuable a 
57 Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 230. 
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"satisfaction" as possible. This vision or "lure" becomes a part of the 
present universe of each actual entity, able to be positively or negatively 
prehended by it. In the process view of god, nothing is ever forgotten or 
lost, nor is anything ever forced or demanded. 
As noted above, present reality is never merely the unchanged repetition 
of the past. With each new actual occasion comes novelty and change as 
well as a memory of the past. That is, every actual entity integrates its 
feelings of the past in a manner unique to itself; thus every actual entity is 
entirely new at the same time as it is entirely dependent upon the past. 
Again, once it has achieved satisfaction ( or perished) it becomes available 
as a resource for the becoming of future actual entities.58 Whether 
speaking of a single actual entity or a society of actual occasions ( e.g. a 
human), the basic process remains the same: every entity seeks to feel 
through or experience its "antecedent universe" in a singular, integrated 
fashion - or as a whole. It does so by bringing "the many into one" and it 
then adds itself to that "one". In Whitehead's words, "the many become 
one and are increased by one."59 This is the basic rhythm of the universe 
in process thought: integration, individuation, integration - order and 
novelty and order, simultaneously and ceaselessly. 
I have described Whitehead's thought in (more) detail than (perhaps) was 
necessary for three reasons. First, I find process thought to be hauntingly 
beautiful, a harmony composed of hope and tragedy in equal measure. In 
process thought, as in feminist christian theology, it is impossible to 
transform quickly any history of systematic oppression or injustice. Every 
time anyone's life (in process terms, any enduring society of actual 
occasions) is distorted, diminished or denied, the temporal present and 
future are impoverished to an unknowable degree. What has been lost (a 
person's life or hopes or dreams, a culture's memories, a community's 
58 Ibid., p. 130 and p. 233. "In the conception of the actual entity in its phase of satisfaction, the 
entity has attained its individual separation from other things; it has absorbed the datum, and it has not 
yet lost itself in the swing back whereby its appetition becomes an element in the data of other 
entities superseding it." 
59 Ibid., p. 32. 
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way of being ... ) is lost to this world forever. However, it is equally true 
that the present and the course of the future are affected by every 
becoming occasion of love (or justice or harmony or right relationship). 
In process thought little things matter greatly. Second, the affinities 
between these aspects of process thought and feminist christian theology 
are strong, and in my opinion, extremely important to name. Lastly, 
Alfred North Whitehead and, later, Charles Hartshorne and Henry 
Nelson Wieman had the audacity to reject or radically reconceptualise 
any theological notion they felt was untenable in relation to the 
metaphysical presuppositions they embraced. They proved (as 
Schleiermacher had done earlier) that neither the how nor the what of 
theology was fixed, unalterable.60 By the 1960s, the decade in which the 
feminist christian theological paradigm has its immediate social and 
political roots, the what of christian theology was revealed to be 
indivisible from the who of christian theology. In other words, some 
theologians (feminist and otherwise) increasingly asserted that 
theological content was closely related to theological authorship.61 
It is not possible, within the context of this chapter, to identify all of the 
social, political, scientific/ technological, and ethical factors leading to the 
historical event known as the 1960s. However, here I must at least name 
two of those factors which were to be of particular importance to christian 
theologians. The dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki by the US made it impossible for any theologian to consider 
60 They called into question and rejected such bedrock theological assumptions as divine omnipotence 
and omniscience, not to mention the concepts of predestination, the salvation of the elect, and eternal 
damnation. See Hartshorne, Charles, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes, State 
University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1984. I include this reference because the title is 
so delightfully apt; my point, however, is that these theological notions had to be rejected (at least 
implicitly) even in the initial writings in process thought because they contradict basic assumptions 
about the nature of the universe and of god posited in process theology. 
61 In 1988, in the fifteenth anniversary introduction to A Theology of Liberation, Gustavo Gutierrez 
wrote: "Although theology is a language for communicating God, in every place it must display the 
inflections given it by those who formulate it and those to whom it is directed. Every language has a 
number of dialects .... Our theological language is subject to the same rule; it takes its coloring from 
our peoples, cultures, and racial groupings .... This accent may not be to the liking of those who until 
now have regarded themselves the proprietors of theology and are not conscious of their own accent (to 
which, of course, they have every right) when they speak of God." Gutierrez, Gustavo, A Theology 
of Liberation, eds and trans, Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson, Orbis, Mary Knoll, New York, 
1988, p. XXXV. 
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scientific achievements as inevitably "progressive" or for the good of all 
humanity. The development and use of nuclear weapons also prompted 
a re-examination of the ethical dimension of christian theology. 
Similarly, the fact of the Holocaust prompted an examination of the role 
of christian anti-Semitism in creating a social and political climate in 
which such genocide was not only considered but carried out. The sheer 
scale of such senseless death and destruction was ( and remains) 
simultaneously unbearable yet mandatory to consider. As Barth had been 
confronted by an enormous human capacity for sin that he witnessed first 
in WWI, so too were christian theologians in confronted, in the 
aftermath of WWII, with human sins of a magnitude that had seemed, 
theretofore, impossible. 
With this legacy it is perhaps not surprising that in the 1960s in the US 
the civil rights movement, massive demonstrations against US 
involvement in the war in Vietnam, and, by the end of the decade, the 
increasingly visible women's liberation move men t62 collectively called 
into question the structure of society. Who had the power to decide that 
one race was superior to another? Who had the power to send US troops 
to kill and be killed in a small Asian country? Who was excluded from 
the country's economic and political and military strongholds? The 1960s 
were a time when fundamental presuppositions governing the structure 
of society were openly challenged. The 1960s were also, not incidentally, a 
time of tremendous theological upheaval. A growing number of 
theologians were of the opinion that, in the face of the Nazi Holocaust, 
Hiroshima, Nagasaki and napalm, to speak or write of an immutable, 
omniscient, omnipotent, and all good deity was rationally untenable and 
morally unconscionable. According to them, God - literally - was dead.63 
62 For example, Betty Friedan's revolutionary (at that time) book, The Feminine Mystique, was 
originally published in 1964. Friedan, Betty, The Feminine Mystique, Dell Publishing Co. , New 
York, 1964. 
63 See Altizer, Thomas J. J. and William Hamilton, Radical Theology and the Death of God, The 
Bobs-Merrill Company, Inc., New York, 1966. I realise that not all the death-of-God theologians 
would describe god as literally dead; Paul van Buren in particular was concerned with the bankruptcy of 
traditional god-language rather than with the literal death of a transcendent deity. However, Hamilton 
and Altizer certainly felt that there had been such a transcendent God and that now such a God was 
dead 
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With Dietrich Bonhoeffer's words as a rallying cry, the death-of-God 
theologians proclaimed it was time for "man to come of age", to live in 
the absence of god. Concretely,, what this meant, at least in part, was for 
"man" to live knowing that, "for good or ill he bears responsibility for 
what he makes of his life and the life of the world".64 For the death-of-
god theologians there simply was no longer an omnipotent god prepared 
to come to the rescue of "man". The focus of their theological attention 
was on this world as it is "here" and "now". A similar "this-worldly" 
focus was also prominent in the work of a number of theologians 
concerned with secular society, in particular Harvey Cox.65 However, in 
much secular theology god remained alive and well, and very much 
wholly-other-than any aspect of "his" creation. 
Meanwhile,, in the Roman Catholic church there were two momentous 
developments: in the early 1960s Pope John XXIII, cardinals, bishops, and 
the laity were preparing for the Second Vatican Council, during the 
course of which the active participation of the laity in the affairs of the 
Church was encouraged,,66 while in Peru (1968) Gustavo Gutierrez was 
insisting that all theology is shaped by the context in which it is 
developed,, and that theology developed by economically-privileged 
Europeans or North Americans was not appropriate to the context of the 
poor in Latin America. The God of the gospels is a God with a 
preferential option for the poor, said Gutierrez,, and liberation theology 
was voiced for the first time.67 
At the same time as white, middle-class men were burying god or turning 
to the "secular city" and liberation theology was beginning to take shape 
64 Heron, A Century of Protestant Theology, p. 155. 
65 Cox, Harvey, The Secular City, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1968. 
66 The Second Vatican Council was concluded (after John XXIII's death) in Rome in 1965. 
67 See Gustavo Gutierrez, 'Expanding the View', in Expanding the View, eds, Marc H. Ellis and 
Otto Maduro, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, 1988, p. 4. "The name and reality of 'liberation 
theology' came into existence at Chimbote, Peru, in July 1968." For the moment I ignore the 
simultaneous development of feminist christian theology. However, I do want to note that, as I will 
discuss further in the next chapter, the development of feminist christian theology, Black theology and 
liberation theology occurred simultaneously, with at least one leading feminist theologian (Rosemary 
Ruether) engaged with ongoing developments in both Black and liberation theology. 
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m Latin America, in the US a number of Black churchmen (and they 
were primarily men) were meeting and beginning to relate Black Power 
to theology. In the summer of 1966 the underlying foundation of Black 
theology was established with the publication of a full-page 
advertisement in the New York Times, entitled "Black Power: Statement 
by the National Committee of Negro Churchmen, July 31, 1966".68 
Signed by forty-seven Black churchmen and one woman, it was clear that 
from where they stood god was fully alive and sustaining the struggle of 
Black communities to liberate themselves from the racist, violent and 
oppressive conditions imposed upon them by white America(ns). In 1969 
this vision was cogently expressed in the opening paragraph of "Black 
Theology", a statement written by the Theological Commission of the 
National Committee of Black Churchmen (NCBC). Importantly, James 
Cone, who was to publish his first book, Black Theology and Black Power, 
(also 1969), was the "key member" of the NCBC Theological Commission 
which drafted the statement.69 The statement begins: 
Black people affirm their being. This affirmation is made in 
the whole experience of being black in the hostile American 
society. Black Theology is not a gift of the Christian gospel 
dispensed to slaves; rather it is an appropriation which black 
slaves made of the gospel given by their white oppressors. 
Black Theology has been nurtured, sustained and passed on 
in the black churches in their various ways of expression. 
Black Theology has dealt with all the ultimate and violent 
issues of life and death for a people despised and degraded. 
The black church has not only nurtured black people but 
enabled them to survive brutalities that ought not to have 
been inflicted on any community of men. Black Theology is 
the product of black Christian experience and reflection. It 
comes out of the past. It is strong in the present. And we 
believe it is redemptive for the future70 (italics original). 
This paragraph is rich with 1) metaphysical presuppositions (e.g. "black 
people affirm their being", "the ultimate and violent issues of life and 
death"), with 2) metaphors ( e.g. "black", "slaves", "gospel", "white"), with 
3) models (e.g. "the black church", "black Christian experience"). And it is 
68 Wilmore, Gayraud S. and James H. Cone, eds, Black Theology: A Documentary History, 1966-
1979, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, 1979, pp. 23-30. See also pp. 17-18. 
69 Ibid., p. 77. 
7o Ibid., p. 100. 
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from beginning to end 4) a value judgement; it is simultaneously a 
condemnation of the treatment of Black people in America by white 
Americans and a positive affirmation of the goodness (although the term 
"good" does not appear in the paragraph, "gospel" is literally translated as 
"good news") of black lives and black "being". In marked contrast to most 
theology written by white male authors, the emphasis on black churches 
and the black community is coupled with the absence of any reference to 
individual lives, thus whatever is "redemptive" about Black Theology is 
redemptive in a collective, corporate sense. It is clear from this brief 
excerpt that Black Theology is based upon a host of presuppositions, and a 
way of talking about those presuppositions, that are, taken together, 
unique to Black Theology. In other words, Black theology is a theological 
paradigm unto itself: a paradigm formed at the same time as the feminist 
christian theological paradigm and the Latin American liberation 
theological paradigm. 
These distinct theological paradigms multiplied during and following the 
1960s, and rather than attempt to deny the validity of all other paradigms, 
they each sought instead to bear witness to the lived-truths and faith-
claims of particular, theretofore epistemically silenced, communities.71 
This is a critical point. What happened in the 60s was that groups of 
people who had previously been denied entrance into the rhetorical space 
surrounding the discipline of christian theology came together and 
created the rhetorical spaces in which they could speak and write and 
piece together their own theological paradigms. Those who had 
previously been ignored or made the objects of theological reflection 
became active theological subjects. However, again, they did not start 
from scratch. As the "Black Theology" statement baldly declares, they 
71 See Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, p. xxxvi. "I mentioned earlier the dialogue between the 
theologies of the Third World, in which the theologies emerging from minorities in different countries 
all participate on an equal footing. But this further dialogue does not stop at the borders of the Third 
World. There have also been very profitable meetings with representatives of types of theological 
thinking that originate in Europe and North America. Then there is the encounter with the feminist 
perspective in theology and with the new and challenging contribution this is making. My 
impression is that the deeper importance of this dialogue is to be found, not in the coming together of 
theologians, but in the communication established among Christian communities and their respective 
historical, social, and cultural contexts, for these communities are the real subjects who are actively 
engaged in these discourses of faith" (italics added). 
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appropriated models and metaphors from the gospel and from any source 
they found valuable. Thus it is not surprising that different theological 
paradigms share what seem to be "the same" metaphors and models, e.g. 
redemption, sin, liberation, the kingdom of god. What differs with each 
paradigm, however, is the underlying metaphysical presuppositions and 
value judgements. 
Having gone on a somewhat lengthy tour to arrive at this point, let me 
review it briefly. In roughly chronological order - Hume and Kant deny 
the objective existence of god, leaving future theologians with a not 
insignificant epistemological issue on their hands. Schleiermacher 
defines religion as an "intuition of the universe" and radically de-
personalises "god", suggesting that "god" be understood instead as the 
"whence" of every aspect of the universe, from the greatest to the least. 
Ritschl insists that the kingdom of God is to be created on earth by the 
power of loving huni.an endeavours. The Social Gospel movement 
understands and expresses systemic sins in social, political, and economic 
terms. The "real" intentions and concerns of Jesus of Nazareth are called · 
into question. Faced with the horror of WWI, Barth seeks refuge in a 
familiar figure, an omnipotent, wholly-other deity who promises 
eventual salvation in a better realm. After WWII, and with it yet more 
humanly created horror in the form of the Holocaust and the dropping of 
the atomic bomb, the existentialists refuse Barth's turn to a personal god-
above. Like Schleiermacher earlier, they put their faith in the fact that 
anything is at all. Process theologians too reject the omnipotence and 
otherness of god, and insist on the relationality (for good and ill) of all 
that is, was, and ever will be. The 1960s erupt, and initially there is much 
theological-talk of taking responsibility for one's actions. In the US peace 
is demanded; love is celebrated; students, activists and a president are 
shot; race riots spread from city to city. The power of an elite few 
(primarily white) men to name god, to direct the affairs of the world, and 
to define the lives of entire categories of humanity is challenged and 
rejected by the laity in the Roman Catholic church, by the poor in Latin 
America, and by Black (primarily male) theologians in the US. This is the 
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theological inheritance and, combined with the emergence of second-




The Components of One Feminist Christian 
Theological Paradigm 
Having identified the formative theological influences upon the feminist 
christian theological paradigm I wish to examine, in this chapter I will 
identify and make explicit the metaphysical presuppositions, the 
underlying value judgements, and (some of) the metaphors and models 
that make up this paradigm. To do this I will engage in a close reading of 
three early and deeply influential essays: 'The Human Situation: A 
Feminine View', first published by Valerie Saiving in 1960 in The Journal 
of Religion (April, 1960); 'Motherearth and the Megamachine: A 
Theology of Liberation in a Feminine, Somatic and Ecological 
Perspective', first published by Rosemary Radford Ruether in Christianity 
and Crisis (April 12, 1972); and 'After the Death of God the Father', first 
published by Mary Daly in Commonweal (March 12, 1971). These three 
essays all appear in the first section (entitled 'The Essential Challenge') of 
the first anthology of constructive feminist theological texts, 
Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion, edited by Carol P. 
Christ and Judith Plaskow and first published in 1979.1 I accept Christ and 
1 Christ, Carol P. and Judith Plaskow, eds, Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion, 
Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1979. While published five years earlier, the 1974 text Religion and 
Sexism: Images of Women in the Jewish and Christian Traditions, edited by Rosemary Radford 
Ruether, is a compilation of essays written specifically to examine the role of religion (in the Jewish 
and christian traditions) in shaping traditional cultural images that are degrading to women. As such it 
is not explicitly concerned with constructive feminist theological efforts; rather, in it the authors 
highlight misogynist thoughts from the traditions' pasts and in so doing put forward the necessity to 
engage in non-misogynist constructive efforts. 
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Plaskow's designation of these essays as formative feminist christian 
theological texts, and in the course of this chapter will demonstrate how it 
is that collectively they do represent "the essential challenge" of one 
feminist christian theological paradigm. In addition to them I will refer 
to Daly's The Church and the Second Sex (1968), as well as to Beyond God 
the Father (1973), to Ruether's Liberation Theology (1972), and, lastly, to 
Sheila Collins' A Different Heaven and Earth (1974). 
Because, as I suggested in chapter one, a paradigm is composed of 
metaphysical presuppositions and value judgements as these are 
conveyed through the use of various metaphors and models, I will seek 
to identify the metaphysical presuppositions and value judgements 
within this feminist christian theological paradigm through an 
examination of the following key theological metaphors, each of which is 
used in one or more of the essays I examine: sin, love, revelation, 
salvation, incarnation, reconciliation, and messiah/ messianic. 
Additionally, I will discuss the following models as they are used in the 
texts: the cultivation of the garden, the body of God, and the second 
coming of God. Lastly, I will refer again to Thomas Kuhn's 
understanding of the process of creating a paradigm, in particular to his 
emphasis on the necessary formation of a new universe of discourse with 
which to speak of a new world(view). 
In 1960 Valerie Saiving published 'The Human Situation: A Feminine 
View',2 the essay now considered to mark the beginnings of (white, 
North American) feminist christian theology. The essay's impact on the 
1960 theological world was not, however, immediately transformative. 
Rather, it was discovered by women studying theology in the late 1960s 
and has come to be considered to be something which it was not when it 
was first published, i.e., the landmark feminist theological text.3 
2 Originally published in The Journal of Religion (April, 1960) by the University of Chicago Press, 
all citations in this thesis are from Valerie Saiving, 'The Human Situation: A Feminine View', in 
Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion, eds, Carol P. Christ and Judith Plaskow, Harper 
& Row, San Francisco, 1979, pp. 25-42. 
3 Christ and Plaskow, 'Introduction', in Womanspirit Rising, p. 21. 
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Saiving's central hypothesis was that, theologically, the "human 
condition" or the "human situation" (she used both terms 
interchangeably) had been characterised inadequately because it had been 
defined exclusively on the basis of "masculine experience". Further, she 
proposed that this inadequacy was particularly evident when one 
examined contemporary theological characterisations of love and sin.4 
Specifically, she chose to look at the theological metaphors sin and love 
because their contemporary characterisations (by males) as self-assertion 
and selflessness respectively seemed to Saiving to be related to "a 
widespread tendency in contemporary theology to describe man's 
predicament as arising from his separateness and anxiety occasioned by 
it ... ".5 In other words, Saiving believed that characterisations of sin and 
love were dependent on this specific understanding of "the hum.an 
condition". If separateness and anxiety did not characterise the experience 
of all humans, then these conceptualisations of the metaphors sin and 
love were inadequate. In short, Saiving questioned a primary 
metaphysical (in this instance anthropological) presupposition, the 
assumption that the human situation is always and everywhere that of 
alienation and estrangement, and two fundamental theological 
metaphors - love as entirely self-giving and self-sacrificial and sin as self-
assertion. Importantly, she was aware that "analys[es] of the human 
situation and the definitions of love and sin which accompany [them] are 
mutually dependent concepts".6 That is, she interpreted theology to be a 
whole composed of inter-related parts. Whenever one of the parts is 
altered so too are the other parts effected. This insight matches the 
understanding of the components of a disciplinary paradigm proposed in 
the first chapter. 
Basing her analysis on her own "experience and observation"7 she noted 
that as mothers women have been expected to give almost all of 
4 Saiving, 'The Human Situation', pp. 25-27. 
5 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
6 Ibid., p. 27. 
7 In 'The Human Situation' essay Saiving acknowledged that she was writing out of her "own 
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themselves to their infants and children. If contemporary male 
theologians (in particular she was responding to the work of Anders 
Nygren and Reinhold Niebuhr) were correct, this would imply that 
women as mothers were the most loving (self-giving) and least · sinful 
(self-asserting) members of humankind. However, Saiving went on to 
state her observation that "a woman can give too much of herself, so that 
nothing remains of her own uniqueness; she can become merely an 
emptiness, almost a zero, without value to herself, to her fellow men, or, 
perhaps, even to God."8 While contemporary (male) theological 
considerations of sin were grounded on the assumption that "man" pays 
too much self-referential attention to the "I" aspect of the "I-Thou" 
relationship, Saiving approached the subject from her own experience 
and detected a peculiarly "feminine" distortion of the I-Thou 
relationship - the "feminine" sin of self-negation rather than the 
"masculine" sin of self-elevation. 
Saiving drew her characterisation of "feminine sin" from her description 
of a mother's relationship to her child. Her analysis was based on a 
description of the undivided attention infants and children require in 
order to thrive. To the extent that infants and children do require an 
astonishing amount of care and attention in order to survive Saiving's 
description was also prescriptive - a prescription based it seems on her 
belief that a society that encourages women "to despise the functions of 
childbearing and nurture ... is in grave danger of bringing about its own 
destruction" .9 Yet her judgement of self-giving, self-transcending love 
differed radically from that of her contemporaries. While Saiving 
positively evaluated a mother's occasional experience of self-transcending 
love she also denied this experience be-all and end-all status. In her 
words, the attempt to "sustain a perpetual I-Thou relationship ... can be 
experience and observation as it [had] been clarified and substantiated" by the anthropological accounts 
of Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict and Ashley Montagu and the psychoanalytic perspectives of Helene 
Deutsch, Erich Fromm and Theodor Reik, as well as the sociological insights of Talcott Parsons. 
Ibid., p. 29. 
8 Ibid., p. 37. 
9 Ibid., p. 33. 
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deadly. The moments, hours, and days of self-giving must be balanced by 
moments, hours, and days of withdrawal into, and enrichment of, her 
individual selfhood if she is to remain a whole person 1110 (italics added). 
Saiving accepted as a given the fact that most women in all cultures are or 
become or have been mothers, but she refused to accept "motherhood" as 
exclusively definitive of women's situation or condition, in other words, 
of women's nature or being. She thus rejected the limits placed on 
"woman" by previous theological anthropologies, e.g. that a woman was 
fit by nature only to be "for birth and children" (the view of Jerome),11 
and she rejected also the notion that "woman's" being (physical, 
emotional, and spiritual) was inferior, of less worth and dignity (or, as 
Barth insisted, of a second ontological order)12 than "man's". Instead, she 
based her statements on an anthropological presupposition which I term 
"the full, unqualified humanity of women". This anthropological 
presupposition was a necessary corollary to her (value) judgement that a 
woman's life can and ought to be the life of "a whole person". That this 
presupposition and accompanying value judgement were strange and 
novel is evident by the implicit assumption in the following quote, to the 
effect that at the time Saiving was writing, women had to choose between 
being women or being fully human. Writing of the few women she 
knew who were questioning the adequacy of the then current conception 
of the universal "human" situation, Saiving said, "they want, in other 
words, to be both women and full human beings"13 (italics original). 
Regarding women's situation, her description highlighted the fact that 
many women's experience as a mother was not that of separation, 
lO Ibid., p.37. 
11 See Daly, Mary, The Church and The Second Sex, rev. ed., Beacon Press, Boston, 1985, p. 85. 
In 1964 Rosemary Ruether also publicly rejected the limits inherently placed on women by the 
Roman Catholic Church's refusal to approve of the use of artificial birth control. In an essay 
appearing in What Modem Catholics Think about Birth Control, Ruether wrote, "Such a request is 
simply a demand that I scuttle my interests, my training, and in the last analysis, my soul." Quoted 
in Daly, The Church and the Second Sex, p. 133. 
12 See Barth, Karl, 'The Doctrine of Creation', Church Dogmatics, vol. 3, sec. 4, eds, G. W. 
Bromily and T. F. Torrance, T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1961. " ... [I]n order she is woman, and 
therefore B, and therefore behind and subordinate to man [who is A]. ... She, too, has to realise that she 
is ordered, related and directed to man and has thus to follow the initiative which he must take." 
13 Saiving, 'The Human Situation', p. 36. 
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alienation, and estrangement, as the human situation had been defined 
by contemporary theologians, but very often that of enmeshment and 
utter involvement. She did not claim that women were incapable of the 
sin of pride or self-assertion, but that women's lived-experiences were 
more likely to put women at the risk of a different sort of sin altogether, 
and that this different sort of sin was the logical extension of what had 
been characterised by male theologians as the epitome of love. In short, 
Saiving proposed that "woman's" tendency toward self-
underdevelopment is as sinful and harmful to self, humanity and God as 
is "man's" temptation toward mis-placed pride of self and will to power. 
She thus transformed the metaphors sin and love, enlarging their scope 
and range of applicability. Rather than presenting a rigid contrast 
between them, her more open understanding of the metaphors sin and 
love was based on her recognition that, as regards their meaning, the 
metaphors sin and love are in a mutually interdependent relationship 
with "sinners" and "lovers". She assumed that who was doing the 
sinning or the loving was a theologically significant issue. As a 
consequence, when she looked at the lived experiences of the women she 
knew14 she realised that they were at risk of a different sort of sin than 
that defined by Nygren and Niebuhr. 
By beginning from this assumption Saiving argued that theology written 
from the perspective of male/masculine experience, although theretofore 
taken as normative and universally true, was in fact neither normative 
nor universal. Her point was that contemporary theologians had 
accepted as universal truth an understanding of the human situation 
based on the experiences of only half of the human race, the male half, 
which tended not to experience enmeshment and involvement with 
another's life to the same degree as women-as-mothers. Saiving exposed 
a fundamental anthropological assumption regarding humanity to be 
14 Importantly, Saiving wrote this essay in the context of a Western, industrialised, capitalistic 
society, as a relatively privileged member of that society. Her reflections applied specifically to those 
of white, middle or upper class, Western women and men and, as such, were devoid of any race or 
class analysis (not to mention her presumption of heterosexuality and motherhood as the norm for all 
women). See Plaskow, Judith, Sex, Sin and Grace: Women's Experience and the Theologies of 
Rheinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 1980, p. 2. 
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erroneously narrow, i.e., that "the human condition" was always and 
everywhere that of alienation and estrangement, and she showed how 
this error was sustained in the theological metaphors of love ( as self-
sacrifice) and sin (as self-assertion) that had been constructed to reflect and 
support this narrow view of "the universal condition of humanity". 
Methodologically, Saiving's approach involved examining and 
describing her own experience, exploring her interpretation of women's 
"condition" "in dialogue with other women", and using inter-
disciplinary sources in order to "clarify and substantiate" her knowledge 
claims.15 Before she could write 'The Human Situation', Saiving had 
first of all to question within herself the assumption that contemporary 
theologians' description of the human situation was accurate. 
Importantly, the theological paradigm within which she worked at the 
time neither questioned this assumption nor provided the impetus to 
question it. · The universal nature of the human situation was a 
fundamental "given", an implicit anthropological assumption grounding 
and pervading the christian theological paradigm within which she 
worked. When, within this paradigm, real, embodied women 
occasionally were noticed to be something of a problem or anomaly, the 
concept "woman" was categorically "adjusted" to fit within the 
"universal" understanding of "man".16 In Thomas Kuhn's words, the 
15 Saiving has written elsewhere: 
From ... personal history I draw two conclusions relevant to any exploration of the relations 
between feminism and process thought. On the one hand, not even an intimate acquaintance 
with Whitehead's ideas is capable of creating feminist consciousness; such consciousness arises 
out of a certain kinds [sic] of life experience, explored in dialogue with other women. On the 
other hand, feminist consciousness, once awakened, seeks a conceptual framework for self-
understanding, and process philosophy may provide such a framework (italics in original). 
Valerie C. Saiving, 'Androgynous Life: A Feminist Appropriation of Process Thought', in 
Feminism and Process Thought, ed, Sheila Greeve Davaney, The Edwin Mellen Press, 
Lewiston, New York, 1981, pp. 12-13. 
Her epistemological assumptions are more evident in this quote than they are in 'The Human 
Situation' essay, and include the following: making knowledge claims on the basis of lived 
experience, verifying these knowledge claims through discussion with others, and elaborating them 
through the process of dialogue instead of solitary reflection. 
16 Aquinas "adjusted" woman by assigning to "her" Aristotle's biological definition of woman as 
"mis-begotten male"; Jerome was willing for women to be women when involved with "birth and 
children;" however, " ... when she wishes to serve Christ more than the world, then she will cease to be 
a woman and will be called man (vir)." (quoted in Daly, The Church and the Second Sex, p. 85) 
Ambrose wrote, "she who does not believe is a woman and should be designated by the name of her 
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"body of intertwined theoretical and methodological belief that 
permit[ted] selection, evaluation and criticism"17 (or paradigm) within 
which Saiving worked accepted as a given the universality of the human 
condition. That "given" regarding theological selection (a "choice" of one 
universal understanding of humanity) in turn determined what could be 
evaluated: one universal understanding of the human situation. How 
then did Saiving come to step outside the theological paradigm of her 
time and question this universal theoretical premise? 
Kuhn posits the presence of an anomaly as a critical instigating factor in a 
paradigm shift, so perhaps Saiving's personal situation as an anomaly, 
that is, as a female theologian in a field dominated and defined primarily 
by white men, meant that she was not as committed to maintaining the 
worldview of the old paradigm - a worldview which did not include her 
existence as fully human subject. This is only speculation on my part; 
however, Mary Daly's experience in 1966 of being called "Miss Daly" by 
her colleagues at Boston College - when she possessed not one but three 
doctorates - lends credence to my supposhion that Dr Saiving was 
probably not perceived to fit seamlessly within the theological worldview 
of the 1950s.18 
Importantly, Saiving's analysis of the human situation included 1) a 
criticism of what had been presented as the universal human condition, 
2) a transformation of the theological understanding of the human 
condition, and 3) a reformulation of the metaphors sin and love in 
accordance with the new anthropological presupposition. This mirrors 
precisely three aspects of paradigm formation. Kuhn repeatedly states 
that "assimilating a new sort of fact demands a more than additiye 
adjustment of theory":19 that in fact a new paradigm requires changing 
sex, whereas she who believes progresses to perfect manhood ... " (Ibid). And Karl Barth believed that, 
ontologically, "man" was super-ordinate to "woman" and "woman" was sub-ordinate to "man". 
17 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 16-17. 
l8 Daly, Mary, Outercourse: The Be-Dau.ling Voyage, HarperCollins Publishers, San Francisco, 
1992, p. 89. 
19 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 53. 
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"the meaning of established and familiar concepts",20 and that "a new 
theory is always announced together with applications to some concrete 
range of natural phenomena" .21 
To conclude, Saiving set about transforming christian theological 
knowledge of the human situation by presenting a new anthropological 
presupposition (that of the full, unqualified humanity of women) 
through two revised metaphors, sin and love. Additionally, the values 
that informed her approach were significantly different from the values 
undergirding the old paradigm. For instance, Saiving considered that 
maintaining a "self" was both a necessary aspect of full humanity and of 
greater value than giving all of one's self away. Epistemologically, she 
assumed that her interpretation of her own experiences and observations 
(an interpretation made in dialogue with others) was sufficient to base a 
knowledge claim on, and, having made this epistemological shift, she 
exposed the fact that the consequence of denying the diversity of lived-
experience is found in the partiality of supposedly universal statements.22 
Rosemary Radford Ruether's essay, 'Motherearth and the Megamachine', 
published in 1972 in Christianity and Crisis as well as in her book 
Liberation Theology, is an extended reflection on "a set of dualities that 
still profoundly condition the modern worldview" .23 Her thesis was that 
christianity had inherited strands of Jewish apocalyptic thought which in 
turn had joined with and been reinforced by certain aspects of Platonic 
and neoplatonic thought. When combined, this inheritance proved to be 
profoundly "world-negating" and to make itself felt in particular on the 
bodies of women and the earth itself. 
All the basic dualities - the alienation of the mind from the 
body; the alienation of the subjective self from the objective 
20 Ibid., p. 108. 
21 Ibid., p. 46. 
22 See footnote 14. 
23 Rosemary Radford Ruether, 'Motherearth and the Megamachine: A Theology of Liberation in a 
Feminine, Somatic and Ecological Perspective', in Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in 
Religion, eds, Carol P. Christ and Judith Plaskow, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1979, p. 43. 
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world; the subjective retreat of the individual, alienated from 
the social community; the domination or rejection of nature 
by spirit - these all have roots in the apocalyptic-Platonic 
religious heritage of classical Christianity. But the alienation 
of the masculine from the feminine is the primary sexual 
symbolism that sums up all these alienations. The psychic 
traits of intellectuality, transcendent spirit, and autonomous 
will that were identified with the male left the woman with 
the contrary traits of bodiliness, sensuality, and subjugation. 
Society, through the centuries, has in every way profoundly 
conditioned men and women to play out their lives and find 
their capacities within this basic antithesis.24 
As she traces the origins of these dualities, Ruether identifies in the 
Jewish tradition a shift away from an earth-based religion, like that of the 
Canaanites, towards a historical faith. In other words, she suggests that as 
Jewish thought developed, the religious concept of "the renewal of life" 
was more and more cut off from the earth or from any natural processes. 
Instead, such renewal was understood to come with the future as opposed 
to from the earth. Increasingly, this future hope was then identified not 
with any actual historical possibility but with "the apocalyptic negation of 
history itself, [with] a cataclysmic world destruction and angelic new 
creation" .25 This shift in emphasis from this world to a hoped-for~future-
world was accompanied by a value judgement: this material world was 
considered inferior to · that which was to come. Unfortunately, this 
judgement of the earth as an inferior place resonated with two closely 
related strands of Platonic thought: Plato's insistence on the absolute 
distinction between bodies and souls and his characterisation of the 
female body as an inferior home (when compared with the male body) 
for the soul. While the soul's desired home was in the heavens, that is, 
the ideal was the soul freed from any body at all (described by Ruether in 
terms of "liberation [as] a flight from the earth to a changeless, infinite 
world beyond"26); while on the earth it was far better to be incarnate in 
male than in female form. In Ruether's words, "Christianity brought 
together both of these myths - the myth of world cataclysm and the myth 
24 Ibid., p. 44. 
25 Ibid., p. 44. 
26 Ibid., p. 48. 
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of the flight of the soul to heaven" .27 Instead of treating them as myths, 
however, in christian thought they were accepted as fundamental 
metaphysical presuppositions. 
Ruether's two-sentence description of the effect of these presuppositions 
on "man's" psyche served to identify the "why" behind the ecological 
crisis (with which she was and remains deeply concerned), sexism, 
racism, classism and colonisation. 
What we see in this development is a one-sided expression 
of the ego, claiming its transcendental autonomy by negating 
the finite matrix of existence. This antithesis is projected 
socially by identifying woman as the incarnation of this 
debasing threat of bodily existence, while the same polarized 
model of the psyche is projected politically upon suppressed 
or conquered social groups (italics added).28 
In accepting as descriptive of reality itself an understanding of the 
material stuff of this earth as being of less inherent value and worth than 
the "stuff" of a future earth (an entirely new creation) and in accepting as 
descriptive of reality itself an understanding of all human bodies (but 
female bodies most of all) as being of less inherent value and worth than 
a distinct and separable soul that seeks eternal life in a place not of this 
world, i.e., heaven, the early church Fathers contributed to the 
establishment of a dualistic worldview integral to which was the 
denigration and devaluation of this world and this-worldly, especially 
female, bodies. For two millennia (in the christian west, at least) social 
reality has been constructed on the basis of this dualistic worldview. As a 
result, noted Ruether, at this time a woman " ... literally finds reality itself 
stacked against her, making the combination of maternal and masculine 
occupations all but impossible without extraordinary energy or enough 
wealth to hire domestic help" (italics original). She went on to say, 
"women simply cannot be persons within the present system of work and 
27 Ibid., p. 49. 
28 Ibid. 
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family, and they can only rise to liberated personhood by the most radical 
and fundamental reshaping of the entire human environment ... ".29 
Ruether's point was that the "modern technological environment" had 
been constructed to keep all but the most extraordinary (and generally 
elite) women firmly in their "place", that is, living according to the roles 
assigned to women - as wife and mother and homemaker .30 
Accordingly, she understood the physical (as in physically created) 
structure of Western culture, particularly urban centres, to have been 
constructed on the basis of a set of erroneous metaphysical 
presuppositions and their accompanying value judgements, i.e., that 
female bodies are of less inherent worth and value than male bodies, that 
separable souls exist and are of more value than mortal bodies, and that 
this earth is of less inherent worth and value than a future creation. 
Importantly, while implicitly rejecting these metaphysical 
presuppositions as factually erroneous (and rejecting their accompanying 
value judgements as morally untenable), Ruether contended that any 
society constructed on the basis of them in effect turned them into reality. 
In other words, these metaphysical presuppositions became so embedded 
in the social fabric and the psyches of the men and women constructing 
that society that they did shape reality: the subjugation of women as a 
category influenced the construction of the physical environments in 
which we all live and work, as well as the reality of the global oppression 
of the poor and the destruction of the earth's natural resources. 
Accordingly, she recognised a pressing need to name alternative 
metaphysical presuppositions, and to base the structure of a new social 
reality upon them. However, in order to express these new metaphysical 
29 Ibid., p. 44. 
30 Ibid. "The plan of our cities is made in this image: The sphere of domesticity, rest, and 
childrearing where women are segregated is clearly separated from those corridors down which men 
advance in assault upon the world of 'work'." There is in this essay an implicit assumption that a 
"wife" and "mother" would never have to work outside the "home" in order to support herself, her 
children, or her male partner. There is thus a class and race-bias running throughout this piece, and 
Ruether's interpretation of modem social reality is incomplete, focused as it is almost exclusively on 
the corridors of power. 
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presuppositions she needed to use new (or, more accurately, transformed) 
metaphors and models. 
Therefore, using the familiar metaphors "humanity", "reconciliation", 
"salvation", "messianic", and "earth", she tells a new story, a story in 
which she introduces the model of "the cultivation of the garden" and 
radically transforms the model of "the body of God". Above all else her 
story is based on a set of radically different metaphysical presuppositions 
than the ones she outlined in the first part of her essay. "Reconciliation" 
is the most prominent metaphor in this new story, appearing when she 
describes the "new humanity" she envisions: "a new humanity arising 
out of the reconciliation of spirit and body".31 "Reconciliation" appears 
again when she describes what she is writing toward: "a posttechnological 
religion of reconciliation with the body, the woman and the world", and 
yet again when she writes about this religion: "its salvation myth will not 
be one of divinization and flight from the body but of humanization and 
reconciliation with the earth".32 Finally, in describing "the new earth" 
she writes that "the new earth must be one where people are reconciled 
with their labor ... a world where people are reconciled to their own 
finitude ... " _33 
Theologically Ruether is making an extraordinary shift when she uses the 
metaphor "reconciliation" in these sentences, for it is evident that she is 
not presupposing a god as the active reconciling agent in her "salvation 
myth". Traditionally, "reconciliation" is understood to be accomplished 
by god and god alone. That is, humanity was (after the fall) 
metaphysically characterised as separate from and in need of 
reconciliation with god, but only god could do the reconciling. Humans, 
in the traditional account of reconciliation, are individual, passive 
31 Ibid., p. 51. The "humanity" she envisions is thus never disembodied, not even (perhaps 
especially not) theoretically or in the abstract. Descartes' famous pronouncement concerning his 
existence, "cogito ergo sum", or "I think therefore I am", is literally nonsensical when the fact of 
human bodies is accepted as inseparable from the fact of human existence. 
32 Ibid., p. 52. 
33 Ibid. 
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recipients of god's grace. As Ruether uses the metaphor however, people 
working together are the ones who must accomplish their own 
reconciliation, who must reacquaint themselves with their own bodies, 
must stop trying to separate their own (or others') bodies and souls and 
intellects, and must acknowledge their dependent relationship upon this 
earth and all the creatures who inhabit it, including each other. The 
"new humanity" she envisions is thus comprised of a reconciled people 
forming a society (in the largest sense of that term) that does not structure 
any lives on the bases of hierarchical dualities but that does acknowledge 
the embodied limits and finitude of humankind as well as the double-
edged character of human intellectual and technological abilities.34 
Ruether's conception of "reconciliation" is thus a careful 
acknowledgement that, individually, "full personhood" has a communal, 
participatory component and involves the embodiment of intellect and 
spirit, and that, collectively, social reality is inextricably both technological 
(or humanly created) and natural.35 Reconciliation, as she envisions it, 
leads to the possibility of salvation. 
Not surprisingly, "salvation" in this schema refers to a collective, 
ongoing process, expressed by Ruether through the model, "the 
cultivation of the garden". "Our model is neither the romanticized 
primitive jungle nor the modern technological wasteland. Rather it 
expresses itself in a new command to learn to cultivate the garden .... "36 
34 Ibid., p. 50. Ruether discusses the situation where, in the West, "alienated members of the 
dominant society are seeking new communal, egalitarian life-styles, ecological living patterns, and the 
redirection of psychic energy toward reconciliation with the body" but amongst "insurgent Third World 
peoples, [their] aspirations rise along the lines of the traditional rise of civilization through group 
pride, technological domination of nature and antagonistic, competitive relationships between 
peoples". Ruether notes that Western human potential movements are "elitist, privatistic, esthetic and 
devoid of a profound covenant with the poor and oppressed of the earth". And she notes also that, as 
regards the Third World, "such tendencies might be deplored by those who so far have monopolized 
technology and now believe they have seen the end of its fruitfulness, but they must be recognized as 
still relevant to the liberation of the poor and oppressed from material necessity and psychological 
dependency". Hers is thus not a facile embrace of the body and rejection of technology. Instead, she 
is attempting a "both/and" rather than an "either/or" theological approach. Which aspect she 
emphasises at any one time is always relative to the context about which she is writing at that time. 
35 Regarding the communal element of personhood, seep. 51, where she writes of a "communal 
personhood that could participate in the successes of others rather than seeing these as merely a threat 
to one's own success." 
36 Ibid., p. 52. 
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Within this model "salvation" is not the sole prerogative of a god above; 
it is neither an eternal state nor is it concerned with bodiless souls. 
Instead it is brought down to earth and reconnected to the soil, to physical 
matter, while simultaneously allowed a historical aspect. Rather than a 
one-off event, "the cultivation of the garden" is a process that takes place 
in history and must continually be enacted by finite historical agents. 
Salvation is thus a communal process, one firmly rooted in "the finite 
matrix of existence". To put it another way, whether salvation happens 
or not is up to constantly changing communities, whose members are 
constantly being born and dying, each one with a unique relationship to 
and dependency upon the earth. For the communities to endure (in 
history) the earth must be cultivated with extreme care. Therefore the 
site of salvation, or the cultivation of the garden, is this earth. Again, 
salvation is the work, not of a god above or a god-on-earth-for-a-little-
minute, but of reconciled humanity, which is inspired by a value 
judgement in the form of "a polylinguistic appreciativeness that can 
redeem local space, time, and identity" .37 Practically speaking, this means 
that non-human creation no less than humanity is acknowledged to be 
diverse, and accompanying this acknowledgement is an appreciation of 
diversity, of plurality. Finally, in the garden "the powers of rational 
consciousness come together with the harmonies of nature 1n 
partnership" .38 
As she envisions it, "in the garden" humanity is totally reconciled with 
the earth, but this involves more than acknowledging human 
dependency for life on the rest of creation. Humans are that part of the 
earth able to contemplate and direct the effects of their actions upon the 
rest of creation. Salvation therefore involves the careful redirection of 
human actions that have been perceived to be harmful to other aspects of 
creation. Salvation, in short, is about enabling the renewal of life, and 




personalities, but is about enabling the possibility of life itself. In other 
words, salvation is about caring for "the finite matrix of existence". This 
is, I suggest, what Ruether meant when she named her essay "a theology 
of liberation in a feminine, somatic and ecological perspective" (italics 
added). Salvation, as expressed through the model "the cultivation of the 
garden", is an ongoing, active and always partial and incomplete process. 
It is realised (and not realised) on earth in history through human 
actions. Importantly, underlying and supporting Ruether's "salvation 
myth" is an implicit metaphysical presupposition, that of the inherent 
integrity of non-human creation. By this expression, "the inherent 
integrity of non-human creation", I mean to point toward Ruether's 
affirmation of the value of creation apart from humankind. This 
affirmation, which is simultaneously a value judgement and a 
metaphysical presupposition, is a central tenet in her thought. Put 
positively, "the finite matrix of existence" is blessed and good in and of 
itself. Put negatively, non-human creation is not to be perceived solely as 
a resource for humankind to use until it runs out. The earth and the 
creatures of the earth do not exist merely as "means" to human "ends", 
but are inherently worthy in and of themselves. 
Another model for the reconciled humanity whose work is the 
cultivation of the garden (or the ongoing process of salvation) is "the 
body of God". When Ruether writes of a "messianic appearing of the 
body of God" the '1Jody" of which she writes is clearly communal. As 
community(ies), the body of God (reconciled humanity) makes incarnate 
"a living pattern of mutuality between men and women, between parents 
and children, among people in their social, economic, and political 
relationships and, finally, between mankind [sic] and the organic 
harmonies of nature" .39 Further, the "messianic" (meaning, as she uses 
the term, salvific - but not tied in any way to an individual saviour) aim 
of the body of God "must be the total abolition of the social pattern of 
39 Ibid. In the "body of God" model I also read the merest hint of a possibility that non-human earth 
creatures as well as the physical soil, rock, water, and air of the earth are an integral part of the body 
of God, but to be truthful I am probably projecting later Ruether back into this early essay. 
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domination and subjugation and the erection of a new communal social 
ethic. We need to build a new cooperative social order out beyond the 
principles of hierarchy, rule, and competitiveness."40 In keeping with the 
language of this quote, which is strikingly reminiscent of that of the 
Social Gospel movement, the task of the ''body of God" ( or reconciled 
humanity) about which Ruether writes is to bring about the kingdom of 
God on earth. 
To summarise, where there once was a transcendent god, there is in 
Ruether's thought a reconciled humanity. What was formerly God's 
work, the work of reconciliation and salvation, is in Ruether's thought 
humanity's work. Where there once was a heaven above, there is in 
Ruether's thought a "finite matrix of existence". Where there once were 
souls temporarily housed in more or less satisfactory bodies, in Ruether's 
thought there are finite persons, each embodied and each endowed with 
the capacity to participate for a limited time in the thoughtful, ongoing, 
communal creation of salvation on earth. To repeat, there is no 
transcendent god in Ruether's 'Motherearth and the Megamachine' 
essay.41 She does not posit on the part of humankind a need for a single 
saviour figure or for eternal individual salvation, and she likewise rejects 
the metaphysical presupposition of a heaven above. She affirms the full, 
unqualified humanity of women, but asserts that the traditional christian 
metaphysical presupposition denying the full humanity of women has 
caused social reality to be constructed in such a way as to make almost 
impossible the full, living personhood of all but "an elite few" women;42 
Likewise, she acknowledges that the same set of metaphysical dualities 
has been used to deny the full humanity of non-elite men of all races and 
4o Ibid., p. 51. 
41 Just exactly how Ruether does characterise "god" is a critical question, and one I will take up and 
explore in chapter six. This essay is typical Ruether, however, in that usually she writes of "god" not 
at all, other than to identify how past ( elite male) theologians have characterised "him". 
42 Ibid., p. 44. Ruether never denies the full humanity of anyone - male or female, oppressor or 
oppressed - but with her use of the expression "full personhood" she indicates that human lives can be 
thwarted or not allowed to develop to their fullest potential, a practice that is enabled precisely when 
the "full, unqualified humanity" of any category of people is disallowed by the prevailing 
metaphysical presuppositions. It is noteworthy that she criticises Karl Barth precisely for 
perpetuating an understanding of "woman" as subordinate to "man". Seep. 50. 
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classes, as well as to justify the domination of the earth and the creatures 
of the earth. She replaces the metaphysical presupposition/value 
judgement that ranked humankind but a little lower than angels (and 
much higher than the earth or the creatures of the earth) with the 
metaphysical presupposition of the inherent integrity of all non-human 
creation, and she judges the lived-consequences of the previous dualistic 
metaphysical presuppositions harshly. She presents a new worldview 
through the transformed metaphors "reconciliation", "salvation", 
"humanity", "messianic" (transformed in that she does not associate that 
which is "messianic" or salvific with a single saviour figure) and "earth" 
(a transformed metaphor because Ruether tacitly accepts the earth as a 
part of the finite matrix of existence and does not denigrate or devalue it 
as mere matter). As well she expands on the metaphor "salvation" via 
the model "the cultivation of the garden", and lastly she completely 
recreates the model "the body of God", applying it in a communal sense 
to her vision of a new, reconciled humanity. 
In short, in 'Motherearth and the Megamachine' Ruether writes from a 
whole new set of metaphysical presuppositions. Whereas Saiving had 
proposed one new anthropological presupposition through two 
transformed metaphors, Ruether introduces two new models and at least 
five transformed metaphors in order to express a new theological 
worldview. Saiving's anthropological presupposition (that of the full, 
unqualified humanity of women) and metaphors (sin and love as both 
self- and other-negating and self- and other-affirming) are implicit within 
this new worldview. But Ruether presents an entire (at least in 
rudimentary form) metaphysical outlook when she denies the existence 
of a future new creation wholly other than this earth and insists that 
"salvation" involves, at a minimum, the ongoing renewal of non-
human creation and is the responsibility of humankind.43 Additionally, 
she expresses the vast scope of one feminist christian theological 
endeavour when she presents the means (through her identification of 
43 Ruether thus implicitly embraces as well a transformed understanding of eschatology (the study of 
end or last times). 
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those hierarchical dualisms in which all that is spiritual, intellectual, 
rational, good, holy, pure, light, above, etc. is identified with men - and 
in particular with elite males - and all that is physical, earthly, emotional, 
bad, evil, dirty, dark, below, etc. is identified with women and/ or non-
elite males, depending on context) for other feminist theologians to 
discern how reality as known in Western culture has been ordered 
through the ages by elite males. For Ruether, feminist christian theology 
was and is about nothing less than the re-ordering of reality itself.44 
Along with Ruether, Mary Daly was one of the first to grasp the nature 
and extent of this task. In her essay, 'After the Death of God the Father', 
Daly begins by noting that the women's liberation movement had by that 
time already identified "the oppressive character of our cultural 
institutions" as well as a long history of misogyny in "the Judaic-
Christian tradition". She goes on to say, "we now have to ask how the 
women's revolution can and should change our whole vision of 
reality" .45 Immediately, then, Daly makes explicit the fact that positing 
new metaphysical assumptions, or a new vision of reality, is a central 
element in her work. Strikingly, Daly begins to answer her own question, 
how can the women's revolution change reality, by discussing "values". 
Continuous with this emphasis she later discusses what she terms "the 
transvaluation of values", a process she believes is propelled by the 
"becoming of women", which is in turn only possible when the pre-
existing, constrictive metaphysical presuppositions concerning "woman" 
have been called into question.46 To understand why "values" are so 
44 See also Collins, A Different Heaven and Earth, pp. 16 and 189. Sheila Collins describes as a 
"predominant theme" amongst early feminist theologians the attempt "to find new criteria by which to 
order reality". She also names as a fundamental feminist theological issue the effort "to enable others 
to see through the cracks of the present reality system ... ". This supports my contention that feminist 
christian theology involved, from its inception, a metaphysical component. Not incidentally, Collins 
continues by asserting that a "new language" is needed to convey a different reality. 
45 Daly, Mary, 'After the Death of God the Father', in Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in 
Religion, eds, Carol P. Christ and Judith Plaskow, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1979, pp. 53-54. 
46 Ibid., p. 60. Daly writes, "The becoming of women implies also a transvaluation of values in 
Christian morality. As the old order is challenged and as men and women become freed to experience 
a wholeness of personality which the old polarizations impeded, the potentiality will be awakened for 
a change in moral consciousness which will go far beyond Nietzsche's merely reactionary rejection of 
Christian values." See also Daly, Mary, Beyond God the Father, Beacon Press, Boston, 1973, p. 36, 
where she writes "[women's] exclusion from identity within patriarchy has had a totality about it 
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important in her thought it is necessary to note that throughout this essay 
Daly inextricably links "values" with "culture", repeatedly implying that 
the structures, ideologies and symbol systems of a culture are the outward 
manifestations of that culture's values. According to Daly, religion, or a 
"belief system", plays a significant role in this process. 
What is happening, of course, is the familiar mechanism by 
which the images and values of a given society are projected 
into a realm of beliefs, which in tum justify the social 
infrastructure. The belief system becomes hardened and 
objectified, seeming to have an unchangeable independent 
existence and validity of its own. It resists social change 
which would rob it of its plausibility. Nonetheless, despite 
the vicious circle, change does occur in society, and 
ideologies die, though they die hard.47 
Daly implies that in order for social change to occur on a widespread scale 
the values and images supporting the status quo must first be questioned. 
Accordingly, she asserts that the "women's revolution" calls into 
question at least two fundamental cultural images, that of "masculinity" 
and its inherently less worthy counterpart, "femininity". Daly describes 
"the eternal masculine stereotype" as connoting "hyper-rationality,· 
'objectivity', aggressivity, the possession of dominating and manipulative 
attitudes toward persons and environment, and the tendency to construct 
boundaries between the self (and those identified with the self) and the 
'other'". She then describes "the eternal feminine" as "hyperemotional, 
passive, self-abasing, etc.". 48 
which, when faced, calls forth an ontological self-affirmation". Metaphysics and, broadly speaking, 
ethics are thus distinct but inseparable (better, they are two sides of the same coin) in Daly's thought. 
Values and metaphysical presuppositions support and sanction (justify) each other, and to challenge 
one is to call into question the other as well. 
47 Daly, 'After the Death of God the Father', p. 54. Presumably by the terms "familiar mechanism" 
and "projected" Daly is referring to the thought of Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud, 
each of whom, albeit differently, posited "god" as a human creation onto whom humans continually 
projected their own hopes and fears and fantasies. 
48 Ibid., p. 55. There are a few problematic elements in her account of the "eternal" masculine and 
feminine stereotypes, most particularly the way in which she applies them to all cultures in the world 
since time immemorial. (Saiving's description of "women's experience of motherhood" was similarly 
sweeping.) However, as descriptive of white, North American images of masculinity and femininity 
prevalent at the very least in the latter third of the twentieth century, I take her descriptions to be quite 
accurate. 
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She characterises these images as partial "caricatures" of human beings, 
and goes on to say that "by becoming whole persons, women can generate 
a counterforce to the stereotype ... as they challenge the artificial 
polarization of human characteristics".49 The notion of "becoming" is 
critical in this essay; unfortunately, it is also complicated, for with the one 
term or metaphor Daly is alluding to both the ontological potential of an 
individual (or category of humanity) and that individual's (or category's) 
anthropological actualisation of her or his potential. Like Saiving and 
Ruether, Daly envisions a social reality, or a culture, in which women are 
able to become "whole persons" (Saiving and Daly) or to achieve "full, 
liberated personhood" (Ruether). She values human "wholeness" rather 
than prescribed (that is, metaphysically-defined and sanctioned) partiality. 
Once again linking the metaphysical notion of "wholeness" with values, 
she writes, "this becoming of whole human beings will affect the values 
of our society, for it will involve a change in the fabric of human 
consciousness"(italics in original).50 As in Ruether's essay, the 
implication in Daly's thought is that social reality is physically 
constructed on the basis of those values and metaphysical 
presuppositions that constitute the prevailing "fabric of human 
consciousness". Like Saiving and Ruether, Daly suggests that the full 
potential of women's and men's lives has been thwarted because 
"woman" and "man" (and by implication real live women and men) 
have been assigned only a limited range of supposedly suitable 
metaphysical characteristics.51 In her words, she "wishes to foster the 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 To a much greater extent in The Church and the Second Sex, Beyond God the Father, and 
Gyn/Ecology than in 'After the Death of God the Father', Daly traces male thought patterns that 
justified, sanctioned and sometimes initiated social "policing" of women's lives, or women's 
"becoming". I do not wish to imply that Daly's gift to feminist theology is her ability as a historian. 
What is remarkable about her work, however, is her ability to discern underlying metaphysical 
presuppositions and value judgements that deny the full, unqualified humanity of women-as-a-
category, or women-in-the-abstract. Above all else Daly is concerned to liberate the image or the 
symbol "woman" from several millennia of devalued confinement, for example, as only virgin, wife 
or whore. I believe that her whole body of work can be interpreted as an effort to create a theoretical 
"space" in which real live (and diverse numbers of) women can explore their ontological potentialities. 
A close reading of Daly indicates that she wishes for women's ontological potential never to be 
limited by inhibiting metaphysical presuppositions again. This is, at any rate, how I interpret Daly, 
and I believe it makes sense of her apparent confusion when real live women suggest to her that they 
are not represented in her work; indeed they are not, nor did she ever intend to write them in. Instead, 
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evolution of consciousness beyond the oppressiveness and imbalance 
reflected and justified by symbols and doctrines throughout the millennia 
of patriarchy" .52 And, again like Ruether, Daly suggests that human 
beings are thoroughly communal, or are in some way dependent on a 
supportive community in order to become ever more wholly who they 
are. "[H]uman beings are called to self-actualization and to the creation of 
a community that fosters the becoming of women and men."53 Thus her 
self-proclaimed goal of "the evolution of consciousness" beyond 
constricting metaphysical presuppositions regarding "woman" and 
"man" is dependent for its realisation upon a widespread, cultural 
metanoia (conversion). That is, unless one is a member of a community 
(and she would likely agree, society) that supports one's full, unqualified 
humanity, one's potential "becoming" will inevitably be hindered 
because one cannot actualise any potential that one is a priori deemed not 
to possess.54 
Beginning, then, with the metaphysical presupposition of the full, 
unqualified humanity of women, and linking this presupposition with 
the wide scale transformation of cultural images, symbols and value 
judgements concerning the relative worth of women and men, with 
what models and metaphors does Daly attempt to "rernythologize" 
christianity?55 In this essay Daly presents one revised model, that of "the 
second coming of god", and she presents a transformed account of the 
metaphors "incarnation", "revelation", and "sin". In order to understand 
Daly's revised account of "incarnation" (and following from it, her 
account of "the second corning of god") it is necessary to begin with her 
she invites her readers to live their own lives in the absence (or at least with the awareness of the 
shadow) of centuries of debilitating, misogynist metaphysical presuppositions. 
52 Daly, 'After the Death of God the Father', p. 56. 
53 Ibid., p. 59. 
54 In this regard Daly noted that Karl Barth posited "woman" as "ontologically subordinate to man", 
which makes it impossible for any woman to be perceived as an equal to any man. Ibid., p. 3. 
55 Ibid., p. 59. Regarding a perceived need to "remythologize" Western religions, see also Collins, 
A Different Heaven and Earth, p. 21. It is notable also that Ruether wrote of a new "salvation myth" 
rather than insist on the eternal truth of one version of "salvation". I suggest that all of these writers 
are aware of the transitory nature of human understanding or "truth" claims, but are simultaneously 
aware of a human need to "myth" the point in order to understand at all. 
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preferred model for "god", which she borrows directly from Paul Tillich, 
that is, "god" as the power and ground of being. Daly acknowledges that 
"Tillich's language of transcendence" is not the only language adequate to 
the task of representing or alluding to that which is of ultimate concern; 
she notes that "that of Whitehead, James, Jaspers - or an entirely new 
language - may do as well or better".56 Nonetheless in this essay she does 
insist that "authentic religious consciousness" is possible only when 
"courage in the face of anxiety" is embraced by an individual. She thus, 
for no apparent reason, ties herself to Tillich's very individualistic notion 
of "the courage to be", which means, roughly, to affirm continually one's 
existence in the face of non-being, and in so doing she contradicts her 
earlier emphasis on the necessarily communal element of an 
individual's "whole" personhood. Within her own expressed 
metaphysical presuppositions this notion does not fit. She uses Tillich's 
"god" language, however, because she believes that his model, "god" as 
the power and ground of all being, is almost impossible to use to sanction 
the subordination or oppression of any aspect of reality, human or non-
human. On the level of image, "the power and ground of being" 
supports and indeed suffuses all that is, which does fit within her 
metaphysical presuppositions, and which thought leads directly to Daly's 
transformed understanding of the metaphor "incarnation". 
Rather than accept the traditional understanding of "incarnation" as 
limited to God the Father becoming incarnate (literally, in the flesh) 1n 
Jesus of Nazareth, Daly extends the notion of "incarnation" to include all 
of humanity. 
As a uniquely masculine divinity loses credibility, so also the 
idea of a unique divine incarnation in a human being of the 
male sex may give way in the religious consciousness to an 
increased awareness of the divine presence in all human 
beings, understood as expressing and in a real sense 
56 Daly, 'After the Death of God the Father', p. 58. This statement is significant (in that it supports 
my contention in the last chapter of the influence of existentialist and process thought on feminist 
christian theology) because here Daly takes up an existentialist approach to god-talk while explicitly 
acknowledging the plausibility of Whitehead's process approach. 
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incarnating - although always inadequately - the power of 
being.57 
Just as Ruether described a reconciled humanity as being 11the body of 
God", Daly describes the communal awakening of women 11to their 
human potential" in terms of god being made manifest in themselves, 
that is, in the lives of women living in to their full potential rather than 
according to a restrictive set of alienating stereotypes. She calls this 
development "the Second Coming of God incarnate", which is, not 
incidentally, a theological equivalent of waving a red flag at a wounded 
bull.58 However, when read through the lens provided by her earlier 
comments on incarnation this statement cannot be interpreted as poetic 
embellishment, but must be taken literally. She sees women, via the 
women's liberation movement, as both embodying and expressing the 
power of being (which is "god") in a manner heretofore unknown.59 
"The second coming of god" is thus a model expressive of both "god" as 
the power and ground of being and Daly's understanding of the category 
"won1en" as participating in making "god" incarnate, or making actual 
that which is, without the full participation of womankind no less than 
mankind, only potential. 
One of the more profound theological implications of Daly's assertion 
that the ground and power of being (god) is made incarnate in human 
lives is that, in so characterising "god", she must deny the notion of 
divine aseity, or self-sufficiency. In other words, implicit in her claim 
57 Ibid., p. 59. 
58 Ibid., p. 60. Traditionally (at least since CE 150 and Justin's Apology) the parousia, or the 
second coming, has been conceived as the triumphant return to earth of Christ, expressed in the Nicene 
creed through the words, "He will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead." To 
characterise the second coming as happening in ordinary women's lives is thus quite a theological 
shift. 
59 Ibid., pp. 54-55. Daly describes the "women's revolution" as "transforming the fabric of society 
from patriarchy into something that never existed before - into a diarchical situation that is radically 
new". She says also, "What I am discussing here is an emergence of women such as has never taken 
place before." I take her comments to mean that she believes that at this time the "emergence of 
women" is happening on such a scale as to bring about the cultural transformation of those 
metaphysical presuppositions that had equated "woman" with "feminine". In other words, she 
perceives the women's revolution as having the strength to alter "society's" prevailing assumptions 
about men and women. Unfortunately, which society she is talking about she never indicates, 
although she does discuss Western religion. 
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that humanity makes "god" incarnate is the idea that, at least to some 
degree, "god" needs humanity in order to be made incarnate in that 
particular manner. Or, humanity makes actual a part of "god" which is, 
without humanity, only potential. If, as Daly implies, the ground and 
power of being can only exist in conjunction with and be known through 
being-itself, then insofar as humankind is a unique aspect of being, 
individual humans make incarnate unique aspects of "god". Practically 
expressed, as babies are born into the world, so too is "god" born anew; as 
people die, so too do different incarnations of "god" die. "God", far from 
being self-sufficient and immutable (or unchanging), needs humankind 
to make actual aspects of the power of being. This means, though, that 
"god" is constantly changing just as humans are constantly changing -
physically, or as they are physically incarnate, and experientially, or as 
they incorporate new experiences into their lives and are affected by those 
experiences. 
This implication, that the power and ground of being is ever-changing 
because being-itself is ever-changing, is not explicitly named by Daly in 
this essay.60 Nonetheless in order for her one sentence description of 
"revelation" to make sense, the idea that being-itself as well as the ground 
and power of being is ever-changing is a necessary metaphysical 
presupposition. This is the case because when Daly asserts that she is 
critical of what she terms "idolatry" that is often disguised as "faith" or 
"revelation", she explains herself by stating that "revelation is an ongoing 
experience" .61 She says nothing more about revelation, but to posit it as 
ongoing is to refute the idea that "revelation" could ever be contained in 
the life-event of a particular individual or in a set of writings about a past 
historical figure. If "revelation" has something to do with the expression 
of that which is of ultimate concern (her understanding, again following 
Tillich, of "faith"), and if "revelation" is ongoing, then what is of 
ultimate concern cannot be static and immutable, but must change as 
60 It is noteworthy that this implication strongly resonates with process thought, more so, in fact, 
than with an existentialist approach. 
6l Daly, 'After the Death of God the Father', p. 60. 
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being-itself changes. Thus no single revelation could ever be sufficient or 
expressive of the entire "truth" of being, and to suggest otherwise would 
indeed be idolatrous.62 To put it another way, because being-itself is 
unfinished, to latch onto any one manifestation of it as completely 
revelatory of "god" or the whole ground and power of being (which is 
also mutable and, by implication, incomplete) is to participate in idol 
worship. 
From this metaphysical ground it is but a short step to Daly's 
understanding of "sin", which, although she does not expressly define it, 
can be stated as anything that inhibits or renders impossible the 
"becoming" (again a term best understood as the anthropological 
actualisation of ontological potential) of any body or category of bodies. 
Or, to turn it around, that which is oppressive is sinful. What Daly 
stresses, however, is that beneath outward manifestations of sin, or actual 
instances of the oppression of (an)other(s), there are underlying beliefs 
and structures that promote and enable the oppression of entire categories 
of "others" _63 Traditional christian conceptualisations of sin as an 
individual's action against "God" or "God's" commandments are 
described by Daly as examples of "a privatized morality" .64 Such a 
"privatized morality" can neither acknowledge nor condemn the fact of 
structures of oppression, e.g. laws, public policies, unspoken practices and 
62 In chapter twelve of Liberation Theology (entitled 'Latin American Liberation Theology and the 
Birth of a Planetary Humanity', which indicates her stance toward the full, unqualified humanity of all) 
Rosemary Ruether defines "revelation" as "that redeeming and liberating insight which makes people 
aware of the social contradictions that define their lives, and thrusts them toward a process of 
liberation from dependency and oppression." Ruether, Liberation Theology, p. 183. Her 
understanding of "revelation" is thus, like Daly's, ongoing, but Ruether explicitly relates revelation 
with the liberation of real lives from situations of oppression. She thus links revelation and action 
( or practical concern) in a way that Daly does not and cannot insofar as Daly links revelation with 
ultimate concern and allows a distinction to seep into her thought regarding that which is of ultimate 
and that which is of practical concern. Daly does, however, associate "sin" with practical concerns, 
specifically, occasions of oppression. In this regard she and Ruether are in complete agreement. 
63 Daly, 'After the Death of God the Father', p. 61. "It is well known that Christians under the spell 
of the jealous God who represents the collective power of his chosen people can use religion to justify 
that "us and them" attitude which is disastrous in its consequences for the powerless. It is less widely 
understood that the projection of "the other" - easily adaptable to national, racial and class differences -
- has basically and primordially been directed against women." 
64 Ibid. Daly notes, in terms reminiscent of Saiving, that "there has been theoretical emphasis upon 
charity, meekness, obedience, humility, self-abnegation, sacrifice, service. Part of the problem with 
this moral ideology is that it became generally accepted not by men but by women, who have hardly 
been helped by an ethic which reinforces their abject situation." 
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traditions that discriminate against entire categories of humanity. 
Further, such a /.(privatized morality" can in no way be used as an 
analytical tool to discern the underlying metaphysical presuppositions 
that justify and cause to seem "natural" the "structures themselves of 
oppression".65 In moving the discussion of "sin" away from an exclusive 
focus on individual actions, then, Daly is able to name as "sinful" social 
structures and practices that have seemed, to those whose lives are not 
oppressed by them, perfectly "natural" and/ or ordained by "God". Such a 
revised understanding of "sin" is ultimately dependent, however, on a 
prior metaphysical presupposition, and that is the assertion of the full, 
unqualified humanity of all. In Daly's case, however, like Rosemary 
Ruether, she is explicitly concerned not only with the oppression of some 
categories of humanity by others but also with the degradation of the 
wider environment. Thus she understands that non-human creation can 
be sinned against. 
The consciousness raising which is beginning among women 
is evoking a qualitatively new understanding of the subtle 
mechanisms which produce and destroy "the other", and a 
consequent empathy with all of the oppressed. This gives 
ground for the hope that their emergence can generate a 
counterforce to the exploitative mentality which is destroying 
persons and the environment. 66 
And underlying her contention that the environment can be sinned 
against is the metaphysical presupposition (and, simultaneously, value 
judgement) introduced in Ruether's essay, that of the inherent integrity 
of non-human creation. 
To summarise, in 'After the Death of God the Father' Mary Daly writes 
from two fundamental metaphysical presuppositions, that of the full, 
unqualified humanity of women and men, and that of the inherent 
integrity of non-human creation. She identifies a necessarily communal 
or social aspect to the "becoming" of women and men, and she stresses 
65 Ibid. Daly's emphasis on the structures of oppression as being sinful is, like Ruether's, closely 
related to the understanding of sinful social structures expressed in the Social Gospel movement. 
66 Ibid. 
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that the actual "becoming" of entire categories of humanity is inextricably 
linked to the metaphysical potential associated with that category of 
humanity within the prevailing social order. To put it another way, she 
proposes that the limits inherent in the understanding of "being" 
associated with a specific category or class of humankind directly affect the 
ability of individuals within that category to actualise their full potential. 
To realise oneself in any way "outside" of one's assumed potential is 
almost impossible in that one is not perceived within the wider society as 
being capable of stepping outside one's pre-determined, symbolically-
conveyed, metaphysical limits. In order to convey her own metaphysical 
presuppositions Daly adopts Tillich's model of "god" as ground and 
power of being and reconceptualises the metaphors "incarnation", 
"revelation", and "sin". She develops her notion of "incarnation" 
through the transformed model of "the second coming of god" - a model 
strikingly consonant with Ruether's transformed model of reconciled 
humanity as "the body of god". Like Ruether (yet again), within her 
theological worldview there is no need for a solitary saviour figure.67 
Taken together, what do my readings of these three essays indicate 
concerning the paradigmatic aspects of feminist christian theology? In 
Thomas Kuhn's essay, 'Reflections on My Critics', he delves into two 
aspects of paradigm formation that seem to be inextricably interlinked. 
He says, "in the absence of a neutral language, the choice of a new theory 
is a decision to adopt a different native language and to deploy it in a 
correspondingly different world" (italics added).68 While Saiving's essay 
is now considered to be a landmark feminist theological text, in fact 
neither the "language" nor the "world" in which it is now discussed and 
understood "existed" when she first published it. To quote from Christ 
67 Ibid., p. 58. Daly writes, "An effect of the liberation of women will very likely be the loss of 
plausibility of Christological formulas which come close to reflecting a kind of idolatry in regard to 
the person of Jesus. As it becomes better understood that God is transcendent and unobjectifiable - or 
else not at all - it will become less plausible to speak of Jesus as the Second Person of the Trinity 
who 'assumed' a human nature. Indeed, the prevalent emphasis upon the total uniqueness and 
supereminence of Jesus will, I think, become less meaningful." It is also worth noting that Saiving 
simply never mentioned Jesus at all in 'The Human Situation' essay. 
68 Thomas Kuhn, 'Reflections on My Critics', in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds, Imre 
Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p. 277. 
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and Plaskow, "Her article was reprinted once, and then, like [Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton's] The Woman's Bible, was forgotten."69 However, when 
read together with Ruether's 'Motherearth and the Megamachine' and 
Daly's 'After the Death of God the Father' essays, I suggest that both the 
"different native language" and the "different world" Kuhn names begin 
to be revealed. Taking the language of christian theology and 
transforming it completely - by linking it with a different set of 
metaphysical presuppositions than had ever been combined before -
these women established the basic vocabulary necessary to comprehend 
and discuss feminist christian theology. Together they redefined the 
metaphors "sin", ,, "love , "reconciliation", "salvation", 
"messiah/messianic", "incarnation" and "revelation", and introduced or 
reconceptualised the models "the cultivation of the garden", "the body of 
god", and "the second coming of god"?O 
Regarding "the world" in and of which they wrote, underlying this 
feminist christian theological paradigm are three primary metaphysical 
presuppositions: that of the full, unqualified · and embodied humanity of 
all women, men, and children without exception; that of the inherent 
integrity of all non-human creation; and that of the finite character of all 
human and all earthly existence. Associated with this last supposition is 
the rejection of the notion of eternal life, a heaven above, and the idea of 
a new creation brought into being by an omnipotent, transcendent, 
wholly-other deity. Above all else, in this paradigm the finite matrix of 
existence is valued for its own sake. Following on from this value 
judgement is the value accorded each distinct aspect of existence 
(meaning, in this instance, the whole of earthly creation). Because each 
aspect of this creation (including individual humans) is inherently 
valuable, there is no hierarchical ranking scheme associated with the 
feminist christian theological paradigm. There is instead an 
69 Christ and Plaskow, 'Introduction', in Womanspirit Rising, p. 21. 
?O Importantly, the models for god introduced by these women, "the body of god" and the "second 
coming of god", have everything to do with their understandings of humanity, and terribly little to do 
with a deity removed in any way from humanity. 
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acknowledgement of the intricate, interdependent web of life, to the effect 
that in order for Life to endure on earth for as long as it can, humankind 
must come to understand and abide by the limits of creaturely existence. 
Within the worldview of this feminist christian paradigm the power of 
those who rule the State and Church to define reality is fully 
acknowledged, as is the structurally-embedded and metaphysically-
justified oppression of numerous categories of "others". So too is the 
extent of the task facing feminist christian theologians well understood. 
In Mary Daly's words, 
We have been foreigners not only to the fortresses of political 
power but also to those citadels in which thought processes 
have been spun out, creating a net of meaning to capture 
reality. In a sexist world, symbol systems and conceptual 
apparatuses have been male creations. ... Therefore, the 
various ideological constructs cannot be imagined to reflect a 
balanced or adequate vision. Instead, they distort reality 
and destroy human potential, female and male. What is 
required of women at this point in history is a firm and deep 
refusal to limit our perspectives, questioning, and creativity to 
any of the preconceived patterns of male-dominated culture 
(italics added).71 
In the chapters to follow I will explore the extent to which Rosemary 
Ruether, Carter Heyward, and Sallie McFague "refuse to limit their 
perspectives" while continuing to engage with and refine the 
foundational propositions of this feminist christian theological paradigm. 
But in order to talk in greater detail about the knowledge claims they are 
making I need first of all to make a crucial side-step; I need to delve in to 
the subject of epistemology. Specifically, I need to ascertain what theory 
( or theories) of knowledge coexists with the feminist christian theological 
paradigm. As discussed in the introduction, an underlying assumption 
in this work is that an epistemological framework is a necessary element 
in any endeavour that purports to represent truths about "humanity", 
"the world", and "god" - however those metaphors are understood. 
Therefore, I turn now to an examination of recent feminist 
epistemological developments. 
71 Daly, Beyond God the Father, pp. 6-7. 
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Chapter Four 
Feminist Epistemology: Trans£ orming Understandings 
of Knowers, Knowing, and the World to be Known 
Up to this point I have written almost exclusively in terms of 
metaphysical presuppositions, value judgements, metaphors, and 
models, focusing specifically on the development of the paradigmatic 
aspects of (a specific type of) feminist christian theology. In this chapter I 
am going to begin to change the terms of this discussion. Specifically, I 
am going to write about theories of knowledge, about epistemology and 
epistemological issues rather than disciplinary paradigms and paradigm 
components. In a very real sense, however, it is impossible to make a 
sharp distinction between disciplinary paradigms and epistemological 
issues. Already one of the background assumptions necessary for the very 
idea of a disciplinary paradigm to make sense is that a body of knowledge 
must be coherent; beliefs must be internally consistent and support each 
other. To embrace the notion of a disciplinary paradigm is to embrace, 
broadly, some sort of coherence account of knowledge or "truth". It is to 
take up a specific epistemological stance and to reject a na1 ve 
correspondence or naive realist account of "truth" .1 Even more 
importantly, within a disciplinary paradigm are a set of assumptions 
about human beings (described in chapter one as anthropological 
1 See Michael DePaul, 'Coherentism', in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed, Robert Audi, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 133-135; Keith Lehrer, 'Coherentism', in A 
Companion to Epistemology, eds, Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 
1993, pp. 67-70. 
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presuppositions) and about the nature of physical reality ( described as 
ontological presuppositions). These metaphysical assumptions 
correspond closely with, in epistemological terms, assumptions or 
statements about "knowers" and "the world to be known". Theologically, 
these topics are discussed most often as "humanity" and "creation", 
respectively, and it is this close correspondence that makes an 
examination of a theologian's epistemological assumptions so important. 
When theologians engage in discussions about humanity and/ or creation 
they are making epistemological statements; they are either describing or 
assuming one or more characteristics of knowers and/ or the world to be 
known. In other words, they at least implicitly take up a specific 
epistemological perspective on humans as knowing agents and the world 
as an object (or a subject) to be known. Theologians also tend to make 
"truth" claims. When they justify or substantiate these claims they 
engage with their statements on an epistemological level. Th us 
paradigmatic assumptions about human beings and the nature of physical 
reality (put theologically, assumptions about humanity and creation) turn 
out to be epistemological assumptions as well; they are assumptions 
about knowers and the world to be known. Thus, the feminist christian 
theological paradigm I identified in chapter three is structured around a 
co-existent epistemological framework. However, just as I needed to 
explore in detail the notion of a disciplinary paradigm before I could 
identify the paradigmatic elements of this feminist christian theological 
paradigm, so too I will now explore in greater detail certain developments 
in the field of feminist epistemology in order to identify the outlines of 
the epistemological framework co-existent with the feminist christian 
theological paradigm. 
This task, however, is made difficult by the fact that there is no single 
conception of "feminist epistemology" to which to point or from which 
to begin. Since the 1980s a diverse body of work has been developed by 
various feminist epistemologists; some are in dialogue specifically with 
history or philosophy of science traditions, some locate their work at the 
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furthest reaches of postmodern thought, some contribute to the 
development of feminist standpoint epistemology, and some take up and 
explore questions of epistemic-moral-political agency arising from (highly 
specified examples of) lived experiences or "everyday" life.2 But these 
distinctions, although useful as a heuristic device, are in fact anything but 
clear. At a minimum they must be understood to have permeable and 
overlapping boundaries; I suggest they are best understood as 
characterising an author's emphasis rather than as sharply defining the 
extent of her epistemological endeavours. Sandra Harding, for example, 
is the author of The Science Question in Feminism as well as Whose 
Science? Whose Knowledge? and she has contributed greatly to 
developing a feminist standpoint theory, and her thought has been 
transformed as she has taken into account and then posited postmodern 
notions of subjectivity, and one of her driving concerns is to ascertain 
how to "create research that is for women in the sense that it provides 
less partial and distorted answers to questions that arise from women's 
lives ... ".3 (second italics added) Similarly, Donna Haraway's work fits 
under the rubric "history of science", yet her 'Situated Knowledges' essay 
is a highly influential essay on feminist standpoint epistemology; 
meanwhile, her conceptions of "a cyborg world" and "cyborg identities" 
are deliberate attempts to name and simultaneously promote a 
postmodern sensibility concerning "lived social and bodily realities 1n 
which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and 
machines ... " .4 (italics added) In short, both Harding's and Hara way's 
work can be approached from any of the perspectives mentioned above, 
2 See Alcoff, Linda and Elizabeth Potter, eds, Feminist Epistemologies, Routledge, New York and 
London, 1993. This is a thorough and cogent representative sample of the diversity of approaches 
taken by feminist epistemologists. The contributors to the volume are, with only one Australian 
exception, working in the US or Canada. 
3 Sandra Harding, 'Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology', in Feminist Epistemologies, eds, Linda 
Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, Routledge, New York and London, 1993, pp. 49-50. As far as her debt to 
postmodemism goes, she describes "the subjects/agents of knowledge for feminist standpoint theory 
[as] multiple, heterogeneous, and contradictory or incoherent, not unitary, homogeneous, and 
coherent...". Ibid., p. 65. 
4 See Haraway, Donna, 'A Cyborg Manifesto', in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention 
of Nature, Routledge, New York, 1991, p. 154. See also Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The 
Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', pp. 575-599 in Feminist 
Studies 14, no. 3 (Fall 1988), and Haraway, Donna, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the 
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and need to be approached from at least two or more simultaneously 1n 
order for something of the intricate texture of their thought to be 
perceived. To paraphrase Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, "the work of 
these feminist philosophers, among others, is in the process of producing 
a new configuration of the scope, contours, and problematics of 
epistemology in its entirety" .5 (italics original) 
According to Alcoff and Potter, far from being concerned with defining 
the necessary conditions according to which S knows that P propositions 
can be said to be true, feminist epistemologists in North America are 
concerned to show in any number of ways how it is the case that "values, 
politics, and knowledge are intrinsically connected" .6 This assumption 
signals, I suggest, the existence of a feminist epistemological paradigm as 
unlike preceding epistemological paradigms as the feminist christian 
theological paradigm is unlike preceding theological paradigms. This 
suggestion is by no means original. In 1983, in their introduction to 
Discovering Reality, an oft-cited collection of feminist essays on 
epistemology and metaphysics, Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka 
quote a sentence from Louise Marcil-Lacoste's essay in the same volume 
and add their own pithy interpretation of it: 
"In introducing historicity, materiality, and values as 
fundamental epistemological categories, feminist writings 
represent a forceful challenge to critical thought seen as 
formal or meta-discourse." In the Kuhnian sense, feminists 
introduce a new paradigm for human understanding.7 
Following their lead, I am taking it as a given that since the 1980s there 
has been, within the academic discipline of philosophy, a feminist 
epistemological paradigm for human understanding. 
World of Modem Science, Verso, London and New York, 1989. N.B. The 'Situated Knowledges' 
essay appears also in Simians, Cyborgs and Women. 
5 Alcoff and Potter, 'Introduction: When Feminisms Intersect Epistemology', Feminist 
Epistemologies, p. 3. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds, Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on 
Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, Holland, Boston, London, 1983, p. xiv. 
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Paradoxically, as more metaphors and models are developed and the 
contours of this paradigm become more evident, one of the fundamental 
metaphysical presuppositions running through it prohibits the 
sufficiency of any single paradigm for human understanding. In other 
words, a basic tenet inherent in the feminist epistemological paradigm is 
that no single theory of knowledge can ever adequately express, convey or 
provide an avenue to the whole truth - if, indeed, there is such a thing as 
"the whole truth". Further, it is also accepted as a given that every theory 
of knowledge must inevitably exclude or deny other theories, others' 
approaches to knowledge and others' knowledge claims. Women have 
long been excluded from traditional Western, Euro-American 
knowledge-making practices on the basis of a set of metaphysical 
presuppositions inherent within all of the hegemonic epistemological 
frameworks associated with that tradition - the most fundamental 
presupposition being that women qua women are incapable of the 
highest levels of epistemic agency, however that is defined. Therefore, to 
purposefully create an epistemological paradigm that cannot but hinder 
the expression of some others' epistemic agency seems to many to be a 
dubious exercise at best. Lorraine Code argues that: 
A feminist epistemology would seem to require a basis in 
assumptions about the essence of women and of knowledge. 
Hence it would risk replicating the exclusionary, hegemonic 
structures of the masculinist epistemology, in its various 
manifestations, that has claimed absolute sovereignty over 
the epistemic terrain.8 (italics original) 
Recalling Mary Midgley's description of every statement, every 
proposition resting upon a "mass of background truisms" and thus only 
being intelligible in the context of those background assumptions, Code is 
correct in naming the existence of a set of feminist epistemological 
assumptions about "women" and "knowledge". However, these 
assumptions, I suggest, are ~eliberately inclusive rather than exclusive, 
flexible rather than rigid. To put it another way, the assumptions made 
8 Code, What Can She Know, p. 315. 
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by feminist epistemologists are quite different from the assumptions 
made by masculinist epistemologists. Moreover, there is no "law" that 
says any epistemology ( or any epistemological paradigm) must pit itself 
against all others, must seek to obtain a position of hegemonic 
domination over every "other" epistemological theory or paradigm.9 
And indeed, instead of trying to become the one dominant 
epistemological paradigm in North America at this time, feminist 
epistemologists are concerned primarily with transforming the entire 
notion of epistemology. Code is thus correct when she states "there can 
be no feminist epistemology in any of the traditional senses of the 
term" _IO Again this points to the creation of an entirely new disciplinary 
paradigm. The question is, how do some (white, economically and 
educationally privileged, North American) feminist epistemologists 
understand "epistemology"? What assumptions and value judgements 
do they share? How do they characterise knowers, the world to be 
known, and the processes for making knowledge? 
The feminist epistemology I have found most useful to my own project 
of identifying the epistemological framework accompanying one feminist 
christian theological paradigm are the works dealing explicitly with 
feminist standpoint theory, and/ or with conceptions of knowers and the 
world to be known that fit together to convey an "epistemology of 
everyday life" (Lorraine Code). Accordingly, I am not going to look 
extensively at issues arising in ferr1inist contributions to history or 
philosophy of science discussions, nor am I going to venture too far down 
any feminist postmodern tracks. Nor, again, am I going to try to "prove" 
9 See Janice Moulton, 'A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method ', in Discovering Reality: 
Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, 
eds, Sandra Harding and Merill B. Hintikka, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Holland, Boston, 
London, 1983, pp. 149-164. 
lO Code, What Can She Know , p. 314. Code is most reluctant to acknowledge the existence of a 
feminist epistemological paradigm, primarily, I believe, for reasons having to do with issues of power 
and privilege and race and class. The feminist epistemological paradigm that I have identified within 
North American philosophy is, like its theological counterpart, almost entirely the creation of white, 
middle and upper class, highly educated women. This does not mean, however, that it is or could ever 
be the only alternative to what she terms "masculinist epistemology". If one rejects the assumption 
that different paradigms must be, not just incommensurable but incompatible with each other, then 
there is no reason why two, three, a half dozen paradigms cannot co-exist. 
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the existence of a feminist epistemological paradigm in the same way as I 
established the existence of one feminist christian theological paradigm. 
The reason I focus more on standpoint theory and an epistemology of 
everyday life than, for example, on exploring recent developments 1n 
feminist empiricism is that it has become almost axiomatic in feminist 
christian thought that engaged, critical reflection on the various factors 
(political, economic, military, industrial, ideological, religious) that 
converge to shape to a significant degree the contours of one's social, 
communal, and interpersonal life is an essential component of every 
theo-ethical endeavour. In other words, it is morally and theologically 
unconscionable to base the claims one makes as a theologian on a closed 
set of past revelations given to humankind by a transcendent god. 
Theologically, it has long been held that the truth will set you free, but, 
say certain feminist christian theologians, first you must come to know 
the truth - not as it descends from above, but as it is lived out around 
one. Such liberating knowledge, it is tacitly accepted, comes primarily 
from critical engagement with one's lived-context. In epistemological 
terms, this perspective resonates most strongly with (some versions of) 
feminist standpoint theory.1 1 
Therefore I will limit the rest of this chapter to a detailed reading of three 
key essays contributing to feminist standpoint theory: Nancy Hartsock's 
1983 essay, 'The Feminist Standpoint: Developing The Ground For A 
Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism'; Donna Haraway's 1988 
essay, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective'; and Sandra Harding's 1993 essay, 
'Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is "Strong Objectivity"?'12 
In the following chapter I will take a broader approach to the issues of 
11 Consciousness-raising groups (of the second wave, North American women's liberation movement 
sort) played an important role in the early development of feminist theology, and, together with the 
Marxist-inspired influence of the Latin American notion of concientizacion, help contribute to the 
epistemological affinity with standpoint theory shared by most feminist christian theologians. 
12 Nancy Hartsock, 'The Feminist Standpoint: Developing The Ground For A Specifically Feminist 
Historical Materialism' , in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, 
Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science , eds, Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, 
D. Reidel Publishing Company, Holland, Boston, London, 1983, pp. 283-310; Haraway, 'Situated 
Knowledges'; Sandra Harding, 'Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology' . 
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epistemic agency, epistemic community, and everyday life, looking at 
some of the contributions to North American feminist epistemology 
made by Katherine Pyne Addelson, Lorraine Code, Evelyn Fox Keller, 
Helen Longino, Lynn Nelson, and Elizabeth Potter. Taken together this 
chapter and the next will provide the conceptual tools I need to identify 
the epistemological elements in the work of Rosemary Radford Ruether, 
Carter Heyward, and Sallie McFague. 
The Feminist Standpoint: Developing The Ground For 
A Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism13 
Nancy Hartsock's essay is widely cited as one of the ground-breaking 
works on feminist standpoint epistemology.14 First published in 
Discovering Reality, it appears in a slightly revised form in Hartsock's 
book Money, Sex, · and Power .15 To contextualise the following 
discussion, it is important to note that in the Notes section in Discovering 
Reality Hartsock mentions that her "discussions with Donna Haraway 
and Sandra Harding have been intense and ongoing over a period of 
years".1 6 To further connect these essays, Haraway's 'Situated 
Knowledges' essay was originally a response, delivered at the Western 
Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association in San 
Francisco, March 1987, to Sandra Harding's book The Science Question in 
Feminism, in which Harding took up (among others) Hartsock's 
development of a feminist standpoint. Finally, Harding's 1993 essay is a 
13 In 1998, Hartsock published an essay in which she re-addressed the issue of a feminist standpoint/s 
and in particular responded to others' interpretations of her initial standpoint essay. While I was 
unable to obtain her most recent text until shortly before this thesis was due to be bound, it seems as 
though the points she still considers to be salient are the points that I focus on in the following 
reading. See Hartsock, Nancy C. M., The Feminist Standpoint Revisited & Other Essays, Westview 
Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1998, pp. 227-248. 
14 See Harding, Sandra, The Science Question in Feminism , Cornell University Press, Ithaca and 
London, 1986, p. 26. Harding also names Jane Flax, Hilary Rose, and Dorothy Smith as 
contributing to the body of work known as feminist standpoint theory. 
15 Hartsock, Nancy, Money, Sex, and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism, Longman, 
New York and London, 1983, pp. 231-251. 
16 Hartsock, 'The Feminist Standpoint', p. 306. Interestingly, this statement is nowhere to be 
found in the end notes in Money, Sex, and Power. 
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reflection upon and refinement of her own attempts to develop more 
fully the notion of a specifically feminist standpoint while taking 
increasingly into account Haraway's comments on her, that 1s, on 
Harding's, own efforts. All of which is to say that in choosing to examine 
these three essays, each one individually recognised as a valuable 
contribution to feminist epistemology, I am also eavesdropping on an 
intricate and long-running conversation. 
Nancy Hartsock's stated purpose in 'The Feminist Standpoint' essay is "to 
show how ... a feminist standpoint can allow us to understand patriarchal 
institutions and ideologies as perverse inversions of more humane social 
relations" .1 7 The placement of this sentence in her essay is critical; even 
before explaining to her readers what a feminist standpoint is, Hartsock 
makes a value judgement. She judges that social relations as they are are 
1n some fundamental way(s) inhumane, and it is the value of "more 
humane social relations" that justifies her search for a feminist 
standpoint - a standpoint that "exposes the real relations among human 
beings as inhuman, points beyond the present, and carries a historically 
liberatory role" .18 To put it another way, the vision she values as a goal 
or end, more humane social relations, is held up as evidence to justify a 
specific means (the development of a feminist standpoint) to that end. I 
stress this point even before examining her construction of a feminist 
standpoint because it reveals the dependency of her entire project on an 
explicit, a priori value judgement. Importantly, this fact does not negate 
her epistemological project; on the contrary, the fact that she does not 
deem it necessary to describe in detail the values she embraces as both 
"end" and "justification of the means" seems to indicate that she is 
writing a feminist epistemology from within at least the bare bones of a 
pre-existent conceptual paradigm. Her unstated expectation that others 
share her values, and that she is writing to and/ or for a like-minded 
community of knowers is revealed through her unproblematic (or 
17 Ibid., p. 284. 
18 Ibid., p. 285. 
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unproblematised) use, in the concluding sentence of her introduction, of 
the words "us" and "more humane social relations". 
What then, according to Hartsock, is a standpoint? Firstly, a standpoint is 
an engaged position in social relations; it is not a distanced reflection 
upon those particular social relations most visible to a detached observer. 
Nor is a standpoint simply the perspective of an individual, engaged 
activist. A standpoint is a collective effort, a collective understanding 
requiring "both science (analysis) and ... political struggle on the basis of 
which this analysis can be conducted".1 9 A standpoint is a "vantage 
point" formed by the efforts of a mass movement; it is the result of praxis, 
combining both political action on the part of an oppressed group ( in 
Marx's case the proletariat and in Hartsock's case women) and critical 
reflection on that action.20 It is not easy to create or achieve a standpoint; 
a standpoint is not a "natural" perspective naturally available to an 
individual simply because that individual is a member of an oppressed 
group. According to Hartsock it is not the case that the oppressed simply 
live "true" lives and the oppressors' "false" - the lives of the oppressors 
are real indeed, as are the oppressors' worldviews. They are real; the 
issue (revealing the need for an alternate standpoint/ theoretical 
perspective) is that these worldviews are presented (by the oppressors) as 
whole when in fact they are dangerously incomplete, "partial and 
perverse" .21 
In a theoretical step deliberately analogous to "Marx's proposal that a 
correct vision of class society is available from only one of the two major 
class positions in capitalist society" ,22 the most important epistemological 
claim Hartsock advances in her feminist standpoint theory is that a 
correct vision of a gendered society is available from only one of the two 
19 Ibid., pp. 285, 288. 
20 Ibid., p. 284, " ... women's lives make available a particular and privileged vantage point on male 
supremacy .... " 
21 Ibid., p. 285. 
22 Ibid., p. 284. 
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major gender positions in Western capitalist society.23 She names these 
two theoretical positions "feminist standpoint" and "abstract 
masculinity", and sets out to establish a) what the foundations for a 
feminist standpoint are, and b) how a feminist standpoint reveals the 
partiality and perverseness of the epistemological and metaphysical 
presuppositions and values inherent in the view from "abstract 
masculinity" .24 Again, just as the value of humane social relations (as 
opposed to social relations constituted by the oppression and domination 
of many by a few) implicitly grounds her project, so too an a priori 
metaphysical commitment determines her decision to base a feminist 
standpoint on the structural differences between women's lives and 
men's lives. In short, she appropriates from Marx his conception of 
reality as consisting of "sensuous human activity, practice".25 The 
implication, she notes, is that persons are what they do, and that what 
they do structures how they will understand themselves and the world in 
which they act. The · epistemological significance of this metaphysical 
stance is that males and females do, on a day-to-day basis, -significantly 
different things, and therefore know themselves, others, and the world in 
which they act in significantly different ways. Accordingly, Hartsock bases 
her epistemological approach on "a schematic and simplified account"26 
of the differences, in everyday lived practices (or "material life"), between 
the actions of males and females. It is the understanding of the world, 
and of humans in relation to the world, available from critical 
engagement with and reflection upon the activities of females as a group 
in Western capitalist societies that constitutes Hartsock' s fem in is t 
standpoint. 
23 Hartsock uses the term "gender" three times in phrases paralleling "the ruling class" and "the 
ruling gender" (pp. 285, 302, 304). It is because she uses the phrases "ruling class" and "ruling 
gender" that I write "gendered society" rather than "sexed society", although elsewhere in the essay she 
is insistent on acknowledging the sexual (biological) distinction dividing humankind. 
24 Ibid., p. 296. 
25 Ibid., p. 285, quoting from Karl Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach,' in The German Ideology , ed, C. J. 
Arthur, International Publishers, New York, 1970, p. 121. 
26 Ibid., p. 289. 
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Specifically, the one aspect of material life that Hartsock considers to be 
structured in fundamentally opposing ways for men and women, 
regardless of class or society, is what she terms "the sexual division of 
labor" .27 How does she characterise the sexual division of labour, or the 
differences between what men as a group and women as a group do in 
their daily lives? She begins by establishing a base-line reason for labour, 
for doing work: "The real point of the production of goods and services is, 
after all, the continuation of the species, a possibility dependent on their 
use."28 Here she exposes the perversity of valuing the exchange of goods 
and services over their use, a perverse valuation mirrored in the social 
prestige accorded to the "capitalist" but denied the "worker". Similarly, 
she notes that the work of those male workers engaged in the production 
of goods and services for exchange is accorded social value in comparison 
with the work females do that is for immediate use but not exchange, e.g. 
housework, child rearing. In other words, she implies that bringing 
home the bacon is, in Western capitalist societies, always a more 
prestigious activity than frying it up to be eaten. 
Regarding men's labour she adheres to Marx's distinction between the 
"capitalist" and the "worker", asserting that the male capitalist, because he 
has no involvement with production whatsoever, that is, because he is 
not physically involved with the production of concrete goods, is "at the 
furthest distance from contact with concrete material life" .29 The male 
worker is immediately involved in the work of "transforming natural 
substances into socially defined goods",30 but the difference between the 
male worker and the female worker (or even the female capitalist) is that 
"quittin" time really is "quittin" time for the male, whereas it is not for 
the female. She goes home and keeps working, doing the repetitious 
27 Ibid. Hartsock does note that her strategy "contains the danger of making invisible the experience 
of lesbians and women of color" (p. 290). But she assumes some minimum of what can be termed "an 
institutionalised commonality" among all women in Western societies, and proceeds to construct her 
standpoint on the basis of these "institutionalized social practices" (p. 289). 
28 Ibid., p. 287. 
29 Ibid., p. 292. 
30 Ibid. 
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work necessary to ensure ongoing, basic human survival, including the 
production/reproduction of children. "Women's activity as 
institutionalized has a double aspect - their contribution to subsistence, 
and their contribution to childrearing."31 
On the basis of this schema (though described in far greater detail) and her 
prior value judgements and metaphysical presuppositions, Hartsock 
maintains that the institutionalised sexual division of labour, as manifest 
in Western capitalist societies through the removal of the male capitalist 
from the means of production, the imposition of time-clock 
boundary /limits on the male worker's participation in the "sensuous" 
activity of production, and the demand that females do the vast majority 
of the day to day subsistence chores, including childbearing and rearing, 
in addition to any work they do to produce goods or services for exchange, 
does provide the foundation for a feminist standpoint. But again it is 
important to note that when interpreting the consequences of this sexual 
division of labour Hartsock relies on two presuppositions: 1) the real 
reason, and hence the value of work or labour is to maintain human life, 
and 2) "life itself consists of sensuous activity" .32 By implication, women 
do the vast majority of work that matters, work that actually sustains life, 
and thus are far · more involved than men in real life itself. Again 
Hartsock is quite explicit that this account is not to be understood as 
definitive of the lives of all individual females or males, but is an account 
of the lives of women and men as socially institutionalised groups at a 
particular historical time.33 
According to Hartsock a feminist standpoint must be able to expose the 
perspective from II abstract masculinity" as partial and perverse, that is, as 
a reversal of what is really the case, while incorporating and explaining 
the simultaneous reality of the perspective from and effects on the world 
of II abstract masculinity". In order to examine how she does this it is 
31 Ibid., p. 291. 
32 Ibid., p. 292. 
33 Ibid. , p. 289. 
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necessary first to provide a brief description of how Hartsock characterises 
"knowers" and "the world to be known" from the perspective of abstract 
masculinity and then from the theoretical perspective of a feminist 
standpoint. The fundamental conception of "knowers", or more precisely 
of individual human nature, advanced by those immersed in "abstract 
masculinity" is that "of the self in opposition to another who threatens 
one's very being".34 Importantly, "one's very being" is itself sharply 
divided: "the body is both irrelevant and in opposition to the (real) self, 
an impediment to be overcome by the mind".35 From this perspective, a 
"real" human is understood to be utterly independent, as dis-embodied as 
possible, and continually engaged in attempts to dominate all isolated 
others with whom he comes into contact. One's existence (his existence) 
as a fully human being is in fact dependent on his dominating another. 
What of the world according to abstract masculinity? To paraphrase 
Hartsock, it is a world in which the emphasis is on stasis and control, 
quantity not quality, and human (read male) separation from nature.36 It 
is a world filled with sharp, hierarchically ordered dualisms: mind over 
body, culture over nature, abstract over concrete, ideal over real, male 
over female, masculine over feminine. The world is in fact two worlds, 
one "abstract and deeply unattainable, the other useless and 
demeaning" .37 Not surprisingly, in this account "real" humans 
(masculine male capitalists) occupy the more valued of the two worlds. 
From Hartsock's feminist standpoint, knowers and the world take quite a 
different shape. To begin with, knowers are thoroughly embodied; 
"There is some biological, bodily component to human existence."38 In 
fact, one of the reasons Hartsock uses the phrase "sexual division of 
labour" in this essay "is to keep hold of the bodily aspect of existence -
34 Ibid., p. 296. 
35 Ibid., p. 298. 
36 Ibid., p. 290. 
37 Ibid., p. 297. 
38 Ibid., pp. 283, 289, 298. 
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perhaps to grasp it over-firmly in an effort to keep it from evaporating 
altogether".39 Secondly, rather than being in a constant state of 
opposition to all others, all human existence is understood to take place 
within II a complex relational nexus" .40 More accurately, both girls and 
boys begin and live their lives within a complex relational nexus, but in 
Western capitalist societies this relationality is devalued and assigned to 
the feminine/ female/ concrete /bodily aspect of existence - or, to II th~ 
useless and demeaning world". However, from the perspective of the 
inhabitants of this useless world, it looks very useful indeed. Necessary, 
in fact, for life itself. It is also a world of ongoing change, 11 a world 
characterized by interaction with natural substances ... , a world in which 
quality is more important than quantity, a world in which the unification 
of mind and body is inherent in the activities performed" .41 It is a world 
in which life is known not to flourish when tightly controlled by another, 
yet in which the impetus is toward a profusion of interdependent life-
forms.42 It is a world of process, flux, change and growth, in which utterly 
independent, isolated beings do not exist. Initially and ultimately, all are 
dependent for life, not on the domination of the other, but on the 
flourishing of the others, be the others plants or humans. 
While this brief description of Hartsock's account does not do it justice, it 
is nonetheless sufficient, if her account is at all accurate, to serve as 
confirmation of the partiality of the perspective from abstract masculinity, 
a perspective that, in the name of impartiality, denies the fundamental 
life-sustaining importance of relational involvement with others and 
with physical creation.43 How then does Hartsock express the 
perverseness of this perspective? That is, how does she understand the 
perspective from abstract masculinity to be a reversal of "the proper order 
39 Ibid., p. 289. 
4o Ibid., p. 294. 
41 Ibid., p. 290. 
42 Ibid., p. 293. Strictly speaking, the second half of this sentence is my own extrapolation from 
Hartsock's text; she does not discuss "life" apart from human life. 
43 Ibid., pp. 283-284. She emphasises that humans are a part of physical creation, are "inextricably 
both natural and social". 
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of things" and a reversal of "the proper valuation of human activity"?44 
She exemplifies such a reversal by examining the tendency in abstract 
masculine thought ( and action) to substitute death for life, for example by 
valorising killing over giving birth.45 And she expresses the reality, the 
lived truth of this false-but-socially-institutionalised reversal in the 
following words: 
Men's power to structure social relations in their own image 
means that women too must participate in social relations 
which manifest and express abstract masculinity. The most 
important life activities [the most abstract] have consistently 
been held by the powers that be to be unworthy of those who 
are fully human most centrally because of their close 
connections with necessity and life: motherwork ( the rearing 
of children), housework, and until the rise of capitalism in 
the West, any work necessary to subsistence. In addition, 
these activities [the most concrete] in contemporary 
capitalism are all constructed in ways which systematically 
degrade and destroy the minds and bodies of those who 
perform them. ~6 
Hartsock's point is that the devaluation and denigration of material life is 
a lived reality affecting both the devaluers and the devalued, albeit in 
drastically different ways. Furthermore, because activities closely 
associated with the maintenance of material life are so devalued, they 
have been institutionally structured in inhumane ways, leading to the 
hastening to death (emotional, spiritual, and physical) of those who 
perform such activities. 
Which brings me back to where I started this reading, to the issue of 
values. For in the end Hartsock again justifies the development of a 
feminist standpoint because it reveals "the inhumanity of human 
relations", and "it embodies a distress which requires a solution".47 From 
44 Ibid., p. 299. 
45 Ibid., p. 301. In this section of the essay Hartsock analyses Georges Bataille's writings to make 
her point, a point astonishingly similar to that made by Charlotte Perkins Gilman in her 1923 book, 
His Religion and Hers: A Study of the Faith of the Fathers and the Work of Our Mothers, in which 
Perkins notes how perverse it is that "man's" religions are built on death, not birth. See Ruether, 
Rosemary Radford, Womanguides: Readings Toward a Feminist Theology, Boston, Beacon Press, 
1985, p. 265. 
46 Hartsock, 'The Feminist Standpoint', p. 302. 
47 Ibid., p. 303. 
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a feminist standpoint as she defines it, the values of co-operation, 
connection, relatedness are defined as being fundamentally more 
important and more real than domination, isolation, radical 
independence, and struggle unto death. Moreover, an epistemology 
based on such an understanding of reality, including human beings, as 
fundamentally composed of and maintained by and through "continuity 
and relation" is able to expose patterns of domination and isolation, 
instances of radical independence, and struggles unto death as both real 
though perverse, perverse precisely because the lived consequence of 
domination and isolation is death rather than life. But again Hartsock is 
making a value judgement. She is judging humane and ongoing social 
relations, or social relations not defined and controlled by the domination 
of many by a few, to be more valuable, more worthy than social relations 
of domination and oppression, and hence more expressive of what life 
truly ought to be about. In other words, her epistemological standpoint is 
simultaneously a moral standpoint. There is, in her work, no separating 
ethics from epistemology. 
Situated Knowledges 
As with the Hartsock essay, I will begin by identifying Haraway's desired 
ends, or her reason for knowledge-seeking in general. This will make 
explicit what she values knowledge for, and by extension the value 
judgements underlying her work. Fortunately, regarding what she 
believes knowledge is for, or why knowledge matters, Haraway is quite 
explicit. She wants to speak of a world "that can be partially shared and 
that is friendly to earthwide projects of finite freedom, adequate material 
abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and limited happiness" .48 She 
writes of seeking "knowledge potent for constructing worlds less 
organized by axes of domination", and of knoivledge that provides "a 
vision of the means of ongoing finite embodiment, of living within 
48 Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges', p. 579. 
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limits and contradictions" .49 In short, she values knowledge for its 
potential in influencing the establishment and maintenance of humane, 
ongoing, earthwide relations. However, it is easier to see that this is what 
she does value by identifying more specifically what she does not value: 
domination, oppression, conspicuous consumption (gluttony), rampant 
suffering, and notions of transcendence, of disembodied infinitude and 
mastery that she characterises as "the god trick, the god's eye view" .50 I 
want to emphasise that Haraway is explicit in naming what she values 
knowledge for and what she does not value, and to suggest that one 
reason she is so clear is because she asserts an integral relationship 
between ethics, politics, and epistemology. Three times in the essay she 
states that "politics and ethics ground struggles for and contests over what 
may count as rational knowledge".51 According to Haraway ethics, 
morals matter in epistemology because knowledge claims are claims on 
people's lives; politics matter because knowledge is often produced and 
used by those with political power to deny or constrain the lives of those 
who do not have access to such power. To put it another way, Haraway 
insists that knowledge is created and contested by "power-differentiated 
communities" whose agendas are not innocent, and she refuses to 
separate discussions of knowledge from discussions of ethics and 
politics.52 With this firmly in mind, what then is Haraway addressing in 
'Situated Knowledges'? 
Donna Haraway's essay was written in response to Sandra Harding's 
book, The Science Question in Feminism. However, Haraway does not so 
much respond directly to Harding's work as lift out what she considers to 
49 Ibid., pp. 585, 590. 
50 Ibid, see pp. 581, 582, 584, 586 ("only those occupying the positions of the dominators are self-
identical, unmarked, disembodied, unmediated, transcendent, born again."), 587, and 589. Haraway's 
use, and even, I would argue, dependence upon theological metaphors (in this and other essays) is quite 
striking, and worthy of a more detailed study, perhaps one entitled, 'Why Can't a Cyborg be a 
Goddess?' 
51 Ibid., p. 587. See also pp. 579 and 593. 
52 Ibid., see pp. 577, 580, 589. In this regard she is in complete agreement with Sandra Harding, 
who, in The Science Question in Feminism, stated, "The problematics, concepts, theories, 
methodologies, interpretations of experiments, and uses [ of science] have been and should be selected 
with moral and political goals in mind, not merely cognitive ones." Harding, The Science Question 
in Feminism, p. 250. 
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be the crux of the issue identified by Harding - the problem of 
"objectivity" in feminist epistemology. To over-simplify, by 1986 Harding 
had identified a double trend among feminist epistemologists': first, the 
embrace of a "social construction of all knowledge" perspective, in which 
traditional notions of supposedly value neutral "objectivity" are revealed 
to hide both the historical specificity and the subjective interests of all 
knowledge claims/ claimants, and second, the insistence on the possibility 
and necessity of "accurate" knowledge of the world. 'Situated 
Knowledges', therefore, is Haraway's answer to the vexing problem of 
"how to have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency 
for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for 
recognizing our own 'semiotic technologies' for making meanings, and a 
no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a "real" world ... ".53 
(italics original) 
To answer this question or to solve this problem, Haraway not-so-simply 
redefines "objectivity", but in order to redefine objectivity she must also 
redefine the nature of knowers and the world to be known. In other 
words, she presents a worldview to accompany her epistemological 
conception of objectivity, a conception in which objectivity turns out 
primarily to be about accountability (ethics), hence the reason her 
accompanying characterisation of human beings (her anthropological 
presuppositions) is necessary; she cannot speak of "what is" without also 
speaking of who is accountable to what. This indivisible relationship 
between accountability or responsibility (Haraway uses the words almost 
interchangeably) and objectivity is a critical aspect of her thought, and 
Haraway emphasises it even before she begins her revision of 
"objectivity". 
Feminists don't need a doctrine of objectivity that promises 
transcendence, a story that loses track of its mediations just 
where someone might be held responsible for something .... 
Immortality and omnipotence are not our goals. But we 
could use some enforceable, reliable accounts of things not 
53 Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges', p. 579. 
112 
reducible to power moves and agonistic, high-status games 
of rhetoric or to scientistic, positivist arrogance.54 
With, therefore, the understanding that the following explanation of 
Haraway's "feminist objectivi~y" will not be complete until I have also 
examined her description of knowers (her accompanying anthropology) 
and the world to be known (her ontological presuppositions) - and these 
must always be held together with her identified ethical/political values -
how does Haraway revise objectivity? 
To begin with she defines objectivity as a particular relationship between 
the knower and that which the knower is trying to know. "All Western 
cultural narratives about objectivity are allegories of the ideologies 
governing the relations of what we call mind and body, distance and 
responsibility."55 To borrow Nancy Hartsock's phrase (used by Haraway 
in 'Situated Knowledges'), objectivity according to "abstract masculinity" 
separates mind from body and insists on "distance" as a prerequisite for 
an objective view of an "other". From the perspective of "abstract 
masculinity" responsibility is separated almost if not entirely out of the 
"objective" equation, because responsibility implies an involved 
relationship, and therefore brings connective impurities into what 
"ought" to be a p·urely uninvolved examination of, or look at, the other .56 
Haraway tells another story, that is, she posits a different relationship 
between knowers and the known. "Feminist objectivity is about limited 
location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of 
subject and object. It allows us to become more answerable for what we 
learn how to see."57 The term "feminist objectivity" is thus not a 
reference to a state (of disembodied uninvolvement), but to a 
relationship, a relationship between knowers and the world to be knovyn, 
including other knowers, that enables or fosters more adequate and 
responsible understandings of particular aspects of the world. It can 
54 Ibid., pp. 579 and 580. 
55 Ibid., p. 583. 
56 My reliance on visual metaphors in this discussion of Haraway's work will be explained below. 
57 Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges', p. 583. 
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never be a relation between one knower and the entire world, for one 
knower is never located in relation to the entire world. Indeed, one 
knower is only ever located in one specific place at a time, and what can 
be seen from that place at that time is precisely and only that which is 
within sight. The "god's eye view from nowhere" is thus a dangerous 
illusion, neither objective (for one who is nowhere is in relation to 
nothing) nor ever possible. However, as Haraway redefines it, 
" ... objectivity turns out to be about particular and specific embodiment .... 
The moral is simple: only partial perspective promises objective 
vision. "58 
But again, this understanding of objectivity (or an objective observer) as 
necessarily embodied, particular, specifically limited, as necessarily 
responsible for what is known, does not make sense if the world is 
understood to be composed of fixed, isolable, passive and inherently 
meaningless compounds, elements and entities. That world is a world in 
which ruthless manipulation and dissection lead to knowledge, lead to 
control, lead to power.59 It is a world in which, theoretically, nothing can 
remain hidden from view forever. Absolute and perfect knowledge of 
everything is possible. It is not, however, the world according to 
Haraway. 
In what she describes as "a simple, perhaps simple-minded, maneuver", 
Haraway proposes to reconceptualise the world as an "active entity"; she 
asserts the agency of the world.60 Specifically, she states that "situated 
knowledges require that the object of knowledge be pictured as an actor 
and agent, not as a screen or a ground or a resource, never finally as slave 
to the master that closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and his 
58 Ibid., pp. 582-583. 
59 "Feminists, and others who have been most active as critics of the sciences and their claims or 
associated ideologies, have shied away from doctrines of scientific objectivity in part because of the 
suspicion that an 'object' of knowledge is a passive and inert thing. Accounts of such objects can 
seem to be either appropriations of a fixed and determined world reduced to resource for instrumentalist 
projects of destructive Western societies, or they can be seen as masks for interests, usually 
dominating interests." Ibid., p. 592. 
60 Ibid., p. 593. 
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authorship of 'objective' knowledge".61 When the world and objects of 
knowledge within the world are understood to be active agents, 
Haraway's characterisation of objectivity as a faithful and responsible 
account of the relations between a specifically situated knower and an 
object/subject of knowledge begins to make sense. "Accounts of a 'real' 
world do not ... depend on a logic of 'discovery' but on a power-charged 
social relation of 'conversation'. The world neither speaks itself nor 
disappears in favor of a master decoder. The codes of the world are not 
still, waiting to be read."62 One fairly important consequence of this 
approach is that, while knowers may manage, and are morally and 
epistemically obligated to try to provide a faithful and responsible account 
of a "conversation" that occurred with an object/ subject of knowledge at a 
specific time and place, the chances of that exact same conversation ever 
taking place again are non-existent; what's more, that object/ subject could 
have been telling lies, perhaps on purpose. 
Feminist objectivity makes room for surprises and ironies at 
the heart of all knowledge production; we are not in charge 
of the world. We just live here and try to strike up 
noninnocent conversations .... [W]e give up mastery but keep 
searching for fidelity, knowing all the while we will be 
hoodwinked. 63 
So objectivity refers to the embodied, situated and thus limited or partial 
relationship/ conversation between the knower and the object/ subject of 
knowledge, described as accurately as possible by the knower, and in as 
responsible or as-a ware-of-paten tial-consequences-of-this-descri ption a 
manner as possible. 
Haraway's notion of objectivity is thus fully compatible with feminist 
standpoint theory. She has written that "there is good reason to believe 
that vision is better from below the brilliant space platforms of the 
powerful" .64 Or, the vantage points or standpoints of the subjugated "are 
61 Ibid., p. 592. 
62 Ibid., p. 593. 
63 Ibid., p. 594 and p. 593. 
64 Ibid., p. 583. 
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least likely to allow denial of the critical and interpretive core of all 
knowledge" .65 Haraway is saying that the subjugated have less reason to 
be dishonest when describing the shape and nature of the relations they 
see in the world around them. But, and this is an important "but" in 
Haraway's thought, "subjugation is not grounds for an ontology; it might 
be a visual clue. Vision requires instruments of vision.... Instruments of 
vision mediate standpoints; there is no immediate vision from the 
standpoint of the subjugated."66 What there is, is a potential for critically 
analysing and evaluating how "visual systems work", analyses less 
inhibited by the "dazzling illuminations of the god trick" and therefore 
more likely to be objective.67 Unlike Hartsock, who understands praxis, 
or immersion in "sensuous human activity" joined with critical 
reflection on that activity to provide the grounds for objective knowledge 
claims, Haraway turns to vision, seeing, as a metaphor for knowing. Her 
reason for doing so is two-fold: in order to keep conversing intelligently 
about modern sciences and technologies, and in order to emphasise the 
specific, partial and mediated character of all knowledge. 
I want a feminist writing of the body that metaphorically 
emphasizes vision again, because we need to reclaim that 
sense in order to find our way through all the visualizing 
tricks and powers of modem sciences and technologies that 
have transformed the objectivity debates. ... The "eyes" 
made available in modem technological sciences shatter any 
idea of passive vision; these prosthetic devices show us that 
all eyes, including our own organic ones, are active 
perceptual systems, building on translations and specific 
ways of seeing, that is, ways of life .... [T]here are only highly 
specific visual possibilities, each with a wonderfully active, 
partial way of organizing worlds.68 
Again, all views are partial, in that all vision is mediated through devices 
designed and crafted to make visible some spe<;:ific, limited aspect of the 
world, or object/ subject of knowledge. Whether human lenses, electron 
microscopes or the Hubble telescope, each device is radically limited in 
65 Ibid., pp. 583-584. 
66 Ibid., p. 586. 
67 Ibid., p. 583 and p. 584. 
68 Ibid., p. 582 and p. 583. 
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what it is able to "see". What visions there are are inescapably partial. 
There is no all-seeing, all-knowing eye, either in or above the world. 
In presenting her case for the partiality of all visions, Haraway insists both 
on knowers seeing (or relating to what they can see) responsibly, that is, 
objectively, and on knowers' positioning themselves to see responsibly. 
"[O]ne cannot relocate in any possible vantage point without being 
accountable for . that movement. Vision is always a question of the power 
to see - and perhaps of the violence implicit in our visualizing 
practices."69 (italics in original) Haraway is addressing two distinct issues 
here, both related to her conception of knowers. First, she is reminding 
the reader of the locatedness, the situatedness of all embodied visual 
perspectives; it is quite possible, in relocating oneself to see some 
object/ subject of knowledge responsibly, that one will relocate oneself 
into standing on another's neck.7° Second, she is reaffirming the power-
charged, relational nature of seeing. Whether it be an unobjective 
relation of imposed domination, or an objective, partial and situated 
attempt at engagement with the "other", seeing is not an innocent 
activity. 
Given the difficulties facing those who would be responsible epistemic 
agents in accordance with Haraway's account of objectivity and vision 
(including necessarily embodied positioning/ locatedness), how does she 
characterise knowers in such a way as to render objective knowing a 
possibility? In her concisely expressed conception of human nature or 
subjectivity, Haraway rejects the term "being" and replaces it with the 
metaphor "splitting". 
The split and contradictory self is the one who can 
interrogate positionings and be accountable, the one who can 
construct and join rational conversations and fantastic 
imaginings that change history. Splitting, not being, is the 
69 Ibid., p. 585. 
7o I take her point to be that, even when every intention is made to be a responsible knower, the very 
fact of being in the world with others (human and non-human) complicates matters greatly, and there 
is no escape to a "pure", "innocent" location in or from which to relate to others. Rather, being 
responsible to one "other" may well result in unintentionally harming another. 
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privileged image for feminist epistemologies of scientific 
knowledge. "Splitting" in this context should be about 
heterogeneous multiplicities that are simultaneously salient 
and incapable of being squashed into isomorphic slots or 
cumulative lists. This geometry pertains within and among 
subjects. 71 
According to Haraway then, it is the "split", "multiple" subject, one who 
possesses "(at least) double vision", who is able to fully "investigate the 
varied apparatuses of visual production, including the prosthetic 
technologies interfaced with our biological eyes and brains".72 However, 
in a confusing if not utterly contradictory move (in that it seems to 
contradict her valuation and affirmation of limited, finite embodiment), 
Haraway then metaphorically disembodies this already split and multiple 
subject. "Feminist embodiment ... is not about fixed location in a reified 
body, female or otherwise, but about nodes in fields, inflections in 
orientations, and responsibility for difference in material-semiotic fields 
of meaning."73 Becau~e, on the face of it, this statement does contradict 
her explicitly stated values as well as her metaphysical characterisation of 
the agency of the world, I want to suggest that her intention is to 
emphasise (in Hartsock's words, "perhaps to grasp over-firmly") a) the 
impossibility of an essential, immutable, "natural" bodily identity, b) the 
shifting character of the ethical, political, and epistemic discourses about 
and/ or inscriptions on bodies which are themselves not staying still, and 
c) the fact that in advanced Western capitalist societies at this time in 
history bodies do have different meanings in different contexts, according 
to different visualising technologies and practices. I believe she is trying 
to accommodate more differences among and between women than 
Hartsock did, and she does not want to privilege one difference above all 
others. Rather, she wants to acknowledge that split and multiple (I think 
of them as contradictory and cantankerous) selves exist together in 
overlapping as well as opposing communities, and she is trying to locate 
situated, hence _ objective, knowledges within communities composed of 
71 Ibid., p. 586. 
72 Ibid., p. 589. 
73 Ibid., p. 588. 
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collections of partial visions and hesitant, stuttering conversations.74 She 
is advocating a politics, an ethics, and an epistemology based on 
solidarities created out of fragments, bits and pieces, solidarities as flexible 
as they are fixed, solidarities always partial, always plural, always 
accountable to the project of making possible the means of ongoing finite 
embodiment.75 
\ 
To conclude, Haraway's vision of feminist objectivity is a vision "of 
elaborate specificity and difference and the loving care people might take 
to learn how to see faithfully from another's point of view, even when 
the other is our own machine ... ".76 Her world is a tricky sort of agent, 
with a stake (or perhaps just a delight) in throwing mud in our eyes from 
time to time.77 Her knowers are political, technological, "material-
semiotic" critters, or, as she writes in another context, "cyborgs".78 She is 
explicit in stating the ethical/ political values underlying her work; she 
acknowledges the fact that a set of metaphysical presuppositions 
accompanies her epistemology; and she explicitly names those 
presuppositions with regard to both the world to be known and knowers. 
Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology 
In 'Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology' the issue of objectivity is, as it 
was for Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding's central concern. Valuing most 
74 Ibid., pp. 589-590. "Feminism loves another science: the sciences and politics of interpretation, 
translation, stuttering, and the partly understood" (p. 589). "Situated knowledges are about 
communities, not about isolated individuals" (p. 590). 
75 Ibid., p. 584. "The alternative to relativism is partial, locatable, critical knowledges sustaining 
the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in 
epistemology." 
76 Ibid., p. 583. 
77 Haraway uses the south-western Native American image of the Coyote, or Trickster figure, when 
describing the sort of agency she envisions the world having. I have deep reservations about white 
North Americans appropriating this image, however, particularly given that Haraway is using it as an 
image with which "to save the world". Looking for present-day salvation for an industrialised, 
capitalist, Western society in the form of a single aspect of a complex symbol system of an 
indigenous culture/people almost entirely destroyed by white colonisers is, well, problematic, to say 
the least. 
78 Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, pp. 176-181. 
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highly "liberatory knowledge projects"79 (while she never elaborates on 
this expression it seems that she has in mind something similar to 
Hartsock's conception of "emancipatory knowledge" and Haraway's 
depiction of "knowledge for constructing worlds less organised by axes of 
domination"), Harding sets out to establish why feminist standpoint 
epistemology provides a necessary (but not sufficient) ground for starting 
to maximise objectivity.80 In other words, Harding attempts to explain 
how it is that feminist standpoint theory as she describes it provides a 
strongly objective starting point for knowledge-seeking enquiries. 
Importantly, her repeated emphasis in this essay on "start[ing] thought 
from marginalized lives" marks a critical shift in the focus of feminist 
standpoint theory.81 Whereas in 1983 Hartsock was clear that "the" 
feminist standpoint provides the best resource for answers to questions 
arising from liberatory knowledge projects, Harding focuses almost 
exclusively on establishing the best ground(s) for formulating those 
questions. To this end she, like Haraway, looks to the concept of 
objectivity for assistance. 
Unlike Haraway, however, Harding does not so much radically redefine 
the concept of objectivity as she extends it, applying it to both the context 
of discovery and ·the context of justification. She locates observers (or 
knowers) in the same causal plane as the observed (the world to be 
known) and insists that the factors affecting the observers are also 
affecting the observed; hence those factors (social, historical, political, 
economic, physical, material, etc.) must be made explicit in order to 
provide the possibility, if not the certainty, of the fullest understanding of 
the object/ event/process under observation.82 Rather than identify 
seemingly extraneous or anomalous influences on an 
object/ event/process at the end of a study in order then to remove them, 
79 Harding, 'Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology ', pp. 62, 66, 71. (Harding used the phrase 
"liberatory knowledge projects" three times.) 
80 Ibid., p. 57. 
81 Ibid., p. 50. See pp. 54-60 for further examples of starting thought but not finding the answers in 
marginalised lives. 
82 Ibid., pp. 64, 69, 71. 
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she wishes to identify in order to take into account as many influences as 
possible from the outset of any knowledge-seeking endeavour. Her point, 
as it is in Haraway's account, is that there is no view from nowhere; no 
knowers are able to transcend their particular location, nor is any object of 
knowledge able to be known apart from the location/ context of those 
doing the knowing.83 
This is the crux of the matter in Harding's account of feminist standpoint 
epistemology; whenever an object is being studied that object is always 
viewed through pre-existent historical perceptions and interpretations of 
the object, including accompanying historical valuations of the object. 
Once this fact is acknowledged, a study that does not include analyses of 
those historical perceptions, social influences, and valuations cannot be 
considered to be maximally objective. Only those knowledge-seeking 
endeavours firmly and consciously located in a specific time and place 
and conducted by knowledge-seekers who are firmly and consciously self-
reflexive can be considered to meet the criteria of strong objectivity.84 
Harding claims feminist standpoint theory provides "systematic methods 
for locating knowledge in history".85 She starts from the premise that all 
thought is indelibly marked by its era, but rather than assert this as a 
constant but peripheral epistemological issue, she moves this premise to 
centre stage. "Standpoint epistemology sets the relationship between 
knowledge and politics at the center of its account in the sense that it tries 
to provide causal accounts - to explain - the effects that different kinds of 
politics have on the production of knowledge."86 
In other words, she is saying that standpoint epistemology incorporates a 
methodology in and through which knowledge claims are made concrete, 
not allowed to transcend the historical, political, economic, and social ( in 
83 Ibid., p. 63. "The thought of an age is of an age, and the delusion that one's thought can escape 
historical locatedness is just one of the thoughts that is typical of dominant groups in these and other 
ages." 
84 Ibid., pp. 63-65 and pp. 69-72. 
85 Ibid., p. 50. 
86 Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
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which is included the race, class, sex, religion, etc.) situations of the 
community(ies) making those knowledge claims.87 This emphasis on 
communities as the agents of knowledge production is of fundamental 
significance in her account of standpoint epistemology. 
Communities and not primarily individuals produce 
knowledge. For one thing, what I believe that I thought 
through all by myself (in my mind), which I know, only gets 
transformed from my personal belief to knowledge when it is 
socially legitimated. Just as importantly, my society ends up 
assuming all the claims I make that neither I nor my society 
critically interrogate. 88 
As with Hartsock's and Haraway's account of standpoint epistemology, 
there are strong and inseparable moral and political components running 
through Harding's thought.89 By insisting on attending to the collective 
activities of members of marginalised communities as the 
methodological starting point for liberatory knowledge projects, it is 
possible to raise questions the answers to which matter to those 
communities. In other words, via standpoint epistemology it is not only 
possible but mandatory to raise precisely those questions which members 
of dominant communities usually would never have cause to ask, either 
because they have no investment in or need to know the answers, or 
because those questions and concerns literally do not exist in the 
dominant communities.90 According to Harding, because of its focus on 
asking the most pertinent questions possible, feminist standpoint 
87 Ibid., p. 52, 57, 65 re: communities and endnote 11 re: methodology. 
88 Ibid., p. 65. Harding characterises individual knowers in much the same way as Haraway. "[T]he 
subjects/agents of knowledge for feminist standpoint theory are multiple, heterogeneous, and 
contradictory or incoherent.. .. " (p. 65) Harding is explicit on this point: not only are there numerous 
heterogeneous communities of knowers, but each individual knower is her/himself "multiple", 
"contradictory" and "incoherent" at the same time as s/he is a member/ participant in a number of 
(possibly conflicting) communities. However, unless one provides a nuanced account of individual 
knowers as also accountable for their knowledge claims (as Haraway does) the image of human nature 
or individual subjectivity expressed through such metaphors as "contradictory", "incoherent" and 
"multiple" eventually works against the possibility of responsible epistemic agency, whether that 
agency is understood individually or communally. See Code, Rhetorical Spaces, p. 15. 
89 It is not surprising that Harding's refusal to separate or make a sharp distinction between 
epistemology, morals and politics is evident in her 'Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology' essay. In 
1986 she wrote, "It is within moral and political discourse that we should expect to find paradigms of 
rational discourse, not in scientific discourses claiming to have disavowed morals and politics. This 
assertion of the priority of moral and political over scientific and epistemological theory and activity 
makes science and epistemology less important, less central, than they are within the Enlightenment 
world view." See Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, p. 251. 
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epistemology potentially contributes to a democratic expansion of human 
knowledge-seeking projects.91 
However, to use a spatial metaphor, there is a vast distance between a 
question and an answer, a distance Harding accentuates rather than 
bridges with her insistence that the answers are not to be found where the 
questions are asked.92 In endnote 19 Harding writes, "We shall return 
later to the point that, for standpoint theorists, reports of marginalised 
experience or lives or phenomenologies of the 'lived world' of 
marginalised peoples are not the answers to questions arising either 
inside or outside those lives, though they are necessary to asking the best 
questions." At issue, I suggest, is the fact that she does not return to this 
point, nor does she provide any sort of epistemological prescription for 
obtaining the "best" answers to any questions. She describes how to ask 
good (in the sense of morally and politically and epistemically 
responsible) questions, but she does not suggest any way for communities 
to negotiate between conflicting answers to those questions. Thus- the 
limitation of feminist standpoint epistemology as characterised by 
Harding lies in the fact that she never adequately explains where or how 
11 answers" come to be acknowledged as II answers". And if, as Harding 
proposes, maximally objective answers are not to be found in the 
epistemically privileged yet socially and politically marginalised 
standpoints giving rise to the most pressing questions of our time, then it 
would seem that those answers can be formulated only (again, how?) in 
socially and politically dominant communities, the very communities 
with no communal investment in asking the questions, let - alone 
answering them in accordance with Harding's conception of "strong 
objectivity". 
90 Harding, 'Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology ', pp. 54, 56. 
9l Harding explains her use of the terms "democracy" and "democratic" in endnote 52. She begins 
from "John Dewey's proposal: those who will bear the consequence of a decision should have a 
proportionate share in making it." Ibid. , p. 81. 
92 Ibid., pp. 56-63. 
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In fact, Harding seems to be rather confused on the issue of which 
communities can be responsible epistemic agents and produce liberatory, 
maximally objective knowledge. She writes, u ... it cannot be that women 
are the unique generators of feminist knowledge", asserting that men too 
can and must start their thought from women's lives, thus producing 
"specifically feminist knowledge. " Then, however, she immediately and 
affirmingly quotes what Patricia Hill Collins has to say about Black 
feminist knowledge. "Other groups cannot produce Black feminist 
thought without African-American women. Such groups can, however, 
develop self-defined knowledge reflecting their own standpoints." 
Following soon after she writes, "a maximally critical study of scientists 
and their communities can be done only from the perspective of those 
whose lives have been marginalized by such communities". I suggest 
that Harding cannot have it all ways. Knowledge produced by, say, a 
white male community in the US that consciously took into account the 
privileges and opportunities afforded to white males qua white males but 
not white females qua white females in the US at the end of the twentieth 
century can be much more objective (in the sense of honestly situated) 
than "knowledge" produced with no acknowledgement of the power of 
maleness and whiteness combined. But, if Patricia Hill Collins is correct, 
without the active participation of white feminist women it cannot be 
white feminist thought, nor, according to Harding herself, can those 
white males be maximally critical, maximally aware of the consequences 
of their power and privilege on the lives of "others" .93 
Given the difficulties inherent in Harding's essay, I will conclude this 
discussion of feminist standpoint epistemology by referring back to the 
contributions of Nancy Hartsock and Donna Haraway. Hartsock's 
specifically feminist historical material standpoint is a theoretical 
approach solidly embedded in an analysis of the forms and consequences 
of the sexual division of labour in Western capitalist societies. Her 
feminist standpoint theory is grounded on the fact that babies are 
93 Ibid., pp. 67-69. 
124 
"produced" by and out of female bodies, and that this production, as well 
as all subsequent labour necessary to ensure the child's continuing 
existence, profoundly affects the ways in which females relate to and 
understand other people and the world. Hartsock maintains that the 
fullest and most accurate knowledge of the political, social, and economic 
practices occurring in this historical moment is available only from an 
engaged feminist standpoint. In other words, the most ethically and 
epistemically accountable answers to the questions "what is happening?", 
"why?", and "what ought we to do about it?" are not to be found in the 
world according to "abstract masculinity", for that world is a world 
removed from the most pressing concerns of human existence. 
Donna Haraway's visionary understanding of "situated knowledges" is at 
once several worlds removed from Hartsock's analysis yet remarkably 
compatible with it. According to Haraway all knowledge claims are 
situated, all knowledge claims are partial, and all knowledge claims are 
simultaneously moral and political claims. There do exist, however, 
communities with less of a stake in seeing the world through the eyes of 
the dominant reality-definers. This does not mean that what is seen from 
the vantage points of the politically, morally and epistemically subjugated 
is a reflection of "pure" reality. It simply means that these communities 
are less bound to pre-determined interpretations of the world that just 
happen to support or sanction the status quo. Just as Hartsock based her 
feminist standpoint epistemology on the inescapably mundane and 
extraordinary fact of childbirth and the care and feeding of messy, hungry 
bodies, so too Haraway deliberately turns her back (though never her 
attention) away from "the dazzling space platforms" of the powerful. She 
denies neither their existence nor their power, but by asserting the active 
and unpredictable agency of the world she inserts an epistemological 
monkey wrench into all merely human knowledge endeavours. 
However, though the world-as-agent plays tricks upon humans, still 
Haraway acknowledges the importance of human attempts to come to 
know the world. But the sort of "objective" knowledge she strives for is 
utterly removed from the "objective mastery" that accompanies so many 
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"White Capitalist Patriarchal" knowledge claims.94 According to 
Haraway "objectivity" means being accountable to the non-innocent, 
power-charged conversations one enters into with aspects of the world 
(including other humans) around one. "Objectivity" is about living 
responsibly, with an active awareness of the always complex and never 
static relationships between humans and the Mars probe no less than 
between humans and panda bears. 
In this chapter I have examined three distinct approaches to standpoint 
epistemology, a worthwhile place to begin an investigation into feminist 
conceptions of epistemology because, as Helen Longino concisely puts it, 
"standpoint epistemologies notice systematic distortions in description 
and analysis produced by those occupying social positions of power".95 In 
other words, standpoint theories provide the means to describe broadly 
the fact that knowledge is made - not merely "found" - by specific 
epistemic agents in specific social, political, and economic locations. 
Further, who is doing the making affects what sort of knowledge gets 
made. To use Donna Haraway's expression, there is a "non-innocent" 
relationship between knowledge, knowledge-makers (or epistemic 
agents), and power. Standpoint epistemologies, however they are 
formulated, foreground this critical point. Feminist standpoint theorists 
argue that women in particular often have not been accorded knowledge-
making status but have been, as a category, profoundly affected by the 
putative knowledge claims of elite men. 
Keeping in mind this non-innocent relationship between knowledge, 
knowledge-makers, and power (for it is a theme that resonates strongly in 
most if not all work in feminist epistemology), it is time now to explore 
how other feminist epistemologists have characterised knowers, the 
world to be known, and the production of knowledge. 
94 Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges', p. 592. 
95 Longino, 'Subjects, Power, and Knowledge', p. 106. 
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Chapter Five 
Epistemological Communities and their Consequences 
In one of the concluding sentences of the last chapter I noted that 
according to feminist standpoint theories, women as a category have been 
systematically disadvantaged by traditional Western Euro-American 
epistemologies. While on one level this is a straightforward assessment 
of the social, political and moral effects of various hegemonic masculinist 
theories of knowledge (and their accompanying presuppositions 
concerning the nature of "women"), on another level this statement 
covers up a more complex situation. Simply, for some time the notion of 
"women" as a monolithic category has been untenable.I The situations, 
locations, and lived experiences of different women cannot be spoken of 
in universal terms - to do so is to cover up the significant differences that 
exist between and among women. Accordingly, one way out of this 
dilemma is to resist the temptation to categorise "women" or "women's 
experience" in sweeping terms. To quote Judith Plaskow's and Carol 
Christ's words from a decade ago, "the notion of women's experience 
must be taken as an invitation to explore particularity rather than to 
homogenize significant differences". 2 
1 There are those who support the use of "an operational essentialism, a false ontology of women as a 
universal in order to advance a feminist political program". According to Judith Butler, Gayatri 
Spivak and Julia Kristeva are among them. While I perceive this to be an important political strategy 
in some instances, this is, for reasons which will become clear throughout this chapter, not usually a 
viable epistemological option. Judith Butler, 'Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic 
Discourse', in Nicholson, Linda J., ed, Feminism/Postmodemism, Routledge, New York and 
London, 1990,p. 325. 
2 Plaskow, Judith and Carol Christ, eds, Weaving the Visions: New Patterns in Feminist 
Spirituality, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1989, p. 3. 
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However, feminist standpoint theory seems to require both the possibility 
of referring to some sort of "women-as-a-category" (albeit not necessarily 
a monolithic one) and the possibility of identifying epistemically "better" 
and "worse" standpoints for making knowledge in any given society. The 
problem, according to Helen Longino, is as follows: 
Women occupy many social locations in a racially and 
economically stratified society. If genuine or better 
knowledge depends on the correct or a more correct 
standpoint, social theory is needed to ascertain which of 
these locations is the epistemologically privileged one. But in 
a standpoint epistemology, a standpoint is needed to justify 
such a theory. What is that standpoint and how do we 
identify it? If no single standpoint is privileged, then either 
the standpoint theorist must embrace multiple and 
incompatible knowledge positions or offer some means of 
transforming or integrating multiple perspectives into one. 
Both of these moves require either the abandonment or the 
supplementation of standpoint as an epistemic criterion.3 
(italics original) 
Accepting the issues facing standpoint theory ( and feminist epistemology 
broadly) as stated above by Longino, i.e., that women do participate in 
numerous, different social locations and live in societies organised along 
many different axes, not simply in a single society divided simply along 
sex (or sex/ gender) lines, and that a terribly stark conception of standpoint 
theory potentially could be used to support the silencing of all knowledge 
claims made by epistemic agents in any way tinged with social, economic, 
or political privilege, in this chapter I am going to examine how feminist 
standpoint epistemology has been supplemented by various feminists' 
reconceptualisations of knowers, the world to be known, and processes 
for knowledge making. In keeping with one of the fundamental 
premises of standpoint epistemology, however, I am examining only the 
work of those feminist epistemologists who take it as a given that all 
knowledge is situated, or positional, is located relative to a particular time 
or era and place and group of knowledge makers, or epistemic agents.4 
3 Longino, 'Subjects, Knowledge and Power', p. 107. 
4 Lorraine Code suggests that the concept of "positionality responds more adequately to the 
historical/political exigencies of the 1990s" than does the concept of a standpoint. Code, What Can 
She Know, p. 317. 
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Precedent for this approach has been set by Lynn Hankinson Nelson, who 
suggests that 
the notion of "situation" or "location" is increasingly 
complex and fertile in feminist theory ( and certainly more 
complex than prefeminist empiricist and Marxist 
epistemologies were capable of conceptualizing), and I view 
it as bridging recent feminist empiricist epistemologies, 
standpoint epistemologies, and some postmodern 
arguments. 5 
I will begin by re-examining a point raised only briefly by Hartsock, 
Haraway, and Harding, yet one which is a critical component in many 
North American feminist epistemological works. 
As stated in the previous chapter, according to Nancy Hartsock a 
standpoint is an engaged position in social relations. It is not the 
perspective of an individual, whether a "detached observer" or an 
involved activist. ~stead, a standpoint is achieved through both 
collective effort and collective analysis.6 In other words, an individual, by 
her or himself, can neither establish nor speak from a standpoint known 
only to her /himself. Similarly, Donna Haraway, in an almost throwaway 
comment, notes that "situated knowledges are about communities, not 
about isolated individuals"? And lastly Sandra Harding, when 
discussing feminist standpoint theory, states the following: 
the fact that feminist knowledge claims are socially situated 
does not in practice distinguish them from any other 
knowledge claims that have been made inside or outside the 
history of Western thought and the disciplines today; all 
bear the fingerprints of the communities that produce them. 8 
(italics added) 
The issue I want to highlight is the fact that all three theorists share the 
assumption that knowledge is made, not by isolated individuals, but 
through a process of communal engagement and reflection. Thus in 
5 Nelson, 'Epistemological Communities', in Feminist Epistemologies, eds, Linda Alcoff and 
Elizabeth Potter, Routledge, New York and London, 1993, p. 152, endnote 1. 
6 See pp. 103-104 in chapter four. 
7 Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges', p. 590. 
8 Harding, 'Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology', p. 57. 
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feminist standpoint theories it is communities, not individuals, who are 
the agents of knowledge production. 
This notion that epistemic agency is primarily communal and only in 
some secondary, limited way a characteristic or property of individuals, is, 
I believe, fundamental to standpoint epistemologies, yet functions as a 
deep background assumption and is mentioned directly only rarely. 
However, I suggest that it is of such significance in standpoint theories 
(feminist or otherwise) that they make no sense apart from it.9 Further, 
there is a vital corollary to this assumption of communal rather than 
individual epistemic agency. If it is necessarily communities which 
produce knowledge rather than individuals, then knowledge (or "the 
truth") is not something that is entirely pre-existent and complete, just 
waiting to be discovered by any individual who stumbles upon it. Instead, 
knowledge is constructed, is made by those communities acknowledged 
by the wider society to possess the expertise to make knowledge claims 
about specific subjects. Knowledge of humankind and the world is 
therefore made not by just any random communities, but specifically by 
those communities widely accorded a) epistemic credibility (Code) and b) 
cognitive authority (Addelson).10 
This rich notion of "epistemological communities" receives explicit 
attention and development in the thought of Lynn Hankinson Nelson 
and Elizabeth Potter, among others. In the following pages I will examine 
how this notion of epistemological communities has been developed, 
beginning with a discussion of the underlying conceptions of human 
nature or subjectivity that support such a notion of epistemological 
communities. This will lead in turn to an examination of the issues of 
cognitive authority and epistemic credibility, issues that cannot be 
9 In this regard I respectfully disagree with Helen Longino, who asserts that, with feminist 
empiricism, feminist standpoint theories "have in common a focus on the individual epistemic agent, 
on the autonomous subject." (Longino, 'Subjects, Knowledge and Power', p. 109.) I would argue 
that within feminist standpoint theories there is at least implicitly no such thing as an autonomous 
subject, or an epistemic agent who can know something all by herself. 
lO See Code, What Can She Know, pp. 222-264; and Addelson, 'Knower/Doers and Their Moral 
Problems', pp. 265-273. 
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discussed without also discussing questions of power and epistemic 
privilege. Lastly, I will conclude this chapter by discussing the 
impossibility, within the North American feminist epistemological 
paradigm as I understand it, of there being one eternal truth - a stance 
that is, arguably, the most charged and potent consequence following on 
from the idea that knowledge is made and made again, not simply 
"found". The world becomes a very different sort of place when 
perceived from this perspective; ultimate answers about the nature of 
creation disappear. Obviously the theological ramifications of this 
account of "truth" are rather important; it is thus vital to be able to 
identify this approach to knowledge and truth if it is present (whether as a 
developed idea in its own right or tagging along as a consequence of some 
other presupposition) in the epistemological framework of feminist 
christian theologians. I need to be clear from the outset, however, that 
the following description of epistemological communities and their 
epistemic consequences is representative of no one feminist 
philosopher's work. Rather, I draw together certain themes and issues 
present to varying degrees in a number of philosophers' work. My 
representation of these themes is not necessarily indicative of the way 
they have been developed by individual authors. 
Because I will refer again to rhetorical spaces in this chapter, before I 
sketch an account of epistemological communities I ought to clarify a 
distinction alluded to but not dwelt upon in the first chapter, that is, the 
difference between rhetorical spaces and epistemological communities. 
There I adapted and extended somewhat Lorraine Code's notion of 
rhetorical spaces to my own use when I wrote that a rhetorical space 
surrounds an epistemological community, and that it is within this 
"space" that statements made by members within that community make 
sense, are intelligible. The difference between an epistemological 
community and the rhetorical space that envelopes that community is 
critical, and can best be described by example. I, as a white woman, can 
never be a member of the epistemological community that produces 
feminist African-American, or womanist, theological texts. However, if I 
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enter the rhetorical space surrounding the womanist theological 
community I can learn the theories, or the metaphysical assumptions, the 
models, metaphors and value judgements used and held by that 
particular epistemological community, and in doing so I then 
simultaneously affirm its existence and am able to comprehend more 
fully the knowledge claims produced by that community. Further, I must 
enter that rhetorical space in order to converse intelligibly or 
meaningfully with members of that epistemological community about 
their knowledge claims, just as they must be willing to enter the 
rhetorical space in which I speak if they wish to converse meaningfully 
with me or any other member of the feminist christian theological 
community in which I work about the knowledge claims made by that 
community. It is within the rhetorical spaces surrounding 
epistemological communities that knowledge claims are shared with 
other epistemological communities. One does not have to be a member 
of a specific epistemological community in order to comprehend 
knowledge claims made by that community, but one does need to be an 
acknowledged member of an epistemological community to contribute to · 
the process of making the knowledge claims produced by that 
community. To put it simply, a rhetorical space is the "location" where 
knowledge claims are intelligible; an epistemological community is the 
"location" of the production of those knowledge claims. With that 
distinction in place, it is time now to examine more closely the notion of 
epistemological communities. 
Epistemological Communities 
I begin with a brief examination of the understanding of human 
subjectivity(ies) underlying and making possible the feminist 
philosophical notion of epistemological communities. Regarding their 
philosophical conceptions of subjectivity, or, more broadly, human 
nature, all the feminist epistemologists whose work I have been drawing 
upon reject " .. .ideals [that] presuppose a universal, homogeneous, and 
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essential 'human nature', [one] that allows knowers to be substitutable for 
one another" .11 Beginning with the assumption that there is no such 
thing as human nature in general, feminist epistemologists justify this 
assertion by noting the fact and constraints of human embodiment, 
including the fact that no two bodies are exactly alike. As Lorraine Code 
notes, "the facts of having a certain kind of sensory apparatus, and bodies 
that fall within certain ranges of size and agility, structure possibilities of 
experience, shaping and limiting possible ways of knowing".12 Further, 
drawing on Annette Baier' s conception of persons as essentially "second 
persons", Code stresses the physical and cognitive dependence of children 
upon adults.13 The formation (never entirely completed) of an 
individual's subjectivity is literally dependent on her or his relations 
with others, others who feed and care for him (or not), who teach her 
how to live (well or poorly) in a world inhabited by others.14 As "second 
persons" humans' very being (at an ontological level) is dependent upon 
and interrelated with other beings. I (for any I) am only because you 
(many of you) are. Such an interdependency, according to Code, "is 
continuous, if variously located and elaborated, throughout people's 
histories, manifesting itself in patterns of reciprocal influence" .1 5 
But again, humans are never in a relationship with everyone, 
everywhere. We are only in relations with specific others in specific 
times and places. Thus, as Helen Longino puts it, " ... subjectivity is 
conditioned by social and historical location" .1 6 It follows from this that 
as humans move in and out of different places, are affected by different 
social and historical movements and events, and engage in different 
relations with others, then their subjectivities will be changed, or, are 
11 Lorraine Code, 'Taking Subjectivity into Account', in Feminist Epistemologies, eds, Linda Alcoff 
and Elizabeth Potter, Routledge, New York and London, 1993, p. 16. 
12 Code, What Can She Know, p. 42. 
13 Code refers to Annette Baier's essay~ 'Cartesian Persons,' in Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind 
and Morals, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1985, pp. 74-92. 
14 Code, What Can She Know, pp. 82-84. 
15 Ibid., p. 84. 
16 Longino, 'Subjects, Power and Knowledge', p. 108. 
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always in process. This process often produces contradictions and 
incoherencies (or multiplicities) within a "single" subject, as well as 
highlighting multiple differences between subjects.1 7 However, the fact 
of embodiment within a physical world - constant and relatively 
enduring even as our bodies themselves are always subtly or drastically 
changing - does seem to ground most feminist epistemologists' 
conceptions of human subjectivity.18 Broadly, then, subjectivities are 
embodied, interdependent, multiple affairs, never wholly unitary, fixed 
or static. They are formed and transformed through interrelations with 
close-by others, historical and social locations (within which are included 
received worldviews and value judgements), physical settings, and 
peculiarly individual physical characteristics: height, weight, eye colour, 
hair colour, physical abilities or lack thereof, reproductive capability, etc. 
Maria Lugones' description of the individuals who comprise 
communities, although not explicitly addressing the concept of 
subjectivity, does, I believe, convey beautifully the current conception of 
human nature/ subjectivity within much feminist epistemology. 
Lugones locates her own thoughts on community " ... in the midst of 
concrete, complex, nonreducible, cantankerous, fleshy, interrelated, 
positioned subjects, noncontainable within any easy, abstract, hard-edged, 
simple classification" .1 9 
I suggest that this understanding of human nature is a necessary corollary 
to feminist conceptions of epistemological communities. According to 
Lynn Hankinson Nelson, 
epistemological communities are multiple, historically 
contingent, and dynamic: they have fuzzy, often overlapping 
boundaries; they evolve~ dissolve, and recombine; and they 
17 See Harding, 'Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology', p. 65. 
18 See Code, Rhetorical Spaces, p. 71. Code notes that "despite their persuasiveness, postmodern 
critiques of the uniform and coherent conceptions of subjectivity, which they attribute to humanism or 
to the Enlightenment tradition, bypass a vital feature of the very possibility of human survival to 
chronological maturity. I am referring to the fact that it is not possible to lead a minimally coherent 
human life unless one's environment, both material and human, sustains a core of realist-empiricist 
assumptions." 
19 Maria Lugones, 'Community,' in A Companion to Feminist Philosophy, eds, Alison M. Jagger 
and Iris Marion Young, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1998, p. 466. 
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have a variety of 'purposes' and projects which may include 
( as in the case of science communities) but frequently do not 
include (as a priority) the production of knowledge.20 
In other words, epistemological communities resemble, in many respects, 
the individuals who comprise them. Kathryn Pyne Addelson defines 
epistemological communities as "communities of knowers/ doers", as 
"people who, over a period of time, perform some sort of collective 
activity together" .21 Further, and of critical importance, she asserts that 
"the relations among members of [an epistemological community] are 
founded in communication" .22 Given the significance of 
communication within this understanding of epistemological 
communities, it does not seem to be a coincidence that both Lynn 
Hankinson Nelson and Elizabeth Potter begin their explanations of 
epistemological communities by first positing the epistemic dependency 
of an individual upon a pre-existent socio-linguistic community. 
For example, Nelson asserts that without interpersonal relationships 
with others in a socio-linguistic community the "development [of that 
section of an individual's brain] necessary to language use will never 
occur". 23 According to Nelson, 
[ o ]ur current understandings of neurobiological development, 
for example, indicate that interpersonal experience is a 
necessary causal factor in the fetal and postnatal 
neurobiological development that permits language 
acquisition, conceptualization, and many perceptual 
experiences. 24 
Thus individuals are, in addition to being physically dependent on a pre-
existent community of others for survival (and for the development of 
their "second personhood"), epistemologically dependent on interactions 
with others in order to develop physiologically into an individual who 
20 Nelson, 'Epistemological Communities', p. 125. 
21 Addelson, 'Knower/Doers and Their Moral Problems', p. 280. 
22 Ibid. She uses the term "social world" rather than "epistemological community," but defines 
social worlds as "communities of knowers/doers". Accordingly, I take her statements about social 
worlds to apply to epistemological communities as well. 
23 Nelson, Who Knows, p. 286. 
24 Ibid., p. 285. 
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shares the capacities necessary to know with others, including the capacity 
for language use. 
Rather than delve into the world of neurobiology, Elizabeth Potter 
follows Wittgenstein's "attack on the very possibility of a private 
language".25 According to Potter there is no way to justify the belief that a 
private language (created in isolation by a single individual) would 
necessarily contain all the distinctions and concepts contained in "our" 
language: distinctions and concepts upon which knowledge and truth 
claims depend. In her words, 
Wittgenstein argued that there is no way for the isolated 
individual - who doesn't yet have any concepts including 
especially concepts of "same" and "different", the concept 
of pointing to something and naming it, or the concept of 
reference - to make this distinction between statements that 
are true and those that seem to him to be true.26 
In other words, individuals are epistemologically dependent upon . a 
shared, communal or public language which contains these concepts and 
distinctions and which is used by two or more people to express, apply 
and debate the application of these concepts. It is necessarily through 
shared language that knowledge claims are made and debated, not private 
languages. Potter's point is that the public language necessary for making 
knowledge exists prior to the individual who learns to use this language. 
She then describes the epistemological consequences of this claim: 
[i]f the individual is not linguistically prior to the community, 
then the individual cannot be epistemically prior either. And 
it follows that the epistemic community cannot be comprised 
of a set of epistemically independent individuals; we must, 
therefore, begin to view the community as comprised of 
epistemically interdependent individuals.27 
And again, this community either exists prior to any individual who 
might one day become a member of it, or is the simultaneous co-creation 
25 Potter, 'Gender and Epistemic Negotiation', in Feminist Epistemologies, eds, Linda Alcoff and 
Elizabeth Potter, Routledge, New York and London, 1993, p. 163. 
26 Ibid., pp. 163-164. 
27 Ibid., p. 165. 
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of a number of interdependent individuals. Accepting the assumption 
that at least some sort of shared language is necessary in order both to 
structure interpretations of experience (i.e., linguistic concepts such as 
"same" and "different") and to discuss those interpretations (or those 
potential knowledge claims), there are at least two ways, then, in which 
an individual is dependent on pre-existent epistemological communities. 
On the one hand an individual is dependent on linguistic interactions 
with others in order to be able to develop physiologically into someone 
with the capacity to know, and on the other hand an individual is 
dependent on linguistic interactions with others in order to gain a set of 
concepts according to which aspects of the world, including other human 
beings, are identified, organised and/ or distinguished from one 
another.28 In the English language these concepts include such 
epistemologically-loaded notions as "true" and "false", "right" and 
"wrong", "fact" and "error". 
But such shared terms/ concepts are themselves used within a variety of 
much larger discursive or theoretical frameworks - theoretical 
frameworks around which specific knowledge making endeavours are 
organised. Different epistemological communities embrace different 
theoretical frameworks (or conceptual paradigms). When used in a 
feminist christian theological text, for example, "sin" and "salvation" 
have rather different meanings than when they are used by a male 
Southern Baptist preacher in the context of a tent revival. Their 
meanings are tied to, or are contextually dependent upon the theory or 
set of theories and practices embraced by the epistemological 
communities that make use of those terms/ concepts.29 This issue 
highlights again the necessarily communal, rather than individual, 
nature of knowledge making: shared theoretical frameworks are 
indispensable to knowledge making endeavours. 
28 See Nelson, Who Knows, p. 288. 
29 To put it in the language of the first section of this thesis, the meanings of individual terms or 
metaphors are paradigm-dependent, and each epistemological community is structured around a slightly 
or very different conceptual paradigm. 
137 
' 
According to Nelson, one consequence of "our" epistemological 
dependence on shared language and shared theoretical frameworks 
means that an individual can genuinely know something only when it is 
possible that others do or could know it as well. 
If an individual claimed to know something that was not in 
keeping with the knowledge and standards of her community 
(or any other), it would require a change in such standards 
and knowledge [or practices and theories] for the individual 
to know - and, then, of course, some community would 
know.30 
In order for Nelson's assertions to make sense she must make a critical 
distinction between knowledge and belief; an individual can believe 
anything she or he likes, but her/his beliefs are not and cannot be 
know ledge claims unless others can affirm them, and the possibility of 
such affirmation depends on the prior existence of a communally-shared 
set of theories and practices within which that individual's knowledge 
claim makes sense. I take Nelson's point to be an elaboration of a claim 
made by Lorraine Code, " .. .for something to count as an item of 
knowledge, it must be possible for at least some members of an epistemic 
community to locate it within the context of what one might call a 
'communication system"'.31 (italics original) Therefore an individual's 
beliefs can only be acknowledged to be knowledge by the community that 
uses specific practices and theories and evaluates putative knowledge 
claims that are intelligible within the framework of those theories and 
practices, a framework inclusive of specific models and metaphors, or, in 
Code's words, of a communication system. By the time an individual 
knows something, so too do other members of the epistemological 
community responsible for the network of theories and practices within 
which that knowledge claim is expressed, again through specific 
metaphors and models. And that knowledge claim could not have been 
expressed, let alone evaluated and acknowledged, without the existence of 
30 Nelson, 'Epistemological Communities', p. 140. 
31 Code, Lorraine, Epistemic Responsibility, University Press of New England, Hanover and 
London, 1987,p. 171. 
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the theories, practices, metaphors, and models of the community that 
evaluates, promotes and sometimes denies putative knowledge claims. 
Lorraine Code, quoting from Wittgenstein's On Certainty, states simply 
that "knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement" .32 As 
Nelson's and Potter's work demonstrates, such acknowledgement is 
possible only within epistemological communities - communities 
structured around a shared language and a shared theoretical framework 
(conceptual paradigm) or worldview.33 These communities exist prior to 
any individual potential member, and are comprised of epistemically 
interdependent members. Within such communities individuals can 
achieve both meaningful agreement and meaningful disagreement with 
one another on many issues, and when at least some number of them 
comprehend a potential knowledge claim and agree that it is credible, 
then that community makes that knowledge claim. Importantly, 
knowledge claims made by a specific community are almost always of 
epistemological significance to other knowledge-making communities; in 
other words, no epistemological community is an island unto itself. The · 
rhetorical space surrounding one epistemological community necessarily 
overlaps with the rhetorical spaces of other epistemological 
communities. If rhetorical spaces did not overlap, communication with 
other epistemological communities would be impossible. Further, 
fundamental theoretical assumptions about the nature of humans and 
the world are shared by many epistemological communities.34 So, for 
example, a knowledge claim about evidence of life forms on one of 
Jupiter's moons, if made by a community of astronomers, would have 
epistemological significance to communities of biologists, chemists, 
physicists, theologians and ethicists, as well as to communities of extra-
32 Code, What Can She Know, p. 215, quoting Wittgenstein, On Certainty, #378. 
33 Not all epistemological communities technically share a conceptual paradigm or theoretical 
framework; some of them may share simply a general worldview; these sorts of epistemological 
communities, however, typically do not have the production of knowledge as one of their primary or 
explicit goals. · 
34 For example, at this time metaphysical presuppositions shared by most epistemological 
communities include the assumption that the earth is round, not flat, and the assumption that female 
babies are the product of two X chromosomes, rather than the result of the south wind, which is 
moist, as Thomas Aquinas and others of his era assumed. 
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terrestrial believers and alien worshippers. However, if the same 
knowledge claim was initially made by a community of alien 
worshippers then the epistemological significance of that claim would be 
accorded much less value by the other epistemological communities 
named above. 
Cognitive Authority 
The issue of the relative value assigned by the wider society to knowledge 
claims made by different epistemological communities, is of fundamental 
significance in the work of many North American feminist philosophers. 
As Kathryn Pyne Addelson succinctly puts it, "who makes knowledge 
makes a difference. Making knowledge is a political act."35 (italics 
original) Importantly, this statement applies both to individual 
(potential) -members of epistemological communities and to 
epistemological communities as knowledge making bodies. According to 
Addelson, knowledge making communities acknowledged by the wider 
society to be epistemological communities have had conferred upon 
them at least some degree of "cognitive authority". She explains this 
phrase by stating: "We take their understanding of factual matters [about] 
the nature of the world within their sphere of expertise as knowledge, or 
as the definitive understanding."36 
Elsewhere she writes of knowledge makers as those groups of people 
upon whom "institutional warrant for making and dispersing 
knowledge" has been conveyed.37 Within the context of her work it is 
clear that she does not mean that those epistemological comm uni ties 
granted "institutional warrant" or a high degree of cognitive authority 
are the only epistemological communities worthy of the name.38 Rather, 
35 Addelson, 'Knower/Doers and Their Moral Problems', p. 267. 
36 Addelson, Kathryn Pyne, Impure Thoughts: Essays on Philosophy, Feminism, and Ethics, 
Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1991, p. 62. 
37 Ibid., p. 110. 
38 See Addelson, 'Knower/Doers and Their Moral Problems', p. 265. "In this article, I will give 
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her concern is with making explicit the fact that knowledge production is 
a value-laden, political process. Within a single society, knowledge made 
by certain epistemological communities is more highly valued than 
knowledge made by other communities. Epistemological communities 
engaged in highly valued knowledge making endeavours are considered 
to be prestigious,39 and the weight of the cognitive authority granted to 
these communities (and by extension to some individual members of 
these communities) has more immediate political impact than . 
knowledge made by non-prestigious epistemological communities. This 
is evident, for example, in terms of what is taught as knowledge in 
classrooms or what is the focus of popular media coverage or what 
research receives government funding. Simply put, some 
epistemological communities are more epistemically powerful than 
others. The knowledge claims made by those communities tend to have 
a much greater impact on how the world is understood and defined than 
knowledge claims made by less prestigious, less powerful epistemological 
communities. To quote from an essay written by Addelson and Elizabeth 
Potter, 
[b ]ehind the feminist critiques [ of traditional, 'objective' 
approaches to the production of knowledge] lies our 
recognition that traditional selections are not independent of 
the values of those who make them. The selections that 
feminists criticize are made by people who have the 
authority to make them and thus to produce the knowledge 
their selections shape. Feminist critiques ultimately point to the 
hierarchical structure of cognitive authority that allows the 
perspective of some to determine the shape of knowledge for all.40 
(italics added) 
some reasons that a feminist epistemology is (and should be) an epistemology for knowledge makers. 
I don't mean by this that 'all women' are included as knowledge makers in the epistemology I sketch 
here - although I believe that all women are knowledge makers and should be respected as such. Who 
makes knowledge varies with the politics of a situation. In this academic anthology, it makes sense 
to speak of (and to) academic knowledge makers." 
39 See Addelson, Impure Thoughts, pp. 74-75. "The sciences differ in prestige, physics having more 
than economics, and both having more than educational psychology. Specialities in a science, too, 
differ in prestige, experimental having more than clinical psychology, for example. Prestige 
differences affect researchers' judgments on which metaphysical and methodological commitments are 
to be preferred." 
40 Ibid., p. 222. (The words appearing in brackets are taken from p. 221.) 
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This quote, while emphasising the hierarchical structure of cognitive 
authority (and implicitly disavowing direct correspondence notions of 
knowledge and truth), should be read from the perspective of a rich 
conception of epistemological communities and sub-communities as 
overlapping with and jostling against one another. The granting of 
cognitive authority to epistemological communities is not a once and for 
all occurrence, but an ongoing process with some epistemological 
communities gaining in prominence at one time but at other times 
receding in distinction (although not always disappearing entirely). For 
example, in the aftermath of World War II the study of genetics was not 
accorded a high degree of value; now, however, work in genetics is a 
highly prestigious epistemological endeavour. Evelyn Fox Keller, writing 
specifically of scientific communities, describes the process in this way: 
One of the characteristics of scientific development that 
most plagues historians is the enormous diversity of 
viewpoints that can continue to persist long after it appears 
that consensus has been reached. The difficulty arises not 
only because consensus is never total, but also because of the 
fact that consensus always means the consensus of a 
particular community. Scientists make up many communities, 
and these communities vary by subject, by methodology, by place, 
and by degree of influence. Science by itself is a polyphonic 
chorus. The voices in that chorus are never equal, but what 
one hears as a dominant motif depends very much on where 
one stands. At times, some motifs appear dominant from 
any standpoint. But there are always comers from which 
one can hear minor motifs continuing to sound.41 (italics 
added) 
Keller's insight is critical - hegemonic knowledge claims, or those 
knowledge claims made by dominant epistemological communities, are 
never the only knowledge claims of an era. 
At this point an examination of Lorraine Code's treatment of the 
relationship between power, knowledge, and knowers will serve as a 
bridge between the previous discussion of epistemological communities 
as communities and a closer examination of the issues facing individuals 
41 Keller, Evelyn Fox, A Feeling For The Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock, W. 
H. Freeman and Company, New York, 1983, p. 174. 
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who attempt to become acknowledged members of "institutionally 
warranted" epistemological communities. 
Code's analysis of the relationship between power and knowledge, and 
the affect this relationship has on knowers in the world, is heavily 
influenced by Michel Foucault.42 In a footnote in What Can She Know? 
she summarises her interpretation of his "power /knowledge complex". 
The power Foucault locates in the power /knowledge 
complex is not the hegemonic, sovereign power of a political 
tyrant. It manifests itself, rather, in the 'totalizing' effects of 
established discourse, which suppresses other ways of 
thinking, rendering them invisible. There is neither a single 
locus nor an identifiable agent of power, yet power is at once 
constitutive of subjectivity and of possibilities of action and 
critique.43 
In keeping with Addelson's conception of certain epistemological 
communities having institutional warrant to make knowledge claims, 
Code's understanding of "established discourse" is that it is neither the 
"voice" nor the creation of any lone individual; it is an institutional 
phenomenon. "The totalising, controlling power of discourse that gains 
institutional hegemony - in medicine, psychiatry, criminology, 
psychology, or sociology- is sanctioned by social regimes and deployed to 
control and discipline populations."44 These institutional discourses 
matter, then, because they shape social reality by determining the 
invisible ideolog(y /ies) of any given society. 
Code defines "ideology" as "an embedded, uncritical, mainly unconscious 
set of perceptions and understandings of the world which constitute a 
'common' framework in a given era, culture, or social space" .45 The 
power of institutional discourse is in the influence it has on informing a 
42 I use the word "affect" rather than "effect" in this sentence intentionally, for Code chooses to take a 
"generous" approach to Foucault's work. Being most concerned with promoting individual and 
communal epistemic responsibility/accountability, her "knowers", though also awash in seas of 
discourse, are arguably better swimmers than Foucault's. 
43 Code, What Can She Know, p. 177. 
44 Ibid., p. 201 and p. 201-202. 
45 Ibid., p. 196. 
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given sociocultural ideology. Importantly, institutional discourses define 
not only how the physical world is conceived, but also the "essential" 
characteristics and abilities of entire categories of people. In Code's words, 
"[p ]ower-knowledge structures constitute people as categories . - as 
homosexuals, women, blacks, mad people - defined and publicly 
understood according to rigid, stereotyped designations" .46 Code is aware 
that individuals are never simply or only members of just one "category" 
or "class" of people, and that often the "allowed" characteristics of one 
category of which they are a member are denied by another category of 
which they are also a member. However, by identifying stereotypical 
ideological designations and not confusing those designations with the 
actual people to whom they purportedly refer, Code provides a theoretical 
tool with which it is possible to discuss the ideological figure of "woman" 
or "women" and the effect this ideology has on real women's concrete, 
particular lives. 
Difficulties abound, however, because ideologies shaped by institut~onal 
discourses seem natural. Ideologies, again, are those "set[s] of meanings 
in terms of which people live their sociocultural situation" .47 When "the 
meanings" that structure daily life appear to be "natural" and thus 
inevitable, the influence of the institutional discourse(s) on the shape of 
social reality becomes invisible. Yet these "meanings", these "facts" 
control the behaviours and thoughts (in that they determine the limits of 
what is thinkable) of the majority of any given populace the majority of 
the time. For example, if "women" as a category are, according to 
institutional discourse, incapable of the highest level of rational thought, 
it follows that most women will never be given the opportunity to 
participate in endeavours considered in that society to be "intellectual", 
simply because it would be illogical to afford women such opportunities. 
The epistemological communities that made this knowledge claim 
concerning "women's" inferior mental status may not be directly 
responsible for establishing the sociopolitical structures that make it 
46 Code, Epistemic Responsibility, p. 244. See also Code, What Can She Know, p. 196. 
47 Code, What Can She Know, p. 196. 
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difficult for women to gain entry into intellectual professions, but they 
are responsible for creating the conception of "women" upon which those 
sociopolitical structures have been built. 
Code emphasises the mutually reinforcing relationship between 
knowledge and power at this point. Hegemonic institutional discourses 
incorporate those discursive contributions made by epistemological 
communities whose knowledge claims are acknowledged to be 
knowledge by "people in positions of power". These people in positions 
of power are members of epistemological communities possessing 
institutional warrant (Addelson) to acknowledge and act upon the 
knowledge claims of other epistemological communities.48 Importantly, 
epistemological communities acknowledged to have a high degree of 
cognitive authority are composed of individuals who are most likely 
members of their society's dominant social and political categories. For 
example, in North America individual "knowers" participating 1n 
dominant epistemological communities - those that contribute to 
hegemonic, institutional discourses - are most likely male, white, 
economically privileged, and well-educated in the tradition of their 
white, economically and educationally privileged forefathers. That is, 
because of their location within socially privileged categories they are 
already people with access to positions of power.49 In simplest terms, the 
powerful create the putative knowledge/ facts that in turn confirm the 
power and privilege of the powerful, as well as the "natural" inferiority of 
all members of non-dominant social categories. Individual exceptions are 
able to be tolerated/accommodated/subsumed within dominant 
epistemological communities because, as Code notes, so long as they are 
"merely" isolated exceptions · to the rule, the rule remains intact.50 
However, when two or more "exceptions" come together, there the 
possibility of disrupting hegemonic discourse exists. 
48 Ibid., p. 249. 
49 Code, Rhetorical Spaces, p. 213. See also Code, What Can She Know, p. 249. 
50 Code, What Can She Know, p. 57. 
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Again relying on Foucault, Code emphasises the promise of collective, 
localised strategies for disrupting dominant power-knowledge structures. 
She characterises such collective efforts as "microrevolutions" that 
produce "rippling spheres of influence".51 Her point is that "knowledge 
about" whole categories of people can be changed when the people so 
categorised collectively "work at repudiating the confinement of the 
categorization and at deconstructing its implications" .52 However, 
equally importantly, this collective effort is located in specific 
contexts/ communities; it manifests itself through the efforts of specific 
groups working together within unique sociopolitical as well as physical 
( urban, suburban or rural) environments. The actions of each local group 
"ripple" out and influence/ change the wider sociopolitical context, 
eventually (potentially) altering the hegemonic institutional discourse.53 
In order for collective "resistance" or "subversion" (Code uses the former 
term in 1987, and both in 1991) to come into being, however, there must 
exist the possibility of an individual refusing "to speak from within 
hegemonic discourse".54 In the context in which she writes of this 
"discursive refusal" Code is alluding to the possibility of an individual · 
choosing to reject ideological "complicity", "self-surveillance" and "self-
discipline". She is fully aware that an individual is never located outside 
of any "power relations", nonetheless if conscious of the existence and 
power of hegemonic discourses a subject can choose to participate with 
others in the creation of more "ambiguous positions" from which 
imaginative and transformative discourse(s) can be spoken.55 
Code's point, one which further supports the understanding of 
epistemological communities held by Nelson and Potter, is that 
hegemonic discourses cannot be disrupted by a lone, epistemically 
autonomous voice. One voice, disputing received and theretofore 
51 Code, Epistemic Responsibility, pp. 244-245 and Code, What Can She Know, p. 289. 
52 Code, Epistemic Responsibility, p. 245. 
53 Code, What Can She Know, p. 289. 
54 Ibid., p. 297. 
55 Ibid., pp. 297-298. 
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accepted "general knowledge", is never acknowledged by the wider 
community or society to be a knowledgeable or epistemically credible 
voice. The speaker is "speaking nonsense"; he or she must be confused, 
angry, or insane, and thus not, by definition, an epistemically credible 
speaker. Nor, at that moment, is the speaker perceived to be a 
personally /morally /politically autonomous agent. Paradoxically, in those 
instances when an individual seems to exercise "epistemic autonomy" 
and comes to a cognitive conclusion that differs from or flatly contradicts 
"received knowledge" she or he is denied both the status of a knowing 
agent and the status of an "autonomous" moral-political agent. 
Code thus demonstrates that epistemic credibility, and also an 
individual's moral and political agency, depends on the 
acknowledgement and affirmation of others.56 Membership in an 
epistemological community (even a non-dominant one) conveys such 
epistemic credibility and agency to individuals who utter communal 
knowledge claims that conflict with hegemonic discourse(s). In other 
words, non-dominant epistemological communities are the "places" 
where speakers who are often "categorically" denied the possibility of 
being "knowers" (because of sex, race, class, physical or mental ability, age, 
sexual orientation, etc.) are communally acknowledged to possess 
epistemic credibility. The fact that they live in real, complex social, 
economic, and political circumstances about which they know a great 
deal, if only because sheer physical survival requires such knowledge, is 
acknowledged. An individual must, then, seek out "like-enough" others 
in order collectively to bear witness to the truths of their (personal-social-
moral-political) lives. Such "testimony" can be, and quite often is, 
challenged by the dominant epistemological communities, yet the 
challenge itself acknowledges the existence of the epistemological 
community making the challenging knowledge claim. Having claimed 
the attention of other epistemological communities, the knowledge 
claims of the non-dominant epistemological community are 
56 Ibid., pp. 222-232. 
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acknowledged by the wider society to be "real", even as the "truth" of 
those claims is debated. The hegemonic discourse has been interrupted, 
disrupted, and forced to acknowledge a "new reality". 
Creating new epistemological communities is not, however, the only way 
to disrupt and potentially transform institutional discourse. Helen 
Longino, writing of knowledge production in scientific communities, 
begins (like Addelson, Code, Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Nelson, and 
Potter) with the assumption that knowledge making is a communal 
rather than individual endeavour. She asserts "that scientific knowledge 
is constructed not by individuals applying a method to the material to be 
known but by individuals in interaction with one another in ways that 
modify their observations, theories and hypotheses, and patterns of 
reasoning" .57 (Elizabeth Potter describes this interactive process as 
"epistemic negotiation".58) Longino's concern is that very often 
members of a scientific community (or, I would suggest, any 
epistemological community) share a set of background assumptions, and 
that "unreflective acceptance of such assumptions can come to define 
what it is to be a member of such a community (thus making criticism 
impossible)" .59 These assumptions include "social values and interests" 
that influence the ·choice of research as well as the observation/ collection 
and interpretation of data. One way to make these background 
assumptions visible (and thus limit the influence they have on shaping 
knowledge claims) is to include in already established epistemological 
communities "representatives of alternative points of view" who hold 
different interests and social values.60 Longino is aware, however, that it 
is by no means an easy task to alter the composition of an established 
epistemological community, particularly when embracing certain 
background assumptions/value judgements is a factor influencing (or 
determining) one's potential membership in such a community. This 
57 Longino, 'Subjects, Power, and Knowledge', p. 111. 
58 See Potter, 'Gender and Epistemic Negotiation,' pp. 161-186. 
59 Longino, 'Subjects, Knowledge and Power', p. 112. 
60 Ibid. 
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raises again the issue of the difficulties faced by an individual attempting 
to become an acknowledged member of an epistemological community 
bestowed with institutional warrant for making knowledge claims. 
To begin with, an individual must have access to the rhetorical space 
surrounding a given epistemological comm unity, for it is within this 
"space" that knowledge claims made by that community are spoken. It is 
within this "space" that an individual is taught, or is able to immerse 
her /himself and thus learn the language, theories, practices and value 
judgements embraced by that particular epistemological community. 
Very often initial access to such rhetorical spaces is provided via 
educational institutions. Entry into such institutions, however, is most 
often limited to those who are economically privileged enough to afford 
entry, at least in the United States. Unless blessed with unusual 
opportunity then, a working-class or poor individual, regardless of sex or 
race or any other socially "marked" characteristic, will never have the 
chance to attempt to become a member of an epistemological community 
granted a high degree of cognitive authority. In the case of white, 
economically privileged females, potential access to educational 
institutions is now more widely available; nonetheless, the influence of 
social ideology concerning the "appropriate" areas of study for women 
(i.e., the humanities rather than the sciences, the "soft" sciences rather 
than the "hard" sciences, the arts rather than mathematics) is discernible-
if not directly, then indirectly, when one counts the number of women 
actually practising certain professions. As Lorraine Code puts it, "the sex 
of the knower is one of a cluster of subjective factors (i.e., factors that 
pertain to the circumstances of cognitive agents) constitutive of received 
conceptions of knowledge and of what it means to be a knower".61 (italics 
original) In the past "women" as a category have been denied the status 
of knowing agents in many streams of traditional Western Euro-
American discourse, accordingly, in a society still structured upon this 
61 Code, What Can She Know, p. 4. 
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conception of "women" (as not-knowers) and "men" (as knowers) one's 
sex has profound epistemological consequences. 62 
When an individual is a member of more than one non-dominant social 
category, i.e., is not male and/ or not white and/ or not heterosexual 
and/ or not (in the United States) christian and/ or not physically able-
bodied, etc., then the obstacles to entry in an epistemological community 
with institutional warrant for making knowledge claims become even 
more difficult to surmount. The insidious effects of social ideologies 
concerning the "proper" roles and occupations of entire categories of 
people again make themselves felt. As Longino notes, "each individual 
occupies a location in a multidimensional grid marked by numerous 
interacting structures of power asymmetry".63 Her point, like Code's, is 
that an individual's membership in various social categories, which are 
themselves defined and evaluated in both hegemonic discourse and by 
the members of those categories (and those definitions and evaluations 
are never the same), is of epistemological significance. 
Individuals' access to epistemically powerful communities is impeded (to 
varying degrees) by sociopolitical structures built upon stereotypic 
theoretical designations of whole categories of people. Should an 
individual be able to overcome the structural impediments in her or his 
way, she/he is next faced with the challenge of assenting to at least some 
of the underlying assumptions and value judgements held by members 
of the epistemological community she/he wishes to enter. These 
assumptions and value judgements often contradict the assumptions and 
value judgements held by other (less powerful) epistemological 
communities of which she/he is already a member. To paraphrase 
Audre Lorde's famous quote, an individual must become adept at using 
62 Ibid., p. 231. She notes, "biologically reinforced stereotypes are peculiarly tenacious determinants 
of women's positions in epistemic communities. When so many disciplines and institutions to which 
women seek entry have persistent, constantly revived histories of producing (allegedly objective) 
'knowledge' that demonstrates their natural incapacity to do so, it is a monumental project just to 
establish the credibility needed to challenge the knowledge. Indeed, merely posing the challenge can 
be read as further evidence of feminine irrationality." 
63 Longino, 'Subjects, Power and Knowledge', p. 109. 
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the master's tools. However, proficiency with those tools is only 
acknowledged after one has proven oneself capable of using them to 
build the master's house. Unfortunately, to extend the metaphor, the 
master's house is filled with walls, and those walls serve to separate 
members of privileged epistemological communities from the so-called 
"non-objective", "value-laden" perspectives of all those living outside 
those walls. When an individual member of one or more non-dominant 
social/ epistemological/political categories somehow achieves the 
opportunity to use the master's tools, that individual can easily become 
ostracised from the very epistemological communities whose knowledge 
claims and value judgements she/he is trying to incorporate in more 
dominant discourse. 
To summarise, the issues confronting an individual member of one or 
more non-dominant social categories who wishes to become an 
acknowledged member of an epistemological community with 
institutional warrant for making knowledge claims are multiple . yet 
inseparable. That individual must overcome sociopolitical structural 
impediments, impediments like lack of money ( due to their relationship 
to the economic structure of society) and lack of educational opportunity 
(one factor of which is the tendency for "better" schools with "better" 
teachers to be located in wealthy white neighbourhoods). 
Simultaneously, an individual member of non-dominant social 
categories must overcome the stereotypic theoretical understandings ( or 
anthropological assumptions) concerning "those" sorts of people - of 
which the individual is a representative member - assumptions like 
"they" are all stupid or lazy or simply incapable of high levels of rational 
thought. Then the individual · must enter the rhetorical space, learn the 
theoretical assumptions and be acknowledged to be adept at the practices 
of a given epistemological community. At some point along the way an 
individual member of non-dominant social categories/ epistemological 
communities will almost inevitably become caught in an epistemological 
"crunch" - a clash of conflicting assumptions and value judgements 
associated with different epistemological communities of which that 
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individual is, and/ or wishes to be acknowledged as, a member. All of 
which is to say, it is extremely difficult for people with "different" social 
values and interests to become members of epistemological communities 
widely acknowledged to have cognitive authority. Barriers to entry are 
embedded in sociopolitical structures and institutions; they are embedded 
in theoretical underpinnings of society, and lastly they are inextricably 
tangled up in that individual's personal (yet understood to be dependent 
upon communal acknowledgement) sense of identity.64 Fortunately, 
while it is extremely difficult, it is not (quite) impossible for members of 
non-dominant social categories to become members of epistemological 
communities with institutional warrant for making knowledge. And 
when sufficient numbers of these interdependent epistemic agents 
question, challenge, and negotiate with each other and with socially 
privileged members of the epistemological community, then the 
knowledge claims made by that community can change. There is always 
a danger, however, that those individuals will be changed (in the sense of 
coming to accept as their "own" the values, theories, and practises of an 
existing discipline) long before the knowledge claims of those 
epistemological communities change. 
Throughout this discussion of epistemological communities (a 
discussion which has not done justice to the depth and rich complexity of 
the philosophers' work upon which it has been based), two points have 
been either argued or assumed. First, that knowledge is made (by more 
and by less powerful, epistemically privileged) communities and not 
simply "found" by isolated individuals, and second, that the knowledge 
made by these communities (in particular the epistemically privileged 
ones) actually shapes the world. This point is expressed most clearly by 
Kathryn Pyne Addelson. "Truth is not discovered, it is enacted."65 
64 I will never forget hearing someone described, in a most derogatory way, as "an apple". The 
individual in question was a Native American who, it was asserted by other members of his tribe, was 
"red on the outside but white on the inside'. In the course of conversation it became apparent that his 
values and approach to the study of Native American issues were not in accord with the values and 
'way' of his tribe - an epistemological community of much lesser power and prestige than 'the 
academy' of which this man was also a member. 
65 Addelson, Impure Thoughts, p. 111. 
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"Enacting truth means living together so that our worlds, our lives, and 
our characters are made in certain ways."66 As I interpret her words, the 
"truth" of ( or our knowledge about) any given aspect of the world is 
created/ constructed by "our" relationship(s) to that aspect of the world at 
least as much as that truth or knowledge is constrained by any 
"recalcitrant" features of that aspect of the world.67 This insight, arguably 
one of the core presuppositions of the feminist epistemological paradigm 
I have been examining, is strongly reminiscent of Donna Haraway's 
reconceptualisation of objectivity (as always shifting and never 
completely transparent yet accountable relationships between knowers 
and known) and her assertion of the active agency of the world.68 
To put it in more concrete terms, when truth is conceived as enacted by 
communities the truthful answer to the question, "is the mountain just a 
mountain, or is it a sacred site, or is it a uranium mine?" is not one single 
answer at all, but the answers of all those who are in a relationship with 
that mountain. For those who worship there, it is indeed a sacred site. 
For those who extract uranium from it, it is a uranium mine, and for 
those who pass by it unaware of either its history as a sacred site or its 
history as a uranium deposit, it is just another mountain. As for the 
mountain's self-understanding, some things remain unknown. This 
example is stark, yet it highlights the point that truths about the "same" 
aspects of world, even incompatible truths, can and do co-exist - though 
not always peacefully. Further, these truths are always relative to, or 
enacted within and by, the communities making those knowledge claims. 
However, the truths of some communities have a greater effect on how 
the world is shaped than the truths of other communities. This 
hypothetical example highlights again the relationship between making 
knowledge and power. In this scenario the mining company had the 
66 Ibid., p. 124. 
6? Evelyn Fox Keller writes of the "recalcitrance" of nature and sex, reminding her readers that 
"despite its unrepresentability, nature does exist". Likewise, there are constraints "imposed by the 
recalcitrance of sex". She writes, "both persist, beyond theory, as humbling reminders of our 
mortality". Keller, Evelyn Fox, 'The Gender/Science System', in Feminism & Science, ed, Nancy 
Tuana, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1989, p. 43 . 
68 As discussed in chapter four. 
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power to enact its truth, a power far greater than the power of the 
community for whom the mountain is sacred. Additionally, within the 
wider society within which both communities and the mountain are 
located the knowledge claims of the community for whom the mountain 
is a sacred site were/ are valued less than the knowledge claims of the 
m1n1ng company. If they were accorded equal or higher value than the 
knowledge claims of the mining company it is probable that no mine 
would ever have been allowed to have been constructed there, and the 
truth of the mountain as a uranium mine would never have been 
enacted. 
Approaching the subject of knowledge about the world (or, in Addelson's 
words, truth as enacted), Lynn Hankinson Nelson writes, 
That there is a world that constrains what it is reasonable to 
believe makes the most sense of what we experience -
predictions misfire, theories fail, we can and do get things 
wrong.... What we are not warranted in assuming is that only 
one system could organize the world or that the world is of a 
determinate nature, specifiable in categories our sense organs 
will lead us to discover.69 (italics added) 
I include this quote here to emphasise the deeply practical, pragmatic 
aspects present in all the feminist epistemologists' work I have examined. 
Rather than agonise over the certainty of the existence of the world (or 
not), most feminist epistemologists simply accept that there is a physical 
reality that structures and limits existence. 70 Further, feminist 
epistemologists tend to emphasise those limits to existence, and, by 
extension, limits to human knowledge. By emphasising as well the 
multiplicity and varieties of human existence (within individuals as well 
as within and between communities and cultures) and hence the 
varieties of possible human relationships to each other and the world, 
feminist epistemologists deny the possibility of any singular, eternal, 
monolithic knowledge claims. 
69 Nelson, 'Epistemological Communities', p. 134. 
70 See also Code, 'Taking Subjectivity into Account', p. 21. "The fact of the world's intractability 
to intervention and wishful thinking is the strongest evidence of its independence from human 
knowers." 
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To conclude, then, communities of interdependent, more and less 
epistemically powerfully people working and living together create 
various systems according to which different aspects of the world are 
known. For example, according to one system, as enacted by one 
epistemological community, human beings are known as collections of 
genetic sequences. According to another, humans are known as 
collections of recycled star dust, simply new incarnations of the same 
elements that have comprised the universe since it came into being. 
According to yet another, humans are known as split and multiple, 
fragmented and opaque subjectivities. These truths are all enacted, and 
they matter; moral, ethical, and political decisions are made on the basis 
of them. Depending on the power and prestige of the epistemological 
communities enacting them, they shape our relationship to the world 
around us, they determine how we treat one another. 
The existence of multiple enacted "truths" about the world, or multiple 
systems according to which the world is known, is made evident when 
communities are taken to be the agents of knowledge production. 
Simultaneously, it also becomes evident that knowledge-making is about 
world-making; the sort of knowledge "we" make determines what sort of 
world "we" live in. "Objectivity" as traditionally defined by privileged 
Euro-American epistemologists, as the value-neutral, detached 
observation and record of a single external reality, simply has no place, no 
meaning within this approach to epistemology. Instead, the most 
pressing epistemological issue becomes that of "epistemic 
responsibility" ?1 Drawing again on the concise words of Kathryn Pyne 
Addelson, "The measure of any epistemology lies in how well it allows 
knowledge makers to be responsible. It does not lie in how well it gives 
us certified knowledge or the route to the truth of the one reality."72 
(italics original) "It is not our business to be omniscient," agrees Mary 
Midgley.73 
71 Epistemic Responsibility is, as has already been cited, the title of a book by Lorraine Code. 
72 Addelson, 'Knower/Doers and Their Moral Problems', p. 288. 
73 Midgley, Wisdom, Information and Wonder, p. 232. 
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It would seem, however, to be the business of epistemically responsible 
communities to realise that knowledge making is as much a political and 
ethical as it is a cognitive process; to realise that knowledge claims made 
with cognitive authority shape the structure of society and of the world, 
thereby enabling some communities (human and non-human) and 
harming others; and to realise that no knowledge claim made by an 
epistemological community is ever the only or final word on the subject. 
Such an approach to knowledge making is not easy. 
[I]t requires courage to become reconciled to dealing in areas 
where certainty is not possible, where the subject matter is 
amorphous and, to a great extent, unmanageable, and where 
the kind of understanding [or knowledge] that can be 
reached will fall far short of perfect understanding. On all 
sides one is faced with the fact of one's own fallibility, of 
human fallibility in general, and of the need to acknowledge 
this fallibility if better understanding is to be achieved. 
These are the demands of epistemic responsibility.74 
It is the hope and affirmation of many feminist epistemologists that such 
communal, consciously situated, responsible, and fallible knowledge 
making practices can lead to knowledge with emancipatory rather than 
damning effects: to knowledge (neither absolute, eternal, nor universal) 
conducive of, in Donna Haraway's words, "earth-wide projects of finite 
freedom, adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, 
and limited happiness".75 
In the following chapters I will use the epistemological assumptions 
found within the feminist epistemological paradigm (as I have 
characterised it in this and the last chapter) as a "lens" through which to 
examine the epistemological assumptions inherent within the work of 
three feminist christian theologians: Rosemary Radford Ruether, Carter 
Heyward, and Sallie McFague. 
74 Code, Epistemic Responsibility, p. 254. 
75 Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges', p. 579. 
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Chapter Six 
Paradigmatic and Epistemological Elements 
in the Theology of Rosemary Radford Ruether 
In chapter three I based an analysis of one feminist christian theological 
paradigm on a close reading of three early feminist theological essays, 
including Rosemary Radford Ruether's 'Mother Earth and the 
Megamachine'. There I concluded the following: 
underlying this feminist christian theological paradigm are 
three primary metaphysical presuppositions: that of the full, 
unqualified and embodied humanity of all women, men, and 
children without exception; that of the inherent integrity of 
all non-human creation; and that of the finite character of all 
human and all earthly existence. Associated with this last 
supposition is the rejection of the notion of eternal life, a 
heaven above, and the idea of a new creation brought into 
being by an omnipotent, transcendent, wholly-other deity. 
Above all else, in this paradigm the finite matrix of existence 
is valued for its own sake. 
In this chapter I return to Ruether's theology, seeking to find further 
evidence of these metaphysical presuppositions (and accompanying value 
judgements) in her work, but also to draw out the epistemological 
assumptions she makes, either implicitly or explicitly, regarding hum ans 
as knowers, the world to be known, and processes for making knowledge. 
As I noted in chapter four, paradigmatic assumptions about humankind 
and non-human physical reality correspond to epistemological 
assumptions about knowers and the world to be known, which in turn 
correspond theologically to assumptions about humanity (the subject of 
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theological anthropology) and creation (or, more broadly, cosmology). 
Additionally, epistemological propositions concerning the acquisition of 
knowledge correspond (albeit somewhat loosely) to theological 
discussions of revelation. Accordingly, in my discussion of Ruether's 
characterisations of humankind, her statements concerning creation/ the 
world/ the cosmos, and her discussions of revelation (including any 
references she makes to acquiring or creating knowledge apart from the 
notion of "revelation"), I will note both the paradigmatic presuppositions 
she is making and the epistemological assumptions that accompany these 
metaphysical presuppositions. 
Before I begin, however, I need to acknowledge both the extraordinary 
breadth of her scholarship and my own debt to Ruether as a feminist 
christian theologian and historian. It is not too much of an exaggeration 
to say that a veritable "cottage industry" has sprung up around her work 
as a historian and theologian. Numbers of articles, dissertations, and 
books have been devoted, exclusively or in part, to analyses of various 
aspects of her thought; it is impossible to study feminist christian 
theology without reference to her contributions. However, it is vital to 
note that Ruether's efforts toward constructing a systematic feminist 
theology represent only a portion of her intellectual endeavours. She is a 
leading authority on christian anti-semitism, with her book Faith and 
Fratricide1 having received international acclaim. Likewise her (1972) 
book Liberation Theology was one of the earliest books written by a white 
North American about theological developments in Latin America as 
well as about black theology as influenced by the Black Power movement 
in the United States. (She taught at the School of Religion of Howard 
University, a black school, in Washington, DC, from 1966-1976.)2 To get a 
sense of how attuned she was to the importance of Latin American 
liberation theology, it must be kept in mind that Gustavo Gutierrez's A 
1 Ruether, Rosemary Radford, Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism, The 
Seabury Press, New York, 1974. 
2 Ruether, Rosemary Radford, Disputed Questions: On Being a Christian, Abingdon Press, 
Nashville, Tennessee, 1982, p. 81. 
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Theology of Liberation, the foundational work in this area, was published 
in Spanish in 1971 and in English in 1973. Additionally, from the early 
1970s she has been insistent on the relationship between ecological 
destruction and other forms of social domination. Most importantly, all 
of her work is rooted in and cannot be fully appreciated apart from her 
extensive study of christian history, in particular early church history in 
the patristic period (the subject of her doctoral dissertation), as well as her 
encyclopaedic knowledge of non-dominant trends and heretical (and/ or 
revolutionary)3 movements throughout christian history in Western 
culture. Lastly, with Rosemary Keller she has edited and contributed to 
the three volume series, Women & Religion in America.4 On the same 
topic her most recent contribution, again with Keller, is the highly praised 
In Our Own Voices. 5 Quite literally she has researched and written her 
way from Babylon and Canaan to the present. All of which is to say, it is 
an open question as to whether Ruether will be remembered most for her 
theological work or her historical research. In this chapter, however, I am 
limiting my study to her earlier works which I believe are in some way 
foundational to or precursors of her feminist theological development, 
and to her later works concerned explicitly with feminist christian 
theology. 
• 
As for my personal debt to Ruether, or my own intellectual "location" in 
relation to her work, I must admit from the outset that she has had a 
formative influence upon my own thought, an influence more apparent 
to me now than when I was her student at Garrett-Evangelical 
Theological Seminary. It was from Ruether that I learned to appreciate 
christianity as nothing more and nothing less than one (complex) faith 
tradition among others - christianity as an often contradictory collection 
of historical developments that neither "completed" Judaism nor made 
3 See Ruether, Rosemary Radford, The Radical Kingdom: The Western Experience of Messianic 
Hope, Harper & Row, New York and London, 1970; Ruether, Rosemary Radford, Women and 
Redemption: A Theological History, SCM Press, Ltd, London, 1998. 
4 Ruether, Rosemary Radford and Rosemary Skinner Keller, eds, Women & Religion in America, 3 
vols., Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1981-1986. 
5 Ruether, Rosemary Radford and Rosemary Skinner Keller, eds, In Our Own Voices: Four Centuries 
of American Women's Religious Writing, HarperSanFrancisco, San Francisco, 1995. 
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(or makes) incarnate the last or necessarily "best" word on the subject of 
religion. It was from Ruether that I learned to look for patterns of 
domination and subjugation as these course through history, taking on 
different forms, supported by varying justifications, but leading to the 
same end: the oppression of the less powerful by the more powerful. It 
was from Ruether that I learned to perceive no single oppression 1n 
isolation from any others, but to trace connections and, even more 
importantly, to acknowledge complicities, ambiguities, the absence of any 
"pure" or innocent location from which to speak. It was from Ruether 
that I learned to seek out and listen to dissenting, minority voices within 
the christian tradition, and it was Ruether who brought Jewish scripture 
(the Old Testament) to life for me. Her passion for the Jubilee tradition as 
expressed in Leviticus 25: 8-55, her appreciation of those trouble-making 
prophets and her insistence that the work of the prophets must ever be 
done anew, these elements of her thought became for me simply 
background assumptions that I welcomed and took up as my own. 
Lastly, I will never forget hearing, second or third hand, I don't remember 
now, her off-the-cuff response to the question, "why do you stay in the 
church?" Legend has it that she replied, "because the church has 
photocopiers." This story is vintage Ruether: pithy, pragmatic, and 
profoundly aware of the power of the word and of the institution as 
creator and conveyor of the word. In addition, beneath the five words she 
spoke aloud runs her awareness of the all-pervasive presence of cultural 
ideologies and superstructures which sanction and support domination 
by the elite. From Ruether I learned that there is no retreat, no paradisial 
escape from the "powers and principalities" of this world. There is 
simply the struggle to make this world a more just and loving place. One 
would be foolish not take advantage of existing photocopying machines 
to assist one in this effort. 
I have already mentioned how important the study of history is for 
Ruether; accordingly, in order to discern the paradigmatic and 
epistemological elements in her work as a feminist christian theologian, I 
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need to contextualise her theology, to locate it in relation to the efforts 
and conclusions of Ruether the historian.6 As she herself notes, 
The effort to express contemporary experience in a cultural 
and historical vacuum is both self-deluding and 
unsatisfactory. It is self-deluding because to communicate at 
all to oneself and others, one makes use of patterns of 
thought, however transformed by new experiences, that have 
a history.7 
Broadly, Ruether perceives the history of Western christian culture (and 
all patterns of thought within this culture) to be the history (and product) 
of patriarchy, by which she means "not only the subordination of females 
to males, but the whole structure of Father-ruled society: aristocracy over 
serfs, masters over slaves, king over subjects, racial overlords over 
colonized people" .8 On a deeper level, she perceives this dichotomous 
cultural structure to have been sanctioned and supported by the symbolic 
representations of humanity, divinity, and creation provided by the 
dominant strains of christian thought. Over and over again she refers to 
the unfortunate convergence, in the earliest days of the christian 
movement, of two formative strands of dualistic thought: one from 
apocalyptic Judaism (not, ironically, a dominant or long-lasting trend in 
Jewish history)9 and the other from Hellenistic philosophy, based on a 
Platonic interpretation of the nature of the cosmos.1° To comprehend 
6 Writing of Ruether the historian and Ruether the theologian, while useful when trying to sift 
through her work in one short chapter is, in fact, too simplistic a distinction to make. Ruether is 
always a theological historian and historical theologian. This is exemplified by the title of her latest 
major work, Women and Redemption: A Theological History. 
7 Ruether, Rosemary Radford, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology, Beacon Press, 
Boston, 1983, p. 18. 
8 Ibid., p. 61. She understands the history of patriarchy to include histories of resistance to and 
rejection of patriarchal structures and ideologies, but she insists on locating these revolutionary 
moments within the overarching history of patriarchy. 
9 Ruether, Liberation Theology, p. 56. "Rabbinic Judaism after the fall of Jerusalem repudiated this 
apocalyptic literature." 
lO See Ruether, The Radical Kingdom, pp. 4-11, 148; Ruether, Liberation Theology, pp. 16-17, 55-
59, 115, 120-122, 125; Ruether, Faith and Fratricide, pp. 41-47 and 95-96; Ruether, Rosemary 
Radford, New Woman/New Earth: Sexist Ideologies and Human Liberation, Harper & Row, San 
Francisco, 1975, pp. 16-17, 190; Ruether, Disputed Questions, pp. 68-69; Ruether, Sexism and God-
Talk, pp. 237-240, 244; Ruether, Rosemary Radford, To Change the World: Christology and 
Cultural Criticism, The Crossroad Publishing Company, New York, 1989, pp. 39-40, 48; Ruether, 
Rosemary Radford, Gaia. & God: An Ecof eminist Theology of Earth Healing, HarperCollins 
Publishers, San Francisco, 1992, pp. 22-29 ( on the influence of Platonic thought), pp. 69-73 ( on 
Jewish and christian apocalyptic thought) and pp. 230-234 (on the combination and adaptation of both 
the Jewish apocalyptic and Platonic strands of thought); Ruether, Women and Redemption, pp. 14-15, 
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Ruether' s interpretation of the last two thousand years of the history of 
Western christian culture, as well as her understanding of the task facing 
feminist christian theologians today, it is vital to understand her analysis 
of the christian synthesis of these two strands of thought: the one 
religious/mythological and the other philosophical, both highly symbolic. 
On the one hand, from the apocalyptic tradition christianity inherited an 
understanding of this world, perceived as originally a blessed creation, as 
having been taken over by the power of evil. What is expected (and 
required) is the intervention of God in order to defeat the forces of evil, 
establish a thousand year reign of justice, and then re-establish a perfect, 
everlasting creation (the importance of immortality and eternal 
incorruptibility is stressed primarily in the later apocalyptic accounts -
those contemporary with the early christian movement).11 The notion of 
an original paradise serves as a point of reference against which the 
present, unjust era is compared and found wanting, and in terms of 
which the future "new creation" is described.12 On the other hand, from 
Hellenistic philosophy, in particular from Plato, christianity inherited an 
understanding of physical reality or matter, including human bodies, as 
being of lesser value than "the invisible, eternal realm of thought" .1 3 
According to Ruether, within this symbolic system "mind or 
consciousness is primal, eternal, and good. Body or visible corporeality is 
secondary, derivative, and the source of evil, in the form of physical 
sensations to be mastered by the mind."14 Referring to Plato's Timaeus, 
Ruether notes that "this hierarchy of mind over body is duplicated in the 
hierarchy of male over female, human over animals"; further, in his 
Republic this symbolic representation is extended to include "the class 
20, 27, 29. This list of citations is not exhaustive, but it is representative of the extent to which 
Ruether grounds all her work upon her understanding of the effect of the convergence, in christianity, 
of these two strands of thought. I cannot over-emphasise its importance in her thought. 
1 l See Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 239. 
12 Ruether, The Radical Kingdom, pp. 6-7. 
13 Ruether, Gaia & God, p. 22. 
14 Ibid., p. 24. 
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hierarchy of rulers over workers" .15 In other words, within this symbolic 
worldview the dualistic, hierarchical order of things (social and political) 
on this material earth is reflective of an eternal form or ideal, even if all 
matter, all materiality is tainted with corruptibility. 
Following the apocalyptic line of thought, within the christian tradition 
there arose a strong tendency to posit and value a future, new creation 
(one unattainable by man and thus brought about entirely by God's 
efforts) as infinitely superior to this world, this perverted creation. When 
combined with Plato's depiction of human bodies (in particular female 
bodies) as the rather unsatisfactory hosts of immortal souls, as well as his 
notion of mutability (change) and sensation (feeling) as evidence of the 
corruption pervading all material things, the result was the denigration 
of "the flesh" (or material reality in any form) and positive expectation of 
a God-effected, other-worldly rescue from bondage to this material reality. 
Unlike earlier Jewish thought, in which it was believed that if the people 
of Israel simply obeyed God's commandments and kept their covenant 
with God then their communities would flourish and the earth would 
yield up an abundant harvest, in christian thought humans came to be 
understood as relatively powerless, as being at the beck and call of the 
forces of evil (in particular in the form of bodily sensations).16 An 
intimate relation between humans, the rest of creation, and God was 
denied. Instead, the spirit was seen to be at war with the flesh. And, in 
christian thought, "woman" was quickly identified as having been 
responsible "for the advent of evil in the world".17 Female responsibility 
for evil was joined with the metaphysical presupposition concerning the 
inferiority of women (and all those who are "like" women, e.g. slaves, 
serfs, peasants, animals.) According to Ruether, "the female [came] to 
lS Ibid. 
l6 Augustine in particular agonised over his inability to control his own body, one "member" of 
which seemed to have a tendency to rise to the occasion when Augustine wished it wouldn't. See 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, 'Misogynism and Virginal Feminism in the Fathers of the Church', in 
Religion and Sexism: Images of Women in the Jewish and Christian Traditions, ed, Rosemary 
Radford Ruether, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1974, p. 162. 
17 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 168. 
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represent the qualities of materiality, irrationality, carnality, and finitude, 
which debase the "manly" spirit and drag it down into sin and death" .18 
Ruether identifies the hierarchical dualisms (god over man, transcendent 
over immanent, heaven over earth, mind over body, spirit over matter, 
male over female, master over slave, etc.) inherent within this symbolic 
understanding of the cosmos, whether presented as salvation myth or 
metaphysical fact, as the ideological ground and justification for social 
structures and systems that perpetuate "patriarchy" and oppression. Of 
critical importance is the fact that "these ideologies try to make that social 
structure look 'natural', inevitable and divinely given".1 9 Accordingly, 
Ruether stresses the epistemological as well as the world-shaping 
consequences of this hierarchical, dualistic theological and philosophical 
inheritance. 
Apocalyptic . dualism, interpreted as gnostic body-soul 
dualism, gave to classical Christianity a dualistic mode of 
moral, epistemological and ontological perception. Such a 
dualistic mode of perception of reality not only impedes a 
holistic theology of liberation, but it is also substantially 
responsible for constructing the very world of alienation from 
which we seek liberation. We can analyze this alienation as 
operating on three levels: (1) alienation from oneself; one's 
own body; (2) alienation from one's fellow person in the 
"alien" community; (3) alienation from the "world"; from the 
visible earth and sky.20 
Alert to the almost all-pervasive presence in Western culture of this 
hierarchical, dualistic perception of humankind, divinity, and physical 
creation, Ruether identifies sexism, racism, classism, colonisation/ 
imperialism, and environmental degradation as the "logical" (and closely 
related) historical consequences of a social and spiritual mentality trapped 
18 Ibid., pp. 168-169; see also Ruether, Women and Redemption, p. 273. "The classical Christian 
paradigm defines women as created to be dominated and blames women as deserving . redoubled 
domination for resisting it. ... " 
19 Ruether, New Woman/New Earth, p. xiv. This quote from Ruether could just as easily have 
come from Lorraine Code. In the last chapter, referring to Code's understanding of "institutional 
discourses" and quoting her definition of ideology, I wrote, "ideologies shaped by institutional 
discourses seem natural. Ideologies, again, are those "set[s] of meanings in terms of which people 
live their sociocultural situation." 
20 Ruether, Liberation Theology, pp. 16-17. 
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within this mode of perception.21 Further, this mode of perception is the 
historical legacy of (the dominant strains of) Western christian theology. 
Regarding the current historical context in and out of which she ·writes 
her own theology, in the following quotation from New Woman/New 
Earth Ruether summarises her conclusions regarding the historical (and 
symbolically related) patterns of domination which she has traced 
through several millennia. 
All the crises of history are converging: racism, sexism, 
colonialism, the technological depletion of the earth. The 
scientific knowledge for an ecological technology, based on 
renewable energy resources, the reintegration of farm and 
town, home and work in a pattern of diversity and balance 
modeled after ecological systems - this theoretically is not 
beyond our grasp. But the social structures and psychology 
of historical oppressive power; the legacy of class, racist, 
imperialist, and sexist structures of domination raise 
obstacles against a humanistic implementation of such 
possibilities, which we do not yet know how to begin to 
overcome.22 
Given her awareness of the historically oppressive consequences of the 
dominant symbolic/mythological/metaphysical perceptions of 
humankind, "god", and physical creation (in Western culture), the task 
facing Ruether the theologian is simple, and simply enormous: to re-
conceptualise humanity, divinity, and the cosmos, to create an alternative 
perception (non-dualistic and non-hierarchical) of the relations among 
and between humans, between humans and that which is holy, and 
between humans and the earth. According to Ruether, what is required is 
"a revolution in theology that totally overcomes the traditional 
antinomies of dualistic ontology and epistemology; that dualism of the 
spiritual and the temporal. .. " _23 
21 Ibid., pp. 17-22. She perceives "Cartesian epistemology [to have] carried on much the same 
presuppositions of Platonism and [to have] couched its view of knowledge in terms of subject-object 
dualism. Thinking and knowing were a process whereby a non-material thinking subject reduced all 
around him, including his own body, to the status of an object to be mastered." (p. 17) Thus 
Descartes both preserved and reinforced, in terminology suitable for his day, a sharp hierarchical split 
between mind and body, spirit and matter, self and other. 
22 Ruether, New Woman/New Earth, p. 183. 
23 Ruether, Liberation Theology, p. 182. 
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Ruether's Understanding of Theology 
Before examining her theological conceptions of humankind, divinity, 
creation/the world, and revelation, I need first of all to describe what 
Ruether perceives theology to be about. In Liberation Theology she 
characterises theology as that "mode of reflection that mediates between 
the existence and the transcendent horizon of human life" .24 She 
continues by asserting, "If theology is really to speak meaningfully about 
the mediating point between the "is" and the "ought" of human life, then 
it takes as its base the entire human project ... the whole range of human 
sciences and the whole history of human cultures of self-
symbolization."25 The points she makes in this quote, but, typically, does 
not emphasise, are critical if one is to comprehend her theological 
judgements about humans and the world "we" have constructed out of 
this physical creation (a distinction which I will explore in detail later.) 
On the one hand she perceives the scope of theology to include all aspects 
of human existence, including scientific and technological developments. 
She rejects the post-enlightenment separation of theology or religion 
from life's practical concerns (the separation of theology and ethics of 
which I wrote in chapter two); she refuses to relegate "theology" to the 
contemplation of "other-worldly" concerns. Instead, her approach to 
theology is profoundly this-worldly. 
On the other hand, for Ruether theology, perhaps more than any other 
human knowledge-seeking or knowledge-making endeavour, is an 
ongoing process of self-symbolisation. Theology is a human attempt to 
name what is important, what is considered to be of ultimate meaning 
and value in life within specific human cultures/ societies. It is reflective 
of both human experiences and queries concerning the nature of 
existence now and in the past (what "is" and what has been), and 
simultaneously it is a judgement upon human existence. It is a 
24 Ibid., p. 2. 
25 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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judgement based on imagined (and imaginatively symbolised, or mythed) 
possibilities for the future, what "ought" to be, or "the transcendent 
horizon of human life". Importantly, Ruether uses the metaphor 
"transcendent" often, but almost always accompanied by the word 
"horizon". By relating "transcendent" to "horizon" in this way she pulls 
the "transcendent" down from above and places it on the human plane, 
either in front of or before humanity. This spatial shift resonates with 
Schleiermacher's depiction of "god" as the source of life and Tillich's 
· description of "god" as ground of being. · Imagined and hoped for 
horizons of human life well up from the ground, from the concrete 
situations in which people find themselves in need of salvation; they do 
not burst in from above. In locating the transcendent on the temporal 
horizon before humanity rather than in a heaven above humanity 
Ruether is deliberately uniting the temporal ( or historical) and the 
"spiritual". She is rejecting a sacred/ secular split. 
From her approach to theology as a thoroughly human project (and to a 
great extent "projection") stem two interrelated epistemological 
consequences, both of which Ruether is profoundly aware of: 1) that who 
has been formulating these symbolic questions (based on their particular 
experiences of the divine, themselves, their communities and the world, 
all in an interacting, dialectical relationship )26 not only shapes the queries 
posed but also the responses given, and 2) that definitive answers are not 
to be found "in once and for all events of a particular sacred history",27 
but must be reformulated continually in order "to illuminate and 
interpret"new experiences. 28 As she informed Thomas Merton in 1967, 
"only theology bred in the crucible of experience is any good".29 Because 
Ruether understands "human experience [as] the starting point and the 
26 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 12. 
27 Ruether, Liberation Theology, p. 3. 
28 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 12. 
29 Merton, Thomas and Rosemary Radford Ruether, At Home In The World: The Letters of Thomas 
Merton and Rosemary Radford Ruether, ed, Mary Tardiff, OP, Maryknoll, Orbis Books, New York, 
1995, p. 25. 
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ending point of the hermeneutical circle",30 it follows that she allows no 
single theological proclamation to stand as the final word or the ultimate 
truth; different experiences require different symbolisations. Thus her 
approach to theology as an ongoing, continually incomplete 
epistemological or knowledge-making endeavour is remarkably 
compatible with the assumptions,, within the feminist epistemological 
paradigm, of the situatedness of all knowledge claims, and of multiple 
enacted "truths",, or of the impossibility of "one" truth ever being 
adequate.31 
Given that she understands all theological reflection to be grounded in 
experience ("what have been called the objective sources of theology; 
Scripture and tradition, are themselves codified collective human 
experience"),,32 Ruether downplays any suggestion that feminist or any 
other sort of liberation theology is unique in stressing the epistemological 
importance of "experience". Rather, what is unique to feminist christian 
theology is that, for the first time in history, women's experiences are 
being considered as worthy and vital resources for theological reflection. 
Moreover, this action 
explodes as a critical force, exposing classical theology, 
including its codified traditions, as based on male experience 
rather than on universal human experience. Feminist 
theology makes the sociology of theological knowledge 
visible, no longer hidden behind mystifications of objectified 
divine and universal authority.33 
Implicit in this quote is the assumption that all attempts at theological 
reflection are and cannot help but be particular and incomplete rather 
than universal. Ruether would agree with the words of Kathryn Pyne 
Addelson; "who makes knowledge [or theology] makes a difference." 
What is also implicit in her insistence that all theological reflection is a 
30 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 12. 
3l Ruether, Women and Redemption, p. 280. "We need to own as ongoing revelation the process of 
continuous reinterpretation that lies behind our restatements of redemptive gender equality in new, 
more socially embodied terms." (italics added) 
32 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 12. 
33 Ibid., p. 13. 
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product and reflection of experience, or the shape and nature of existence 
as lived ( differently) by various people at various times, is the influence 
of existentialist thought on her theology. (In chapter two I noted 
Bultmann's injunction that theology must begin with "an analysis of that 
understanding of human existence which is given with existence".) 
Ruether's analysis of "human existence" reveals that it is and has always 
been diverse, shaped in different ways by the social structures and systems 
into which people are born. Importantly, she has never written of 
"women's experience" as though it were a homogeneous source for 
theological reflection; instead she has paid close attention to the way 
different women's lives are affected differently by the social structures 
that, to a large extent, determine the shape of their lives. In 1972, with 
reference to the power of these social structures, she wrote, "Women's 
liberation is therefore impossible within the present social system except 
for an elite few."34 (italics original) Like Code she is profoundly 
concerned with the effects of the ideologies that support oppressive social, 
political, and economic systems. In 1975 she noted that "a monolithic 
analysis of sexism as the ultimate oppression obscures the way in which 
sexism is structurally integrated with class and race". She continued by 
calling for the women's movement to "reach out and include in its 
struggle the interstructuring of sexism with all other kinds of 
oppression ... ". 35 
Thus it is axiomatic in Ruether' s thought that theological reflection 
drawn upon similar experiences of human existence by a relatively small, 
professionally and politically privileged group of elite males ( or females) 
cannot possibly be universally authoritative. Rather, it reflects the 
perspectives, concerns, and judgements of a privileged few as they ha :ve 
responded to the personal and historical crises arising within their 
particular socioeconomic, political, and cultural locations. It is from this 
perspective that Ruether, discussing the development of Crisis or N eo-
34 Ruether, Liberation Theology, p. 116. 
35 Ruether, New Woman/New Earth, p. 125. 
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orthodox theology, writes of Karl Barth's theological response to the first 
World War, a response written, as I noted in chapter two, out of a sense of 
the inadequacies of the then dominant liberal theological paradigm: "[f]or 
Karl Barth ... the defects of this liberal theology came as a personal, 
existential problem. [H]e found that this theological and cultural currency 
left him without a prophetic word to preach in a time of profound cr1s1s 
and reversal of that optimistic faith."36 
Not only does this quote reveal both the existential and contextual nature 
of Ruether's understanding of all theology,37 it also illumines one of the 
sources of her deeply held conviction that theology must be prophetic; it 
must seek continually to provide an "ought" that stands in judgement 
over against what "is".38 The point is that all her characterisations of 
humanity, divinity, and creation/the world, as well as "revelation", are 
consciously and deliberately limited, made relative to the fabric and crises 
of her time and place, and imbued throughout with value judgements. 
The title of one of her more recent works, Gaia & God: An Ecofeminist 
Theology of Earth Healing, conveys her value-laden understanding of the 
crisis most relevant to this time: the ongoing, humanly caused 
destruction of the earth, sanctioned in part by received conceptions of 
"God" and "his" relation to this creation (Gaia). Over and against what is, 
i.e., environmental degradation (related to manifold social oppressions) 
and increasing earth-wide impoverishment, she posits a vision of 
redemption, a vision of a healed earth, healed relations amongst and 
between all earth creatures and between humans and the physical 
environment upon which we depend for life. Again, this vision is 
36 Ruether, The Radical Kingdom, p. 114. 
37 See Ruether, Gaia & God, p. 273. In the penultimate paragraph she affirms again the dialectical 
relationship between particularly located "existence" and the "transcendent horizon" against which what 
"is" is evaluated. "[W]e remain committed to a vision and to concrete communities of life no matter 
what the "trends" may be. Whether we are immediately "winning" or "losing" cannot shake our root 
understandings of what biophilic life is and should be, although we need to adapt our strategies to the 
changing fortunes of the struggle." 
38 See Merton and Ruether, At Home in the World, p. 21. "[W]hen I want prophetic insight I look 
to Barth, Bonhoeffer, Bultmann, etc." While in her work she expresses many assumptions about 
humankind and creation that are in direct opposition to Barth's, it does seem as though she has been 
deeply influenced by the prophetic edge to his work. 
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consonant with the metaphysical presuppositions inherent within the 
feminist christian theological paradigm concerning the value and 
integrity of non-human creation. 
With this extended introduction to Ruether's thought (as historian and 
theologian) in place, it is time now to examine her conceptions of 
humankind and creation. In the course of this examination I will be 
seeking to identify the metaphysical presuppositions she embraces 
regarding humans and creation, or physical reality (in chapter one I 
termed these anthropological and ontological presuppositions, 
respectively). Because these metaphysical presuppositions are also 
epistemological, that is, because they also shape her understandings of 
humans as knowers and the world to be known, I will sometimes use 
paradigmatic language and sometimes epistemological language when 
discussing her assumptions. In the section on theological anthropology I 
will weave into the discussion Ruether's statements concerning making 
or acquiring knowledge. To do this I will use, as she sometimes does, the 
theological language of "revelation". Lastly, in the section on creation I 
will include a brief discussion of Ruether's conception of "God/ ess", for 
without an understanding of her sense of the divine, her conception of 
creation and her prophetic judgements upon human actions in this 
world cannot be fully appreciated.39 
Ruether's Theological Anthropology 
In order to comprehend Ruether's theological conception of humankind 
as diversely embodied (to mis-quote Paul, as female and male, slave and 
free, Jew and Greek), it is vital to acknowledge the tension in her thought 
between what she perceives as the past and current historical reality of 
different human lives, and what she honours or values as a deeper 
metaphysical reality - a sacred truth that has been perverted in and 
39 See Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 46. 
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through history. Fundamentally Ruether perceives every individual to 
be fully human, and uniquely so. Historically, however, it has been the 
narrow image of an elite, ruling class male that has been taken to be 
normative of what it is to be fully human. It is on the basis of the deeper 
truth of the full and unique humanity of every person that Ruether 
criticises any system of thought, any sociopolitical structure that hinders 
the full developmental potential of any class or category of people. In 
Sexism & God-Talk she relates both this metaphysical stance and the 
historical reality of the oppression of women's lives to the task of 
feminist christian theology. 
The critical principle of feminist theology is the promotion of 
the full humanity of women. Whatever denies, diminishes, or 
distorts the full humanity of women is, therefore, appraised 
as not redemptive .... This negative principle also implies the 
positive principle: what does promote the full humanity of 
women is of the Holy, it does reflect true relation to the 
divine, it is the true nature of things, the authentic message of 
redemption and the mission of redemptive community. But 
the meaning of this positive principle - namely, the full humanity 
of women - is not fully known. It has not existed in history .... 
Still, the humanity of women, although diminished, has not 
been destroyed. It has constantly affirmed itself, often in 
only limited and subversive ways, and it has been 
touchstone against which we test and criticize all that 
diminishes us.40 (italics added) 
In this quote it is perhaps not evident that Ruether, while embracing a 
deeper metaphysical reality (that of the full humanity of women) and 
using it to judge history, does not perceive such a metaphysical 
presupposition to be an abstract, immutable form or to reveal an 
unchanging essence of "woman". I believe it is accurate to say the 
Ruether would correlate the notion of "full humanity" to the notion of 
"authentic existence". Writing of "authentic existence", Ruether states: 
"Authentic and inauthentic existence are universal human possibilities. 
They exist where they actually exist, and this dialectic changes its 
boundaries constantly and ultimately runs across each of our hearts."41 It 
is always within history, within and often in opposition to received social 
40 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
41 Ruether, Liberation Theology, p. 136. 
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structures which impose unjust constrictions on human lives, that the 
meaning of "full humanity" is made and remade in particular contexts. 
Ruether clearly stresses the open-ended character of her presupposition of 
the "full humanity" of women. 
How women continue to experience themselves 
autonomously and struggle against . .. male subjugation of 
their experience is hardly known. What women might be 
like, how we would symbolize the polarities of self and 
other, thinking and feeling, activity and receptivity outside 
these traditions of male domination is something that we 
cannot know until a nonsexist society is created where 
women are recognized as full human persons .... 42 
Nonetheless, while we do not live in a nonsexist (or nonracist or 
nonclassist) society (and therefore all our patterns of thought are shaped 
by sexist, racist, and classist propositions, including those metaphysical 
presuppositions that reject such oppressive assumptions), there are 
histories of "subversive" resistance to the metaphysical characterisation 
of "woman" as inferior to "man", of "slave" as inferior to "master". 
Within these histories are found proleptic moments, glimpses both 
realised and anticipatory, of authentic, fully human existence. And 
Ruether locates her own knowledge claims in line with these past 
histories. The epistemological importance of this move on her part 
cannot be overemphasised. Keenly aware that humans are historical, 
social creatures who cannot know themselves apart from historical, 
communal patterns of thought, patterns often corrupted in Wes tern 
culture by the hierarchical dualities discussed earlier, she asserts the 
relation of her own knowledge claims to other, non-dominant historical 
developments. She locates a sacred "truth" in these alternative traditions 
that is deeper, more fundamental than the "truth" of hierarchical 
oppressions. 
To find glimmers of this truth in submerged and alternative 
traditions through history is to assure oneself that one is not 
mad or duped. Only by finding an alternative historical 
community and tradition more deeply rooted than those that 
have become corrupted can one feel sure that in criticizing 
the dominant tradition one is not just subjectively criticizing 
42 Ruether, New Woman/New Earth, pp. 158-159. 
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the dominant tradition but is, rather, touching a deeper 
bedrock of authentic Being upon which to ground the self. 
One cannot wield the lever of criticism without a place to 
stand.43 
There are two elements in this quote that need to be highlighted. First, 
for Ruether, no individual exists apart from "community and tradition". 
Second, one can challenge the dominant tradition ( or prevailing 
knowledge claims) only from the standpoint of an alternative 
community and tradition. Within her theological anthropology she 
continually asserts the communal nature of existence and experience; for 
Ruether, humans are thoroughly social creatures, and this is as true for 
humans as knowers as it is for humans as people in need of redemption. 
Writing of the increasing awareness of the evil of sexism in the United 
States in the twentieth century, and referring to this knowledge as 
"consciousness", Ruether notes: "Consciousness is much more of a 
collective social product than modern individualism realizes. No one 
can affirm an idea against the dominant culture unless there is at least a 
subcultural group that gives people both the ideas and the social support 
for an alternative position."44 This understanding of the collective 
nature of knowledge-making resonates strongly with the notion of 
epistemological communities expressed in chapter five. The following 
quote from Ruether is also strikingly consonant with Code's depiction of 
the illusion of epistemic autonomy and the power of institutional 
ideology. 
The woman who experiences dissenting thoughts alone, 
without any network of communication to support her, can 
hardly bring her own dissent to articulation. Without a 
social matrix, she will simply be terrorized into submission 
by the authorities that surround her or acquiesce in their 
judgment that she is a "witch" or a "madwoman."45 
The "social matrix" of which Ruether writes is an epistemological 
community that acknowledges the epistemic participation of individual 
members of that community at the same time as it affirms the identity of 
43 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 18. 
44 Ibid., p. 184. 
45 Ibid. 
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those making the knowledge claims. "Psychologically, one cannot affirm 
a feminist identity against the historical weight of patriarchal oppress zon 
by oneself. "46 (italics added) Ruether's awareness of the communal 
nature of an individual's personhood or "being" is a key component 1n 
her theological anthropology. She affirms that ""human being' 1s 
precisely that form of being constituted by mutual recognition" .47 
Importantly, within her affirmation of the full humanity of all persons is 
the implicit assumption that women as well as men, slave as well as free, 
Jew as well as Greek all have the capacity to be epistemic agents-in-
community; moreover, this capacity is an integral aspect of one's self, 
one's self-identity as a human being or "thinking animal" .48 It 1s 
critically important to note again that Ruether' s positive evaluation of 
her metaphysical assertion of the full humanity of women is an 
ontologically open-ended assertion. She does not posit an "essential" 
understanding of "women" or "men". Rather, in her thought human 
subjectivity is always in process. "Identity" is not and can never be a fixed 
or static given. 
However, one's self-identity is (and cannot help but be) shaped by the 
beliefs of the communities in which one lives, and especially by one's 
relations with others, relationships shaped by those beliefs. She writes, 
therefore, of the full humanity of all persons, male and female, in order 
that this knowledge claim will inform social/ communal beliefs and thus 
help to free women and men from the bonds of theological, 
philosophical, psychological, and biological assertions of "woman's" 
46 Ibid., p. 193. 
4? Ruether, The Radical 'Kingdom, p. 134. 
48 Merton and Ruether, At Home in the World, p. 49. In response to Merton's characterisation of 
her as "a very academic, cerebral, abstract type" (p. 43), Ruether responded in the postscript of her next 
letter to him, "If I weren't a woman would it have occurred to you to accuse me of being cerebral? . . . I 
am just as fleshy as you, baby, and I am also just as much a 'thinking animal' as you." This is one 
of the few times she explicitly writes of human embodiment; it is striking in that her response to 
Merton's words indicates the extent to which an understanding of human existence as necessarily 
embodied is implicit throughout all her work. I suspect that because she spends so much time 
demolishing the idea that minds/spirits/souls are distinct from and more valuable than bodies she feels 
it is unnecessary to affirm, from a different angle, the same point: that humans are necessarily 
embodied creatures, "fleshy, thinking animals". Ruether tends not to use ten words when one will 
do. 
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inherent inferiority and irrationality.49 Here are found echoes of 
Nelson's and Potter's insistence that the epistemological community 1s 
prior to the individual. Here also Ruether stresses the liberatory, 
emancipatory aim of feminist christian theological formulations. 
Metaphysical presuppositions concerning human beings, as these are 
communally embraced and, in Addelson's words, enacted, can either 
hinder or encourage the becoming of fully human people. Her 
theological anthropology is deliberately constructed to encourage such 
communal becoming. She writes to redeem humanity from oppressive 
conceptions of entire categories of people. 
Importantly, for Ruether theological (and also epistemological) 
communities are comprised of past historical voices and knowledge 
claims as well as living epistemic agents. The affirmation and 
encouragement of Mary Magdalene and Olympe de Gouges is just as real, 
just as present and valuable (and potentially redemptive) to her as the 
acknowledgement of her contemporaries. She stands in their company 
(and in the company of Ann Lee and Lucretia Mott and the Marquis de 
Condorcet)50 when she affirms the full humanity of women. Thus 1n 
Ruether's thought epistemological communities - as standpoints in and 
from which knowledge claims are made - are not to be confused with 
sociological communities, or communities comprised only of people who 
share the same combinations of sex, race, class, religion, etc. The 
connective bonds between members of an epistemological community 
are instead paradigmatic; they are the shared metaphysical 
presuppositions upon which shared value judgements, shared visions of 
what "ought" to be are grounded. Thus Ruether, in the postscript of a 
letter to Thomas Merton, cheerfully locates herself 1n a 
theological/ epistemological community with the third century 
49 Re: the psychological, see Ruether, New Woman/New Earth, p. 137. "Psychoanalysis has 
become the chief tool, replacing patriarchal religion, for rationalizing and sanctifying the inferiority of 
women." Re: the biological, see ibid., pp. 15, 71-72. 
50 See Ruether, Rosemary Radford, Mary: The Feminine Face of the Church, The Westminster 
Press, Philadelphia, 1977, p. 87; Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 184, 199; Ruether, To Change 
the World, p. 51; Ruether, The Radical Kingdom, p. 45. 
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theologian Origen. "I am one of those mad Origenists who believe that 
when God is all in all, even the last enemy of Satan will be redeemed."51 
Nonetheless, while her conception of epistemological communities 
implicitly stresses the fundamental importance of shared paradigmatic 
elements, she also explicitly acknowledges the importance of shared or 
similar lived experiences in shaping the knowledge that supports such 
paradigmatic assumptions. Emancipatory knowledge, or "revelation", 
tends more often than not to arise from the lived experiences of 
oppressed communities. "Revelation," writes Ruether, "is 
concientizacion." (italics original) "Revelation is that redeeming and 
liberating insight which makes people aware of the social contradictions 
that define their lives, and thrusts them toward a process of liberation 
from dependency and oppression."52 That "revelation" 1s as 
epistemological in Ruether's thought as it is theological is evident in the 
following quote, taken from chapter nine, 'Is There a Black Theology?', of 
her book Liberation Theology. 
He [the black man] knows the white man well, the way a 
servant knows the secrets of a master's household, from the 
backstairs view. From this vantage point, he knows the 
faults of the white man better than the white man knows 
himself. This is true of all oppressive relationships. The 
oppressed must know the one he serves, but the oppressor, 
by disregarding him, knows nothing really about the 
oppressed.53 
In this regard Ruether is in complete agreement with Donna Haraway's 
(qualified) affirmation of feminist standpoint theory, quoted in chapter 
four: "there is good reason to believe vision is better from below the 
brilliant space platforms of the powerful."54 Such knowledge is necessary 
for survival; among other things, it is knowledge of power: who has it, 
51 Merton and Ruether, At Home in the World, p. 86. 
52 Ruether, Liberation Theology, p. 183. See also p. 179, "It would be called 'Black Power' and 
'Black Pride' in the Black movement in the USA; or 'consciousness raising' in the women's 
movement." 
53 Ibid., p. 142. 
54 Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges', p. 583. 
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how they can use it, and what its effects are.55 Like Harding, Ruether does 
not consider this sort of knowledge to be unattainable by people in 
positions of privilege and power-over others, but she is aware that there 
is not a sense of urgency, of life or death need for this know ledge on the 
part of the oppressor. For Ruether, revelatory knowledge is made 
incarnate as one discerns (always with others) one's participation in the 
sociopolitical and economic structures that divide the people of the world 
into "haves" and "have nots", on both metaphysical and physical levels: 
those who have the capacity for reason and those who have not; those 
who have enough to eat and those who have not. In her own words, 
I ... see the perspective from the "bottom" as key to my 
feminist liberation methodology. From my summer in 
Mississippi [in 1965] until today I find that the crucial way 
to see the dominant system of patriarchy, including its 
racism, classism, and colonialism, in critical perspective is to 
put myself constantly in those places where, in solidarity 
with its victims, I can see it from the underside.56 
Ruether characterises the knowledge gained and shared by "oppressed 
groups committed to the struggle for justice for their community" as 
"crucially revelatory", yet she is well aware that such knowledge does not 
have hegemonic status in the world; rather, it is the knowledge of a 
"cognitive minority".57 Such situated, value-laden knowledge cannot be 
value-neutral, but then, for Ruether, no knowledge is or can ever be 
value-neutral; it is not possible to abstract fact from value.58 The 
following quote conveys most of her epistemological assumptions, and 
reveals why it is that she rejects as untenable a notion of value-neutral 
knowledge claims. 
55 See Ruether, Rosemary Radford, 'Introduction', Women Healing Earth: Third World Women on 
Ecology, Feminism, and Religion, ed, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New 
York, 1996, p. 1. "I have for thirty years been deeply concerned with the oppressive use of power by 
my own country against subjugated people in the 'Third World'. My own experience of 'crossing 
worlds' between affluent and poor, white and people of 'color', and between 'first' and 'third' world has 
been revelatory and transformative for my understanding and my life. By viewing the ruling classes of 
my country from the underside, its evils and lies are revealed and put in the context of a larger reality 
and call for justice." 
56 Ruether, Women and Redemption, p. 222. 
57 Ibid., pp. 222-223. 
58 Ruether, Gaia & God, p. 39. 
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Rather than assuming a standpoint outside of and unrelated 
to reality, from which "objective" knowledge is possible, the 
observer is an integral part of the reality observed .... What is 
constituted as the web of relationship will also be shaped by 
how we relate to it. The knower must take responsibility for 
shaping the reality that is known in ways that can be benign 
or destructive.... [T]he knower cannot avoid ethical 
responsibility, not only in terms of how the knowledge may 
be subsequently used, but also in terms of what kind of 
relationship is implied by the stance of knowing itself.59 
This pithy account of Ruether's presuppositions concerning humans as 
knowers in the world combines Hartsock's insistence that reality be 
conceived ( on an ontological level) as inclusive of the sensuous 
interaction between humans and their physical environment - of which 
they are inescapably a part - with Haraway's insistence that "objectivity" 
be conceived as an awareness of the relational (and world shaping) 
character of all knowledge. With Haraway, Code, and Addelson, Ruether 
also emphasises responsibility as a, if not the, most important element in 
any epistemological framework. But for Ruether, epistemic responsibility 
is not simply a philosophical or ethical or even political goal, although it 
is all of those things. To deny any epistemic responsibility for the 
knowledge claims one affirms, to pretend to abstract oneself from any 
relationship with one's surroundings (both human and non-human), is 
to commit a grave sin. It is to contribute to the "distortion and corruption 
of human relationality" .60 For Ruether "sin exists precisely in the 
distortion of relationality",61 which is the consequence of 'false naming", 
false naming that supports the exploitation of "others" (both human and 
nonhuman) as "its" instead of "Thous" .62 Such false naming has shaped 
the "entire symbolic universe" in the image of which Western christian 
culture has been constructed.63 
59 Ibid. This quote comes near the end of Ruether's discussion of recent developments in quantum 
and astrophysics. 
60 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 163. That humans are inescapably relational, interdependent 
creatures is one of Ruether's core anthropological presuppositions. 
61 Ibid., p. 181. 
62 Ibid., p. 163 and pp. 161 and 174 (on her use of Buber's I and Thou). See also Ruether, New 
Woman/New Earth, p. 211. 
63 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 173. 
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In relating her conception of sin (as distorted relationship) to human 
societies structured around distorted or false metaphysical 
presuppositions, Ruether incorporates within her theological 
anthropology the traditional theological understanding that the sins of 
the fathers have been visited upon the children; or, to put it another way, 
that humanity exists in a "fallen" state.64 For Ruether, this fallen state is 
"a reality that perpetuates itself, both through socioeconomic and political 
structures and through ideology that shapes education and socialization 
at every level" .65 Most importantly, this fallen state is rooted in and 
sustained by false epistemological assumptions concerning humans as 
knowers, e.g., the false assumption that women are less capable of 
rational thought than men; the false assumption that knowers are not in 
an interdependent relationship with each other as well as with the rest of 
creation, or the world that is known; and the false assumption that 
knowledge itself, to be worthy of the name, must be eternal and 
immutable: ideal forms abstracted from the messy, complicated, and 
interdependent character of physical reality, a reality that is both historical 
( and the ref ore ever-changing) and finite. 66 
For Ruether there is a profound connection between the traditional 
christian rejection of the finite character of existence ( a rejection she 
repudiates almost as often as she locates the origin of this belief in the 
christian synthesis of apocalyptic and Hellenistic thought) and knowledge 
claims that seek to transcend any relationship to time, place, and human 
authorship. This flight from finitude is simultaneously theologically and 
epistemologically irresponsible; according to Ruether it is a projection of 
human desires to deny the inescapable limits of creaturely existence. 
64 Ibid., p. 161. 
65 Ibid., p. 164. She is particularly critical of the socialising of males and females into so-called 
complementary "masculine" and "feminine" roles. "What is called 'masculine' is the egoistic attitudes 
of the powerful, and what is derogated as 'feminine' is the defeated traits of the powerless, both of 
which have little to do with the full potential of men and women as they might exist in an 
equalitarian society." (Ruether, New Woman/New Earth, p. 142.) See also Ruether, Sexism and God-
Talk, p. 111, and Ruether, Women and Redemption, p. 166, where she writes that "both masculinity 
and femininity are false distortions of humanness". 
66 See Ruether, New Woman/New Earth, p. 211; Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, pp. 264-265; 
Ruether, Gaia & God, pp. 251-253. 
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We should not pretend to know what we do not know or to 
have "revealed" to us what is the projection of our wishes. 
Moreover, whatever we wish is not thereby proved to be 
probably true or something upon which we should "wager" 
our lives. There needs to be a compatibility between our 
wishes and what we know of our finite nature and primary 
responsibilities. 67 
And for Ruether, our primary responsibilities are to this earth and all the 
creatures of this earth, born and yet unborn. "It is not our calling to be 
concerned about the eternal meaning of our lives, and religion should 
not make this the focus of its message. Our responsibility is to use our 
temporal life span to create a just and good community for our 
generation and for our children."68 Theologically, humans are called to 
revere life, to attend to life out of a sense of committed love.69 We are 
not called, nor are we able, to escape its ambiguities and tragedies. This is 
the "ought" that Ruether lays upon Western christian culture at this 
time, from her place as a privileged white woman living in the US at the 
end of the twentieth · century: humans ought to stop denying our own 
finitude and acknowledge the finite nature of this earth; humans must 
begin to live responsibly, within the limits of existence given with 
existence?O Because all people are fully, blessedly human, the resources 
necessary for life must be shared equitably among all, not hoarded by the 
privileged, powerful few. But humans are not the only earth creatures 
whose survival matters. Humans must acknowledge the relational 
truths revealed by the earth sciences; that we are dependent for life on the 
flourishing of plants and animals whose habitats are daily being 
destroyed.71 
67 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 257. 
68 Ibid., p. 258. See also Ruether, New Woman/New Earth, p. 211. She writes of "using the 
human capacity for consciousness, not to alienate ourselves from nature, but rather, to nurture, 
perfect, and renew her natural harmonies, so that earth might be fair, not only for us and our children, 
but for all generations of living things still to come." 
69 See Ruether, Gaia & God, p. 273 and p. 57. 
70 See Ruether, To Change the World, p. 66. "The Western dream of infinitely expanding power and 
wealth defies the actual finitude of ourselves and the world and conceals the exploitative use of other 
people's resources. It must be replaced with a new culture of acceptance of finitude and limits." 
71 See Ruether, Gaia & God, pp. 47-58. 
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Dependency is a fundamental character of human existence. Most often 
this dependency has either been denied or, conversely, utterly embraced, 
used as an excuse for not acting responsibly where and when it is possible 
to do so. When combined with an image of an omnipotent Father God, 
who, it is supposed, eventually will make everything anew anyway, the 
result has been the callous domination of "mere matter" (a word which 
comes from the Latin mater, or mother) and the domination as well of all 
those humans categorically identified with matter rather than with 
"spirit". The knowledge concerning humankind that Ruether seeks to 
make incarnate, the revelation made incarnate in her theology, is the 
awareness that humans are not only dependent upon the rest of creation 
for life, but are also responsible for tending to creation that it might 
continue to sustain life for the full measure of the earth's days. The 
problem, according to Ruether, is that a world of powers and 
principalities has been constructed within t~is blessed creation, and may 
yet destroy the earth. 72 
Creation and the World 
For over thirty years Ruether has consistently maintained a distinction in 
her thought between "creation" and "the world". She draws this 
distinction (although she transforms it somewhat in her thought) from 
christian scripture (in particular Pauline texts in the new testament), and 
often writes about it with the metaphors "powers" and "principalities", 
also drawn from Paul. Simply put, according to Ruether, 
In the New Testament "the world" does not stand for the 
nature of the original Creation; it refers to Creation as fallen, 
existing under the servitude to man's idols and given over to 
an oppressive relationship between man and man. This is 
the theological identity of "the world". .. . "This world" is 
creation considered from the point of view of the Fall. ... 
"This world" is the sphere governed under the law of 
72 Ibid, pp. 85-111. 
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alienation and oppression, under the dominion of the powers 
and principalities.73 
According to Ruether, "the world", constructed by humans in the 
(hierarchical) image of a symbolic universe projected by the ruling class 
elite, is a real but fundamentally distorted edifice. It is a place of 
"alienation and oppression"; inclusive of all those social political systems 
constructed around "a false system of alienated dualisms".74 "The world" 
is thus an expression of human attempts to deny the creaturely fact of 
interdependent, finite existence. However, and this is a critical point, 
Ruether's distinction between "creation" and "the world" is not to be 
understood as a facile separation of non-human "nature" and human 
"culture", with an accompanying positive evaluation of "nature" and 
negative evaluation of "culture". Nor is her use of the metaphors 
"powers" and "principalities" to be understood in the traditional sense of 
"fallen angels", evil forces exerting their influences on powerless, 
helpless humans. Rather, for Ruether the powers and principalities of 
the world are human powers, human principles that systematically 
discriminate against and oppress entire categories of people, as well as 
non-human creatures and nature. These powers and principles are 
inhumane and unjust, and they have been repeatedly enacted to create an 
inhumane and unjust world. 
In contrast to "the world" of alienation and oppression, there is 
"creation", which Ruether affirms as "good". However, her use of the 
word "good" must be understood in the sense of being "holy" (a 
metaphor for which there is no epistemological equivalent), not in the 
sense of being fundamentally benign or benevolent.75 Creation 1s as 
terrifying, as awe-full as it is wonderful; it is the incarnation of a 
fiercesome, holy mystery, but it never existed in the form of an original 
73 Ruether, The Radical Kingdom, pp. 164-165. See also Merton and Ruether, At Home in the 
World, p. 28. '"The world' is not creation, but is the sphere of the powers and principalities." 
74 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 71. 
75 Ruether is critical of "the romantic project of return to nature", especially when this includes the 
elevation of all that is "feminine" and the rejection of all that is "masculine" or "rational", including 
human technology. See Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, pp. 41-42 and 84-85. 
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paradise.76 Nor is .I/creation", in Ruether's thought, to be understood in a 
completed or static sense.77 Creation is in process; the universe is still 
growing, constantly changing. Creation has a history, and this history is 
unfinished. Old stars die, and new stars and planets (and thus, 
potentially, new life forms) come into . existence. They do not, however, 
arrive ex nihilo. Ruether affirms that whenever any aspect of creation 
perishes, the material stuff of that creature or plant or object is gathered 
into the divine (alternatively, "cosmic") matrix of all being, where it 
becomes the substance that enables and sustains new life, new aspects of 
creation.78 
Here I need to clarify and elaborate upon Ruether' s conception of the 
relationship between creation and the divine. For Ruether there is an 
inseparable relation between creation (or "being") and Godless - "an 
unpronounceable and inadequate" term that Ruether uses when trying to 
write of the divine in an inclusive yet singular manner.79 
Feminist theology needs to affirm the God of Exodus, of 
liberation and new being, but as rooted in the foundations of 
being rather than as its antithesis. The God/ ess who is the 
foundation (at one and the same time) of our being and our 
new being embraces both the roots of the material 
substratum of our existence (matter) and also the endlessly 
new creative potential (spirit).80 (italics added) 
Ruether's conception of God/ess as "the empowering matrix, She, in 
whom we live and move and have our being", is also inclusive of "the 
total community of being", past, present, and unknown future.81 "It is 
this matrix ... that is 'everlasting', that subsists underneath the coming to 
76 See Ruether, Gaia & God, p. 270. " ... to know we stand on holy ground". See also Ruether, 
Sexism and God-Talk, p. 168. Ruether considers various versions of the "original paradise" myth "to 
be a mythologizing of early infancy, in which the mother provides the time of ease and plenty from 
her own body ... ". 
77 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 70; see also Ruether, Gaia & God, pp. 251-253. 
78 See Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, pp. 70-71, 258; Ruether, Gaia & God, p. 252. 
79 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 46. 
80 Ibid., pp. 70-71. The influence of Paul Tillich's depiction of "being" and "new being" is clearly 
present in this quote. 
81 Ibid., p. 266 and 257, respectively. 
184 
be and passing away of individuated beings and even planetary worlds."82 
Again, the divine matrix is not identified solely with the immanent stuff 
of "being". The divine matrix of all creation includes all that has been but 
is no longer, as well as a transcendent horizon of creative possibilities for 
creation, not all of which will ever be made incarnate.83 In short, 
Ruether's conception of Godless is as "the source of being that underlies 
creation and grounds its nature and future potential for continual 
transformative renewal in biophilic mutuality" .84 This- last point is 
critical. The divine matrix, while in no way resembling a personal deity, 
is in Ruether's thought a positive, purposeful force or power, although 
not an omnipotent one. In addition, Ruether's conception of this 
"empowering matrix" includes a yearning or a desire for relational 
mutuality among and between all aspects of creation. Such mutuality is 
never without ambiguity and tragedy, nonetheless Ruether seems to be 
suggesting that creation is a holy "place" and "process" in which life, 
although constrained and subject to the limits of existence given with 
existence, seems to flourish in moderation - when the "powers" and 
"principalities" of the human world do not prevent or prohibit such 
flourishing.85 
Flourishing in moderation can also occur when transformative, justice-
enhancing possibilities are made incarnate (or enacted) by human beings, 
who therefore must be regarded as co-creators of creation, as well as the 
creators of "the world". It is in this regard that Ruether' s conception of 
"creation" and "the world" does not lend itself to a neat nature/ culture 
split. Some cultural artefacts do belong, theologically, with creation and 
82 Ibid., p. 257. The quote continues, "Acceptance of death, then, is acceptance of the finitude of our 
individuated centers of being, but also our identification with the larger matrix as our total self that 
contains us all." Here again she stresses the finite character of human lives. 
83 Ibid., p. 85. In many respects Ruether's conception of the divine matrix or Holy Shekinah (Hebrew word for presence of god) is similar to the characterisation of the consequent nature of "god" 
in process theology. It is panentheistic, mutable, and not omnipotent. 
84 Ruether, Women and Redemption, p. 223. 
85 In chapter four I noted that Nelson, Keller, and Code all wrote of reality's "intractable" constraints; 
this notion is implicitly present throughout Ruether's work. 
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not with the world.86 Among these transformative cultural artefacts 
Ruether identifies the Jubilee tradition of Leviticus 25:8-12 as providing a 
baseline model of just relations between humans and between humans 
and the rest of creation, while at the same time acknowledging and 
seeking to minimise the harmful effects of "the world" upon creation 
(both human and non-human).87 Time is set aside every week for people 
and animals to rest and every seven years for the land itself to rest. Every 
fifty years debts are forgiven and slaves set free. In this way, periodically 
both "humanity and nature recover their just balance".88 However, such 
a balance is never, in Ruether' s thought, able to be maintained, 
unchanging, forever. At an ontological level change is the nature of 
creation and all existence. 
To conclude then, for Ruether this material earth, this creation of which 
humans are inextricably a part, is our home, but not ours alone. Upon 
(and often by mis-using the material of) this life-sustaining earth humans 
have erected social, political, economic, technological, and military 
structures and institutions that are used by an elite few to oppress the 
majority of people on earth, and to destroy and damage entire species of 
plants and animals and their habitat, thereby also threatening human 
survival. While she affirms that humans have the capacity to use our 
knowledge and power to co-create a more just, more equitable creation, 
she also affirms the tragic possibility that the powers and principalities of 
"the world" will not be converted to the service of creation.89 Again, 
creation is that of which humans, as "thinking animals", are inextricably 
a part. Physical, material reality, including the interconnections and 
interdependencies which make up this never static material reality, is, in 
86 Ruether, To Change the World, p. 69. "We must seek the life intended by God for us within 
these limits [of change and death]. The return to harmony in the covenant of creation is not a matter 
of cyclical return to the same, for each new achievement of workable balances is different, based on 
new environments and technologies. It is a historical project that has to be undertaken again and again 
in changing circumstances. Each great social movement, such as the labour movement, leaves some 
needed changes undone and generates new contradictions." 
87 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, pp. 254-255. 
88 Ibid., p. 255. 
89 Ruether, Women and Redemption, p. 224. " ... God cannot force this conversion upon us (I agree 
with process theology here.) ... I believe failure is possible, though not fated." 
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Ruether' s thought, the foundation of the only life we can ever know. 
However, as theological and epistemological and ethical and political 
agents, we have yet to acknowledge the depth of our dependency upon 
creation; even now we are enacting the destruction of creation/ ourselves. 
While the divine matrix will remain no matter what humans do, what 
has been destroyed will never be made anew. Thus the theo-ethical and 
epistemological demand Ruether lays upon humankind: to tend 
responsibly to an irreplaceable creation. With our attention thus focused, 
We can then recognize that the fragile fruit of the tree of life 
is indeed lovely and good for discernment, and eat the fruit 
with relish, making it a part of our bodies. This is the 
possible redemption of life on earth. But it is possible only 
when we put aside the impossible redemptions of final 
conquest of limits in a realm of immortal life untouched by 
sorrow, vulnerability, and finitude.90 
Conclusion 
I suggest that Rosemary Ruether' s feminist christian theology represents a 
thirty year elaboration upon and refinement of the metaphysical 
presuppositions named at the beginning of this chapter. Profoundly 
aware of the interrelated nature of all theological assertions concerning 
humanity, god, and creation, she has systematically transformed all of 
these concepts in order that her whole theology might consistently affirm, 
simultaneously, the full, unqualified humanity of every person without 
exception, the finite and blessed character of all life/ aspects of creation, 
and a sense of "god" as that non-omnipotent matrix of being which 
allows for the possibility but not the certainty of limited, finite life and 
lives. Her theological anthropology, while utterly senseless apart from 
her value judgement concerning the full humanity of every person, 
conveys no fixed essence of "woman" or "man", but rather reveals an 
understanding of human beings as differently embodied, thoroughly 
90 Ibid., p. 254. 
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social creatures - as dependent upon our relations with non-human 
reality for our lives (and thus our identities) as we are upon our relations 
with other humans for our lives, identities, and knowledge(s).91 Finally, 
in close affinity with process thought, Ruether insists upon the constantly 
changing, never fixed or static nature of the entire cosmos, including the 
divine matrix of all that is. Neither theologically nor epistemologically 
does she affirm a final, unchanging truth. 
Rather, she accepts the existence of multiple truths, each relative to 
particular times and places and communities of knowledge makers, each 
inseparable from the value judgements and ethical/political 
requirements of those particular knowledge makers. With the feminist 
standpoint theorists, Ruether perceives the knowledge of oppressed 
communities to be rather less distorted, more aware of the life and death 
dynamics of power than the knowledge of dominant/ dominating 
communities. Ruether also identifies, within present-day epistemic 
communities, the voices, values, and insights of past epistemic agents. 
From Mary Magdalene to Mary Wollstonecraft, Margaret Fell to Margaret 
Mead, Ruether's understanding of the social matrix in which both self (in 
relation) identity and communal knowledge is developed is inclusive of 
those historical agents whose presuppositions and value judgements can 
be interpreted to support and enable "us" (for some "us") in "our" 
struggles now. Lastly, Ruether is exceedingly clear about what she 
perceives to be the integral relationship between theology, epistemology, 
and responsible action. The following quote, cited earlier as well, sums 
up her understanding of both the purpose of theology and the purpose of 
knowledge. "It is not our calling to be concerned about the eternal 
meaning of our lives, and religion should not make this the focus of its 
91 I suggest that Ruether's anthropological and ontological assumptions are, in this respect, quite 
similar to Catherine Keller's recent description of "a social ontology of the self'. Catherine Keller, 
'Seeking and Sucking: On Relation and Essence in Feminist Theology', in Horizons in Feminist 
Theology: Identity, Tradition, and Norms, eds, Rebecca S. Chopp and Sheila Greeve Davaney, 
Augsburg Fortress, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1997, p. 77. 
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message. Our responsibility is to use our temporal life span to create a 
just and good community for our generation and for our children."92 
With this analysis of Ruether' s metaphysical and epistemological 
presuppositions in place, it is now possible to discern those 
presuppositions that Carter Heyward and Sallie McFague share with 
Ruether. Accordingly, in the following chapters I will refer again to 
Ruether's core assertions whenever they are shared by Heyward or 
McFague. 
92 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 258. See also Ruether, New Woman/New Earth, p. 211. She 
writes of "using the human capacity for consciousness, not to alienate ourselves from nature, but 
rather, to nurture, perfect, and renew her natural harmonies, so that earth might be fair, not only for us 
and our children, but for all generations of living things still to come". 
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Chapter Seven 
P.aradigmatic and Epistemological Elements 
in the Theology of Carter Heyward 
At the start of the last chapter I named the significant influence Rosemary 
Ruether has had on my own academic/intellectual development. I begin 
this chapter in a similar manner, by elaborating briefly on the impact 
Carter Heyward's work has had on my theological understanding and 
imagination. If, through her theology, Rosemary Ruether taught and 
continues to teach me to locate my own work in relation to deep-rooted 
historical trends and patterns of thought, if Ruether teaches me to ground 
my work historically, then, through her theology, Carter Heyward teaches 
me to ground and imagine my work in and through the particularities of 
my own life. She is a theologian who insists that theology cannot and 
must not be abstracted or removed from this life, here and now, 
wherever and however it is being lived. As she says, ,'/particularity is the 
window of all joy, sorrow, and knowledge for all of us".1 
In Heyward's case this means her own imaginative, constructive efforts 
are rooted in the soil of North Carolina, where she was born and raised in 
a white Southern Protestant family.2 It means she grounds her work as 
1 Heyward, Carter, Touching Our Strength: The Erotic as Power and the Love of God, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1989, p. 10. This quote comes at the end of a paragraph which she begins by 
stating, "knowing our particular social locations and our limits is not only intellectually honest. It is intellectually empowering as a lens through which we may catch a glimpse of what is, paradoxically, 
universally true - that all people are limited by the particularities of their life experiences." (pp. 9-10) 
2 See Heyward, Carter, Staying Power: Reflections on Gender, Justice, and Compassion, The 
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an Episcopal priest, teacher, and theologian in the specificities of her own 
christian, feminist, lesbian life, even as she acknowledges that these 
aspects of her identity are constantly evolving, changing.3 Already it 
should be evident that elements in Heyward's thought resonate strongly 
with the concern for situated knowledges expressed by the feminist 
epistemologists discussed in chapters four and five. However, I want to 
acknowledge that it was primarily through Heyward's writings that I 
began to comprehend the epistemological necessity of acknowledging the 
particular, always tangled elements of my own life as these, inevitably, 
seep through whatever I write. 
Perhaps the most profound influence Heyward has had on my theological 
development, however, comes from her unwavering insistence that "we 
who currently constitute the Christian church are the temporary authors 
and guardians of 'Christian truth'. It is ours to determine and ours to 
teach. "4 (italics added) Until I read Carter Heyward's theology, until I 
immersed myself in it for weeks and months on end, I never understood 
the extent to which I, as a student of theology, had unconsciously accepted 
the notion that it was appropriate to criticise elements of "the tradition" 
but somehow not my place to claim it as my own and reconceptualise 
every element of it. In all fairness to Rosemary Ruether, it should have 
been possible for me to "hear" this from her work, but I did not. It was 
not until I read Heyward that I realised that I too could be a constructive 
theologian. This may have had something to do with their different 
writing styles. Ruether writes in measured sentences meant to be read 
and studied, while Heyward often writes with a cadence and a rhythm 
that reminds me of rocking chairs and scorching summer days, of the 
kind of heat that soothes and sears you both at once. Her words are words 
for the ears to hear and the tongue to taste, not merely for the eyes to see.5 
Pilgrim Press, Cleveland, Ohio, 1995, pp. 66-76. 
3 On identity, see Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 21 7. Heyward is professor of theology at 
Episcopal Divinity School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
4 Heyward, Carter, Speaking of Christ: A Lesbian Feminist Voice, ed, Ellen C. Davis, The Pilgrim 
Press, New York, 1989, p. 34. 
5 Much of Heyward's published work consists of sermons and talks written to be heard, not simply 
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To put it another way, Heyward most often speaks and writes in one of 
my first languages, a language to which I respond with my heart as much 
as my mind. 
Or it might be the case that I first read Heyward rather more closely, held 
onto her words a bit more tightly, simply because she writes as a white 
protestant feminist lesbian. It is no doubt significant that I read most of 
Heyward's work for the first time in 1988-89, while an openly lesbian 
MTS student at Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary (a United 
Methodist institution);6 unfortunately, lesbian and gay students in the 
MDiv program at this school had then and must still remain closeted or 
face the probability that they will be asked to leave the program, and 
hence not become ordained ministers, solely on the basis of their 
"unacceptable" sexual orientation/preference. Accordingly, into this 
culture of fear and silence (and lesbian MDiv students literally walking 
away from me when they saw me coming, only to double back and speak 
to me when no one else was looking), Heyward's self-avowedly lesbian 
feminist words came as water to a drought-stricken land? Like most good 
rainstorms, all this water was accompanied by a fair bit of thunder and 
lightning. "That which does not bear directly upon human life and move 
toward the creation of justice in society is not worth our bother."8 
Lightning. "If we do not take seriously [the] sacred vocation of Christian 
interpretation it will be taken from us, as it is in every generation, by false 
prophets."9 Thunder, sounding right in my ear. For the first time I knew 
myself to be included in an author's "we", and simultaneously felt 
enabled and empowered to participate in such interpretive and 
constructive work. It is therefore with a great deal of respect and gratitude 
read. 
6 The MTS, or Master of Theological Studies degree, is directed primarily toward the academic study 
of theology, rather than to preparing students for ordination as a minister. 
7 Importantly, two of her books were published and appeared at G-ETS in 1989, just when I most 
needed to read them, was most unsure of my own "right" to be studying and beginning to write 
constructive theology. 
8 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 20. 
9 Heyward, Speaking of Christ, p. 34. 
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for her (and its) existence that I now turn to an examination of the 
paradigmatic and epistemological elements in Heyward's theology. 
As in the last chapter, I will begin by presenting Heyward's understanding 
of theology broadly considered, and will then identify what I consider to 
be the central focus of her theological system, or, better, pattern. Without 
an understanding of this constant, driving focus it is impossible to 
comprehend how each of the paradigmatic elements in her theological 
pattern fit together. Following this brief overview I then will identify and 
discuss her understanding of human beings (her theological 
anthropology) as knowing agents (including, inseparably, her 
epistemological assumptions concerning the production of knowledge) 
and her understanding of the world (theologically, creation) as it is 
known. Throughout all these discussions I will identify the discernible 
influences of past theological and philosophical developments on her 
work. 
T he Na t u re a n d P u r p o s e o f u T he o Io gy " 
in Heyward's Thought 
For Heyward, feminist christian theology is not and must not become an 
individual, passive, "cerebral exercise")O It is instead a communal, 
active, and ever-changing process: the process of enabling wherever and 
whenever possible the flourishing of love and justice between and 
among humans and other "earth creatures" in the world.11 In Heyward's 
thought, to do theology is neither to engage in individual spiritual navel-
gazing nor is it to engage in individual intellectual self-stimulation. 
Rather, it is to attempt, always with others, to help bring justice/love to 
those places and lives from which justice/love is absent or denied. 
10 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 20. 
11 See Heyward, Carter, Our Passion for Justice, The Pilgrim Press, New York, 1984, p. 12 for a 
discussion of the communal nature of feminist theology. The phrase "earth creatures", which Heyward 
uses particularly in her later work, originates (at least in feminist christian theological discourse) with 
Phyllis Trible. It is Trible's translation of the Hebrew word 'adam. See Trible, Phyllis, God and the 
Rhetoric of Sexuality, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1978, pp. 72-143. 
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Importantly, this is my conception of Heyward's understanding of the 
nature and purpose of her theology, drawn from statements made by her, 
such as the one quoted above: "That which does not bear directly upon 
human life and move toward the creation of justice in society is not 
worth our bother." 
Her own definition of theology, if taken out of the context of her work as 
a whole, can appear to support only implicitly her communal, justice-
centred understanding of the nature and purpose of theological reflection, 
or, better, theological praxis. For instance, she has defined theology as "a 
capacity to discern God's presence here and now and to reflect on what 
this means" ,12 and as "critical, creative reflection on the patterns, shape, 
and movement of the Sacred in our life together" .13 (Here the influence 
of existentialist thought is evident in the this-worldly focus of her 
theological attention. And indeed Heyward has named her own work to 
be in continuity with Bultmann's belief "that the motivation for all 
theology is to be better able to comprehend our own existence" .14) Again, 
however, when taken out of context the definitions of theology offered by 
Heyward can be somewhat misleading unless they are read as referring to 
a communal or collective struggle to "comprehend ourselves in a world 
in which relation is broken violently" .15 (italics added) This is a critical 
point, and one that I will discuss in much greater detail when I examine 
her presuppositions concerning human beings and the world; the context 
in which she grounds all her theological praxis is that of a society, culture, 
and world in which abusive relationships, whether between groups of 
people or between individuals, whether economically or symbolically 
structured and maintained, are rampant. The issue, for Heyward, is that 
once such knowledge or comprehension of the "brokenness" of existence 
is achieved (albeit always partially, imperfectly, or, as she sometimes 
l2 Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, p. 7. 
13 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 22, and endnote 9 on p. 61. She takes her account of 
Bultmann's thought from his Jesus Christ and Mythology. 
14 See Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 28. 
15 Ibid., p. 35. See also Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, p. 68. "To immerse ourselves in 
theology and ministry of radical participation may be to survive .... " (italics original) 
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writes, "through a glass darkly"16) it is a theo-ethical imperative that such 
knowledge be acted upon. It is for this reason that I describe the nature 
and purpose of theology in Heyward's thought as the communal effort to 
co-create love and justice in the world. 
"A Theology of Mutual Relation" 
An Overview of Heyward's Theological Pattern 
In Appendix A (Roots of Relation in Liberal Protestantism: 
Schleiermacher) of her doctoral dissertation, later published as The 
Redemption of God: A Theology of Mutual Relation, Heyward names the 
theological and philosophical developments most influential in her 
thought. 
I see my work in continuity with [the] liberal relational 
theological tradition as informed (1) by the Barthian critique 
of its failure to acknowledge the depths of human sin; (2) by 
a Marxian critique of its bourgeois individualism; and (3) . by 
a feminist critique of its indifference to structures of male 
d · 17 ormnance .. .. 
While Heyward thus squarely locates her work in the liberal stream of 
post-enlightenment thought, it is necessary to stress Heyward's rejection 
of any single theological paradigm (or any single theologian's work) as 
the only way to approach theology. According to her, "there is no 
universally correct theological system that can be applied to all people, 
everywhere, at all times" .1 8 Heyward is insistent on this point: theology 
ought not to consist of a single set of a priori presuppositions that are 
then applied, as from above, in the same way to every different situation 
or context.19 Rather, and this is a value judgement closely aligned with 
16 See Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, pp. 33, 46, 126. 
17 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 187. 
l8 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 223. 
l9 See Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 12. "The theologian's on-going constructive task is to 
discern common assumptions which are emerging in the praxis out of which and to which she speaks. 
Her task is not to determine which assumptions 'have always been' Christian. No common 
understanding of such words as 'God', 'humanity', and 'Jesus Christ' can be assumed as a priori to the 
theological task ... " (underlining original). 
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the value judgements found in Latin American liberation theology and 
Black theology, as well as in Ruether's work, she affirms that theological 
praxis ought to (indeed cannot help but) grow out of the lived experiences 
and felt needs of different communities.20 Importantly, this theological 
affirmation is simultaneously an epistemological affirmation. She writes, 
"epistemologically, feminist theology moves from action to ideology, 
rather than vice-versa" .21 I will elaborate on this point in the discussion 
of her theological anthropology, but because Heyward begins all of her 
work by acknowledging not just the theological and philosophical 
traditions in which she participates but also the communities in which 
she lives, acts, and to whom she holds her work accountable, it is vital 
that I identify these communities as well, thereby contextualising her 
theology. As mentioned above, Heyward writes as a white, North 
American, "middle-strata", christian feminist lesbian; she acknowledges 
that she writes primarily "to serve the interests of lesbians and gaymen", 
"in the service of feminists and womanists - women and men of 
different colors", and "on behalf of the interests of progressive and radical 
religious folk - especially, though not exclusively, christians and former 
christians" .22 With the understanding that it is out of her experiences in 
these various, sometimes overlapping and sometimes conflicting 
communities that she crafts her theology, and to these communities that 
she holds her work accountable, it is time now to identify the distinctive 
elements of her theological pattern. 
20 See Mud Flower Collective, God's Fierce Whimsy: Christian Feminism and Theological 
Education, The Pilgrim Press, New York, 1985, pp. 17-21, for a discussion of the points of 
similarity and dissimilarity between feminist christian and liberation and Black theological 
understandings of praxis. While this book is the result of a collective process, Heyward did much of 
the writing up and editing of the collective's insights. For this reason, where there appears to be 
collective agreement on an issue, I consider the opinions so stated to be representative of Heyward's 
thought. 
21 Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, p. 228 
22 See Heyward, Carter, When Boundaries Betray Us: Beyond Illusions of What is Ethical in Therapy 
and Life, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 1994, p. 248, for Heyward's discussion of the term 
"middle-strata". She does not use the term "middle class" because it does not reflect the reality of the 
"fluid, and downward, mobility" of what is usually considered as a stable, or upwardly mobile class of 
people. The rest of the phrases in quotation marks are taken from Heyward, Touching Our Strength, 
p. 7. 
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On the one hand, to attempt to sketch an outline of Heyward's theology 
as theology, that is, apart from a discussion of the epistemological 
elements running through it, is to risk thoroughly distorting her words. 
She herself has described the focus of much of her work as a concern with 
"calling especially, though not exclusively, white liberal and radical 
christian women beyond our attachments to the individualistic "self" 
concept of a liberal religious and political epistemology ... ".23 (italics 
added) On the other hand, before I can discuss the epistemological 
implications of her own characterisation of her work as "a theology of 
mutual relation, of knowing and being known", it is imperative that I 
wrestle with the meaning of "a theology of mutual relation", or the 
distinctive shape of her theology as a whole.24 To begin to make sense of 
what is unique to Heyward's theological pattern it is necessary first of all 
to identify the hermeneutical norm at the heart of all her writings. The 
interpretive norm central to her work, based, according to Heyward, on a 
value judgement, "is right-relation or the love of one's neighbor as 
oneself" .25 (underlining original) 
There are two points that I need to discuss with regard to Heyward's 
hermeneutical norm. The first has to do with the phrase "right-relation". 
In Heyward's work the concept of "right relation" (in her later works she 
does not use the hyphen) is the touchstone to which she returns again 
and again, and the cornerstone on which she constructs her entire 
theology. Right relation, according to Heyward, is "mutual relation", and 
mutual relations are just or loving relations. However, and this is the 
second point I need to mention, by "love" she does not mean a private, 
individualistic feeling, but an openness to action: "a willingness to 
participate with others in the healing of a broken world and broken 
23 Heyward, Staying Power, p. ix. 
24 Ibid., p. 120. 
25 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 15. See also p. 14, where Heyward notes that the values 
she affirms "form the interpretive framework within which I make whatever claims I do to theological 
knowledge". From this statement it is evident that Heyward considers value judgements to be an 
integral part of the theological paradigm within which she works. 
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lives" .26 Therefore, with regard to her hermeneutical norm, it is by the 
physical presence and absence of right relations ( or justice, or love) 
between neighbours that Heyward evaluates human and creaturely 
existence. Importantly, while she appropriates from christian scripture 
the phrase "love one's neighbour as oneself", she does not claim that her 
model of "right relation" has thus always been a christian theological 
norm. Rather than claim authority from the christian tradition, she 
confronts the tradition with the value judgements of her communities of 
accountability.27 In other words, it is not upon the authority of scripture 
or tradition or the ostensibly unmediated Word of God that Heyward 
grounds her theology. Nonetheless, the concept of "god" is a central 
component in Heyward's theological pattern. This is the case precisely 
because she defines "god" as "our power in mutual relation".28 
Given the tightly woven nature of Heyward's writings, it is not possible 
to make clear Heyward's understanding of "god" as our power in mutual 
relation, or as the "resource and power of relation" ,29 without also 
discussing her understanding and use of the metaphor "sacred", an effort 
that involves discussing again her understanding and use of the 
metaphors "love" and "justice". Simply put, Heyward allows of no 
distinction in her thought between notions of "love" and notions of 
"justice"; to love is to make justice in the world, to do justice is to enact 
( or make incarnate) love. Further, to do either is to participate with 
others in "godding", or the sacred work and play of making god-as-
love/justice incarnate in the world. 30 Put differently, there is absolutely 
26 Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, p. 187. See also p. 92, "To really love is to topple unjust 
structures, bringing down the principalities and powers of domination and control at all levels of 
human social relations." It is significant that Heyward uses the language of "powers and 
pirincipalities" in the same way that Ruether does. 
27 A theological aside - for Heyward, there is nothing inherently better about the christian tradition 
than any other religious tradition - it is simply one among others, and ought not be considered as 
more inherently authoritative than any other tradition, although she acknowledges the powerful 
influence the christian tradition has had on shaping in particular the symbolic universe wrapped around 
Euroamerican societies. See Heyward, Speaking of Christ, pp. 64-65. 
28 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 188. 
29 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 31. 
30 Ibid., p. 9. "The human act of love, befriending, making justice is our act of making God 
incarnate in the world." 
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no qualitative difference in her thought between "justice", "love", "god" 
and the "sacred" at all. She herself removes any such distinction when 
she describes "love and justice in human life as the only sacred - godly, 
right, and normative - dimension of our life together" .31 Or, again, 
when she writes, "the pattern of the Sacred in our life together is justice. 
The shape of God is justice."32 
Heyward's steadfast refusal to allow any qualitative difference between 
human acts of love and justice and her understanding of "god" or the 
"sacred" is, in my opinion, one of the most distinctive contributions she 
makes to feminist christian theology. Her avowal that human beings, 
through our actions, do and do not make god incarnate in the world is a 
profoundly innovative theological move. In making it she is not merely 
criticising a hierarchical, dualistic understanding of "God" and 
"humanity", which is, as Ruether noted, arguably the ontological (and 
value-laden) assertion most central to traditional christian theology.33 
Rather, she is presenting a radically transformed understanding of both 
"god" and "humanity": a vision in which human activity is divine 
activityi whenever and wherever it is just and loving. 
While there is no qualitative distinction, there is, however, a crucial 
quantitative difference between Heyward's understanding of 
love/justice/ god/the sacred as made incarnate by human beings and her 
understanding of god/the sacred/justice/love as it exists apart from 
humanity. As insistent as she is on humanity's responsibility for doing 
the work of love and justice, for making god/the sacred incarnate, she is 
equally insistent on "the 'more-ness' of God beyond simple humanity" .34 
31 Ibid., p. 222. 
32 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 22. 
33 See Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 192. In Appendix B: Chalcedon's Ontology, Heyward 
describes the decisions reached by the council of Chalcedon ( 451 CE) regarding "the relation between 
the divine and human in Jesus Christ" as reaching the following metaphysical conclusion: "that all 
life exists within an ontological structure of hierarchical dualism, in which the higher essence is the 
valuable essence" (underlining original). Of particular importance in Heyward's thought is that this 
ontological dualism plays itself out in traditional theological anthropology in the form of "divine 
activity over human passivity". 
34 Personal correspondence, April 1 7, 1997. 
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For example, Heyward writes of "the whole inhabited earth [as] sacred 
space ... ".35 Likewise, she characterises "the ground we share in this world 
[as] holy ground ... ".36 While most of her theological attention is devoted 
to human relations and human activity, she never identifies "god" ( or 
the sacred, or the holy) solely with humanity, or with any single human 
being. This point is important; it is not simply as a corrective to the 
sexism of the church, but is also the "more-ness" of god that Heyward 
emphasises when she refuses to identify "god" "with any one person in 
any time or place", i.e. with God the Son in Jerusalem two thousand years 
ago or God the Father in heaven.37 
To focus messianically on any one person, to try to locate 
and establish God in any single figure, to insist that 
relational tension and ambiguity be broken and that the 
definition of "God" be handed to us as a package in the 
person of a lone messiah, is to deny the movement of power 
in relation through many incarnations in history.38 
It is also, implicitly, the "more-ness" of god that sustains Heyward's 
v1s1on of a theology of mutual relation, a vision she plants solidly . in a 
world of "alienation", a world replete with badly broken relations 
(usually of domination and subordination) between and amongst human 
beings, with badly broken relations between humans and other earth 
creatures, and with badly broken relations between humans and the very 
air, water and soil all earth creatures need to survive.39 When in those 
fleeting instances genuinely mutual, loving, enabling relations are 
experienced, the knowledge that there is more to life than domination 
and oppression, suffering and death is realised. Such knowledge is 
literally made incarnate in the very bodies of those who have experienced 
moments of mutuality in their lives. Such knowledge leads, according to 
35 Heyward, Speaking of Christ, p. 24. 
36 Ibid., p. 69. 
37 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 43. Heyward is sharply critical of theological systems that 
posit the realm of "God" as existing only in another time or in another place - because such a move 
undermines the responsibility of human beings to effect good, and can serve to sanction present evils 
in the name of future ("God"-given, heavenly) salvation. See also pp. 2-5, and pp. 107-126. 
38 Ibid., p. 164. 
39 See Heyward, Our Passion for Justice , pp. xiii-xv. She discusses the "structures of alienation" , or 
the structures of the social world, into which all of us are born. 
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Heyward, to yearning, the physical, sensual, sacred, erotic yearning for 
more mutual relation.40 This concept is a critical one in her work; she 
demands that bodies, flesh and blood desiring bodies, be taken with 
utmost seriousness, as embodying the sacred, sexual "yearning for 
meaningful relationship".41 This sacred, embodied, erotic yearning is 
simultaneously "our passion for justice" (which is always an embodied 
passion) and our passion for and with a lover. The sacred demand for 
involvement, that yearning for mutual, meaningful, just and loving 
relationships in all aspects of our lives, is always a physically embodied 
yearning, and the justice/love we make together in, through and with 
our bodies is the power of god. 
Again, this power of god cannot be the property of any single individual, 
but is the "wellspring", the source and resource from which individuals 
draw the power (as strength) to enact justice (love, god) in the world.42 I 
believe Heyward would say also that it is this same power or love that set 
the planets spinning in their courses: the power that enabled the universe 
to be at all.43 Importantly, accompanying Heyward's understanding of 
god as the source or wellspring of the universe is a sense of wonder that 
creation in all its shapes and sizes exists in the first place. At the 
conclusion of a talk in which she was speaking of "the sanctity and the 
value of the body", Heyward said, 
Finally, acknowledging, as I believe we must, and bowing, as 
I believe we must, before the mystery and the wonder of all 
that is created, we go, aware of our own limitations and 
boundaries, beginning with those of our own skins.44 (italics 
added) 
4o See Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 187, for a concise statement of her understanding of the 
erotic as "our yearning to be involved ... ". 
41 See Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, p. 35. 
42 Ibid., p. 240. Regarding the metaphor "wellspring", Heyward has used this metaphor when 
writing of her understanding of compassion and the transcendence of god. "Compassion is a 
wellspring of transcendence, or the movement of God not only between and among human beings, but 
also in and through the heights and depths of all that is." 
43 In personal correspondence ( 17 April, 1997) and conversation (late January, 1997) Heyward 
emphasised a growing "ecological/cosmic awareness" and a belief in the "purposive nature of the 
uni verse". 
44 See Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, p. 146. 
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There are two issues intertwined in the metaphors Heyward uses 
regarding creation and god. First, when Heyward writes of "mystery" and 
"wonder" in the face of creation, or existence as experienced by human 
beings, she strongly echoes Heidegger's use of the metaphor "Being" as 
expressive of the wonder that anything is at all. Second, her use of the 
metaphors "wellspring" and "source" with relation to the more-ness of 
"god" seem to correspond almost exactly with Ruether's use of the model 
"divine matrix", and are closely aligned as well with Paul Tillich's model 
of god as "the ground of being". As with Ruether (and in continuity with 
elements of process thought), Heyward utterly rejects the notion of a 
transcendent (both in the sense of "above" and "wholly other than") and 
omnipotent God.45 It is precisely this sort of understanding of God from 
which, writes Heyward, "god" needs to be redeemed. And it is frail, finite, 
and fearful human beings who must do the work of redemption, over 
and over again, in every different corner of our lives. 
The metaphor "redemption" figures largely in Heyward's theology. 
Perhaps more vehemently than any other feminist christian theologian, 
Heyward insists on human responsibility for doing whatever 1s 
redemptive in the world. The work of redemption is the work of making 
love and justice incarnate in the world wherever love and justice is 
absent; it is the effort to establish and maintain mutual relations with one 
another, with other earth creatures, and with the earth itself. In 
Heyward's thought "redemption" is the purpose of theology. 
Importantly, just as she rejects the adequacy of any single theological 
paradigm, Heyward does not offer, nor would she accept, a single recipe 
for redemption. The shape realised justice might take, as opposed to a 
theoretical notion of justice, differs with every context, every situation. 
In this regard Heyward is an uncompromising relativist. The shape of 
redemption depends on the shape of the evil from which real people 
45 See Heyward, The Redemption of God, pp. 64-65, for a discussion of Heyward's affinity with 
process theology's consequent (relational and constantly changing) nature of god, but rejection of 
process theology's immutable (absolute and unchanging) primordial nature of god. Heyward writes, 
"It seems to me that if Goo has a primordial, unchanging, and absolute nature, it is in the same sense 
that humanity does: we are unchanging, or constant, in our changing; we are absolutely, or 
constantly, relative to one another and the rest of creation" (p. 65, underlining original). 
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need to be redeemed. Where there is not enough food, justice/ love 
demands there be more food; where there are not enough schools, 
justice/love demands there be more schools; where there is violence 
against women, or lesbians and gaymen, justice/love demands there be 
no violence. The notion of "redemption", as Heyward uses it, cannot be 
understood in a static, single, or once-and-for-all sense, as it is in the 
traditional christian paradigm.46 Instead, it is an "open" theological 
concept that must take on different concrete forms relative to different 
concrete needs. According to Heyward, "We tend to confuse a recognition 
of the relativity of all that is with a moral acceptance of all that is, as if our 
intellectual appreciation of reality's complexities demands passive moral 
response."47 Her antidote to this passivity is found in her use of the 
metaphor "redemption". If the metaphor "redemption" does not come 
with a single set of instructions for use in her thought, it does convey a 
single theo-ethical imperative: to actively love one's neighbour. 
Accordingly, · I suggest "redemption" is the theological manifestation of 
Heyward's hermeneutical norm. As such, it is a concept, perhaps the 
concept, central to her theological pattern. 
This brief overview of Heyward's theology of mutual relation has not, of 
course, done justice to the intricacy and subtlety of her thought, nor have 
I managed to convey the importance of human embodiment 1n 
Heyward's theology. However, with an understanding of the absolute 
centrality in her theological pattern of human responsibility for making 
incarnate love/justice, it is now possible to explore more fully her 
theological anthropology, an effort that is simultaneously an exploration 
of her epistemological presuppositions concerning human beings as 
knowing agents. 
46 Traditional understandings of redemption are inextricable from traditional understandings of the 
atonement, according to which Jesus' God-ordained suffering, death, and resurrection were necessary 
(for various reasons) to redeem (some members of) humankind. 
47 Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, p. 208. 
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Heyward's Theological Anthropology 
"In the beginning is the relation."48 With this quote from Martin Buber's 
I and Thou, Heyward begins chapter one of The Redemption of God. 
Throughout this work, as well as all her other books, Heyward elaborates 
on the implications of this metaphysical presupposition as it relates to her 
theological anthropology, or conception of human beings. As she noted 
when reflecting back on the process of writing the book, " .. .I was trying to 
articulate a relational ontology as a companion piece to the profoundly 
moral motives and commitments of liberation theology."49 (italics 
original) Her ontology, or her conception of the essential nature of all 
that is, is premised on a single presupposition: that "being" is utterly 
relational. By extension, for good and ill, human beings are in relation 
with the rest of creation and with one another - whether we choose to be 
or not, vvhether we feel as though we are in relation or not, whether we 
admit we are or not.50 "Whether we experience ourselves this way or 
not, we are inherently relational. This is the metaphysics of all that is 
created. From a philosophical perspective, this is our ontological 
( essential) state."51 Heyward grounds her theological anthropology, her 
claim that humans are inherently relational, on an analysis of the limits 
of existence given ·with existence. As she bluntly states, "We do not grow 
in incubators. We are not alone in the world. We are in relation."52 As I 
read it, Heyward's understanding of relation includes a critical, implicit 
component. Within her thought relation always involves change, 
process. 
Importantly, Heyward never characterises the ontological state of 
relationality as being either inherently idyllic or inherently evil. Nor 
48 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 1. 
49 Heyward, Staying Power, p. 17. 
50 See Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 164. "We may feel alone, but we are not" (underlining 
original). 
51 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 12. 
52 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 134. It is important to note that, on a metaphysical level, 
there is no distinction between Heyward's ontology (as it applies to non-human creation) and her 
anthropology. All that is, including human beings, is in relation. 
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does she confuse an understanding of "relationality" with an assumption 
of "oneness". Rather, in her thought the fact of relation is inherently 
ambiguous, inherently tense. Each creature, human and non-human, 
each aspect of the created universe is different from all others, with 
different and sometimes conflicting needs and desires; "In the beginning 
is the relation, not sameness. In the beginning is tension and turbulence, 
not easy peace."53 This point is critical. Heyward locates her theological 
anthropology in a society and culture in which the real relations between 
individuals, between groups or categories of people, and even within 
individuals themselves are most often not characterised by mutuality (or 
love/justice). She refuses to speak of relationality in the abstract, and 
instead grounds human relations in their social setting. " ... [N]o relation 
happens in isolation from its social milieu. Thus, no relation is asocial 
and no act is politically neutral (irrelevant to the dynamics of power in 
social relations)."54 (underlining original) Insofar as Heyward refuses to 
discuss "human beings" apart from the world in which we live, it is 
impossible to discuss her theological anthropology without also 
discussing her conception of the social world. While I must therefore 
elaborate briefly on her understanding of the nature of the world as it has 
been socially constructed, I will give this topic more attention in the next 
section of this chapter. 
Elsewhere, rather than use the phrase "social milieu", Heyward writes of 
the alienation into which all of us are born, albeit born into differently 
structured relationships to this alienation. Through her use of the 
metaphor "alienation" she is clear that she does not mean only or 
primarily a feeling or sense of estrangement, qua Paul Tillich. Instead, 
she defines alienation (in a Marxist sense) as: 
53 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 100. See also Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 159. 
" .. .in relation we are immersed in ambiguity, tension, shifting foci: between self and self, present and 
past and future, memory and hope, gain and loss, freedom and destiny, what we know and what we 
dream, what we welcome and what we fear." 
54 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 135. Heyward's concern with the politics of power 
resonates strongly with Lorraine Code's discussion of power with regard to social institutions and 
ideologies. 
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a primary consequence of unjust power relations in which 
particular groups of people are held systematically over 
other groups - white, economically privileged people, for 
example, over others, alienated from others and others from 
us .... As a liberation theologian, I am interested in economic, 
racial, sexual, and other patterns [ of alienation] into which 
we are born and in which our psycho-spiritualities are being 
shaped probably in utero and surely within the first hours 
and days of our lives on planet earth. We are, in this sense, 
born alienated, born into Augustine's massa damnata and 
· · 1 · 55 ongma sm .... 
It is a fundamental assumption in Heyward's thought that "we live 1n a 
praxis of alienation, or wrong relation, from which we cannot escape".56 
And again, the praxis of alienation of which Heyward writes consists of 
"the social structures" into which we are born and within which we live 
our lives.57 These social structures shape to a large extent the nature of 
our relations with one another, as well as the shape of our own 
"becoming", our own never-static identities.58 According to Heyward, 
"our social situations are so fully the arenas of our becoming that we 
cannot lift ourselves, as individuals, outside of our communities in the 
exploration of who we are".59 To the extent that our communal "social 
situations" are located within unjust social structures, Heyward agrees 
with "Augustine's claim that 'we cannot not sin' (non posse non peccare) 
- not in a world in which structures of injustice constitute the foundation 
upon which we all stand together" .60 Moreover, she asserts that these 
unjust social structures cannot be understood adequately if they are 
studied in isolation from one another. Their impact is felt on human 
lives (and thus they are known) only through their "dynamic 
interaction" _61 
55 Heyward, Staying Power, p. 80. 
56 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 105. 
57 Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, p. 77. The entire quote is as follows : ''We are in some 
significant part creatures of the social structures in which we participate .... " 
58 See Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 217 and Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 40 
regarding her understanding of personal identities as non-static, ever-changing. 
59 Mud Flower Collective, God's Fierce Whimsy, p. 24. 
60 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 208. 
61 See Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, p. xiv. 
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For each injustice in our common life is held in place in the 
everyday lives of women and men on the basis of race and 
class and gender and sexual preference and religion and age 
and national/ ethnic/ cultural heritage and a willingness or 
unwillingness to conform to the ideologies and practices of 
those (usually Euroamerican men) who deny that they are 
alienated and, rather, perceive the rest of us as prisoners of 
our own alienation and ideological suspicions by which we 
are said to bring violence on ourselves.62 (italics original) 
There are a number of paradigmatic and epistemological elements both 
explicitly touched upon and implicitly supporting the statements made in 
the preceding paragraph, all of which need to be examined further. First, 
regarding her paradigmatic metaphysical presuppositions, Heyward 
assumes, but never attempts to prove, the full, unqualified humanity of 
every woman, man, and child without exception. According to Heyward, 
"we have more compelling tasks than to attempt to 'prove' ourselves to 
anyone".63 In a sermon on humility, however, she makes clear her 
understanding of the worth of every individual. "To be humble means 
to know ourselves as no more or less valuable than anyone else in the 
world."64 Curiously, given how few times she discusses it, the value 
judgement that accompanies Heyward's affirmation of the full humanity 
of every human being is of fundamental significance in her theology. 
She has written that human "liberation from injustice in the world is 
dependent upon the theological value we give to our shared 
humanity" .65 Within her work the theological value she gives to every 
human body is a vital, yet tacit component. Heyward's rarely named 
presupposition of the full humanity of every human body without 
exception parallels, in my opinion, Ruether's rarely named 
presupposition of the embodied nature of every human being. Both 
theologians must take both assumptions for granted; their theology 
makes no sense apart from them, but Heyward's emphasis is on 
62 Ibid., p. xv. 
63 Ibid., p. 12. 
64 Heyward, Speaking of Christ, p. 57. Heyward does not limit her value judgement concerning the 
worth of every individual to individuals currently alive; she explicitly values "all past, as well as 
current, inhabitants of planet earth who have been committed to the well-being of humanity". (p. 26) 
65 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 16. 
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redeeming embodiment while Ruether's emphasis is on redeeming the 
conceptual category "women". 
More precisely, Heyward's notion of "humanity" is centred on 
embodiment; "the body is to be taken with ultimate seriousness. There is 
nothing higher, nothing more holy."66 It is as embodied creatures that 
we live and act in the world. It is our bodies that are affected, scarred, and 
shaped by the social structures within which w~ live and from which we 
cannot escape;67 and it is through our bodies that we know everything 
we know about ourselves and the world in which we live. On this 
epistemological point, that it is through our bodies that we know 
everything we know, Heyward quotes feminist ethicist Beverly Harrison 
at great length, drawing from 'The Power of Anger in the Work of Love', 
one of the most important feminist christian theological essays ever 
published. The following is an excerpt of what Heyward quoted from 
Harrison. 
If we begin, as feminists must, with "our bodies, ourselves," 
we recognize that all our knowledge, including moral 
knowledge, is body-mediated knowledge. All knowledge is 
rooted in our sensuality. We know and value the world, if 
we know and value it, through our ability to touch, to hear, 
to see. Perception is fundamental to conception. Ideas are 
dependent on our sensuality.68 (italics original) 
This is the foundation upon which Heyward constructs her 
"epistemology of embodiment" _69 It is always through the lived 
experiences of bodies-in-relation that knowledge is made - and for 
Heyward knowledge is most certainly made and made again, not simply 
66 Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, p. 140. 
67 Ibid., p. 171. She writes of " ... the folly of the illusion that any of us can simply up and leave the 
patriarchal structures that surround and fill us". 
68 Ibid., p. 172. She is quoting from Beverly Wildung Harrison, 'The Power of Anger in the Work 
of Love', in Harrison, Beverly Wildung, Making the Connection: Essays in Feminist Social Ethics, 
ed, Carol S. Robb, Beacon Press, Boston, 1985, pp. 3-21. 
69 Heyward, Staying Power, p. 116. "I am speaking of an epistemology of embodiment as the basis 
of both our understanding of ourselves as our church (who we are as a corporate body) and our 
theological anthropology (who we are in right relation to one another as sisters and brothers and 
friends and lovers)." 
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"found" ?0 This epistemological assumption is, I suggest, almost identical 
to Kathryn Pyne Addelson's conception of "truth" as enacted (discussed 
in chapter five). In keeping with the notion of "truth" as relationally 
enacted, or made incarnate, Heyward insists that it is not as individual, 
isolated bodies through which we know the world, but as particularly 
situated bodies always participating in complex, tension-filled, ambiguous 
relations with other bodies. Heyward is thus in complete agreement with 
those feminist epistemologists who insist that situated knowledge is 
necessarily communal, or, in Donna Haraway's words, that "situated 
knowledges are about communities, not about isolated individuals".71 In 
Heyward's thought, there simply are no isolated bodies, thus, as I quoted 
her earlier, "we cannot lift ourselves, as individuals, outside of our 
communities in our explorations of who we are". 
Moreover, Heyward's understanding of "body" is as a constantly changing 
subject-in-relation. Such change is both physical ("will we resist believing 
what our bodies know: that whatever is not changing and growing is 
dead ?"72) and social, in that institutionally-sanctioned meanings laid 
upon various bodies also change over time. As she notes in a footnote 
appearing in a discussion of bodies, sexuality and power, 
... physiology does not supply motives, passion, object 
choice, or identity. These come from "somewhere else," the 
domains of social relations and psychic conflict. If this is 
correct, the body can no longer be seen as a biological given 
which emits its own meaning. It must be understood instead 
as an ensemble of potentialities which are given meaning only 
in society.73 
Again, Heyward has consistently affirmed an ever-changing, never fixed 
or static understanding of human bodies, human subjectivities. Like 
Ruether's, her metaphysical assumption of the full humanity of every 
7o See Heyward, Touching Our Strength, pp. 5-6 and p. 160, fn 5. "Both [Paulo] Freire and the Mud 
Flower collective start with the presupposition that knowledge is socially constructed and restricted." 
71 Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges ', p. 590. See also Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 9, 
"Every particular theological expression is peculiar to the theologian and to the community, time, and 
place which she represents." 
72 Heyward, Staying Power, p. 120. 
73 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 166, footnote 3. 
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woman, man, and child without exception and without qualification is 
an open-ended assertion based on a value judgement. That is, she values 
all human lives equally, but does not and cannot offer a definite, 
unchanging essence of humanity to accompany her value judgement. 
Instead, and in keeping with elements of process thought, she affirms that 
human beings, including herself, are creatures who are cons tan tl y 
changing, whose identities are never fixed. 
My understanding of myself continues to evolve - often very 
roughly, sometimes abrasively even to myself, peppered with 
surprises about myself and others. I do not understand 
myself primarily in categories that suggest that anything 
about me is static, unchanging, finished. Even those 
categories that most of us assume to be basic - such as 
female or male gender, such as racial identity, such as the 
Homo sapiens species itself - seem to me more elusive, less 
static, than we often assume. I am tempted to say, and will 
for now, that nothing is fixed; nothing in the world is so 
essentially what it is today that tomorrow may not surprise 
. th thin 74 us WI some g new .... 
\ 
The epistemological presuppositions accompanying Heyward's relational, 
communally-situated, physically embodied yet socially defined (and 
continually redefined), constantly changing subjects are extensive. 
Heyward rejects the notion that knowledge is ever properly ascribed to 
any single individual, is ever universal in scope, or is ever static, 
unchanging, or final; rather, for her " ... knowledge is both relational (born 
in dialogue with others) and relative (contingent upon the difference it 
makes to our own lives and the lives of others)".75 Further, because 
Heyward deliberately writes against a liberal, individualistic 
understanding of epistemic agency,76 rejecting both a god's eye view from 
nowhere and the idea that any knowledge claim is ever value neutral, or 
74 Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, p. 83. 
75 Mud Flower Collective, God's Fierce Whimsy, p. 25. Regarding her rejection of static, 
unchanging knowledge claims, see Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 161. "Our co-creative task 
is to see ... more fully what we are doing in the world. To see not only what we are looking for, but 
also what is, in fact, happening. And what is happening is dynamic. There is no stasis" (underlining 
original). 
76 See Heyward, When Boundaries Betray Us, p. 146. She asserts that an individualistic 
understanding of epistemic agents, in combination with a hierarchical, dualistic symbolic universe, 
has resulted in a "fundamental epistemological problem", an epistemological problem that "has been 
the basis" of her critique (with others) "of white Western patriarchal christian theology". I discuss her 
issues regarding a hierarchical, dualistic symbolic universe in the next section. 
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can ever be separated from its ethical implications, she must redefine the 
notion of "objectivity". Like the feminist epistemologists discussed in 
chapters four and five, Heyward rejects a distant, dispassionate, or abstract 
approach to knowledge. Instead, she combines an insistence on 
particularity and situatedness with an insistence on the ethical 
dimensions of knowledge claims. "Objectivity is knowledge of what is 
happening in the actual life experiences of people-in-relation - what is, in 
fact, true or good for these real people."77 (italics added) Elsewhere 
Heyward writes of "co-subjectivity" as a better way to express the process 
of making and gaining knowledge. 
With many feminist and liberation analysts, I understand 
genuine objectivity to be radically honest co-subjectivity, in 
which we are clear and up-front about our biases and 
experiences and are working together with one another, as 
co-subjects, toward fuller understandings of what may be 
more nearly "objectively" true.78 (italics original) 
Importantly, while this quote can be read as pointing in the direction of 
an immutable "truth" that can, with effort, be discovered by human 
beings, Heyward's insistence on the relational and relative nature of all 
knowledge renders such a reading impossible. For Heyward, knowledge 
is never unchanging. As I read it, the emphasis of the above quote 
should be on the notion of "radically honest co-subjectivity", which is the 
sine qua non of Heyward's epistemological framework, and is as well the 
link between her epistemology and her theology. A relationship of 
radically honest co-subjectivity is a mutual relationship, in which all 
participants are mutually present to one another, even as they are 
affected, and thus changed, by that relationship. In Heyward's thought it 
is only to the extent that we are truly present to one another that 
knowledge (as understanding, not control) is possible. She is explicit 
about the relationship between presence and knowledge. "When we are 
really present with someone, we know and are known by this person."79 
77 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 7. 
78 Heyward, When Boundaries Betray Us, p. 134. Heyward cites Beverly Harrison's Making the 
Connections and Donna Haraway's Simians, Cyborgs, and Women at the end of this quote. 
79 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 147. 
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But again Heyward defines all relations as inherently ambiguous, 
tension-filled. In her thought perfectly loving, perfectly just, or purely 
"good" relational presence with another is simply impossible, even as it is 
the theo-ethical goal of all relations.80 Whatever knowledge is co-created 
out of any relationship, even the most mutual, will fall short of "perfect" 
knowledge. Thus I suggest that Heyward's understanding of the 
ambiguous, dialogical process of making knowledge is remarkably similar 
to Donna Haraway's assertion of 
surprises and ironies at the heart of all knowledge 
production; we are not in charge of the world. We just live 
here and try to strike up noninnocent conversations.... [W]e 
give up mastery but keep searching for fidelity, knowing all 
the while we will be hoodwinked.81 (italics added) 
The similarities between their thought go beyond a shared appreciation 
for the noninnocent nature of conversation/relation. Heyward writes of 
" ... a theology of mutual relation, of knowing and being known, of 
struggling to know and be and do what we will never "master" ... ".82 
(italics added) Mastery is, in her thought, the goal of those who hold to 
one "truth", and use that "truth" to construct the world according to their 
(socially and politically powerful) will. To equate knowledge with 
mastery leads to the imposition of one's knowledge claims upon the lives 
of others. It does not lead to epistemic responsibility, which is for 
Heyward no less than for Addelson, Code, and Ruether, the primary 
epistemological issue. In her words, "The basic issue is relational 
responsibility."83 Given the primacy of "responsibility" in Heyward's 
epistemological presuppositions, I suggest that she is in complete 
agreement with Kathryn Pyne Addelson's words; "the measure of any 
epistemology lies in how well it allows knowledge makers to be 
80 See Heyward, The Redemption of God, pp. 160-161. She writes that "no one of us, nor all of us 
together, can choose to effect good without also experiencing, and maybe choosing to participate in, 
evil - destruction of the good, the breaking apart of the relation.. .. We who co-create must 
acknowledge our own evil effects." 
8l Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges', p. 594 and pp. 593-594. 
82 Heyward, Staying Power, p. 120. 
83 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 134. 
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responsible. It does not lie in how well it gives us certified knowledge or 
the route to the truth of the one reality."84 (italics original) 
To conclude this discussion of Heyward's theological anthropology and 
presuppositions regarding humans as epistemic agents, and to prepare the 
way for a discussion of her conception of the world as it is known, I turn 
again to an examination of her understanding of the communal nature of 
all knowledge claims. The point I wish to stress is that, while she 
explicitly characterises the co-creation of knowledge as inherently 
relational, dialogical, her emphasis on responsibility and accountability, 
as well as her conception of the social world, requires that she locate 
knowledge-creating relations within social communities - social 
communities whose knowledge claims and actions affect and are affected 
by other social communities. In other words, her epistemological 
presuppositions fit within the conceptual category of standpoint 
epistemology, with a critical difference. Heyward's use of the concept of 
accountability underscores the inseparability in her thought of ethics and 
epistemology, but it also underscores the communal and inescapably 
relative- nature of all knowledge claims. 
If, as the context of theology, praxis is to be anything other 
than a person's or a group's thinking about interesting 
abstract ideas, there must be at the outset of the conceptual 
effort a sense of to whom, in addition to ourselves, we are 
accountable. Otherwise, even at our personal best, we are 
laboring under the assumptions of a liberal epistemology, in 
which each person authorizes herself to idealize her subject 
matter - whether feminism, theological education, God, or 
the world - and for which she is accountable to no one but 
herself.BS (italics added) 
Insofar as Heyward regards all knowledge to be "grounded in human 
experience" ,86 and insofar as she conceives of all human experience to be 
relational, and insofar as all human relations take place in social worlds 
comprised of different communities, then all knowledge claims are 
84 Addelson, 'Knower/Doers and Their Moral Problems' , p. 288. 
8S Mud Flower Collective, God's Fierce Whimsy, p. 24. 
86 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 6. 
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shaped and formed in the context of specific communal experiences.87 
However, and this is where Heyward's thought extends standpoint 
theory, "insofar as anyone, or any group, theologizes solely on the basis of 
its own experiences of reality - and takes no care to listen to anyone · else -
its theology ought to lack credibility" .88 (italics added) It ought to lack 
credibility precisely because the epistemological community responsible 
for that knowledge claim is not being accountable to other communities 
affected by that knowledge claim. 
Further, an absence of accountability, in the sense that Heyward uses the 
term, leads to the universalising of one epistemological community's 
knowledge claims, and, by implication, the rejection of other knowledge 
claims about the same subject matter. An epistemological community 
that refuses to acknowledge any accountability for its knowledge claims 
refuses to acknowledge its own "relational particularity", or the fact that 
its knowledge claims are situated in relation to other communities' 
knowledge claims.89 That is, it denies the fact that its knowledge claims 
are located relative to, and have relatively larger or smaller impacts on 
the lives of, bodies located in other epistemological communities. Put 
differently, Heyward is concerned with discerning which epistemological 
communities deny any accountability to other communities and then use 
their political power to structure the social world according to their 
(usually universalised) knowledge claims.9° For Heyward, the most 
credible knowledge claims are neither univocal nor universal, rather, 
they arise out of "a praxis of relational particularity and cooperation", co-
8? Ibid., p. 223. Writing of coming out as a lesbian priest, Heyward expresses this experience as one 
of "craziness". She says, "To feel crazy is to wonder if I am concocting a reality meaningful only to 
me and to a few folks who are crazy enough to agree with me. It is to feel as if I have stepped outside 
the arena of what is not only acceptable, but also intelligible - even to myself" (italics added). I 
suggest that the significance of this quote is found in her insistence that more than just "a few folks" 
must be in agreement before a knowledge claim concerning the nature of reality is intelligible, or can 
be acknowledged as a knowledge claim. Again this points to the existence of epistemological 
communities rather than individuals as the agents of knowledge production. 
88 Mud Flower Collective, God's Fierce Whimsy, p. 25. 
89 See Heyward, Speaking of Christ, p. 21, for her use of the phrase "relational particularity". 
90 Ibid., p. 20. 
214 
operation not just between individuals, but between epistemological 
communities.91 (italics original) 
Not surprisingly, the question of which standpoint/ community is the 
most epistemically privileged one simply cannot arise in Heyward's 
thought. Implicit in her work is the assumption that many 
epistemological communities are able . to create responsible, justice-
oriented knowledges, and that knowledge can be shared between 
communities. For example, she writes, 0 ••• we must help one another to 
see that the patient has much to teach the doctor, the Palestinian has 
much to teach the Jew, the gayman or lesbian has much to teach the 
heterosexual man or woman ... " .92 Importantly, this quote reveals 
Heyward's understanding of the power-riddled nature of knowledge 
claims. In each of the examples she uses, the latter epistemic agent 
belongs to a more socially /politically powerful epistemological 
community than the former. Her point is that it is precisely because the 
knowledge claims of the more powerful epistemological communities are 
felt to a greater extent by the bodies of those in less powerful communities 
that the less powerful are epistemically advantaged.93 The following 
quote exemplifies Heyward's understanding of various epistemic 
(standpoint) communities and their relation to the social world. 0 W e 
almost have to be poor, sick, old, differently abled, gaymen or lesbians, 
women raising kids alone, or people of color to know for a fact that the 
social fabric of our life together is rotten. "94 And for Heyward, it is the 
social fabric of our life together that constitutes, to a large extent, the 
world in which we live. 
9l Ibid., p. 21. 
92 Ibid., p. 66. 
93 See Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, pp. 224-225. Heyward discusses "the epistemological 
privilege of the oppressed". 
94 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, p. 127. 
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Heyward's Understanding of Creation and the World 
As is already evident, Heyward's work does not lend itself to systematic, 
point by separate point analysis. This is especially the case when 
considering her conceptions of creation and of the world as it is known, 
for she insists that it is only as particularly located humans that we know 
creation and the world at all, and that no necessarily situated, humanly 
constructed knowledge about creation or the world is ever absolute or 
final. Her insistence on this point is both personal and pointed. "I, Carter 
Heyward, don't know for sure, and never will, and you can quote me."95 
However, there are several paradigmatic assumptions concerning 
creation (in the sense of the physical or material stuff of the world) that 
she does take for granted, beginning with an assumption of "normative 
realism", to use Lorraine Code's expression, i.e., she assumes that creation 
really does exist apart from human thoughts about it. I suggest that she 
would also agree with Evelyn Fox Keller's understanding of physical 
reality as being curiously "intractable," or stubbornly "what it is" even in 
the face of human attempts to define it otherwise. Further, Heyward does 
not assume that creation exists solely for the benefit of human beings. In 
ethical terms, she presupposes the inherent value of nonhuman creation 
apart from any use humans might make of it.96 Put theologically, that all 
nonhuman creation is sacred or holy (in Rudolph Otto's sense of 
awesome and terrifying, i.e., wonderful but not benign) is axiomatic 1n 
her thought. However, in Heyward's work these assumptions 
concerning creation function as deep background assumptions, and they 
are for the most part implicit.97 She is explicit, however, regarding her 
central ontological presupposition. Creation, being, all that exists, is in 
relation. 
95 Heyward, Staying Power, p. 10. 
96 Ibid., pp. 101-111. 
97 Most of Heyward's explicitly creation-oriented thoughts appear in chapter 11 of Staying Power, 
entitled 'Turning to the Animals: Another Conversion'. 
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But Heyward does not write often of creation. At the forefront of her 
thought is her understanding of the (Western) world (in the sense of 
human societies and cultures) as it/they have been shaped in the image 
of the symbolic universe constructed primarily by ruling class, 
economically and educationally privileged, christian Euroamerican men. 
In this regard Heyward's work is similar to Ruether·'s, although Heyward 
never explicitly accentuates the difference in her thought between 
"creation" and "the world", as Ruether does. What Heyward does do is 
insist upon the social, political, and economic effects - on human bodies 
as well as on nonhuman aspects of creation - of a symbolic universe 
structured according to what she terms "patriarchal logic". She uses the 
expression "patriarchal logic" to refer "to the systematic, pervasive 
ordering of our bodies/minds/souls/selves in relation to one another 
through a hierarchical construction of unchanging power-relations" .98 
Like Ruether (in fact she cites Ruether as a source informing her own 
analysis),99 Heyward characterises "the prevailing symbolic universe of 
Christian theology" as structured according to a series of hierarchical 
dualisms .1 oo She writes, 
Dualism is steeped in an assumption of opposition: whether 
in relation to the knowledge of God or Christ, of ourselves or 
the world, we can know something only insofar as we are 
unlike it. Man is unlike woman. Spirit is unlike flesh. Light 
is unlike darkness. Heaven is unlike earth. God is unlike 
humanity. In a dualistic praxis, "the other" is always better 
or worse, more or less, than oneself or one's people. Identity 
is forged and known by contrast and competition, not by 
cooperative relation. Dualism is cultivated in a praxis of 
alienation between men and women, rich and poor, light and 
dark, and, in the image of such oppositions, divinity and 
humanity.101 (italics original) 
Heyward's point is that a symbolic universe structured according to these 
dualisms a) provides and sanctions a particular conception of humanity, 
specifically the division of humanity into categories of people occupying 
unequal places in social and "divine" worlds, and b) is inextricably related 
98 Heyward, When Boundaries Betray Us, p. 4. 
99 See Heyward, Speaking of Christ, p. 14, and footnote 5, p. 87. 
100 Mud Flower Collective, God's Fierce Whimsy, p. 154. 
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to "a dualistic epistemology", or an epistemological framework structured 
around metaphysical assumptions of opposition and domination rather 
than relationality. Further, this epistemological framework has in turn 
sanctioned the construction of "cultures of death and despair", or social 
worlds of domination and oppression.102 Importantly, Heyward 
perceives the hierarchical structure of the christian symbolic universe to 
be premised on the value-laden assumptions that: "God is more valuable 
than humanity; heaven, more valuable than earth; the future realm of 
God, more valuable than present relation" .1°3 According to Heyward 
such a set of assumptions render it impossible to take "with ultimate 
seriousness" this world, here and now: the social and political worlds in 
which real people live and die, in which animals are slaughtered for 
sport, in which gay men are mutilated just because they are gay, in which 
women are raped and beaten just because they are women, in which Jews 
and Muslims and blacks are murdered just because they are Jews or 
Muslims or blacks.1°4 (underlining original) In a word, Heyward 
characterises most social, political, and economic relations in this world 
as unjust. They are relations of domination and subordination, and they 
are a structural feature of "late monopoly capitalism", of "white racism 
and male gender superiority and compulsory heterosexuality and 
christianity's claim, implicit or explicit, to possess spiritually the final, 
supreme, religious truth" .1°5 Because she does try to take with ultimate 
seriousness this world, "the world" of which Heyward writes is a world in 
which the bodies of many are used as disposable labour forces, play things, 
sex toys, and cannon fodder by the few. 
Heyward uses concrete examples to convey the point that the social and 
political structures of this wor Id bear a striking resemblance to the 
prevailing christian symbolic universe, always stressing the felt effects, 
101 Heyward, Speaking of Christ, p. 18. 
l02 Ibid., p. 19, re: dualistic epistemology; Heyward, Staying Power, p. 105, re: cultures of death 
and despair. 
103 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 131. 
l04 Ibid. See also Heyward, Staying Power, pp. 101-102. 
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the embodied social and political consequences in this world of a 
hierarchical, dualistic metaphysics and epistemology. The following 
quote exemplifies this insistence on her part. In an essay entitled 'Latin 
American Liberation Theology: A North American perspective', given as 
a talk in 1980, Heyward writes: 
The revolution in Latin America seeks to change the 
structures of society which, with financial and military 
backing of the United States and other Western capitalist 
countries, are perpetuated on the economic (capitalist) tenet 
that for the rich to get richer, the poor must get poorer; that, 
in fact, the upward mobility of the rich .. .is dependent on the 
resignation of the poor to their poverty. In short, the Latin 
American revolution is rooted in informed analysis of social 
reality: namely, that the ruling classes and families in Latin 
America, together with us - their economic and political 
allies in North America and Europe - feed ourselves, clothe our 
bodies, run our cars, buy our houses, invest our money, enjoy our 
work and leisure time, elect our politicians, and worship our god 
over the dead bodies of increasing numbers of human beings 
throughout the world. l06 (italics added) 
Heyward's ontological assumption of (ambiguous and tension-filled) 
human relationality is here evident in her perception of the nature of the 
relations between rich and poor people, between Euroamerican 
governments and ruling class Latin Americans, and between the 
everyday activities of the economically privileged who benefit as 
participants in Euroam.erican nations and the everyday struggle for 
survival of the (distant) destitute. She alludes as well to relation between 
the theological affirmations of the socially and politically powerful and 
the ongoing crucifixions of the socially and politically marginalised. It is 
not difficult to discern how the affirmation of an omnipotent God in 
Heaven, one who causes everything to happen for a reason, could be used 
to support the unchallenged acceptance of unequal, abusive relationships 
- interpersonal, social, and political - as these occur here and now. Such 
a theological affirmation leads to the impossibility of taking with ultimate 
seriousness either the full, unqualified humanity of every human body 
without exception or lived experiences of oppression and injustice. It is, 
105 Heyward, Staying Power, p. 104. 
l06 Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, pp. 106-107. 
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moreover, this very theological affirmation that is an integral part of the 
symbolic universe Heyward is trying to transform. 
Writing on behalf of the Mud Flower collective, she notes that they 
"perceive a radical, terrifying disjuncture between the prevailing symbolic 
universe of Christian theology and our well-grounded senses of identity 
as women in struggles for justice".1°7 Her point, I believe, is that their 
"struggles for justice" in this world are actively hindered by the 
metaphysical presuppositions concerning "women" inherent within the 
"prevailing symbolic universe of christian theology". In addition, a 
"terrifying disjuncture" appears with the realisation that, within the 
dominant christian symbolic universe, no struggle for this-worldly justice 
can be valued as highly as a passive acceptance of "God's will". Indeed, 
any demand for justice on earth can be interpreted as a rejection of God's 
assurance of justice in heaven or assurance of heavenly justice brought to 
earth by God in the future.108 
Again, it is to the extent that features of the dominant symbolic universe, 
such as a conception of "women" as naturally or essentially inferior to 
"men", are enacted in this world, in the real relations between sexes, 
classes, races, and nations, that Heyward considers the symbolic universe 
to be a part of the world. That is, a symbolic universe is not known as a 
disembodied theory, but by its felt effects. And Heyward perceives the 
cumulative effects of social and political relations as these do embody the 
dominant christian symbolic universe to be threatening the fabric of 
creation. In her opinion, the survival of human and nonhuman life is 
increasingly under threat. As she bluntly puts it, "as far as we hum ans 
can tell, time is not on 'our side' in relation to the survival of life, human 
and other, on this planet" .1°9 Unless there is a radical shift in the way 
social, political, and economic relations between peoples, nations, and 
human and nonhuman earth creatures are structured and enacted, there 
107 Mud Flower Collective, God's Fierce Whimsy, p. 154. 
108 See Heyward, Staying Power, pp. 103-105. 
109 Ibid., p. 105. 
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may well be no social worlds in the future at all. In this regard Heyward 
is in complete agreement with Ruether. 
It is fitting to conclude this discussion of Heyward's conception of 
creation and the world with a brief description of her own vision for the 
future. Strikingly, when positing her "goal and vision" for creation and 
future social worlds, Heyward explicitly refers to the work of Donna 
Haraway. Quoting Haraway, she writes of working for a world "that can 
be partially shared and friendly to earth-wide projects of finite freedom, 
adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and limited 
happiness" .1 10 Or, to put it simply, Heyward advocates the ongoing co-
creation of a world in which love and justice are made incarnate far more 
often than hatred and injustice. 
Conclusion 
Within Carter Heyward's theology are many of the paradigmatic 
presuppositions inherent within the feminist christian theological 
paradigm as described in chapter three. She affirms the full, unqualified 
humanity of every woman, man, and child without exception; she 
affirms the inherent integrity and value all nonhuman creation; she 
rejects as unloving and unjust the notion of a wholly other-than, 
transcendent, immutable, and omnipotent god; and she rejects as well a 
value-laden preoccupation with a heaven above this world or a future 
new creation, brought into being by god above, that would supersede this 
flawed creation. However, Heyward is noticeably silent when it comes to 
affirming the blessedly finite character of existence. While she does accept 
the fact that creaturely finitude is an unavoidable fact, she does not (seem 
to) go as far as Ruether in the sense of positively evaluating this fact, nor 
does she draw an anthropological-cosmological relation between life-
110 Ibid., pp. 97-98, citing Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, p. 187. I cited the same quote 
also, see chapter four, footnote 48. 
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energy and matter (or the constancy of the "stuff" of the universe) - as 
Ruether explicitly does.111 
Regarding the epistemological elements in her thought, Heyward's work 
fits beautifully within the feminist epistemological paradigm outlined in 
chapters four and five. She insists on the situatedness and particularity of 
all knowledge claims; she affirms the relational and communal character 
of all knowledge production; she explicitly disavows the possibility of any 
absolute or unchanging "truth"; she redefines the concept of "objectivity" 
in a manner quite similar to Donna Haraway's formulation of this 
notion; like all the feminist philosophers discussed, she characterises the 
production of knowledge as an always value-laden and power-riddled 
process; and she insists on the centrality, in any knowledge-making effort, 
of epistemic responsibility. I conclude this chapter with a quote from 
Heyward, which, while not explicitly epistemological in focus, does 
convey, I believe, the core of the epistemological emphasis present 
throughout all her work. This quote also provides her answer to the 
question, "why does knowledge matter?" 
... (W)e must help one another learn to walk more confidently 
along the boundaries of good and evil. It is a matter of 
learning to tolerate ambiguity without allowing ourselves to 
be duped into either the passivity of apathy and 
indifference, or the panic which seeks final solutions.112 
111 In fact, on the opening page of Touching Our Strength, even before the contents page, Heyward 
quotes from Edna St. Vincent Millay's poem, 'Conscientious Objector'. "I shall die, but that is all 
that I shall do for death." I find it deeply intriguing that Heyward has not (or at least has not yet) 
connected more fully her theological anthropology to her cosmological perceptions, particularly gj.ven 
the pastoral strength of such a connection, i.e., it does allow one to claim that the dead are always 
with us, which is a claim that Heyward has made with reference to the Latin American concept of 
"jPresente!", a concept that carries with it the affirmation that "resurrection is a relational movement, 
the revolutionary carrying-on of a spirit of love and justice that does not and will not die". Heyward, 
Touching Our Strength, p. 20. (italics original) 
112 Heyward, The Redemption of God, p. 161. 
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Chapter Eight 
Paradigmatic and Epistemological Elements 
in the Theology of Sallie McFague 
In this chapter I will identify and examine the metaphysical assumptions, 
value judgements, and epistemological presuppositions present, both 
explicitly and implicitly, in Sallie McFague's work. McFague, who 
identifies herself as a white, middle-class, Protestant feminist, is the 
Carpenter Professor of Theology and former Dean of Vanderbilt Divinity 
School in Nashville, Tennessee.I While I have neither met nor 
communicated with her in any way, she, like Ruether and Heyward, has 
had a considerable influence on my own theological development. Her 
book Metaphorical Theology was, as far as I can remember, my first 
introduction to an implicitly (for the most part) feminist christian 
theological text. More importantly, it was the first analysis I ever read of 
the world-shaping power of both theological language and conceptual 
paradigms. Its impact on me was immediate and profound; it was as 
though McFague had put into words my own not yet expressible feelings 
about the relationship between images, concepts, language and "truth". 
She provided what seemed to me to be a brand new window through 
which to view a brand new world: a window of metaphors living and 
dead, looking out upon a world in which "truth" lies as much in human 
imagination as it does in the "stuff" of creation.2 She was not cowed by 
1 McFague, Sallie, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age, Fortress Press, 
Philadelphia, 1987, p. xiii. 
2 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 29. Referring to a statement made by the novelist Ursula Le 
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reified/petrified metaphors; indeed, she argued passionately against the 
absolutising of any metaphors, cautioning that "we do not so much use 
language as we are used by it".3 Having thus caught my attention 
McFague continued to speak these most provocative words: 
If language always stands between us and reality, if it is the 
medium through which we are aware of both our relationship 
to "what is" and our distance from it, then metaphor is both 
our burden and our glory .... 4 
"Used by language", "our burden and our glory" - with expressions like 
these McFague spoke to, and in the process helped to free, my theological 
imagination. It was from McFague that I learned the extent to which our 
imaginations shape our conceptual frameworks, and vice versa. In short, 
if not for McFague I would never have written a thesis having something 
to do with paradigms, metaphors, and models. My intellectual debt to her 
is significant, to put it mildly. 
At this point, however, I need to identify a critical difference between my 
understanding of theological paradigms and McFague's views on the 
subject. In the context of this thesis I have already drawn upon 
McFague's work with metaphors and models, and have characterised her 
theology as feminist christian theology, or as theology that fits within the 
feminist christian theological paradigm I am examining. However I need 
to be clear that, although McFague identified herself in 1982 as a "feminist 
reformer" of the christian tradition and, in 1993, as a "feminist 
theologian", she herself does not acknowledge the existence of a feminist 
christian theological paradigm in the way that I have presented and am 
using the concept.5 Rather McFague maintains that each religious 
Guin, McFague paraphrases her words: "truth lies in the imagination. This may be only half a truth, 
but it is the half we most often forget." See also p. 32. "We will not relinquish our idolatry in 
religious language unless we are freed from the myth that in order for images to be true they must be 
literal." 
3 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
4 Ibid., p. 34. 
5 Regarding McFague as a feminist reformer, see ibid., p. 165; regarding McFague's self-
characterisation as a feminist theologian, see McFague, Sallie, The Body of God: An Ecological 
Theology, Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 1993, p. 13. 
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tradition, i.e., Judaism, Christianity, Islam, etc., constitutes a single 
theological paradigm, each paradigm comprised of a host of models built 
up around a single "root-metaphor" .6 In the case of christianity, she 
believes this root-metaphor is embodied somehow by the event of Jesus 
of Nazareth? McFague allows of different emphases within a single 
christian paradigm, but insists, at times quite strongly, that while "old 
interpretations are cast aside ... the basic assumptions of the religion 
remain, since they are not after all settled theories" .8 
I should note that in her work McFague makes what I believe to be a 
highly questionable distinction between scientific paradigms and 
theological paradigms. She states that in the case of a scientific paradigm 
shift there is "a revolution in basic assumptions ... everything is seen from 
a new perspective" .9 She then states that this does not happen in 
theology, i.e., "the basic assumptions of the religion remain", but, and I 
suggest that this is one of the rare internal contradictions in her thought, 
she insists strongly that when a major scientific paradigm shift takes 
place, theology must take it into account or risk being irrelevant to its 
time and place, if not idolatrous and actively opposed to the fulfilment of 
life on earth.lo 
To be more specific, McFague explicitly acknowledges a) that all 
theological constructions are built upon on an implicit worldview and b) 
that a scientific paradigm shift results in a changed worldview - to which 
6 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 110. 
7 See Sallie McFague, 'An Epilogue: The Christian Paradigm', in pp. 377-390 in Christian 
Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks (Revised and Enlarged Ed.), eds, Peter C. 
Hodgson and Robert H. King, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1985, p. 378. She writes of "the 
transformative event of new life, a new way of being in the world that is grounded in the life and death 
of Jesus of Nazareth." (italics original) 
8 Ibid.; p. 380. 
9 Ibid. 
lO See McFague, Models of God, pp. 6, "The constructive character of theology must be 
acknowledged, and this becomes of critical importance when the world in which we live is profoundly 
different from the world in which many of the traditional metaphors and concepts gained currency." 
See also McFague, The Body of God, p. 74. "[W]hen the picture of reality undergoes a major 
paradigm shift, theology must attend to it." See also McFague, Metaphorical Theology, pp. 8-9 (on 
idolatry and irrelevance broadly) and pp. 185-186 on the irrelevance and destructive consequences of a 
traditional view of atonement and salvation. 
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theology must attend. Indeed, she has proposed that "the question for 
theology is not worldview or not but which worldview?"ll (italics 
original) She states that "the reason many Christian doctrines are 
considered obsolete is that they are based on a very different picture of the 
world than the current one" .12 As I argued in chapter one, when a basic 
set of assumptions shifts, when a group of people start doing theology on 
the basis of a new set of assumptions about humankind, the world, and 
god, they are no longer working within an old theological paradigm. 
Their worldview has changed; they perceive reality from a new 
perspective - one informed by a new set of metaphysical presuppositions 
and value judgements. Given that McFague agrees that " ... a paradigm 
constitutes the most basic set of assumptions within which a tradition, in 
this case a religious tradition, functions", and given that she agrees that 
all theological constructions presuppose a basic worldview, I find her 
distinction between scientific and theological paradigms implausible.13 A 
theological paradigm shift, especially one that takes seriously a scientific 
paradigm shift, results in a new perspective on the world, a changed set of 
core assumptions, not simply a different set of interpretations concerning 
an unchanging set of core beliefs. 
Further, her own arguments concerning the metaphysical implications of 
metaphors and models (and the need to stop using metaphors and 
models that support an ancient worldview) support my contention. She 
writes of " ... the crucial importance of models in theology. They are 
comprehensive and at base metaphysical, and a theologian is not able to 
operate without them."14 (italics added) Later in the same book she notes: 
"The price paid for the hegemony of the hierarchical, monarchical model 
[of God the Father] ... is a heavy one indeed: not only has God been 
removed from us as a distant being in some other world but, also, 
apparent licence has been arrogated by 'man' to dominate and destroy the 
11 McFague, The Body of God, p. 74. 
12 Ibid., p. 235, endnote 23, referring to the work of Hanbury Brown. 
13 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 108. 
14 Ibid., p. 105. 
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natural environment."15 My point is that McFague believes different 
theologies are grounded upon and project different worldviews; she 
argues that theologians must take seriously current scientific worldviews; 
she assumes the metaphysical implications of theological models - and 
advocates changing them when their metaphysical implications are 
contrary to current and commonly held scientific understandings of 
reality - yet she simultaneously insists that various liberation theologies 
are simply reinterpretations of the same "basic assumptions" .1 6 Her own 
presuppositions, in my opinion, contradict this assertion. 
I do want to acknowledge, however, the fact that McFague's insistence on 
a single christian theological paradigm may well be motivated in part by 
political reasons. She has insisted that all forms of christian theology, 
including but not limited to liberation, black, and feminist theologies, are 
simply theology full-stop; and I suggest that this insistence on her part is 
partly motivated by an unwillingness to ghetto-ise any theological 
approach by qualifying and perhaps diminishing its worthiness with a 
label such as "liberation", "black", or "feminist" .17 Nonetheless, again, I 
understand each of these theological approaches to be structured around a 
different worldview: a different conceptual framework with a different set 
of underlying assumptions about human beings, god, and the nature of 
reality. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, McFague's own worldview, 
or her metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions, fits perfectly 
within what I have described as the feminist christian theological 
paradigm. 
Before I examine her anthropological, ontological, and epistemological 
assumptions, however, I must address another curiously problematic 
issue: this one concerning the models of god for which she is most well 
known.1 8 To some extent in Metaphorical Theology, and to a large extent 
l5 Ibid., p. 105 and p. 144. 
16 McFague, 'Epilogue', pp. 379-380. 
17 See McFague, Models of God, p. 47. 
l8 McFague received the American Academy of Religion's Award for Excellence for Models of God, 
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in Models of God and The Body of God, McFague attempts what she calls 
a "thought experiment". In this thought experiment she self-consciously 
presents various models of god. At the end of Metaphorical Theology she 
presents the model of god the friend, while in Models of God she presents 
the models god the mother, god the lover, and, again, god the friend. 
Finally, in The Body of God she presents an extended reflection on the 
model of the cosmos as god's body, and, in conjunction with this model, 
examines the model of god the spirit, "the divine wind that "swept over 
the face of the waters" prior to creation ... ".19 
In this chapter, however, I will not include within my examination of 
McFague's over-arching theological system the models god the mother, 
lover, friend, or spirit, although I will examine the metaphysical and 
ethical implications of the model of the cosmos as god's body. Given the 
centrality in her thought of these models it is imperative that I explain 
and justify my rationale for this. To put the cart before the horse for a 
moment, the issue as I perceive it is that McFague's conceptual analyses 
of these models quite often run counter to their inherent imagistic 
metaphysical implications, contradict her explicitly stated theo-ethical and 
political agenda, and undermine her theological anthropology. For 
example, as I will discuss in greater detail below, she is insistent that 
human beings need to live, move, and have our being in the world as 
responsible adults, "responsible for all the rest upon which we are so 
profoundly dependent". She asserts, "no longer should we speak of 
ourselves as children, especially in a religious context, as the passive, 
needy children of a loving, all-powerful father who will take care of us 
and our planet".20 While this quote rejects only a paternal image for god, 
eleven years earlier she wrote that "parental images ... cannot express 
mutuality, maturity, cooperation, responsibility, or reciprocity" .21 (italics 
added) Given the great weight she places on human responsibility, as 
the book in which she discusses her conception of god as mother, lover, and friend. 
l9 McFague, The Body of God, p. 143. 
20 Ibid., p. 109. 
21 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, pp. 178-179. 
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well as her own critical evaluation of parental images, I find her model of 
god the mother to fit - at the level of image - not at all with the rest of 
her thought. 
Regarding the model of god the lover, in her analysis of this model she 
denies what I perceive to be the inherently individualistic and privatistic 
connotations of this image, i.e., lovers are two individuals who love each 
other specifically and in some ways exclusively and, at least early on in 
their relationship, tend to be oblivious to what is happening around 
them. McFague, however, interprets the model of god as lover "in the 
context of the world as God's body ... ".22 Accordingly, she perceives " ... the 
lover is God and the beloved the world ... ".23 At the level of image, I 
suggest, this is simply theological narcissism, a picture of god loving 
nothing but godself.24 To be fair, McFague is attempting to provide a 
reason for humans to love the world and live in it responsibly, but the 
model of god the lover seems to me to work, at the level of image, against 
such an effort. As much as she argues against interpreting this model as 
reflective of a one-to-one relationship between oneself and god, such 1s 
the power of the image of god as lover that such an interpretation 1s 
almost unavoidable. 
Likewise, her conceptual analysis of god as spirit is similarly problematic, 
although for a different reason. At the level of image she suggests that it 
conveys an awareness that "God is not primarily the orderer and 
controller of the universe but its source and empowerment, the breath 
that enlivens and energizes it."25 McFague even goes so far as to say that 
22 McFague, Models of God, p. 128. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Of critical importance, neither her interpretation of god the lover loving god's body nor my 
interpretation of god the lover focusing on loving and being loved by individual humans can be used 
to address, in anything other than a superficial way, the suffering of the innocent or humanly caused 
ecological destruction. In other words, I believe it is theologically reprehensible to say to a woman 
who has been raped or a child who is dying of AIDS or a species threatened with extinction, "well, 
God loves you, and that's the main thing .... " Let me be clear that I do not believe McFague would 
use the model of god the lover in this way, but that does not negate the fact that it is a theological 
implication of this model. 
25 McFague, The Body of God, p. 145. 
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"one of the great assets of the model is precisely its amorphous character 
in contrast to the highly human, personal, and. androcentric nature of 
Father and Son: spirit is not necessarily human, personal (though it is 
relational), or male" .26 In this instance I quite agree with her analysis of 
the imagistic connotations of the model. The problem is that she prefaces 
her discussion of the model of god the spirit with the insistence that it is a 
personal model.27 Again, I would suggest that at the level of image god 
the spirit, that divine wind that blew across the face of the waters, is not a 
personal image - as, paradoxically, McFague herself notes. Lastly, if it is to 
be interpreted as a personal model for god, and if, as is always the case in 
christian theology, humans are understood to be made in the image of 
god, then I do not perceive a way to avoid the problem of a hierarchical, 
dualistic, value-laden split between spirit and matter, spirit and human 
bodies. Given McFague's unwavering rejection of any sort of spirit-body 
or mind-body split (to be discussed in the section on her theological 
anthropology), her understanding of god the spirit as a personal image 
does not fit within her anthropological presuppositions. 
Finally, there is god the friend, another self-consciously constructed 
model of god to which I will not be referring simply because the 
metaphors she most often uses to describe her understanding of god -
when she is not engaged in self-conscious, constructive "thought 
experiments" - are not personal metaphors. Rather, she writes 
beautifully of god as the source and divine matrix of all that is, as the 
power enlivening and sustaining creation in all its diversity and 
intricacy.28 Source, matrix, power: these metaphors are the only ones that 
26 Ibid., p. 147. 
27 Ibid., pp. 142-143. One of McFague's endearing and exasperating theological quirks is her 
insistence that to speak of god in the christian paradigm one must use personal metaphors, although 
one can and should also use impersonal metaphors to accompany them. It is my contention that 
whenever she tries to use personal metaphors for god, or to interpret impersonal ones as personal 
images, she contradicts the rest of her otherwise incredibly consistent and elegant theological system. 
28 See McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 187. " ... God is part of our being as the source of 
power, of love, of endurance, of insight. But God is also the source of our life." or p. 192, " ... God 
as the source and depth of our being." See also McFague, Models of God, p. 111. "God's body, that 
which supports all life, is not matter or spirit but the matrix out of which everything that is evolves." 
Also p. 139, " ... the matrix of being from whom all life comes." See also McFague, The Body of 
God, p. 20, where she refers to god as "the source, power, and goal - the spirit - that enlivens (and 
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fully support her suggestion that humans ought to turn to the cosmos to 
glimpse god's transcendence, to experience the mystery and wonder and 
awe that she believes characterises a religious sensibility.29 As I will 
demonstrate when discussing her understanding of the world and 
creation, this understanding of divine transcendence is of central 
significance in her thought; accordingly, it is noteworthy that, rather than 
personal metaphors, she uses the metaphors "source", "power", and 
"matrix" when writing of the transcendence of god in relation to the 
cosmos. That these particular metaphors are the metaphors for god used 
by Ruether and Heyward is also rather significant, particularly in the 
context of this thesis.30 
For these reasons I believe it is justifiable to set aside McFague's models of 
god when examining her theology for her metaphysical and 
epistemological presuppositions. As I will demonstrate, she 1s 
exceedingly clear about which presuppositions she values and adheres to. 
It is her clarity on these foundational assumptions, as well as her 
consistent use of metaphors compatible with these assumptions, that, 
paradoxically, contradict the implications of her own models of god. 
Having named what I am not going to explore in this chapter and why, it 
is time to outline briefly what I am going to examine. In the next section I 
will trace McFague's (changing) understanding of the nature and purpose 
of theology. Following this I will identify her theological anthropology, 
or her assumptions about human nature, and discuss at some length her 
assumptions concerning humans as knowing agents, in particular her 
loves) the entire process and its material forms." Also p. 100. " ... [W]e all exist together in one 
space, our finite planet or, in terms of our model, within the nurturing matrix of God's body." 
29 See McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 192. "Ecstasy and awe cannot be contained in models 
of God as parent or friend - the ocean, the sky, and the earth express them more fully." See also 
McFague, Models of God, p. 186. "And in fact, does not the universe provide us with far more 
awesome images of transcendence than the political arena? ... If one can say that the basic religious 
apprehension is the wonder at being, wonder that there is something rather than nothing, then the 
ecological, evolutionary sensibility is in this sense religious." She continues by stating that she is 
"imaging the transcendence of God in a worldly way .. .in the mythology or images of our own day that 
inspire feelings of awe, reverence, wonder." See also McFague, The Body of God, p. 21. " ... the 
cosmos is the picture we turn to when we try to imagine what divine transcendence is." 
30 In fact, McFague's second use of the metaphor "matrix" (that I have found, at least) occurs when 
she is describing Ruether's conception of Godless as matrix. See McFague, Models of God, p. 116. 
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understanding of humans as linguistic animals. I will then turn to an 
examination of her metaphysical presuppositions concerning the world, 
or creation and the cosmos. As in Heyward's thought, however, there is a 
great deal of overlap between McFague's anthropological and 
epistemological assumptions and her ontological assumptions. That is, 
the sorts of knowledge claims McFague considers it possible for humans 
to make about the world and creation are predicated to a large extent 
upon her understanding of what sort of (creaturely) epistemic agents 
humans are. 
The Nature and Purpose of "Theology" 
in McFague's Thought 
McFague's understanding of the nature and purpose of theology has 
undergone, on one level, a profound shift since the rnid-1970s. At that 
time, in keeping with the neo-orthodox tradition, she affirmed Gerhard 
Ebeling's assertion "that hermeneutic is the . whole of theology ... " .31 In 
other words, she considered theology to be nothing other than an 
interpretive response to "God's word" to the world.32 Further, her 
understanding of this interpretive response was both dependent on a 
wholly-other-than god and individualistic, in the sense that she 
considered each interpretive encounter to take place between "God's 
word" and an individual - who did not so much do the interpreting but 
was interpreted by and responded to the Word.33 
By 1982, however, McFague's perspective on theology had changed 
significantly. She stated then that "the ultimate goal of theology is 
comprehension of all reality by means of a root-metaphor and -its 
3 l TeSelle, Sallie McFague, Speaking in Parables: A Study in Metaphor and Theology, Fortress 
Press, Philadelphia, 1975, p. 30. In 1993 McFague characterised herself as an "erstwhile Bartman", 
and this characterisation is certainly in keeping with her earliest understanding of the nature of 
theology. See McFague, The Body of God, p. 208. 
32 TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, p. 41. " ... [T]he task of theology is to serve the hearing of God's 
word .... " It is important to note that McFague did believe that "God's word" could and did come, 
indirectly, through human words. 
33 Ibid., p. 71. 
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dominant models ... " .34 (italics original) To this end she proposed that the 
question with which theology was most concerned was, "What is the 
meaning of life in the world?"35 She herself was far more concerned 
with collective human attempts to make sense of and value this life than 
she was concerned with individuals being interpreted by and responding 
to "the unmerited grace of God", although this was still an identifiable 
factor in her thought.36 However, McFague's concern with making sense 
of the world in a way that would allow and encourage humans to live 
responsibly in it had become pronounced by 1987. By that time she had 
rejected the notion that theology is hermeneutics, and was insisting 
instead that " ... theology must be self-consciously constructive" .37 The 
purpose of her own theology, according to McFague, was to 
"remythologise" the "relationship between God and the world" .38 
The assumption underlying and supporting her project of 
remythologising the relationship between god and the world, and 1n 
particular the relationship between humans and the world, is one that 
she has, I believe, held consistently since at least 1975: that human beings 
understand ourselves, construct, and live in the world according to the 
stories we tell about ourselves and the world. "We know who we are 
through the stories we embrace as our own - the story of my life is 
structured by the larger stories (social, political, mythic) in which I 
understand my personal story to take place."39 It is crucial to note 
McFague's consistent affirmation of this epistemological (and 
anthropological and metaphysical) claim. In 1993, in the preface to 
Models of God she at last applies this point to her understanding of the 
34 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 104. 
35 Ibid., p. 107. The influence of existentialist thought is evident in this quote: she is concerned 
with the meaning of being-in-the-world, which Heidegger expressed in German as in-der-Welt-sein. 
36 Ibid., p. 108. 
37 McFague, Models of God, p. 21. The entire quote is as follows: " ... Christian theology, in our 
time at least, cannot be merely or mainly hermeneutics, that is, interpretation of the tradition, a 
translation of ancient creeds and concepts to make them relevant for contemporary culture. Rather, 
theology must be self-consciously constructive .... " 
38 Ibid., p. xi. In using the term "remythologise" McFague is (deliberately, I believe) playing 
against Bultmann's project of demythologising christian scripture. 
39 TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, p. 140. 
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nature of theology; 11 ••• theology is mostly fiction .... "40 This truly is one of 
McFague's central insights, and I cannot over-emphasise how profoundly 
aware she is of the world-shaping influence of the stories, narratives, 
myths into which humans are born and by means of which humans 
perceive, interpret, and order the world. As she succinctly puts it, "we 
live our lives according to our constructions of the world".41 
Thus her understanding of theology as "mostly fiction", an 
understanding that I take to be McFague's most important contribution to 
feminist christian analyses of the nature of theology, is no facile dismissal 
of past or present theological pronouncements. In her thought they 
matter greatly, precisely because they are human "stories" that contribute 
to shaping human relations with other humans and with the rest of 
creation. However, McFague is exceedingly forthright in her assessment 
of the II certainty" of christian theological assertions. 
Ibegin with the assumption that what we can say with any 
assurance about the character of Christian faith is very little 
and that even that will be highly contested. Christian faith 
is, it seems to me, most basically a claim that the universe is 
neither indifferent nor malevolent but that there is a power 
(and a personal power at that) which is on the side of life 
and its fulfillment.42 
From this statement I take it that McFague understands the purpose of 
theology to be, quite simply, to promote the fulfilment of life. And 
indeed, in her analysis of those elements any theology ought to include if 
it is to be relevant to the current historical and ecological context, she 
notes that " ... a credible theology for our time ... accepts responsibility for 
nurturing and fulfilling life in its many forms" .43 In an endnote within 
the same chapter as the previous quote she reiterates her point: " ... the 
main criterion for a "true" theology is pragmatic, preferring those models 
of God that are most helpful in the praxis of bringing about fulfillment 
4o McFague, Models of God, p. xi. This is one of my favourite theological quotes of all time. 
41 Ibid., p. 28. 
42 Ib.d I ., p. X. 
43 Ibid., p. 32. 
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for living beings" .44 I suggest that McFague's understanding of the 
purpose of theology as promoting fulfilment for living beings is, if not 
precisely the same, extremely compatible with Heyward's understanding 
of the purpose of theology as the effort to make incarnate love and justice 
in the world. Further, both McFague and Heyward take for granted 
Ruether's conception of theology as providing a mediating point between 
the "is" and "ought" of human life. 
Just as Heyward's theological pattern is centred on her understanding of 
the need for humans to do the work of redemption, i.e., to bring 
love/justice to those people and places from which it is absent, at the 
heart of McFague's theological system is her understanding of salvation -
salvation defined "as the well-being and fulfillment of all that lives" .45 
She explicitly places "salvation" at the core of her theological system. 
The formal criterion for theology .. .is that it reflect, in tough-
minded, concrete ways and in the language and thought 
forms of one's own time, about what salvation could, would, 
mean now, to us.... What the formal criterion does not 
allow, however, is resting in an interpretation of God's 
salvific love from some bygone time, for this will invariably 
be escapist and, finally, destructive: that gospel will be good 
news not for our time but for another.46 
Importantly, to understand fully the radical implications of this 
theological move on her part one must know the context in which 
McFague locates all her theological claims. McFague's understanding of 
salvation depends for its radicality upon her theological standpoint, 
which is, and is exclusively, this earth as it exists within the universe - of 
which humans are inextricably a part and upon which humans and all 
"earth others" are dependent for life.47 Her rejection (like Ruether's) of a 
44 Ibid., p. 196, endnote 13. 
45 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 187. See also McFague, Models of God, p. 7. She writes 
that "the principal insight of liberation theologies - that redemption is not the rescue of certain 
individuals for eternal life in another world but the fulfillment of all humanity in the political and 
social realities of this world - must be further deprivatized to include the well-being of all life." 
46 Ibid., p. 45. 
47 See McFague, The Body of God, p. 40. She writes of "attempting to take the cosmos as the 
context for doing theology. We are trying to take the context of the whole within which we exist, 
rather than merely a psychological or political context, as our theological standpoint in a way that 
emphasizes rather than sacrifices diversity." Regarding the expression "earth others", see McFague, 
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heaven above and of an other-worldly afterlife is total, thus her assertion 
that "creation is the place of salvation" must be interpreted literally.48 
(italics original) For example, McFague writes scathingly of "any notion 
of salvation which presumes that individuals can be rescued from the 
world ... ", and ironically of " ... the strange illusion that we are other than 
our bodies, that we and those we love can and will exist apart from them, 
that our spirits will live on, here or 'in heaven,' after death" .49 (italics 
original) Further, because all earthly life forms exist only in a state of 
interdependence, McFague asserts that "in our time, salvation must be 
understood to extend to all, or it will apply to none" .50 Her definition of 
sin, which is perfectly consistent with her understanding of salvation, 
further clarifies her meaning and use of the metaphor "salvation". "[S]in 
is the turning-away not from a transcendent power but from 
interdependence with all other beings, including the matrix of being from 
whom all life comes."51 
McFague's theological extension of the scope of salvation beyond 
individual human souls to the well-being of the entire creation 1s 1n 
perfect accord with two value judgements underlying all her work since 
1982. On the one hand she believes that "the moral issue of our day - and 
the vocation to which we are called - is whether we and other species will 
live and how well we will live", and on the other she refuses to value 
human life above non-human earth others.52 The second of these value 
judgements is critical; in positing all earth others as inherently worthy of 
salvation, or deserving of whatever constitutes their own well-being and 
fulfilment, she is not advocating that seals and whales and rivers and 
Sallie, Super, Natural Christians: How We Should Love Nature, Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 1997, 
p. 151. 
48 McFague, The Body of God, p. 180. 
49 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 185, and McFague, The Body of God, p. 16. 
50 McFague, Models of God, p. 53. 
51 Ibid., p. 139. 
52 McFague, The Body of God, p. 9. See also p. 108, " .. . we are not the center of things .... " See 
also McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. xi, where she speaks of "delight in the other, not 
domination of the other. ... " And all of McFague, Super, Natural Christians, which is an extended 
reflection on what it might mean to perceive all earth others as subjects rather than objects. 
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rain forests be saved either for the sake or the enjoyment of ongoing 
human life, but for their own sakes, because these earth others are as 
valuable and irreplaceable as any aspect of creation. For McFague it is a 
fortunate consequence that caring for (trying to save) the earth in its 
ecological and evolutionary diversity contributes to enabling human life, 
but this consequence is just that, a consequence and not the theological 
reason for such activity.53 Moreover, regardless of its consequences - in 
the sense of direct, measurable outcomes - activity on behalf of the well-
being of particular aspects of the earth (including the health and 
fulfilment of human earth creatures) is the "vocation" to which she 
perceives humans no less than god (as the source of and power 
enlivening all that is) are called. 
However, regarding outcomes, in McFague's thought neither humans 
nor god can ever bring about a state of perfect salvation for all. As with 
Heyward's conception· of redemption, McFague's understanding of 
salvation is that it is always imperfectly achieved where it is. achieved at 
all, and, given her metaphysical stress on process rather than stasis, it can 
never be achieved once and for all.54 McFague is, if not exactly a 
pessimist, a hard-core pragmatist. The issue, in her thought, seems to be 
two-fold: first, "most life-forms, including human beings, live in a world 
characterized by brutal, deep, as well as subtle forms of oppression;" and 
second, she notes that "even when we are motivated by the best of 
intentions, our efforts to be sensitive to the needs of some parts of God's 
body, some species of flora and fauna, will inevitably mean the 
deterioration and demise of others" .55 As I will discuss in greater detail 
below, McFague's conception of reality as relational and interdependent 
is, again like Heyward's, inherently ambiguous and tension-filled. The 
53 See McFague, Models of God, p. 7. On a practical level she does assert, with Ruether and 
Heyward, that unless humans do change our ways of relating to the earth and all earth others we will 
probably destroy ourselves and most other life forms. 
54 Ibid., p. 8. "Relationship and interdependence, change and transformation, not substance, 
changelessness, and perfection, are the categories within which a theology for our day must function." 
See also p. 10. " ... process, change, transformation, and openness replace stasis, changelessness, and 
completeness as basic descriptive concepts." 
55 McFague, The Body of God, p. 72 (first quote), and McFague, Models of God, p. 137 (second 
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salvation or well-being and fulfilment of some aspects of creation 
requires the destruction and demise of other aspects. Given her 
assessment of all that hinders the fulfilment of life (in broadest terms, 
"the decay of our planet is probably inevitable"56), how does she answer 
the question, "why bother?" 
Her answer to this question is, I suggest, three-fold - in an inseparable, 
trinitarian sense - with discernibly ethical, theological, metaphysical and 
epistemological dimensions. First, in bleak, stark words she notes that 
"one has to get up in the morning and look in the mirror. It may come to 
nothing more than that" .57 But this response to the question "why 
bother?" is incomplete and too anthropocentric to stand alone in 
McFague's thought. The second element in her response corrects this 
anthropocentrism. Quoting Iris Murdoch, McFague conveys her 
understanding of love. "Love is the extremely difficult realization that 
something other than oneself is real. Love .. .is the discovery of reality."58 
Love, then, not in a warm fuzzy sense but as acknowledgement of the fact 
of existence apart from oneself, existence indifferent to, even opposed to 
one's own existence: the sheer fact of existence beyond oneself is reason to 
work for the fulfilment of "what is". But still not reason enough. The 
third element in McFague's "why" is simultaneously epistemological and 
theological. 
quote). 
Over the years I have learned that the closer attention I pay 
to whatever piece of the world is before me - the more I 
know about it, the more open I am to its presence, the closer I 
look at it or listen to it or touch it or smell it - the more 
amazed I am by it. It is not that I "see God in it" in any 
direct or general way; rather, it is the specialness, the 
difference, the intricacy of each creature, event, or aspect of 
56 McFague, The Body of God, p. 207. 
57 Ibid., p. 208. Whenever I read these sentences I imagine a scrap of paper attached to the mirror 
containing a quote from Kant including the words "moral imperative". 
58 Ibid., p. 50 and McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p. 35. Citing Iris Murdoch, 'The Sublime 
and the Good', Chicago Review, vol. 13, Autumn, 1959, p. 51. 
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nature that calls forth wonder. And that wonder helps 
sustain me; it helps me stay the course.59 
Wonder: in McFague's thought a religious sensibility informed by 
attention to the presence of the other leads finally to a sense of wonder 
tinged with awe.60 Trying to express the implications of such a 
sentiment, McFague draws on a quote from feminist lesbian philosopher 
Marilyn Frye which combines both McFague's understanding of love and 
her theological/ epistemological bent toward attentive wonder. She 
quotes, "The science of the loving eye would favor the Complexity 
Theory of Truth ... and presuppose The Endless Interestingness of the 
Universe."61 From this theological and epistemological standpoint she 
affirms that this little bit of creation, as spatially and temporally 
insignificant as it appears to be in the cosmic scheme of things, is 
inherently wonder-full, intrinsically interesting, and thus inherently 
worthy of care for as long as any part of it exists. This faith claim/value 
judgement lies beneath her understanding of salvation, extending 
outwards from the very core of her theological system. 
With this overview of the nature and purpose of "theology" in 
McFague's thought (and brief introduction to her theology) in place, I 
turn now to an· examination of her theological anthropology and 
epistemological presuppositions concerning humans as knowing agents. 
McFague's Theological Anthropology 
On one level McFague's theological anthropology is inseparable from her 
ontology, or her understanding of the nature of all reality as "part and 
parcel" of an evolutionary process begun billions of years ago and 
59 McFague, The Body of God, p. 210. 
60 Regarding attention epistemology see ibid., pp. 49-50. "An attention epistemology assumes the 
intrinsic value of anything, everything, that is not the self." (p. 50, italics original) 
61 Ibid., p. 52, citing Frye, Marilyn, The Politics of Reality, The Crossing Press, New York, 1983, 
p. 76. 
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continuing to this day.62 In keeping with the current scientific view she 
affirms that ·human beings, like all earth entities, are nothing more than 
collections of elements formed when the first stars exploded. In this 
regard there is nothing uniquely individual about any human being: 
every atom and molecule of all our bodies comes from the same cosmic 
smorgasbord as everything else.63 As she writes, "All things living and 
all things not living are products of the same primal explosion and 
evolutionary history and hence interrelated in an internal way right from 
the beginning. "64 (italics added) The ontological fact of relationship is a 
foundational assumption for McFague. Like Heyward, she quotes from 
Martin Buber's I and Thou; "In the beginning is relationship."65 That 
humans are related, connected through the very stuff of our bodies to 
every other physical entity in the cosmos is of crucial significance 1 n 
McFague's theological anthropology - as it is in Ruether's as well. 
In no way are human beings "other than" a product of universal 
evolution, and such evolution is, according to McFague's interpretation 
of "the common creation story", a spatio-temporal process characterised 
by relationship, chance, and change.66 Importantly, this aspect of 
McFague's thought - which is highly influenced by process philosophy -
is present to some degree in all her work since at least 1975.67 Her 
emphasis on evolutionary process and relationality, however, must 
always be read through "earth lenses". That is, McFague firmly locates 
human beings as beings not in the cosmos generally, but as earth 
creatures, creatures "in and of the earth" - and again, on this earth, life is 
62 McFague, Models of God, p. 9. "To feel in the depths of our being that we are part and parcel of 
the evolutionary ecosystem of our cosmos is a prerequisite for contemporary Christian theology." See 
also McFague, The Body of God, pp. 99-129. 
63 See McFague, Models of God, pp. 7-8. " ... [W]e belong, from the cells of our bodies to the finest 
creations of our minds, to the intricate, constantly changing cosmos." 
64 McFague, The Body of God, p. 104. 
65 McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p. 21. Citing Buber, Martin, I and Thou , Scribner's, New · 
York, 1970, p. 18. 
66 See McFague, The Body of God, pp. 38-47. 
67 See TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, pp. 55-56; McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 96 and p. 
221, endnote 95; McFague, Models of God, pp. 8, 10, 14; McFague, The Body of God, pp. 20, 31, 
74, 111, 140; and McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p. 2. 
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characterised more often by brutal, oppressive relationships than by 
pleasant, nurturing ones.68 (italics original) Likewise, the spatio-
temporal process in which all relationships are formed is neither, 
according to McFague, utterly random, disconnected from what in 
particular has happened and is happening to specific earth creatures, nor 
does it flow along harmoniously, proceeding seamlessly toward some 
final state of perfection. As she puts it, "The future 1s never an 
abstraction totally unrelated to our particular and familiar presents and 
pasts; it is the sometimes subtle, sometimes violent renovation and 
fulfillment of what is familiar to us."69 In sum, humans are earth 
creatures inextricably related to the same evolutionary process as all else 
in the cosmos, but this process, while of a piece, is at least as random and 
as violent as it is sustaining and enabling of life.7° Thus human existence 
is, in its very nature, relative, ambiguous, tense, and open to the 
unexpected. In McFague's thought this point is, I suggest, simultaneously 
an ontological and anthropological affirmation, and it is one of her 
fundamental metaphysical presuppositions. 
Having thus set the stage for the rest of her theological anthropology, 
McFague's thought becomes rather more focused when she discusses 
what particular sort of earth creatures humans are. Specifically, she 
begins from an understanding that "human beings are organisms ... " .71 
Further, human beings are particularly embodied organisms. McFague's 
stress on the physically embodied nature of human life cannot be over-
emphasised. As she says, 
Whatever more or other we may be, we are bodies, made of 
the same stuff as all other life-forms on our planet, including 
our brains, which are on a chemical continuum with our 
physical being. We do not have bodies, as we like to 
suppose, distancing ourselves from them as one does from 
68 McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p. 6. 
69 TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, p. 57. 
70 See McFague, The Body of God, p. 43. "The process of evolution is through chance (random 
errors) operating at the local level; thus, any overall purposive direction, whether divine or of another 
sort, is highly problematic." 
71 TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, p. 58. 
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an inferior, a servant, who works for us (the "us" being the 
mind that inhabits the body but does not really belong there). 
We are bodies ... .72 (italics original) 
I suggest that McFague intends for these words to be interpre_ted as 
literally as she believes any words can be interpreted, but, and this is 
where her theological anthropology becomes thoroughly epistemological, 
she understands language no less than our bodies to be our "house of 
being", and for McFague language is, at root, always metaphorical, or 
"tentative, open, relative, indirect, and tensive" ?3 (In this regard 
McFague's understanding of language is commensurate with her 
understanding of the nature of being - her ontology - as inherently 
relational, ambiguous, open-ended, and tensive.) According to her, 
humans "are born into a world which is already linguistic", thus we 
never experience our own bodies or any other bodies "as they are" apart 
from relative and indirect interpretations of them - that 1s, 
interpretations relative to specific times and cultures, and taught to us by 
others.74 In her words, just as we cannot live outside of our bodies, "we 
can only live within the confines of our language", yet "language always 
stands between us and reality .. .it is the medium through which we are 
aware of both our relationship to 'what is' and our distance from it ... " ?5 
Or again, "language is the mediation of raw experience (which we never 
have) and complete intelligibility (which we never have)" ?6 In other 
words, while McFague would agree (I think) that a human being is just 
another sort of critter or animal, she would qualify this description: in her 
thought humans are linguistic animals. Thus, in addition to insisting on 
the body as a physical entity she stresses that 
"the body" is a social construction .... What we mean by 
body is a set of associations and stereotypes that are often 
assumed to be "natural" or "obvious" but are, of course, 
72 McFague, The Body of God, p. 16. 
73 See McFague, Metaphorical Theology, pp. 8-10 and p. 116. She draws the "language is the 
house of being" quote from Martin Heidegger (p. 8). 
74 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
75 TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, p. 22 (first quote), and McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 34 
(second quote). 
76 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 122. 
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complex, highly nuanced networks of values and interests 
controlled implicitly (and at times explicitly) by those in 
power.77 
I take this quote to mean that McFague understands bodies to be swaddled 
from birth in power-riddled linguistic constructions - socially "given" 
assessments and interpretations of the meaning and value and potential 
and proper place of "bodies like that". Indeed, McFague seems implicitly 
to assume that the social "conception" of any particular body occurs prior 
to the physical conception of that body.78 Human babies are born in to 
pre-existent, linguistically shaped conceptual bodies - associations and 
stereotypes that never wash off. Further, with Ruether and Heyward, 
McFague agrees that these different associations and stereotypes, while 
theoretically distinguishable, for example as "white", "black", "lesbian", 
"heterosexual", "Muslim", "disabled", etc., combine inseparably when 
they converge on different, particular bodies.79 (That is, the conception of 
a particular Muslim lesbian body is not formed by gluing a stereotype of 
"woman" together with a stereotype of "Muslim" together with a 
stereotype of "lesbian" - the "meaning" of each of these cultural 
metaphors is transformed when it is associated with the other two 
metaphors.) I suggest that both of her understandings of "body" - as 
physical entity and as power-riddled linguistic construct - come together 
in the following quote, in which McFague addresses the extent to which 
all our lives-in-relationship are shaped by "both" of the bodies we are 
born with. 
The body is not a discardable garment cloaking the real self 
or essence of a person (or a pine tree or a chimpanzee); 
rather, it is the shape or form of who we are. It is how each 
of us is recognized, responded to, loved, touched, and cared 
for - as well as oppressed, beaten, raped, mutilated, 
discarded, and killed. 80 
77 McFague, The Body of God, pp. 24-25. 
78 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, pp. 8-9. 
79 See McFague, The Body of God, p. 48 and pp. 53-54. 
SO Ibid., p. 16. 
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Just as there are two discernible yet inseparable strands to McFague's 
understanding of human bodies, I believe there are two discernible yet 
inseparable elements in McFague's epistemology: each element consistent 
with and further developing one strand of her anthropology. 
Accordingly, I will examine first her understanding of "metaphorical 
knowing", which corresponds to her emphasis on the linguistic nature of 
human animals, and will then discuss her understanding of "attention 
epistemology", which corresponds to her emphasis on the physically 
embodied nature of all earth entities. Let me be clear, however, that these 
emphases in her thought are emphases within a single epistemological 
framework; they are inseparable elements of one approach. 
As I will be drawing primarily from her book Speaking in Parables (1975) 
in the discussion of metaphorical knowing, I should note that McFague 
may have distanced herself from this work, as she wrote in 1997 - of her 
"series of four books on religious language" - that "Metaphorical 
Theology laid the groundwork ... ".81 In fact she has written five books on 
religious language, and characterised Metaphorical Theology, when it was 
published, as a sequel to Speaking in Parables.82 It may be that she no 
longer mentions it simply because it is out of print (which is 
unfortunate), or she may be trying to distance herself from the particular 
model of god she accepted without question at the time. What I find 
most significant, however, is that her latest book, an extended meditation 
on humans relating to all earth others as subjects rather than as objects, is 
simply an approach from the perspective of attention epistemology to the 
same subject McFague approached via metaphorical epistemology in 
Speaking in Parables - the theological and philosophical problem of a 
hierarchical, value-laden, subject-object/knower-known split. 
"Language, all language, is ultimately traceable to metaphor - it is the 
foundation of language and thus of thought."83 "[M]etaphor is a way of 
81 McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p. 2. 
82 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. vii. 
83 TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, p. 50. 
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knowing, not just a way of communicating. In metaphor knowledge and 
its expression are one and the same; there is no way around the 
metaphor, it is not expendable.84 (italics original) McFague grounds her 
analysis of metaphorical knowing, and of humans as linguistic epistemic 
agents, on these two assumptions: that language is at root metaphorical 
and, hence, that shared human knowledge too is metaphorical. It is 
therefore imperative to try to be clear about how she understands and 
uses the metaphor "metaphor". However, given that an understanding 
of all human knowledge as metaphorical is, in my experience, strangely 
difficult to convey, and in keeping with her assertion that "there is no 
way now or ever to have strange truth directly", I will be presenting my 
interpretation of McFague's understanding of metaphor via an indirect 
route.85 (italics original) 
First, McFague's understanding of the epistemological function of 
metaphor is ·premised on her assumption that no words correspond 
directly to "what is" .86 In other words, she assumes that language is 
never precisely reflective of, or never corresponds directly to a reality that 
exists independently of human action and reflection. She does not deny 
the existence of reality apart from human beings, but McFague is insistent 
on two points: that of the interdependence of all reality (although she 
does write of the relative indifference of many aspects of reality to human 
existence)87 and that of the constructive character of human knowledge 
claims. One implication of McFague's metaphysical presupposition of the 
interdependence of all reality is that, when this presupposition is carried 
over into one's epistemology, there is no longer the possibility of a strict 
subject-object split - knowers cannot avoid affecting and being affected by 
whatever it is they are trying to know, for they are part of the same 
interrelated whole.88 
84 Ibid., p. 4. 
85 Ibid., p. 41. 
86 Ibid., p. 29. 
87 McFague, The Body of God, p. 50. 
88 TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, p. 56 and p. 58. 
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Regarding the second point, with Kant and Paul Ricoeur McFague agrees 
that humans construct and/or create the reality in which we live -
through our linguistic conceptions of the world.89 Further, quoting 
Philip Wheelwright, she believes we do so in a metaphorical manner, 
that is, by having "something - whether a body, an image, a sound, or ... a 
written word - stand as surrogate for something else". 90 In her words: 
Reality is created through this incredibly complex process of 
metaphorical leaps, of seeing this as that; we use what we 
notice about one thing to "name" (describe, call up, evoke, 
elicit) another thing when we notice something of the same, 
and hence for the first time we see it that new way.91 (italics 
original) 
According to McFague it is through this metaphorical process that 
humans make sense of, know, the world.92 Importantly, this 
metaphorical process must begin concretely, with a "this" with which to 
compare, contrast, and connect with "that", with a "here" from which to 
move to "there". There are thus always two aspects to every metaphor, or 
two "terms" - one of which is physically embodied and particularly 
located. Specifically, in McFague's thought metaphorical knowing begins 
with the fact of human embodiment. This point is so important that I 
will quote McFague at length. 
Human beings ... take themselves, their bodies, and where 
those bodies are and what they are, in all their particularity 
and concreteness and richness, as the "figure," the image, in 
. terms of which they "understand," learn about, fathom 
whatever it is they are concerned to fathom. The unknown 
lies all about us and we "figure" it all with ourselves - the 
human metaphors. Our movement, of whatever sort, is 
89 Ibid. , p. 52 and p. 56. 
90 Ibid., p. 50, citing Wheelwright, Philip, Metaphor and Reality, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1962, p. 19. 
91 Ibid., pp. 52-53. On p. 56 she quotes Paul Ricoeur as saying, "When we ask whether 
~etaphorical language reaches reality, we presuppose that we already know what reality is. But if we 
assume that metaphor redescribes reality, we must then assume that this reality as redescribed is itself 
novel reality.... With metaphor we experience the metamorphosis of both language and reality." 
Citing Paul Ricoeur, 'Creativity in Language: Word, Polysemy, Metaphor', Philosophy Today, 
Summer, 1973, pp. 110-111. 
92 Ibid., p. 59. "[M]etaphor. . .is the human method of investigating the universe." (italics original) 
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always metaphorical, with ourselves as one term of the 
metaphor.93 (italics original) 
Elsewhere she reiterates the particular, embodied character of 
metaphorical knowing: 
[M]etaphorical language not only connects this with that, 
here with there, but demands that one partner of the 
association, at least, be concrete, sensuous, familiar, bodily. 
It will abide no abstractions, no head without a body, no 
mystical flights, but because it is the method of human 
movement it insists on taking along the whole human being in 
all its familiarity, messiness, and concreteness.94 (italics 
original) 
McFague's insistence on the particularly embodied character of 
metaphorical knowing, that is, on the specifically familiar, or the 
"messiness" and "concreteness" of the lives and locations of particularly 
embodied human knowers is in keeping with the claims made by the 
feminist epistemologists discussed in chapters four and five. She 
explicitly proposes " ... a view of meaning and truth that takes seriously the 
diversity of embodied sites from which human beings make such claims: 
the sites that take into account race, class, gender, sexual orientation, 
handicapping situations, and so forth" .95 However, while metaphorical 
knowledge is inescapably situated knowledge, it is never so situated as to 
be inescapably trapped knowledge. In other words, metaphorical 
knowing is never static; it is always a process, a movement. McFague 
expresses this point beautifully as she relates her understanding of 
metaphorical knowing to her conception of humans as products of 
evolution. 
[H]uman knowing, at its most profound, is not disembodied, 
abstract, or conceptual; the analogy for human knowing is 
not the Cartesian machine but the evolutionary organism -
93 Ibid. In this passage McFague is presenting her analysis of Elizabeth Sewell's work on metaphor. 
She cites Sewell, Elizabeth, The Human Metaphor, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 
1964, p. 11. 
94 Ibid., p. 61. 
9S McFague, The Body of God, p. 48. 
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the stretching of the whole creature beyond itself into the 
unknown.96 (italics added) 
Metaphorical knowing is thus, in imagistic language, journeying 
knowledge; it is rather like trying to find your way about an unfamiliar 
environment in dim light. You begin with your senses, listening, 
looking, smelling, stretching out your hands to feel your way around, and 
you cannot help but associate seemingly familiar sounds, sights, smells 
and feels with your understanding of other places you have been. But 
neither the sounds and sights and smells nor the material, physical 
entities you touch are "the same" as any you have ever known. 
Nonetheless you must begin to make sense of your physically embodied 
experience of new surroundings by associating different aspects of it with 
that place from whence you have come. You borrow from what you have 
known and apply that borrowed understanding, borrowed interpretation 
to the new, wherever and whenever the new seems, in one or more 
ways, to be sort of like the old. Such knowing is, in McFague's words, 11a 
highly risky, uncertain, and open-ended enterprise - a maneuver of 
desperation, if you will - in spite of the straightforward grammatical 
structure of a metaphorical statement".97 
It is risky and uncertain because no matter how well the analogies from 
"there" seem to fit "here" they never correspond directly to "what is", nor 
are they ever the only analogies that might fit, might make sense of what 
one is experiencing.98 Nonetheless "all that we know prior to the 
metaphor is, at most, inchoate and confused .. .it is only in and through 
the metaphor that we can speak of it at all."99 (italics original) However, 
once humans have spoken of something in one way we tend to treat it as 
though it is that way, forgetting what McFague calls "the underside of all 
96 TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, p. 60. 
97 Ibid., p. 44. 
98 Ibid., p. 51. "[W]e cannot say our metaphors 'correspond' to 'what is'; at best, we can say only 
that they seem appropriate to our experience, they 'fit' or seem 'right'." See also McFague, 
Metaphorical Theology, p. 214, endnote 37, where she summarises Dorothy Emmet's metaphysical 
understanding of "critical realism" as an epistemological stance. 
99 TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, p. 44. 
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our constructions, the 'is not', the incompleteness, the partiality, the 
uncertainty, that must accompany all our creations lest we reify them into 
absolutes" _lOO McFague's stress on the "is-not" side of all linguistic 
constructions is, I suggest, fuelled both by her desire to keep limited and 
fallible humans from standing in awe of the emperor's new clothes 
(dazzling linguistic constructions), and to keep limited and fallible 
humans aware of our own creaturely limitations and fallibility.1°1 
Moreover, because humans tend to live and act in the world (treat each 
other and other entities) in accordance with the ways "we" (meaning 
those few with the power to do so) name the world, McFague affirms that 
great care must be taken when naming any aspect of the world.1°2 She 
states, "We live our lives according to our constructions of the world; as 
Eric Heller said, "Be careful how you interpret the world; it is like 
that.""103 In this regard McFague's work corresponds closely with 
Katherine Pyne Addelson's conception of truth and meaning as enacted 
by human agents, rather than being "discovered" as something that was 
pre-existent. 
Metaphorical knowing, as embodied human knowing, is therefore a kind 
of "groping" along, the human way of getting from here to there and 
trying to make sense of, or make ourselves at home where (and with 
whom else) we find ourselves.1°4 Such an epistemological journey, 
according to McFague, "has certain characteristics: it is tentative, 
relativistic, multi-layered, dynamic, complex, sensuous, historical, and 
100 McFague, Models of God, p. 25. 
1 O 1 Ibid. ''By seeking security through our constructions, we refuse to step outside the house of 
language we have erected to protect us from the emptiness and terror we cannot control. Our safe 
havens, called dogma and orthodoxy, become absolutes, giving the illusion of being certain, being 'on 
the inside', having the truth." See also TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, p. 29. "The days of supposing 
we are free of finite limitations, of supposing that we have some direct access to 'Truth', that there 
might be words that correspond to 'what is', ... such a time is over (if it ever existed except in the 
most rationalistic circles)." 
l02 See McFague, Metaphorical Theology, pp. 8-10 and p. 63. McFague is profoundly aware of the 
power of naming, of the application of oppressive and devalued linguistic constructions on entire 
categories of people and other earth entities. She writes of "the oppressive cultural structures 
[language] may mask as absolutes" (p. 63). 
103 McFague, Models of God, p. 28. 
104 See TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, p. 58. 
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participatory" .1°5 In addition, the possibility of any individual even 
setting out on such a journey depends on that individual's relationships 
with others - both human and earth others. McFague's understanding of 
metaphorical epistemology is dependent on her explicit assumption of 
the thoroughly relational and relative character of human knowledge 
claims. Within her thought it is taken for granted that human beings are 
epistemic agents "only in relationship - relationships with the world of 
which we are a part and with other selves who respond to us as well as 
influence us" .1°6 But again, particular human beings are related to 
particular places and communities on this earth. "To the extent that we 
know ourselves, our world, and our God, that knowledge is profoundly 
relational and, hence, interdependent, relative, situational, and 
limited."107 
While this statement is in close accord with statements made by feminist 
epistemologists such as Addelson, Code, and Haraway, McFague's 
conception of the profoundly relational, situated character of knowledge 
includes as well Lynn Hankinson Nelson's and Elizabeth Potter's 
insistence that humans, in order to develop into epistemic agents, are 
dependent on close interactions with pre-existent human linguistic 
communities. But McFague extends the scope of human epistemic 
dependence to include not only other humans, but specific attributes of 
the "natural" world. She states: 
[H]uman development is both culture- and nature-
dependent. Infants have brains, but the human mind 
depends not only on other human beings in order to develop 
the distinctive characteristics of human existence but also on 
the stimuli of nature such as light, sound, smell, and heat: 
without the "warbling birds, blossoming cherry trees, sighing 
wind, and speaking humans, there would be no sources of 
signals - and thus no intellects."108 
l05 Ibid., p. 62. 
l06 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 96. 
l o7 Ibid., p. 194. 
108 McFague, Models of God, p. 8. Citing Harold K. Schilling, 'The Whole Earth Is the Lord's: 
Toward a Holistic Ethic', in Earth Might Be Fair: Reflections on Ethics, Religion, and Ecology, ed., 
Ian Barbour, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1972, p. 102. 
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Or, writing in more abstract terms, she asserts that "the individual 
achieves being, its ontological status, through its acts in relationship to 
the network in which it exists".1°9 This "network" necessarily includes 
not only other human beings, but also non-human physical reality. 
Thus, while it is comprised of linguistic constructions, hence always 
uncertain and indirect, metaphorical epistemology is also a profoundly 
participatory and relational form of embodied knowing, and in 
McFague's thought it is only through attention to the relations we have 
with others that our knowledge claims have a hope of enabling the 
fulfilment of life. Importantly, this ethical affirmation is a central 
component of her epistemology, just as it is at the core of her theological 
system. She asserts "that our function as human beings on this planet is 
not mainly to think correct thoughts that correspond to some eternal set 
of verities, but to live appropriately and responsibly".110 Again this 
corresponds with Lorraine Code's understanding of responsibility as an 
epistemic virtue, and with Katherine Pyne Addelson's understanding 
that the goal of all knowledge seeking endeavours is to enable knowers to · 
live more responsibly in the world. McFague puts it in more theological 
terms (which are highly reminiscent of Ruether's words), "The goal is not 
utopia, but sustainability and livability: not the kingdom of God, but a 
decent life in community for all life-forms and the ecosystem on which 
they rely."111 McFague's understanding of the ethical dimensions of all 
knowledge claims, her affirmation of responsibility as a core epistemic 
virtue, and her vision of "a decent life in community for all" resonate 
with the epistemological presuppositions of Ruether and Heyward, as 
well as Addelson, Code, Harding, Haraway, and Keller, among others. 
Like Heyward she further describes her theo-ethical and epistemological 
agenda (or bias, or standpoint) by drawing on a quote from Donna 
l09 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 125. 
110 McFague, The Body of God, p. 89. See also p. 48, where she stresses the integral relationship 
between knowing and doing, and see also McFague, Super, Natural- Christians, p. 149, where she 
writes of the integral relationship between "being, knowing, doing; ontology, epistemology, 
hi " et cs .... 
111 McFague, The Body of God, p. 68. 
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Haraway - the same quote as Heyward, in fact. She advocates a stance 
that would be, quoting Haraway, "friendly to earthwide projects of finite 
freedom, adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and 
a limited happiness" .1 12 But again such projects have no chance of 
succeeding unless the participants attend, and attend closely, to the 
"others" with whom they share their surroundings. McFague 
characterises such an approach to knowledge as "attention 
epistemology" .113 
In simplest terms, attention epistemology is about "the kind of 
knowledge that comes from paying close attention to something other 
than oneself" .1 14 It is, says McFague, "listening, paying close attention to 
another, the other, in itself, for itself" .1 15 That the other is, in itself and 
not as a means to one's own ends, intrinsically valuable - this 1s a 
fundamental presupposition associated with attention epistemology. As I 
understand it, attention epistemology begins, as does metaphorical 
knowing, with physical embodiment, and again there are two terms to 
the knowing. One attends with one's embodied self, with all one's 
physical senses, to that which is physically embodied before one: accepting 
that it is utterly distinct from oneself, or uniquely "other-than". One 
begins by accepting the other in its otherness, and learns from it by 
listening, looking, touching, tasting, smelling - but always through an 
engagement with the other as a subject in its own right and its own way. 
The goal is understanding the other subject in its own in-itself-ness.116 
Drawing on Evelyn Fox Keller's work, McFague refers to Barbara 
McClintock's efforts to develop "a feeling for the organism" rather than 
to impose her own presuppositions concerning how the organism ought 
112 Ibid., p. 96. Citing Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism 
and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist Studies, vol. 14, Fall, 1988, p. 579. See also 
footnote 48, chapter four. 
l l 3 Ibid., pp. 49-54. 
114 Ibid., p. 49. 
115 Ibid. 
116 See McFague, Super, Natural Christians, pp. 35-36 and pp. 75-76. 
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to be.117 In McFague's words, attention epistemology insists that "one 
must set dogmas aside and pay attention to differences, even the 
differences among individual corn plants".118 
Attention epistemology is based on the assumption of radical difference 
and seemingly endless diversity; it is neither a homogenising nor a 
reductionistic approach to knowledge.1 19 To quote Marilyn Frye again, it 
presupposes "The Endless Interestingness of the Universe". Without 
denying the interdependence of all aspects of the universe, attention 
epistemology "takes with utmost seriousness the differences that separate 
all beings: the individual, unique site from which each is in itself for 
itself" .120 Again drawing upon Iris Murdoch's understanding of love as 
"the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is 
real: love [as] the discovery of reality", McFague characterises attention 
epistemology as "the loving eye".121 She explains herself by stating: 
The loving eye is not the sentimental, mushy, soft eye; rather, 
it is the realistic, tough, no-nonsense eye, acknowledging 
what is so difficult for us to recognize: ~hat reality is made 
up of others. Love, then, is no big deal or a specific virtue 
reserved for Christians; it is simply facing facts. It is, in a 
nice twist, being II objective" .122 (italics original) 
Just as Donna Haraway and Carter Heyward both redefine "objectivity" in 
their work, so too does McFague - in a manner 
both Haraway's and HeY'vard's perceptions. 
that combines, I suggest, 
Objectivity as loving 
attention to the other in its otherness includes (as per Haraway) the 
presupposition of the other as a subject (or agent) in its own right and 
way, as well the demand (as per Heyward) that the other subject be known 
within its own context, that knowledge of the other include the attempt to 
117 See McFague, The Body of God, p. 51, and McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p. 76. 
118 McFague, The Body of God, p. 51. 
119 See McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p. 76. 
120 McFague, The Body of God, p. 50. 
121 McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p 35. 
122 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
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discern what is right or true or good for that subject as it is, not as a 
human knower might want it to be. 
Importantly, just as the cosmos, and in particular the bit of the cosmos 
known as "earth" is the standpoint for McFague's theology, this earth, 
this world teeming with human and non-human earth others is the 
standpoint for an attention epistemology. McFague writes of "our place 
in nature along with and close to all the others whom we rub up against, 
smell, reach out to touch, hear calling us, and see beside us".123 (italics 
original) By stressing physical relations amongst earth creatures and earth 
entities McFague emphasises the physical, sensate rather than linguistic 
character of attention epistemology. Aware of the barriers linguistic 
constructions often place between knowers and that which they are trying 
to know, she is trying, I believe, to find a way underneath those barriers 
and see what might happen. It is significant that she quotes at length 
from a short story by Ursula Le Guin, entitled 'She Unnames Them'. In 
the story Eve unnames the animals, and this is what happens: 
They seemed far closer than when their names had stood 
between myself and them like a clear barrier: so close that 
my fear of them and their fear of me became one same fear. 
And the attraction many of us felt, the desire to smell one 
another's smells, feel or rub or caress one another's scales or 
skin or feathers or fur, taste one another's blood or flesh, 
keep one another warm - that attraction was now all one 
with the fear, and the hunter could not be told from the 
hunted, nor the eater from the food.1 24 
Having begun her explanation of attention epistemology by insisting on 
radical differences between subjects, McFague concludes by holding such 
differences in creative tension with a deep and abiding similarity between 
all subjects. What she does is to extend the notion of "subjectivity" to all 
earth others - not in an anthropomorphic sense, but in the sense of 
respecting the ineluctable otherness, the fullness of presence, the 
indwelling grace of all earth entities. She uses "the language of 
123 Ibid., p. 77. 
124 McFague, The Body of God, p. 247, endnote 30. Citing Ursula Le Guin, 'She Unnames Them', 
The New Yorker, 21 January 1985. 
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intentions, goals, purpose, direction - even of health and flourishing" 
with regard to mountains, trees, even the AIDS virus.125 She does so 
with the understanding that such language does, in the first instance, 
refer to human beings, to human experience. But, to bring her 
epistemology full circle, she insists that "we use it metaphorically of the 
earth others, not knowing how it applies but finding it better and more 
appropriate than its opposite" .126 (italics added) In perceiving all earth 
others as "like humans" insofar as they are subjects in their own right 
and manner, McFague is emphasising that "their raison d'etre is not to be 
objects for us" .127 She continues: 
They are agents with intentions, albeit often unconscious 
ones, oriented to their own well-being; they also, as agents, 
influence, often in broad and deep ways, human well-being. 
This means, among other things, that both for ethical and 
political reasons we should take the earth others seriously: 
we ought to because they are centers of value in themselves 
and we need to because as subjects they can and do alter 
human goals..128 (italics original) 
McFague does not shy away from the epistemological implications of 
affirming the subjectivity or agency of all earth entities. She explicitly 
affirms · that the sort of knowledge a knower may come to have about 
another earth entity/ subject is precisely the sort of knowledge that a 
knower may come to have about another human person.129 It is situated, 
relational, relative, incomplete, uncertain, risky, participatory, and both 
subjects are changed, affected by their relationship. Further, drawing on 
Lorraine Code's work (as well as, I believe, on her own model of god the 
friend) she suggests that such epistemological relationships be approached 
by human knowers as a relationship between potential friends.1 30 Or, in 
Buber's words, as an I-Thou relationship rather than an I-It 
125 McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p. 109 and p. 157. 
126 Ibid., p. 109. 
127 Ibid., p. 111. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid., pp. 95-97. 
l30 Ibid., pp. 34-38. 
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relationship.131 Such an epistemological stance, I suggest, is summed up 
perfectly in Carter Heyward's description of her own theology; it is both a 
theology and an epistemology "of knowing and being known".132 
To conclude this extended discussion of McFague's anthropological and 
epistemological presuppositions and value judgements, I would like to 
highlight two points. First, McFague discusses the epistemological 
implications of her work in greater depth and detail than any other 
feminist christian theologian that I am aware of, and she has done so 
since 1975 at least. Further, the epistemological presuppositions she 
named in 1975 (her metaphorical assumptions) are in perfect accord with 
the direction her later work has taken (toward attention). Whether she 
approaches the subject of human knowledge from a "metaphorical" or 
"attention" perspective, in her thought embodied perception precedes 
conception; however she insists that from both perspectives (which I 
have already suggested are better understood as emphases within the one 
epistemological framework) what is initially perceived may well be_ the 
conceptions of others. This follows from her emphasis of the fact that all 
human knowers are born into pre-existent linguistic systems for 
structuring and comprehending the world.133 Thus in her thought it is as 
true to say that conception precedes perception as it is to say that 
perception precedes conception. The point I am trying to make is that 
McFague manages to insist on knowledge as physically embodied while 
also taking with utmost seriousness the presence in all our lives of 
various textual "bodies", or linguistic constructions that shape our 
relationships with one another and the world. 
l3 l Ibid., p. 35. In the section discussing her understanding of "subject-subjects" relations she refers 
to Buber's well-known phrase and Iris Murdoch's conception of love as the realisation that others 
actually exist. 
132 Heyward, Staying Power, p. 120. 
133 See McFague, Metaphorical Theology, pp. 8-9. She writes, "With Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
feminists would say, 'The limits of one's language are the limits of one's world' .... Since we are all 
born into a world which is already linguistic, in which the naming has already taken place, we only 
own the world to the extent that the naming that has occurred is our naming." 
256 
Second, McFague has written that her latest work, Super, Natural 
Christians, was influenced primarily by process philosophy and feminist 
epistemology.134 However I suggest that although the influence of 
process thought in her work is undeniable, McFague's epistemological 
presuppositions are better described as remarkably consistent with 
feminist epistemological claims. It was not until 1993 that she began to 
refer to the work of theorists like Harding, Haraway, Keller, Longino, and 
Nelson - but by that time her epistemological framework was already 
well established, and so too were her accompanying anthropological 
presuppositions.135 I say this not to deny the important and original 
work done by feminist epistemologists, but to stress the fact that 
McFague's feminist christian theology includes what I consider to be the 
richest, most provocative epistemological framework I have come across. 
In her latest work she engages in focused "conversations" with feminist 
epistemologists, but her foundational presuppositions were in place long 
before 1997. That she acknowledges and draws upon the work of feminist 
epistemologists makes her recent work that much more fruitful, but she 
is perhaps being overly modest about the extent of her own original 
thought. It seems to me that what the recent developments in North 
American feminist epistemology collectively provide for McFague is a 
rhetorical space in which her own epistemological presuppositions are 
fully intelligible: in which, to quote Lorraine Code, McFague's words can 
be "heard, understood, taken seriously" .1 36 
In conclusion, McFague's epistemological presuppositions include an 
understanding of human knowledge as embodied, relational, 
participatory, sensuous, indirect, tentative, complex, multi-layered, 
relative, tensive, and inescapably communal - in the sense that language 
is always the language, hence the knowledge, of a people and not of a 
single individual. Further, since 1987 she has insisted that human 
knowers should be responsible knowers, aware that their knowledge 
134 McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p. 2. 
135 See McFague, The Body of God, p. 243, endnote 76. 
136 Code, Rhetorical Spaces, p. x. 
257 
claims will have various lived-effects on earth others, thus she is 
concerned to promote knowledge that increases the well-being and 
fulfilment of as many aspects of creation as possible. 
McFague's Understanding of 
The World and Creation 
I have already named one of McFague's fundamental metaphysical 
presuppositions: that reality is best conceived as an interdependent, 
relational, sometimes surprising spacio-temporal process.137 
Additionally, I have also named one of her fundamental value 
judgements: that of the intrinsic value of all aspects of creation. 
Accordingly, in this section I will focus primarily on McFague's 
conception of the world or the cosmos as god's body, including a 
discussion of her u~derstanding of transcendence. To understand 
McFague's conception of the world/cosmos as god's body, however, it 
must first be made clear that she accepts the "fact" of the physical world _ 
(or reality) apart from human linguistic constructions about the world -
although she insists that human access to this world is at best partial. As 
she says, "there is a reality to which our constructions refer, even though 
the only way we have of reaching it is by creating versions of it".138 As in 
Ruether's and Heyward's thought, there is a distinction in McFague's 
work between "the world" and "creation", albeit an implicit distinction. I 
suggest that within her thought "creation" is best understood as that 
which humans attempt to interpret, while "the world", more accurately, 
"worlds", are those human constructions in which we live, sometimes 
firmly rooted in "creation", and sometimes perched precariously on the 
side of a cliff. For instance, she has written that "the animal world is 
there; our worlds are constructed" .139 (italics original) Further, some 
137 See for example, McFague, Models of God, p. 32. " ... [A] credible theology for our time must 
be characterized by a sense of our intrinsic interdependence with all forms of life, an inclusive vision 
that demolishes oppressive hierarchies, accepts responsibility for nurturing and fulfilling life in its 
many forms, and is open to change and novelty as a given of existence." 
138 Ibid., p. 26. 
139 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 33. 
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world constructions, some interpretations are "healthier than others for 
the entities involved".140 
Importantly, McFague is keenly aware that humans do not live 1n 
"creation", or in a reality devoid of any human interpretations of it. 
Accordingly, she writes most frequently of "the world". However she 
does so always with the awareness of an underlying physical reality ( or 
creation) upon which worldly constructions are built. Further, in keeping 
with her epistemological affirmation of the agency or subjectivity of all 
earth entities, she ascribes to reality/ creation at least one peculiarly 
human attribute. Twice she has written of the patience of reality with 
regard to different human interpretations of it. She first noted that "the 
basic epistemological situation of all investigators and interpreters is of 
being in a world that we create in our attempt to discover those patterns 
of which it is most patient" .1 41 (italics original) Later, writing of the 
"organic model" for perceiving reality, she said, "reality appears to be 
relatively patient in regard to accepting this construct or grid through 
which it is seen" .1 42 Underlying both these statements is an implicit 
affirmation of the "more-than" character of creation or reality; that is, 
McFague presupposes that all human constructs about reality leave out, 
exclude, ignore, or fail to perceive a great deal more than they address in 
their necessarily limited and indirect ways. This assumption comes 
together with her affirmation of the intrinsic value of all aspects of 
creation in McFague's model of the cosmos as god's body. 
McFague writes, "God's body, that which supports all life, is not matter or 
spirit but the matrix out of which everything that is evolves" .143 The 
value judgement that accompanies this model is of particular significance 
in her thought. It is not only an ethical judgement, but a deeply 
theological one as well. McFague conceives of the cosmos as god's body in 
140 McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p. 179, endnote 6. 
141 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 78. 
142 McFague, The Body of God, p. 90. 
143 McFague, Models of God, p. 111. 
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part so that humans, in particular North American, middle class 
christians, will come to perceive it as worthy of care and respect, but also 
in a bid to "consecrate" the universe - to dedicate it to a divine purpose in 
order that christians will come to revere it as a holy place. She writes, 
We do not know in all ways or even in many ways what this 
[divine] purpose is, but the world is not ours to manipulate 
for our purposes. If we see it as God's body, the way God is 
present to us, we will indeed know we tread on sacred 
ground.144 (italics original) 
Such a conception of physical reality calls for more than an attitude of 
respect or even care. It calls for love. It calls for love not only of human 
interpretations, human constructions of the world, but for love of that 
which is apart from all interpretations, including that which is and is 
always a mystery to human beings. Put theologically, McFague calls for 
love of god's transcendence. Not the sort of transcendence McFague has 
described as "that Waterloo of Christian theology, which has pushed God 
out of the world and into another space", but the sort of transcendence 
that Dorothy Emmet describes in her book, The Nature of Metaphysical 
Thinking.1 45 Emmet's work, which McFague identifies as expressive of 
many of her own metaphysical presuppositions, contains the following 
definition of transcendence.146 "We should need to understand the word 
'transcendent' as standing for that which is 'other' than our minds -
'being' or 'existence' apart from our interpretations."147 While I do not 
know if McFague's understanding of transcendence was influenced by 
Emmet's work, it seems likely that it was, especially given McFague's 
description of "divine transcendence". In McFague's .words, 
... the model of the universe as God's body is ... a way to think 
about, reflect upon, divine transcendence - a way to deepen 
its significance to us. It is a form of meditation: the more we 
contemplate any aspect of the universe and especially our 
144 Ibid., p. 185. 
145 McFague, The Body of God, p. 20. 
146 See McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 214, endnote 37. 
147 Emmet, Dorothy M., The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, MacMillan & Co, London, 1949, 
p. 13. 
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own planet, the more we know about it, delve into it, the 
more mysterious and wondrous it appears.148 (italics added) 
In characterising divine transcendence as that which is beyond human 
interpretation, as that which can never be reduced to or expressed 
through human linguistic constructs, McFague denies a completely 
immanent reading of her model of the cosmos as god's body. 
Paradoxically, she does so by insisting that mystery and wonder, divine 
transcendence, unknowable other-ness, are known only through 
attention to what is immanent, to what is immediately present to us. 
While she rejects the possibility of a human ever comprehending in its 
fullness or entirety the presence of another, nonetheless in her thought, 
loving openness to the other is the only way to glimpse god's 
hindquarters, or to come to know and revere and hold sacred every aspect 
of the cosmos. In her thought "[l]ove and knowledge go together; we 
can't have one without the other. "149 I · suggest that McFague, through 
her model of the cosmos as god's body, is attempting to lure people into 
love - into "the extremely difficult realization that something other than 
themselves is real" - real in an inconceivably awesome, complex, and 
intricate manner .150 She writes of "the specialness, the difference, the 
intricacy, the 'unutterable particularity' of each creature, event, or aspect 
of nature that calls forth wonder and delight - a knowing that calls forth 
love and a love that wants to know more".1 51 I can think of no better way 
to characterise McFague's model of the cosmos as god's body; through this 
model she is proposing "a knowing that calls forth love and a love that 
wants to know more". 
Conclusion 
As with Ruether's and Heyward's work, to attempt to distil McFague's 
theology into a short summary of her paradigmatic and epistemological 
148 McFague, The Body of God, pp. 20-21. 
149 McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p. 29. 
150 Ibid., p. 31. "We pray to God through knowing and thereby being able to love all the wild and 
wonderful diversity of creatures." 
151 Ibid. 
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presuppositions is to risk an erasure of the depth and intricacy of her 
thought. Nonetheless, having set out to identify precisely these 
presuppositions, I conclude this chapter by reviewing them here. First, 
McFague takes for granted the full, unqualified humanity of every 
woman, man, and child without exception. This assumption is revealed 
through her affirmation of the inherent value of every aspect of the 
universe. Because she steadfastly insists on perceiving humankind as 
just a tiny aspect of the incredibly vast evolution or ongoing creation of 
the cosmos, rather than as the pinnacle of creation, and because she 
perceives all of the cosmos to be of ultimate value (the body of god), she 
must affirm the full and unique value of every individual human. Like 
Ruether and Heyward, however, she cannot and does not offer an 
understanding of "human being" or human nature as based on an 
unchanging essence of any sort, for, like theirs, her theological 
anthropology is based on an ontological assumption of relationality, 
interdependence, process, and change.152 
McFague also affirms the finite nature of every individual aspect of the 
universe, but (again similar to Ruether's thought) there is within 
McFague' s theology an explicit anthropological-cosmological connection. 
That is, her conception of god as the matrix of all that is must be read in 
combination with her understanding of the universe as composed of a 
fixed or constant amount of "stuff". Creaturely finitude is not only an 
unavoidable fact, but, ultimately, a blessing. Life in the broadest sense 
cannot continue becoming incarnate in new and unique forms unless 
what has been ceases to be, returns to the cosmic or divine matrix from 
which it came and from which all new life is formed. Again, McFague 
rejects any notion of a transcendent (as in wholly-other-than) god, eternal 
life (in the sense of the bodily or spiritual resurrection of specific 
individuals), and a heaven above. In keeping with this theological shift, 
what matters most in her theology is not divine certainty, not revelation 
from above, but human responsibility: the ability to respond with respect 
152 McFague, Models of God, pp. 8, 10. 
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and care and love to all the earth others with whom we find ourselves for 
a very short while. 
This theological affirmation of human responsibility is simultaneously at 
the core of her epistemological presuppositions. For McFague, as for 
Ruether and Heyward and the feminist epistemologists discussed in 
chapters four and five, there is an integral relationship between " ... being, 
knowing, doing: ontology, epistemology, ethics ... ".153 As ever-changing, 
relational, interdependent, embodied, specifically situated creatures, we 
who co-create (primarily through language) whatever knowledge we 
share are the ones who are responsible for the world-shaping 
implications of our knowledge claims. And our knowledge claims, our 
stories, are never certain, never revelatory of an absolute, unchanging 
truth. Rather, McFague asserts that what knowledge we necessarily create 
in communities (through shared language and shared theoretical 
frameworks) is always situated, relational, relative, tentative, and 
limited.154 Moreover, the stories we co-create are value-laden and power-
riddled; they are not innocent tales, but they do structure the ways we 
understand and relate to the world, god, and ourselves. Accordingly, 
McFague insists that we attend as closely to the implications of the stories 
we tell, the metaphors and models we use, as we do to the physical 
presence of another, whether friend, lover, cat, flower, or tree. Having 
tried to attend closely to the paradigmatic and epistemological 
presuppositions inherent within the feminist christian theology of 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Carter Heyward, and Sallie McFague, it 1s 
time now to discuss in greater detail what their work embodies: a 
theological and epistemological paradigm shift the implications of which, 
I suggest, have not yet been fully grasped even within the feminist 
christian theological epistemological community. 
153 McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p. 149. 
154 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p. 194. 
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Chapter Nine 
An Epistemology of Participatory Discernment 
It was a grove of trees, not a tidy, two-tree garden. And it was 
the birds and the squirrels and the chipmunks and the possums 
who showed them, taught them that the fruit was good for 
eating. And they had been eating that fruit, sometimes hoarding 
it and sometimes sharing it with one another, for as long as 
anyone could remember. It was the tree of life they ate from, it 
is the tree of life we eat from still. 
Why, in the end, do the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions 
within one feminist christian theological paradigm matter? Why did I 
believe that they are of such importance that I was willing to spend three 
and a half years immersed in a handful of texts, painstakingly identifying 
and naming, over and over again, a very few shockingly basic and not 
particularly new or, on the face of it, earth-shattering assumptions? After 
all, as I tried to show, individually, the fundamental assumptions held by 
Ruether, Heyward, and McFague are not original. Take elements from 
Schleiermacher, Ritschl, the Social Gospel movement, Barth, Bultmann, 
Buber, Tillich, Whitehead and the process theologians, re-combine them 
a bit, add "her" and stir, and there you have it, one form of feminist 
christian theology. It seems utterly obvious and embarrassingly, well, 
simple. Everything that exists is in an interdependent, albeit deeply 
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ambiguous, relationship with everything else that is. All humans are 
fully, uniquely, preciously human. Every aspect of creation, this earth, 
has inherent value and is irreplaceable. Finitude is both unavoidable and 
good, in that the perishing of what is is necessary in order for what will be 
to have the chance to come into being, or to go through its unique process 
of becoming one related to many. These are their basic metaphysical 
assumptions/value judgements; what about the epistemological ones? 
There never was a tree of knowledge, and we humans couldn't reach an 
eternal truth if our lives depended on it, which they don't, not at all. 
What they do depend on is our willingness, our ability to find our way 
through a vastly confusing, muddled, infinitely complicated and always 
changing world - together. Our knowledge of the world and of one 
another depends in large part on what we need to know in order to 
survive, to help each other to live as well as we can. And the "we" is not 
solely limited to other humans. The "we" includes trees and ants and 
squirrels and dogs and corn plants. What "we" must · know about 
includes computers and pacemakers and machine guns and nuclear 
missiles, soil erosion and carbon monoxide and antibiotics, all those 
things that we have created together that shape, enable, and threaten our 
lives, all together all at once, whether we like it or not. We make our 
knowledge as we need or want it, and no, the making is not fair. Some 
people, some of us, get to make more than others. Some knowledge is 
not used to enable life, but instead is used by some to destroy the lives of 
others. Ouch. Certainty, impeccably dressed, well-groomed Certainty has 
slipped out an open door, and a disreputable character named Ambiguity, 
who is in dire need of a bath and a fresh set of clothes, has moved in with 
a few friends. Non-innocence, Complexity, Relativity, Interdependence, 
Change, they've begun re-modelling the place and things are a bit of a 
mess. Where do we turn, what do we do? We do what we've always 
done. 
Slowly, hesitantly, we start telling each other new stories. We use the 
same old words of course, for they are the only ones we've got. But we 
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combine them in new ways, stack and mould them, push them together 
and wrench them apart, trying desperately to create a common ground 
upon which we can gather together for a short while, where we can each 
be "heard, understood, taken seriously", (Code) where we can give 
thanks, laugh, grieve, struggle, grow and love together. Why do 
metaphysical and epistemological assumptions matter in the first place? 
Without them, we cannot tell any stories at all, we cannot understand 
(more or less) any stories we may hear. Without them, we simply cannot 
communicate different ideas with each other; we cannot share our 
dreams of what might be. We cannot piece together any understandings 
of what has been, and we cannot begin to share our perceptions of what is. 
Without shared metaphysical and epistemological assumptions, we 
would each live in a private, isolated, lonely universe. While Adrienne 
Rich's "dream of a common language" has been criticised in these recent 
postmodern, poststructuralist times, what shared metaphysical and 
epistemological assumptions provide is nothing less than the basis for a 
common language, and languages are world-shaping. Like it or not, 
common languages are what we speak together, what we live, together. 
And we are all multilingual; our capacity for misunderstanding each 
other is enormous. 
Yet what Ruether, Heyward, and McFague have created, what their work 
collectively provides, is a new symbolic universe in the form of a new 
discursive universe, one in which others of us can tell, hear, understand 
and begin to live new stories. They've given old metaphors and models 
new life, and have prepared the way for a whole new way of doing 
theology. And they have been clear that this one new way is not and 
cannot be the only way to do theology: that their beliefs are not universal 
or absolute truths. Still, those of us who feel most free ( or perhaps simply 
at home for the first time) in this new symbolic universe can now take up 
the life-long task of re-interpreting, re-creating every aspect of christian 
theology. We do not have to begin this work by naming or justifying our 
most basic assumptions, for that work has been done. We do not have to 
define every metaphor we use every time we use it, for that work has 
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been done. What we can do is stop writing about theology, and write 
theology. We have the extraordinary opportunity to begin, not from 
nothing, but from a new beginning. And this is what can happen when 
we do. 
In the beginning, nothing. No space, no time, no material stuff, 
just nothing. Nothing so tightly wrapped in on itself as to be 
everything and nothing all at once, everything and nothing 
both at once. Occupying no space, taking up no time, there was 
no distinction, no separation of past, present, future; here, 
there, nowhere, everywhere; something, nothing. All was one. It 
was nothing, yet it was. Words apply only awkwardly to the 
everything/nothing that was, that existed before time and space, 
presence and absence had any meaning at all. There was 
nothing; all was one. 
And then, ages and ages ago, nothing changed. Everything, 
which had been one, became many. Perhaps what was so utterly 
one became lonely, and in a single, desperate gesture stretched 
out its arms and sought to embrace all that was not. As this is, 
after all, theology, I choose to imagine The Beginning as 
compelled by a wistful, extravagant love: a longing for the 
company of others so huge and steadfast that yearning itself 
became incarnate. 
The physicists, when distracted from their Big Bang, say that 
energy is neither created nor destroyed. That energy can take 
the form of matter, and matter the form of energy. The universe, 
they say, can be understood as an equation. All the energy there 
is plus all the matter there is always equals one. One universe, 
though always shifting, moving, changing: now you see a 
particle, now you see a dash of energy. Though always shifting, 
there is a constant. The universe, they say, is composed of a 
fixed amount of stuff. Measure it as energy or measure it as 
matter or measure it as both, the sum remains the same: nothing 
ever added, nothing ever subtracted. It is now as it was in the 
beginning. 
But now this one is no single steady thing but everything that 
is ceaselessly moving, shifting, stretching, yearning. And in the 
beginning, can you imagine it, the shock, the unexpected speed 
with which one became separate from itself, had to begin to 
know itself as other, as many? And with time and space, and 
more time and space now stretching out beyond imagined 
bounds, twisting and spinning and racing in all directions ... was 
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there not a remnant of that extravagant love that began to 
mourn lost unity, lost timelessness? 
Disconsolate, energy grew slower, drew in upon itself, 
discovered it could reunite as matter: matter seeking to gather 
into its arms all that might travel across its path. Gravity 
attracts, the physicists say. Finally. There is hope for the 
physicists yet. Attraction. Can you feel it? It is attraction, it is 
desire, it is yearning, it is love, the force behind gravity, the 
force holding matter together. In the beginning a wistful, 
extravagant love, a longing for the company of others. Come 
unto me, for I desire you. 
But is this not the same yearning, the same desire that compels 
time and space and matter to wrench itself apart, to rush 
headlong away from all that is familiar: shifting, changing, 
creating new time and space and matter which to love? 
I say it is; I say such wild, extravagant longing is exactly like a 
passionate embrace. It cannot be contained; it cannot be 
sustained. So I choose to imagine the nature of the universe. 
Now wistful, now wild: always extravagant in its gestures, 
with its love. A love caught now between a reaching out and a 
drawing in: a love pulled equally in all directions all at once. 
Energy is neither created nor destroyed. Now it's wistful, now 
it's wild. Now it's matter, now it's not. Now it whispers, now 
it cries out with desire: such is the stuff and structure of the 
universe. 1 
Without the theology of Ruether and Heyward and McFague, I would 
never have been able to write those words, to begin writing the 
cosmological component of a systematic, metaphorical feminist christian 
theology. I would lack the paradigm, the metaphysical, theological, and 
epistemological framework in which they make sense; I would lack the 
metaphors and models and value judgements that every word in that 
short piece presupposes. Without their work I could never have thought 
those words. Their work matters because now that some of us (primarily 
educationally and economically privileged white women who live for the 
1 Slightly modified excerpt from Lucy Tatman, 'Mind the Gap: A Feminist Underground Guide to 
Transcendence, maybe', Feminist Theology, Sheffield, England, forthcoming (2000). 
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most part in North America and Western Europe) are able to stand upon 
the common ground they have provided, we can begin, at last, to dig and 
plant and water and harvest and, yes, weed. But to enable anything to 
grow at all we must, I believe, have a thorough understanding of the 
contours of that ground. We must acknowledge where we do in fact 
stand, where it is that we do the work we do. And my fear is that such 
understanding and acknowledgement is somewhat lacking at this time. 
From 1996 to 1998 I did not read much new feminist theology. It was not 
until I had completed a draft of this thesis that I turned from feminist 
epistemological texts and the texts of Ruether, Heyward, and McFague 
and began to "catch up" on feminist christian theology. To put it bluntly, 
some of what I read horrified me. To refer to the most blatant example of 
what worried and still worries me, I read that, according to Sheila Greeve 
Davaney, Ruether's theology (among others, including McFague's) 
promoted "an essentialist notion of tradition that paralleled [her] 
essentialist notion of the female self".2 While I would be the last to 
suggest that there is a single correct interpretation of Ruether's work, I 
would also insist that she clearly understands religious traditions as, in 
the first place, comprised of various and often conflicting understandings 
of god, humanity, and the world, and, secondly, as constantly, albeit 
slowly, changing, changing as the experiences and needs of the diverse 
people who comprise that tradition change. Likewise, as I tried to make 
clear in chapter six, Ruether never proposes (nor does Heyward or 
McFague) that there is an essential, unchanging nature that constitutes 
"woman" or "man". Reading Davaney's words further, I was, 
accordingly, stunned to learn that only now, apparently, is it "argued that 
there is neither an unchanging core that characterizes individual humans 
2 Sheila Greeve Davaney, 'Continuing the Story, But Departing the Text,' in Horizons In Feminist 
Theology, eds, Rebecca S. Chopp and Sheila Greeve Davaney, Augsburg Fortress, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, 1997, p. 201. On a related point, Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza asserts that · "Rosemary 
Radford Ruether's concept of 'new humanity' does not challenge the Western cultural sex/gender 
system .... " Schussler Fiorenza, Elisabeth, Jesus: Miriam's Child, Sophia's Prophet, SCM Press, 
London, 1995, p. 47. She does not explain how Ruether's concept of a "new humanity" fails to cb 
so. I suggest that Ruether's conception of "new humanity", riddled as it is with reversals and 
disruptions, with strong women and men who refuse power-over others, with the affirmation of the 
absolute value of every person without qualification, challenges precisely the Western cultural 
sex/ gender system. 
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nor some transpersonal nature that is constitutive of humans or, 1n our 
case, females as such".3 Didn't Heyward write, in 1979, 
Even those categories that most of us assume to be basic -
such as female or male gender, such as racial identity, such 
as the Homo sapiens species itself - seem to me more elusive, 
less static, than we often assume. I am tempted to say, and 
will for now, that nothing is fixed; nothing in the world is so 
essentially what it is today that tomorrow may not surprise 
. th thin 4 us w1 some g new .... 
Additionally, I was bewildered to learn that, again apparently only now, 
some theorists are concluding "as well that there are no universal forms 
of experience shared by everyone across temporal and historical 
boundaries".5 Wasn't it precisely this claim that led feminist christian 
theologians (and liberation and Black theologians) to insist on the need 
for theology to be grounded in specific, limited contexts, on the need to 
name and acknowledge the complex situations of those who write and 
need theology? Finally, my jaw dropped open when I read the following: 
If much credence is given to the importance of contextuality 
and tradition, a growing number of feminist thinkers, 
including a significant number outside the dominant 
intellectual and geographical North Atlantic context, are 
giving this argument an interesting twist. For they are 
insisting first that the traditions and contexts that shape 
female subjectivity and identity are pluralistic, conflictual, 
and unstable. While subjectivity and identity are always 
situated and those contexts are always part of larger 
historical traditions, neither contexts nor traditions are 
homogenous or monolithic, but are full of diverse and 
contending possibilities and limitations.6 
I thought of Ruether' s life work, of the effort she has put into tracing 
heretical and non-traditional strands of thought throughout the history 
of the christian church. I thought of her locating her own work in 
continuity with those strands within christian history that did promote 
3 Ibid., p. 203. 
4 Heyward, Our Passion for Justice, p. 83. This quote is taken from an address entitled ''Love and 
Sexuality" that Heyward gave at the Integrity Convention (Gay Episcopalians and their friends) on 
September 7, 1979, in Denver, Colorado. 
5 Davaney, 'Continuing the Story, But Departing the Text,' pp. 203-204. 
6 Ibid., p. 204. 
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the value judgement but did not define the meaning of the full humanity 
of women as well as men. I thought of her insistence that without a 
community (whether contemporary or historical) in which one's beliefs 
are affirmed one simply cannot criticise the dominant tradition. Alone, 
one's words go unheard, one's thoughts are unthinkable, one is forced to 
live in conformity with the dominant views, or be considered mad. I 
thought about her naming and describing more alternative communities 
within christian history than I ever dreamt existed. How in god's name, I 
wondered, could Davaney honestly think that the rejection of an 
essentialist understanding of human nature, the rejection of a single, 
unchanging, eternal core of christianity, and the acknowledgement of 
plurality and ambiguity within a historical tradition are "new" or 
"recent" developments in feminist christian theology? A close, attentive, 
and responsible look at the theology of Ruether, Heyward, and McFague, 
and in particular at their fundamental assumptions, reveals that the 
assumptions Davaney lists as "recent" have been collectively asserted 
since the beginning of the feminist christian theological paradigm 
described in this thesis. It worries me that some of us seem to be in a 
hurry to re-write our own recent past, to distance ourselves from the 
work that enables us to be feminist christian theologians in the first place. 
It worries me, and it makes me angry. It made me angry that in the 
conclusion to Horizons In Feminist Theology Rebecca S. Chopp simply 
reiterated Davaney' s points as though they were incontestable facts? 
Likewise, when Chopp wrote that "neither Ruether nor [Karl] Rahner 
differed from modern theorists in the framing of their theories, except in 
their insistence on resting the whole foundationalist enterprise in God 's 
revelation as an epistemological correspondence between theory's a z ms 
and God's disclosure" (italics added),8 I wondered if Chopp had ever 
researched Ruether's understanding of revelation - revelation as the 
7 Rebecca S. Chopp, 'Theorizing Feminist Theology,' in Horizons In Feminist Theology, eds, 
Rebecca S. Chopp and Sheila Greeve Davaney, Augsburg Fortress, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1997, 
p. 217. 
8 Ibid., pp. 217-218. 
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work that humans do together to discover how our lives are shaped by 
the institutions and symbolic universes in which we live. How on earth 
could Chopp assume, as she implicitly does, that Ruether posits a 
personal deity who discloses Truth to humans? This is an example of 
epistemically irresponsible scholarship. It is not what I had hoped would 
appear in the conclusion of this thesis, as a kind of after-the-fact 
justification of the importance of my chosen topic. But I feel it needs to 
appear here, as does Chopp's equally astonishing assertion that 
"poststructuralist theory uncovered the binary structure that regulated all 
meaning through oppositional thinking" .9 In chapter six I noted the 
following: 
Ruether identifies the hierarchical dualisms (god over man, 
transcendent over immanent, heaven over earth, mind over 
body, spirit over matter, male over female, master over slave, 
etc.) inherent within this symbolic understanding of the 
cosmos, whether presented as salvation myth or 
metaphysical .fact, as the ideological ground and justification 
for social structures and systems that perpetuate 'patriarchy' 
and oppression. Of critical importance is the fact that 
"these ideologies try to make that social structure look 
'natural', inevitable and divinely given."10 Accordingly, 
Ruether stresses the epistemological as well as the world-
shaping consequences of this hierarchical, dualistic 
theological and philosophical inheritance. "Apocalyptic 
dualism, interpreted as gnostic body-soul dualism, gave to 
classical Christianity a dualistic mode of moral, 
epistemological and ontological perception."11 
While the metaphors "hierarchical" and "dualistic" are not a part of 
poststructuralist vocabulary, I would suggest that it is rather clear that 
Ruether identified, without the help of poststructuralist thought, the way 
in which "binary structures regulate meaning through oppositional 
h. k. ,, t 1n : mg . I want to say to white, educationally and economically 
privileged feminist christian theologians that we do not need to search 
desperately for (the God) Theory everywhere but within the white North 
American feminist christian theology we read. It may not be easy to 
9 Ibid., p. 218. 
lO Ruether, New Woman/New Earth, p. xiv. 
11 Ruether, Liberation Theology, pp. 16-17. 
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compare the metaphors, models, metaphysical assumptions and value 
judgements within one paradigm with the metaphors, models, 
metaphysical assumptions and value judgements of a different 
theoretical paradigm, but it is possible. It is possible to identify and name 
such similarities, and in doing so one avoids the trap of dualistic, binary, 
either/ or thinking, that is, assuming that if one theory says something 
another theory cannot possibly say something similar. I want to say that 
we need to read and write about white North American feminist 
christian theology far more carefully, that we must read and write about it 
more carefully in order to be epistemically responsible theologians. 
And most of all I want to say that from Ruether, Heyward, and McFague I 
have learned that epistemic responsibility requires participatory 
discernment: slow, painstaking, roll up the shirtsleeves, get your hands 
dirty work. It requires that I acknowledge_ the other members of the 
epistemic communities of which I am a part, that I reflect deeply and 
seriously on the presence and absence of others within those 
communities as well as within the rhetorical spaces within which 
my I our words make sense. It requires of me that I locate myself, 
acknowledge my own biases and limitations and peculiarities, that I take 
responsibility for my own words, while at the same time acknowledging 
my dependence on the words and work of others. 
It takes time, a long time to read and study another's work, to suspend 
judgement as far as possible and to meet that text as a subject, a 
complicated subject or "Thou" in its own right. It takes time and effort to 
discern which assumptions are required for that text to make sense, 
especially when those assumptions are not made explicit. An 
epistemology of participatory discernment requires that I take that time, 
that I make the effort to give every text a thorough, respectful reading -
and that I never assume that I have got it thoroughly right. It requires of 
me that I locate that text within the body of a theorist's thought, take 
seriously its connections with other texts by the same author, as well as 
the historical, social, and political context within which it was written. 
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An epistemology of participatory discernment requires also that I take the 
insights found within those texts and put them into practice, take them 
into grassroots gatherings and find out if they "work", if they are 
meaningful to the participants in those gatherings. An epistemology of 
participatory discernment requires that I shut up and listen when I am 
with others, especially with others who are not professional theologians, 
listen to what they feel they need from feminist christian theology. And 
it requires of me that I act on what I hear. 
An epistemology of participatory discernment does not provide a 
methodology - a study of the methodological differences between 
Ruether, Heyward, and McFague could easily be the subject of another 
thesis. Nor does it, ever, provide easy answers to anything. In fact, such 
an epistemology rejects the possibility of final answers to any question. 
Paradoxically, the epistemological assumptions held by Ruether, 
Heyward, and McFague serve the same purpose as Karl Barth's 
theological assumption of the wholly-otherness of god. They free us to 
continue becoming who we might become, learning what we might 
learn, making the mistakes we will inevitably make, without having to 
worry about fitting into a predetermined Truth. Just as Barth believed 
that humans could never reach god on our own, but must be prepared to 
hear the Word of God when He chooses to speak it, so these feminist 
christian theologians reject the possibility of us ever reaching an absolute 
Truth. At the same time, they suggest that we make our truths as we go 
along, and we can, if we pay attention, hear whispers of little truths from 
time to time. 
Wh is per s of lit t le t r u th s. Lit t le truth s th a t d on 't stay st ill. 
That make about as much sound as a snake sliding out of a too-
tight skin, and leave behind them empty, feather light shells. 
Pretty to look at sometimes, but they crumble when they ' re 
touched. The empty skins, I mean. They ' re what crumble when 
the truth has moved out, moved on. And it does. It's always on 
the move, sometimes slow but sometimes fast. And Lord there's 
a part of me that wishes it wasn't so, that wishes I could stand 
up here and tell you loud and strong, as though I believed with 
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my whole heart, that I had the Truth and was gonna give it to 
you, was gonna set you free with it right here and now. Because 
it hurts, sometimes, to see you looking so puzzled, so confused 
as to what's going on. You look like you need something solid to 
hang on to, to rest yourself on for a bit. I recognise that look, 
oh yes I do. It stares out at me most mornings, at least when I 
bother to look in the mirror. I wish, looking at you, that you 
hadn't been taught so well to be so scared, so scared of what you 
have known, and so scared of not knowing for sure. I wish I 
could take your hand in mine and promise you that the world is 
an ok place, that it's not gonna hurt you, that there will come a 
time when you will understand everything, yourself included. 
But it's too late for that, you'd know I was lying, and you've 
already been hurt too bad for there to be any going back to some 
innocent time. No, you've every reason to be scared, and every 
reason to be wanting the rest that comes with certainty. And I 
can't blame you, and I can't give it to you. All I can do is tell 
you a few stories, listen to the ones you tell me. Hell, I can't 
even promise to keep talking or keep listening for very long. All 
I can do is be here with you while we're together right now, and 
hope that maybe we'll get together again sometime. I can hope 
that, but I can't promise it'll happen. Dear god, what am I 
doing? Storytellers, you know, are kind of dependent on happy 
endings, at least the ones who want to get invited to tell more 
than one story. And here I am telling you a story of the worst 
kind - one that's all middle, one that doesn't have any ending 
at all, one that has endings all the way through it. 
But you don't want to hear about endings just now, and I don't 
want to talk about them. They happen when they happen, and 
the lie of a purely happy ending is just that, a great big 
whopping lie. Think about it. Have you ever in your life 
experienced a purely happy ending? Sure some endings might 
bring relief, some endings might feel like release, but that's 
more about the absence of yuckiness than it is about happiness. 
No, happiness, along with most everything else, comes, if it 
does, in the middle. And the sad thing is it's the middle that 
some of us spend so much time and energy running from . The 
middle, where everything' s jumbled up together, where we can't 
avoid bumping elbows with each other. Where most things , if 
you step back from 'em a little ways, are either silly or sad or 
both at once. It's the middle where we get to stomp our feet and 
wail, and the middle where we sometimes find each other, wrap 
our arms around each other and hold on tight. It's the middle 
where we can spend two hours with a cat asleep on our lap, just 
wondering what cat dreams are being dreamt. It's the middle 
where we find ourselves hungry and naked and in need of 
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shelter. It's the middle where we live our lives alongside 
everything else that's living its life. It's the middle that we're 
born into, and the middle that we die in. It's the middle where 
we jump for joy, and the middle where we cry. It's the middle 
where we make our choices, live our truths, stumble over them 
in the jumbled up confusion that surrounds us. You'd think 
there'd be good reason to work together on this. You'd think 
it'd be just obvious that we need each other. That the world is 
so much bigger than any one of us, and that we don't live here 
all alone. That if we held hands we wouldn't stumble and fall 
quite so often. And for some people it is obvious. But not for 
others. Not for those of us who have been taught to run from 
the middle just as fast as our legs can carry us, who have been 
taught how to turn our eyes and look the other way, how to fear 
in darkness instead of how to open our eyes in wonder. 
Who have been taught how to fear in darkness instead of how to 
open our eyes in wonder. Who have been taught to worship a 
mean-spirited, judgmental old coot who never did have the 
decency to live here himself, but instead hides himself away and 
keeps prom_ising that things are a whole lot better where he is 
than they are here. That's just rude, rude and narrow-minded. 
No one who's ever witnessed a sunrise over a lake while nestled 
up against somebody or some critter they loved could ever 
believe that anything could be better than that. No one who's 
ever had a child throw themselves into their arms out of sheer 
delight could ever believe that angels could do it any better. No 
one who has ever been powerless to stop the suffering and death 
of a loved one could ever really believe that that pain could ever 
be made all right, wiped up and taken care of like a spilled 
drink. 
Here's what I think. I think if we can learn how to worship an 
old coot who doesn't deserve the time of day, we can learn how 
to stop doing so. We can learn how to value a sunrise. We can 
learn how to open our arms, making it that little bit easier for 
someone to throw themselves into them. And we can learn how 
to treasure each other, this life, while we've got it. We can teach 
each other how to be silly when silliness is called for, and how 
to be sad when sadness is unavoidable. We can admit that all 
our fancy stories, no matter how grand they sound . or how 
certain they taste on our lips, are sure to sound silly to those 
who will, we hope, come later. I'm as sure of this one thing as I 
am sure of anything; the day will come when our certainty that 
nothing but nothing can move faster than the speed of light will 
seem as ridiculous as the notion that the earth is flat. I'm not 
talking about progress here, I don't really mean that truth will 
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move on like a snake sliding out of its skin, I just mean that 
we'll all slowly get accustomed to looking at what's before our 
eyes right now in a different sort of way. Our understanding 
will change, because What Is is so big that there's always gonna 
be a no the r way to look at it, an o th er way to talk a bo u t it, 
another way to live it. And I'm sorry, but we are a lot like 
sheep. Where the first few go, the rest of us will follow. It's 
nothing to be ashamed of, just an indication that most of us 
prefer the company of others to being alone. More than that, it's 
a nod to how much we need the company of others. The funny 
thing is, no matter where we go together, no matter how 
carefully we look at what's around us, no matter how carefully 
we tell each other what we see, we're never going to agree on 
everything. Maybe that's what separates us from sheep - our 
sheer cussed stubbornness. Honestly, I just don't know. 
Taken by themselves, the metaphysical, epistemological, and theological 
assumptions of Ruether, Heyward, and McFague are not earth-shattering. 
But put them together, and you have an alternative, one among others, 
to the dominant western christian symbolic universe. Put them together 
in the way that they have, and what you get is an invitation to the m~ddle 
of things. And, honestly, I'm more than ready to stop writing about that 
place and start writing from that place. 
There never was a tree of knowledge. It was a grove of trees, not 
a tidy, two-tree garden. And it was the birds and the squirrels 
and the chipmunks and the possums who showed them, taught 
them that the fruit was good for eating. And they had been 
eating that fruit, sometimes hoarding it and. sometimes sharing 
it with one another, for as long as anyone could remember. It 
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